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CHINESE FAMILY AND SOCIETY

BY

OLGA LANG

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The present volume is the twenty-third work published by the Yale University Press on the Amasa Stone Mather Memorial Publication Fund. This Foundation was established August 25, 1922, by a gift to Yale University from Samuel Mather, Esq., of Cleveland, Ohio, in pursuance of a pledge made in June, 1922, on the fifteenth anniversary of the graduation of his son, Amasa Stone Mather, who was born in Cleveland on August 20, 1884, and was graduated from Yale College in the Class of 1907. Subsequently, after traveling abroad, he returned to Cleveland, where he soon won a recognized position in the business life of the city and where he actively interested himself also in the work of many organizations devoted to the betterment of the community and to the welfare of the nation. His death from pneumonia on February 9, 1920, was undoubtedly hastened by his characteristic unwillingness ever to spare himself, even when ill, in the discharge of his duties or in his efforts to protect and further the interests committed to his care by his associates.

PREFACE

1

COURAGEOUS European thinkers of the eighteenth century foresaw a world increasingly enriched by Asia's great Eastern civilization, China. Today the old vision is being fulfilled like many other dreams, in a manner radically different from the original conception; but as part of a vigorous and painful process of global integration in which we all participate, it is being fulfilled.

The study of things Chinese has ceased to be an academic hobby; it has become a practical necessity. We have to know why the Chinese behave as they do. We have to understand the pattern of their culture and thought. Among the many roads that lead to this goal, few hold more promise than the investigation of the Chinese family.

2

It has frequently been said that the Chinese are family centered. The statement needs qualifying, though in essence it is true. The study of the family offers an unusual opportunity to reveal the human substance of Chinese society, but this opportunity can be fully utilized only if the family is considered a concrete and basic component of the whole social fabric, not an abstract and isolated phenomenon.

The success of such an approach, however, is dependent on an appropriate concept of the nature of Chinese society. Is it correct to equate China during the last two thousand years and Europe of the Middle Ages? Or must China be examined in the light of categories alien to Western tradition? A few modern social scientists have clearly seen the problem. R. H. Tawney, the great English economic historian who, after a lifelong study of the growth of Western society, made an investigation of land and labor in China, concludes his analysis by remarking emphatically: "The hackneyed reference to the Middle Ages . . . is misleading, indeed, both in principle and in detail. On the one hand, it implies a comparison of stages of development, as though the Chinese version of civilization, instead of differing in kind from the European, was merely less mature. On the other hand, it ignores the

sharp contrasts between them, not only—the most important point—in spirit and quality, but in circumstance and environment.”¹

Professor Tawney's statement touches on one of the crucial problems of man's history. Comparative analysis of the world's great agrarian civilizations leads to the conclusion that within the far-flung arid and semi-arid regions of the Old World (and perhaps of the New) there has developed a specific “Oriental society,” of which China is a part. This society differs from its Western counterpart “in spirit and quality,” not because of race or nationality but because of factors of “circumstance and environment” among which the conditions of Oriental agriculture, irrigation, and large-scale water control are paramount. Whereas the postmedieval Western world was trade and industry and capital centered, China, like other Eastern countries, was land and land-rent centered. Adam Smith, one of the first Western economists to note the phenomenon, writes: “The sovereigns of China, of ancient Egypt, and of the different kingdoms into which Indostan has at different times been divided, have always derived the whole, or by far the most considerable part, of their revenue from some sort of land-tax or land-rent. . . . It was natural therefore that the sovereigns of those countries should be particularly attentive to the interest of agriculture, upon the prosperity or declension of which immediately depended the yearly increase or diminution of their own revenue.”²

There is no need here to trace in detail the growth of this concept. Today Oriental society is recognized as an institutional and cultural order of great complexity. Regionally, it is as diversified as are the various representatives of industrial society: England, Holland, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, and the United States. Historically, it is as stable, or as temporary, as the factors that created, shaped, or maintained it.

Olga Lang has used this concept of Oriental society in preparing her field investigation as well as in analyzing her collected material. In both cases the concept was employed to clarify concrete social conditions, not to demonstrate a dogma. To be sure, productivity is not validity, but it cannot be overlooked as a criterion when validity is being sought. The fact that the “Oriental” approach yielded an unusually full and varied picture of the Chinese family is not only gratifying from the standpoint of the sociology of “familism”; it is also significant from the standpoint of the underlying theoretical idea.

3

THE disadvantages of a study initiated by a foreigner are obvious. Less obvious are its advantages. The foreign observer is not hampered by the psychological biases which may at times block or even completely frustrate a "native" study. There is, of course, the danger of replacing native prejudices with imported ones, for the visitor is apt to see the society he is examining as a replica of his own. If this danger is avoided by methodological alertness and self-criticism, the foreign investigator is given an unusual opportunity to make a productive analysis.

Olga Lang's data were gathered in an atmosphere of great political and social tension. The old values which the Chinese Revolution had challenged were not restored and the search for new patterns was intensified under the shadow of the approaching cataclysm. Faced with this situation, students and teachers were willing to discuss problems of family and society and assist the project in innumerable ways. Workers and members of the "modern" middle class from such cities as Tientsin and Shanghai who were exposed to the same political and psychological turmoil were also most responsive. The revealing answers obtained from less sophisticated groups were probably due in large degree to the westernized training of the Chinese field workers.

Olga Lang was a student of historical and social problems many years before she turned her attention to Chinese society. A deep bond of sympathy between her and the Chinese people proved a strong incentive not only for an intensive study of their language, both written and spoken, but also and above all for an understanding of the many facets and trends in Chinese life. Thus she was extremely well equipped for a task which was scientific in form but humanistic in substance.

The first step was the collection of invaluable new data; the second, an analysis of this material supplemented by personal observation and literary sources. The completed study disclosed many previously neglected features, which when properly integrated compelled the reformulation of certain traditional ideas regarding the Chinese family and even Chinese society. No investigation known to me differentiates the social structure of the Chinese family over time as consistently as this book does. None so systematically reveals the family as an integral part of Chinese society, equally exposed to the conflicts and advances that characterize the present era of transition.

There may and will be differences over the argument and interpretations offered here. In time many aspects of the analysis will be elaborated, qualified, developed. But whatever differences of opinion may arise they cannot alter the basic issues involved. Olga Lang sees China as a battlefield of tremendous human forces striving to reshape the destiny of individual, family, society, and state. These forces act within a pattern of culture and behavior specifically Chinese but they are set in motion by drives and needs common to all of us. In this hour when the clouds of a new nationalism threaten to obscure many horizons, it is all the more necessary to recall the visionary message of Confucius that finds an echo in the great dreams of the East and West: "Within the four seas all men are brothers."

KARL A. WITTFOGEL

New York City.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THREE problems which have challenged modern sociologists determined my choice of the contemporary Chinese family as the subject of this book: the problem of China, the problem of the family, and the problem of cultural change.

The family is one of the most representative of all Chinese social institutions. The understanding of it helps one to understand Chinese life and the attitudes of the men and women who make it. And it seems likely that the study of the Chinese family—one of the strongest and most highly respected families in the world—can contribute to our understanding of the structure, development, and functioning of the family in general as well as of the crucial problems created by the disrupted family life of our Western world.

But the family is a part of a more complex social reality: it is influenced by society as a whole, and it in turn influences society. Therefore, I have considered it necessary to give a brief description of Chinese social and economic backgrounds before embarking on my more detailed study of Chinese family life.

To the student of cultural change contemporary China offers a rare opportunity to observe a tremendously complicated process of transformation being produced in a civilized Oriental country by the impact of the West. The family is an especially good field of observation for this process. It also offers an opportunity to observe the relative importance of the new economic environment and the new ideas as factors of social change in China.

The transformation of old China into new China, of a static agrarian society into a dynamic modern society, has been a slow and painful process—which today is far from completed. Contemporary China is a mixture of old, new, and many transitional forms. The remnants of the old can be found at every step. In family relations the old Confucian pattern, although badly shaken, is still a reality which must be reckoned with. It is this fact which makes it necessary to give the reader an account of Chinese family life in the past, as an introduction to my study.

Yet, however strong the remnants of the past, there is scarcely a group of Chinese men and women even in the remotest corners of the country which has remained untouched by the new trends. The change in China is extensive, deep, and irrevocable. The old

conditions will never return, whatever the sacrifices and strain imposed upon China by the war. Now in a painful period of transition, the Chinese family is looking forward to a better life in a free democratic China.

This study is based primarily on field work carried out in China in 1935-37 under the auspices of the Institute of Social Research (Columbia University) and the Institute of Pacific Relations. The material consists of case histories and statistical data taken from some 4000 records of the Social Service Department of the Peiping Union Medical College Hospital; 644 interviews with representatives of the different social classes and age groups in Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai, Wusih, and Fukien; 1700 questionnaires filled out by students in 22 colleges and 8 high schools in 10 cities of North, South, and Central China; and a survey of the life of 26 clans in Fukien and Kwangtung. The author and her associates took great pains to secure a representative sampling of cases and they consider them typical of the social groups they represent. Personal contacts with many Chinese families in different walks of life were helpful in evaluating the material.

Much information was found in the modern economic, sociological, and anthropological surveys made by contemporary Chinese and foreign research workers, especially in those which examined various aspects of Chinese family life. Modern periodicals and Chinese critical literature on family problems proved an important source of information.

As sources for the study of the Chinese family in the past, the author used both the original source material and several historical surveys of marriage, the family, and the status of women, written by contemporary Chinese authors who used modern scientific methods.

In addition extensive use was made of classical and modern Chinese realistic fiction.

For the transcription of Chinese words and names the Wade-Giles system of romanization was used. The words which seemed to form a single idea in Chinese (e.g., *hun-yin*—marriage), as well as personal names, were hyphenated. According to Chinese usage personal names as a rule were put after the family name. Yet this could not be done consistently. For instance, in quotations and in the names of Chinese authors who have published their works abroad, the spelling and order of names are those they themselves adopted. Furthermore, in some well-known geographic terms and

proper names the usual nonsinological spelling was preserved (Peiping, Canton, etc.).

The material about contemporary China was collected in 1936-37. This was an opportune moment to make an inventory of changes. It marked the end of a momentous period in Chinese history which began after the first Chinese defeat in the Anglo-Chinese war of 1842, when foreign imperialism and Western culture first began to penetrate into China. Whatever new developments the last war may have brought will be imposed on the foundations which were there before the war.

No doubt this attempt to draw a picture of the Chinese family will be followed by others which may go farther in explaining its structure and functions. But a beginning had to be made.

The author is greatly indebted to several persons and institutions which have helped her to carry out this study. Dr. K. A. Wittfogel offered invaluable guidance in the gathering of the material and the formation of the general plan. Furthermore, since his conception of Chinese society was extremely helpful in the analysis of the material collected, this book contains more of Dr. Wittfogel's ideas than those directly quoted. Yet, inasmuch as the work of analysis, presentation, and evaluation was carried out by the present writer alone, the responsibility for it rests fully with her.

The Institute of Social Research (Columbia University) inspired this study by its work on family problems in Europe and America; it also offered important suggestions for methodological procedure. Moreover, this Institute, together with the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Carnegie Corporation, gave financial assistance without which the present work could not have been completed.

I would also like to express my warmest thanks to my Chinese assistants: Dr. Francis L. K. Hsü, Miss Jao Yü-ai, Miss Cheng Ping-ling, Mr. Huang Ti, and Mr. Tseng Chia-ting. Professors Wu Wen-tsao, Lei Kitt-king, Yen Ching-yüeh, Randolph Sailer, as well as Mr. and Mrs. Hsing Hsi-ping, Mr. and Mrs. Wang Yü-ch'üan, and Miss Ida Pruitt, helped in many ways to collect and evaluate the material. The statistical evaluation of the data was carried out with the help of the students of Simmons College in Boston.

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The Women's University in Leningrad (Bestuzhevskie Kursy) and other Russian institutions of higher education where I had the privilege of studying before and after the revolution must be credited with whatever scientific insight I possess.

To the College of Chinese Studies in Peiping where I learned Chinese, and my Chinese teachers, especially Mr. Chin Hsien-tseng and Mr. Yang Ssu-chung, I am indebted for my ability to consult the original Chinese sources.

And above all my gratitude is due to the Chinese people—to the numerous respondents who so willingly coöperated in this study, to my many personal friends, to the people of China's towns and villages whose courage and endurance contributed so much to the victory.

I have tried to be impartial in my presentation, but as it is impossible to be "neutral in one's thoughts" I must be excused if my sympathies for the modern generation which is fighting for the democratization of Chinese political and family life are made obvious to the reader.

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PART ONE

THE FAMILY IN OLD CHINA

CHINESE FAMILY AND SOCIETY

I

State and Society

THE birth of the new Chinese society from the old Chinese Empire, which disintegrated under the impact of the dynamic West, has been long and painful. For the last hundred years China has been in a state of continual crisis, marked by social upheavals, foreign invasions, famines, and floods. The end of this process is not yet in sight.

Men have always paid a high price for historic progress. The birth of the medieval European order, the emergence of modern capitalistic society, the establishment of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics—all these creative transformations involved bitter struggle and incalculable suffering.

China has often been envied or criticized for her alleged social immobility and imperviousness to progress. Actually the period preceding the establishment of the stationary empire was marked by many fundamental changes. In prehistoric times the Chinese shifted from food gathering, hunting, and fishing to agriculture and cattle breeding. By 2000 B.C. the tribal organization of Chinese society had been replaced by a feudal organization similar in many ways to the social organization of medieval Europe.* Ceaseless wars among the feudal states, the decay of central authority, ideological and moral changes—with all the violence such processes entail—marked the end of this period (fifth to third century B.C.), which is known in history as the time of the Warring States.

THE CHINESE EMPIRE

By the middle of the third century B.C. the state of Ch'in (situated in what is now the province of Shensi) had conquered all the others. In 221 B.C. the king of Ch'in proclaimed himself Ch'in

* A short sketch of family life in prehistoric China and during the feudal period of Chinese history is given at the beginning of Chapter XXII.

Shih Huang-Ti—the first Emperor of China. This date marks the end of the feudal period in China and the beginning of the Chinese Empire.

Under the empire the expansion of China's political and cultural spheres of influence, begun in feudal times, continued. From the northwest corner the empire grew in all directions. At the heyday of its power—in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—it occupied an enormous territory, more than four million square miles; contemporary China has preserved most of this area.

On the foundations laid in the feudal period the empire created an original civilization that made great achievements in such fields as public administration, philosophy, literature, and the arts. For over two thousand years following the Ch'in conquest the country remained unified despite foreign invasions and sporadic outbursts of feudal warfare. China offers a unique example of political and cultural continuity stretching over more than four thousand years: contemporary China is inhabited by people of the same Mongolian stock that lived there in prehistoric times,¹ using in speech and script basically the same language their ancestors did in the middle of the second millennium B.C.

The Chinese Empire was an agrarian land, and its intensive agriculture required artificial irrigation in order to supply the population with an adequate amount of food. This was particularly true of rice—the main crop—but inadequate rainfall made artificial irrigation necessary also for the cultivation of wheat, millet, and other crops.

The two great rivers of China, the Yellow River and the Yangtze, as well as their tributaries, cause periodic floods; if they were left untamed they would destroy the basis of organized life. Thus in order to earn their living the Chinese of the empire had to solve the problem of land irrigation and flood prevention. This could be done only by means of large-scale public works which in turn required a centralized government.

The fact that agriculture in China was necessarily intensive, requiring great care and exertion, was responsible for the introduction of a social system in which the husbandman was neither slave nor serf but a free peasant.

All these features are characteristic of the system of Oriental despotism which developed a highly centralized state organization with free peasants as the wealth-producing class and a powerful bureaucracy as the ruling class, with political power concentrated in the hands of a small group at the top and an oppressed popu-

lation. This form of social and political organization was also observed in ancient Egypt, Babylon, and India.*²

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE EMPIRE

The bulk of the population consisted of peasants. Unlike their ancestors of feudal times they were not bound to the soil; the land they cultivated was as a rule their own property. There were, however, many exceptions, and the growth of large estates created a group of tenants and half-tenants. There were wide variations of income among both landowners and tenants, though few of them were wealthy. The peasants suffered from excessive taxes and rents, from usury, and periodically from an acute shortage of land. Throughout her history China has constantly been rent by agrarian crises.

The landless peasants constituted a relatively small group of laborers working for the rich peasants and landlords. The Chinese peasants lived in villages. Their communities have more resemblance to European villages than to the isolated farms of America. Community life was rather intensive.

The cities of China like those of medieval Europe contained merchants, artisans (owners of workshops, and a few manufacturers), and wage earners. The wage earners were journeymen working in the artisans' shops, unskilled laborers (coolies) employed as transportation workers, casual workers, and servants, and those working in the few salt and iron mines and in the big manufacturing plants.

By the first century B.C. commodity production and exchange were rather widely developed; by the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries (under the Yüan and Ming dynasties) handicraft and trade were so advanced that travelers from the West (such as Marco Polo and the early missionaries) were amazed. Merchants were also moneylenders, as were many officials and landlords. Banking as a specialized economic function appeared at a rather late date.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries various kinds of

* There has been a controversy over the character of the economic and social structure of the Chinese Empire. Some writers have maintained that the absence of serfdom and the peculiar part played by public works and by the bureaucracy are characteristic of a socio-economic formation *sui generis* which they call the "Asiatic mode of production," "Oriental society," "Oriental absolutism." Others assert that for all its original features, Chinese society in the imperial period was only a variety of feudal organization—"Oriental feudalism" or "bureaucratic feudalism." Chinese intellectuals usually describe the past of their country as "feudal." In fact, the differences between the two theories are chiefly a matter of terminology.

manufacturing were begun. But they were of a minor character. Imperial China failed to develop industrial enterprises on a scale comparable to those which laid the foundation for the development of capitalism in Europe. Industry was not encouraged by the government, which derived sufficient income from the taxation of agriculture. Nor was there enough commercial capital to further the growth of industry. The merchants of old China could and did invest their money in land and preferred this safe investment to the risks involved in industry.

The Chinese merchants were more influential than the artisans but they never loomed as large in the life of China as the urban middle class in medieval Europe, and they never strove to form municipal governments which they could control.

In theory, the officials who supplanted the feudal nobility as a ruling class did not constitute a hereditary group. The imperial order put an end to hereditary nobility and hereditary tenure of office. From about the seventh century A.D. on, any Chinese subject, except the descendants of a few groups considered disreputable, had the right to become an official if he passed a state examination. But only well-to-do people could as a rule afford the time and money needed to master the difficult Chinese script and to comply with the high requirements of the examination boards. Most of the officials were recruited from the families of those already in office, only a few from the families of merchants and wealthy peasants.

The upper bureaucracy ruling in the name of an absolute emperor enjoyed enormous power, perhaps greater than any ruling class in any feudal or capitalist society.

Officials received their income in the form of fixed salaries—and graft, which, although regarded as almost legal, was a real scourge for the population.

In the rural communities there existed a group of local gentry: landowners who had passed at least the first examination. This group supplied the members of the boards of village and small town communities, which were not appointed by the government as in the administration of large towns, cities, and provinces, but were selected by the population.

There was also a group of intellectuals who had failed in the examinations or been unable to obtain appointments or had been dismissed from civil service after falling into disgrace. Many of these unsuccessful literati gained their living as teachers in rich

men's households and private schools. Others practiced medicine. Many poets and prose writers belonged to this group.

Slaves were not numerous except during the early period (second century B.C. to second A.D.). They were used for domestic work, in the salt and iron mines, and occasionally in agriculture. Most of the domestic slaves were women, daughters of poor peasant families sold by their parents. The number of these slave girls always increased in times of depression and national calamities.

In theory, the rigid class distinction which existed under feudalism was abolished, and every individual had the right to choose his occupation. In reality, the occupational groups and social classes were rather static.

The social structure of the Chinese Empire suffered from a basic contradiction. The peasants supported the state and the ruling class with a part of the product of their labor. This was delivered in the form of taxes rather than of rent paid to the landlord. But the system of private landed property which prevailed under the empire led unavoidably to the accumulation of lands in the hands of the landlords who were powerful enough to refuse to pay taxes to the central government. This resulted in the weakening of the state, in agrarian crises, many peasant rebellions, dynastic changes, and foreign invasions and conquests. The long history of China abounds in such dramatic events.*

A new dynasty usually began by redistributing the land among the peasants, thus solving the agrarian crisis and strengthening the state machine. But the fundamental social structure with all its weaknesses remained, and soon a new crisis arose.

Thus, like other Oriental despotisms, Chinese society was stagnant. The word stagnation should not, however, be taken too literally. Under the empire commerce expanded, money economy developed, and manufacture made its appearance, existing side by side with handicrafts; there were some changes in the literary style, in the style of porcelain and painting, dresses and headgear, in customs and manners, as well as in some aspects of human relations. But the basic economic structure of the country, its administration, social institutions, and ideology, remained unchanged for twenty-one centuries and is only reluctantly yielding to the new trends now.

* The last conquest by Manchu nomads occurred in 1644 and Manchu emperors ruled China under the name of Ch'ing until 1911. See the list of Chinese dynasties in the Appendix, p. 347.

The relatively stagnant character of Chinese society during the imperial period justifies the author in treating the family then as a more or less static organism. Wherever changes were visible—as for example the gradual deterioration of the position of women, different attitudes of government toward family divisions, etc.—they have been noted. But as a rule, fairly similar pictures of the ideology and interrelations of the family are given in the short stories of the T'ang dynasty (618–907 A.D.), in the novels of the fifteenth century, and in the novel, *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, written in the eighteenth century.

CONFUCIANISM

The new state created by the French Revolution was theoretically anticipated long before 1789 in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Similarly in China the new bureaucratic state created by the empire was anticipated in the teachings of Confucius (B.C. 551–479), whose philosophy gave final shape to the tendencies that were maturing in feudal times. After a long struggle at the beginning of the imperial period, Confucianism or Ju-chiao (the religion of the learned, as the Chinese call it) was established as the official ideology of China.

Other philosophic systems born in the creative epoch of Warring States—such as the anarchistic quietism of Lao Tzu (Taoism) and Mo Ti's theory of universal love—did not answer the requirements of the new centralized state and were rejected by its government and ruling class. The same fate had befallen Buddhism which made its appearance in China sometime in the second or first century B.C. No other important theory challenged Confucianism until the very end of the nineteenth century. The spirit of Confucian teaching permeated the philosophical literature of the empire, its fiction and poetry as well as the laws of the successive imperial dynasties.

Taoism and Buddhism, however, continued in the Chinese Empire as an undercurrent of Chinese religious and philosophical thought. Except for a few short periods they were not persecuted by the ruling group. Religious tolerance became one of the outstanding features of Chinese society. This tolerance was facilitated partly by the fact that Buddhism and Taoism allowed themselves to be influenced considerably by Confucianism, influencing it in turn.

Confucianism, in spite of some unmistakably religious features

of its teaching, in essence is not a religion but a system of political and ethical philosophy. The aim of Confucius was to create an orderly society to replace the feudal chaos of his time. The new state was to be ruled by what he called *chün-tze* (the perfect gentleman). The authority of these new rulers had to be based on virtue and education. The qualities Confucius demanded of his perfect gentleman had nothing to do with the feudal ideals of bravery, good swordsmanship, and physical strength; they were of a thoroughly civilian character. Physical exercise and military prowess were despised. The well-known expression, "good iron is not used for nails, a good man does not become a soldier," which was used to disparage soldiers of all ranks, was a logical conclusion from this Confucian ideology and is indicative of the pacifist attitude of the imperial Chinese civilization.

A perfect gentleman was distinguished by love of humanity and by piety toward his parents and superiors; he meticulously observed the prescribed rites; he was well versed in literature and poetry, was gentle and urbane.

Yet the most virtuous official can be successful only if the people are willing to accept his authority. Therefore, people had to be taught complete subordination. Love and piety toward superiors, as well as observance of rites and rules of propriety, were expected not only from officials but from common people as well.

How could the people be taught to accept authority? "The wise man knows the roots," says the old Sage.³

THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY

"The root of the empire is in the State. The root of the State is in the family. The root of the family is in the individual," ⁴ says Mencius, the greatest philosopher of the Confucian school. If the individual was properly brought up, if he was taught to respect authority within his family, he would also respect it outside the family and be an obedient subject of the empire. Out of this conviction came the stress put by Confucius and his disciples on the importance of the family. The family, a primary social unit of any social organization, was consciously cultivated in China perhaps more than in any other country in the world and achieved greater importance. High respect for family and paternal authority became another specific feature of Chinese civilization.

A model for the authoritarian family was found by the philosophers of the empire in the patriarchal, patrilineal, upper-class

feudal family. They carefully collected the rules and rites governing it and added new features, intended to extend and intensify the relations of domination and subordination.

Filial piety was proclaimed "the root of all virtue."⁵ Confucius demanded unreserved obedience and devotion of the son to his father, of the younger to the elder, and of the subject to the ruler. Of the "five most important human relationships" mentioned by Confucius three are family relationships: father-son, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother. Next comes friendship, which forms the transition from family life to public life. Yet the relationship mentioned first is that of prince and minister [subject], which crowns the successful work of the family and insures peace in the state.⁶

THE OLD MAN

Another peculiar feature of Chinese civilization which Confucius and his disciples found useful in strengthening authority in the family and the state was the lofty position of the old man. The character of Chinese agriculture as well as of the Chinese political organization was responsible for this. It made it possible for a man to perform useful functions and to be important to his country's and family's well-being long after he had passed his prime.

China's intensive agriculture required not so much physical strength as a high degree of thoroughness, care, and experience—qualities which increase rather than decrease with age. The same situation prevailed in the upper classes. An official's qualifications increased with age. His knowledge of literature and tradition became more complete. He continued to be the main support of the family and shed on it the glory of his position.⁷

But the authority of the old officials went far beyond the domain of their own families. Officials and literati were the heroes of imperial China, "the perfect gentlemen" of Confucius, just as the knights were the heroes of medieval Europe and successful businessmen are those of modern America.

Another feature that served to strengthen the position of the old man was the fact that imperial China was a static civilization. The old man represented an accumulation of wisdom. The young man wanted to imitate him, not to fight him. For hundreds and thousands of years there was no conflict of generations in China.

The very fact of age evoked reverence. Confucius and his disciples made a special point of this reverence. Respect and devotion were due to parents all their lives, but the feelings of children

toward aged parents were especially stressed. Indeed, a respectful attitude was demanded toward all old people, even those who did not belong to one's own family.* Teachers, for instance, were venerated not only for their learning but for their age. By preserving and developing the institution of ancestor worship, Confucius still further strengthened the position of the old man. This rule of the old made a young man of Confucian China a rather weak and insignificant figure.

Confucian teaching actually represented a break with the old feudal tradition and established a new set of traditions suitable for imperial China. But Confucius always stressed his adherence to the old tradition and taught his followers to consider traditionalism as fundamental in their thinking. Confucianism thus became a great force intensifying the stagnant character of Chinese civilization.

Yet for all that stress on tradition, Confucian doctrine and practice were characterized by great realism and flexibility. Not excess but the golden mean, reasonable balance—these were the rules of Confucianism.† In everyday life this doctrine often manifested itself in a tendency to do things in a “more or less” (*ch'a-pu-to*) way and to solve every conflict by compromise. But in the long view one can see that this realism was the source of the great strength of Confucianism and helped the doctrine to survive for over two thousand years.

* See e.g. *The Book of Ritual (Li Chi)* containing the rules of good behavior as well as ethical and political precepts. One of the “Sacred Books” of China, this was compiled in the 2d century B.C., but many of its parts are considerably older. The whole section about domestic rites deals mainly with the care of the old.⁸ Respect for the old, however, was hardly strong enough to overcome social differences. Old servants did not obtain much respect from young masters, the wet nurse being probably the only exception. Among merchants wealth sometimes gave greater advantage than age.

† “Respectfulness beyond measure [without the rules of propriety] becomes laborious bustle, carefulness beyond measure becomes timidity, boldness beyond measure becomes insubordination, straightforwardness beyond measure becomes rudeness,” says the Sage.⁹

II

Functions and Structure of the Family

CHINESE fiction and historical literature of the imperial period, a rich source of information about family life,* have the defect of dealing almost exclusively with the upper and middle classes. Peasants, coolies, artisans, peddlers appear only occasionally and in the remote background, while the stage is occupied by scholars, officials, rich merchants, and their ladies.

* In describing family life in old and contemporary China, I have made extensive use of characteristic and popular works of Chinese realistic fiction (novels, short stories, poems). Realistic novels may be regarded as a kind of case history which have been selected as typical by a man who has unusual powers of observation and artistic intuition. Works of fiction have to be considered along with the general picture of conditions given by other sources, so that one can judge how much of a given novel is a truthful account of real conditions and how much is a product of the author's fancy.

While they are only one among many valuable sources of information about the social and economic conditions of various periods, the great works of realistic literature are a source of primary importance for the study of attitudes and feelings. They sometimes provide more reliable information about family attitudes and intimate relations than diaries and letters. Dickens, Thackeray, Charlotte Bronte, and Samuel Butler certainly reveal more about relationships in Victorian middle-class families than any other sources; the novels of Tolstoy, Turgenev, and Goncharov, and the plays of Ostrovski are our best sources of information about the Russian family in the middle of the 19th century.

The same is true of Chinese literature with its great realistic tradition. When speaking of modern fiction, Chinese students often maintained that *The Family* by Pa Chin and *The Twilight* by Mao Tun, for example, described their own life and problems. As for the old works of fiction, in almost all the cases where the information provided by them could be checked against other sources, as e.g. descriptions of housing, dress, business transactions, examination systems and practices, conditions in the civil service, family size and type, marriage arrangements and marriage procedures, relations between wives and concubines, etc., the novels and short stories quoted in this book proved to be truthful in their details. Inasmuch as sources like diaries and letters depicting family life are very rare (they were not used by any of the Chinese writers on the history of the Chinese family) and the newspapers before the 20th century did not concern themselves with family life, novels are practically the only source of information about the feeling of family members toward each other. The fact that these feelings do not always coincide with the precepts of Confucius and his disciples, but often repeat in a Chinese setting certain feelings and attitudes observed throughout the world, only confirms our impression that they represent a true reflection of reality.

For the evaluation of fiction as source material see E. Kohn-Bramstedt, *The German Aristocracy and Middle Class as Represented in the German Literature of the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1937). See also the excellent way fiction is used to illustrate social conditions in Sir John Maynard, *The Russian Peasant* (London, 1943).

There are great gaps in our knowledge of the life of the Chinese masses from modern times back to the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., when the songs vividly depicting the life of the common people were composed.*

Nevertheless, information gleaned from old sources, combined with direct observation of the life of those numerous modern Chinese who live as their forefathers did, gives us an insight into the conditions that must have prevailed among wage-earning and lower middle-class families under the empire. It would appear that the formal equality of imperial times and the universality of Confucian rules resulted in greater uniformity than in feudal times when the family patterns of feudal lords and of peasants were notably different. Yet even in imperial times upper- and lower-class families differed widely in many respects as to composition, forms of coöperation, and inner relations.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE FAMILY

The term "family" or "family unit" is used in this book in accordance with the current Chinese concept of the family (*chia* or *chia-ting*) which was also prevalent in imperial times and refers to the economic family, i.e., a unit consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage, or adoption and having a common budget and common property.† Both the persons staying together and those temporarily absent are included. The family often coincides with the household (*hu*)—in the lower classes for example—but the two terms are not identical. Thus slaves, servants, boarders, even relatives staying temporarily with the family, are members of the household but not of the family. After family divisions, parents and children, brothers and other relatives cease to be members of the same family.

The relatives outside the family belong to one's kin and clan. "Family," "kin," and "clan" are three concentric circles. The relations within the family are the most intimate, in the clan the most external. In feudal and imperial China the three groups seldom if ever coincided and were very clearly discernible.

* Confucius ordered these songs to be collected and preserved for posterity. The collection (*Shih Ching*) containing 319 songs was included among the "Five Classics." It is translated by James Legge as *The Book of Poetry* "Chinese Classics," IV, Part 1, 2. See also the excellent recent translation by Arthur Waley, *The Book of Songs* (New York, 1937).

† D. H. Kulp who studied rural China in the early 'twenties also came to a conviction that "the economic group is what is commonly referred to by the Chinese as the family." ¹

The composition of the family shows great variations. Three main types are distinguishable: the conjugal, the stem, and two forms of joint family.

The conjugal family, called also the biological, natural, nuclear, or small family (*hsiao chia-t'ing* in Chinese), consists of man, wife or wives, and children. Families of this type may be either complete or broken: the category for instance includes childless couples, families consisting of uncles or aunts with nephews or nieces, of unmarried brothers and sisters, single persons, etc.—though these forms are relatively rare in China. Sometimes unmarried brothers or sisters of the father stay with the family.

The stem family consists of the parents, their unmarried children, and *one* married son with wife and children.* The family of this type, too, can be broken, e.g., when only one of the parents is alive or the son has no children.

The joint family consists of parents, their unmarried children, their married sons (more than one) and sons' wives and children; and sometimes a fourth or fifth generation. This family too may be either complete or incomplete. In one form of joint family the head is the father staying with his married sons; in the other form, one of the brothers (usually the eldest) presides over his married and unmarried brothers, with their wives and his and their children, and sometimes other relatives. This is also called the "large family" (*ta chia-t'ing*) or the "greater family" (German *Grossfamilie*).†

The stem family may be described as an enlarged conjugal family or a reduced joint family. In America these are sometimes called "double families." Many modern Chinese sociologists consider this type most suitable for China and call it "the middle-way family" or "the Chinese small family." In America the great majority of stem families are enlarged conjugal families: parents once separated from their married children and their offspring later come to live with them. In China the stem family is not in-

* The author uses the term "stem family," first introduced by the French sociologist Le Play, mainly because of its brevity and convenience. She does not thereby accept Le Play's endorsement of it. She is also aware of the fact that stem families in China, in spite of certain similarities, differ from the European families studied by Le Play.²

† The term "joint family" is most commonly used in anthropological literature in the description of families of this type in India. I have used it because "large family" might be taken to describe the size rather than the type of family, and because "joint family" best expresses its organization. It is, in fact, a combination of several conjugal family units, each of which leads its own life to some extent.

frequently a reduced joint family. Some of the married sons break away from their parents after having stayed with them in a joint family; one of the sons and his wife and children continue to live with them until their death. But often the Chinese stem family is also an enlarged conjugal family, though the process of its formation is different from that of the American stem family. A Chinese conjugal family which has only one son is enlarged when the son marries and brings his bride home, without being even temporarily separated from his parents.

It is possible that the joint family was the normal unit in China in feudal times, though smaller family units were not uncommon. But what we know about the size and composition of families of the imperial period seems to contradict the generally accepted notion that the joint family, "the large family of many generations and branches," was about as universal in old China as the blue Chinese gown or the yellowish-brown skin of the Chinese peasants.³

The end of feudalism was accompanied by the disintegration of the joint family. The need for colonization and for intensive agriculture prompted the Ch'in state and later the first dynasties of the empire to compel the peasants to live in conjugal families.⁴ At the same time, the government disrupted the joint noble families in order to weaken them and break their opposition to the new imperial order.⁵

Significantly enough, Confucius, who lived in the time of the transition from feudalism to bureaucratic absolutism, was not especially interested in the joint family.⁶ Those three of the "five most important human relationships" which have to do with the family (father-son; husband-wife; elder brother-younger brother) are common to families of all types. The relations of grandfather-grandson or uncle-nephew, peculiar to the joint family, are not mentioned.

Yet the first imperial governments failed to eliminate the old forms altogether. Newly married couples followed the old custom and became members of the household of the husband's parents. To let parents live alone seemed unthinkable. Later the attitude of the government toward the size of the family and its organization shifted. From the T'ang to the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty imperial decrees, laws, and didactical literature encouraged joint families and opposed family divisions.⁷ Yet family division was allowed during the father's lifetime if he agreed to it;⁸ and the laws of inheritance in effect favored the dissolution of joint fam-

ilies. The fact that all the sons were entitled to equal shares of their father's estate gave them no incentive to stay together after his death.

And families did divide.⁹ Historical records, such as official census taken to determine the number of taxpayers, indicate that the average size of the household, which coincided with the family for the overwhelming majority of the Chinese, was relatively small. In the early imperial period (Han dynasty) the average family comprised from five to six persons, in the T'ang time (seventh to tenth centuries) five to six persons, and under the Yüan and Ming dynasties (thirteenth to seventeenth centuries) the average was under six.¹⁰ As the census taken for taxation did not include infants, the real size of the family was somewhat larger, but it could not have exceeded six to eight persons—the average size of a conjugal or of a stem family.

This average was probably typical of peasant families and artisans, as those groups comprised the bulk of the Chinese population. It is also characteristic that whenever in the novels and short stories of the imperial period the family setting is described in detail, the poor families usually consist of parents and children, sometimes also of grandparents.*

There are convincing indications, however, that in imperial China the type and size of family differed widely according to economic position. Historical annals and fiction provide many examples of rich joint families.¹³ The most famous of these are the two branches of the Chia family described in *The Dream of the Red Chamber*.¹⁴

It seems that in imperial China the large joint family was universally accepted as an ideal. The poor, however, were prevented from carrying it into practice mainly because the high mortality rate struck them more heavily than the well-to-do people. More of their children died; fewer adults lived to old age and became grandparents and great-grandparents. As a matter of fact, the old people so highly appreciated in old China were relatively rare there! †

* See, e.g., the poor families described in the 15th-century novel *Chin Ping Mei*: the family of the pastry peddler Wu-ta has two members; that of the small businessman Han Tao-kuo three, of the teacher Shui two, and of the servant Wang two. The peasants and poor scholars described in the 18th-century novel *Scholars' History* (*Ju Lin Wai-shih*) have families of from two to six members.¹¹ Many of the families described in the 17th-century collection of short stories, *Liao-chai Chih-i*, by P'u Sung-ling are of the same size.¹²

† See *supra*, pp. 134 ff.

ECONOMIC COÖPERATION

The families of peasants, artisans, and small merchants were units of production. The members usually worked together in the peasants' homestead or in a small shop or store which was directed by the family head, the father or grandfather. Sons usually inherited their father's trade and seldom left their homes. If they did so without formally separating themselves from their family, they sent their earnings to their parents. Peasant and artisan families were also units of consumption except when their members did not work at home or on their own land. The rule forbidding members of the family to own private property was probably followed.* The poor did not have very much property anyhow.

The well-to-do families of officials, landlords, and rich merchants were, as a rule, not units of production. The men of officials' families worked in different offices, often scattered all over the Middle Kingdom: not all merchants' sons participated in their fathers' business; many became officials. In the joint families—probably the prevalent type in those circles—land was always owned in common, but in addition to it, the men had separate incomes, from business or salary. They were supposed to contribute all of it to the family treasury administered by the family head or his assistant, the family manager (*tang chia*) who could be a man or a woman. However this system, which has often been referred to as "Chinese Family Communism," could hardly have been the rule, to judge from the many descriptions of Chinese families in didactical literature and fiction.

To quote but one example—the large family described in *The Dream of the Red Chamber* certainly does not practice family communism. The conjugal family units of the joint family have their private treasures. The wife of the family head uses her position to amass a private fortune. The manager of the household invests the household funds for her own profit.¹⁶ Food is supplied from the common kitchen, clothing from the general storeroom, and the younger family members receive their allowances from the manager; but there is no real equality in the distribution.

THE FAMILY AND THE STATE

In addition to its economic functions, the family in imperial China had very important administrative functions. The house-

* "A son and his wife should have no private goods, nor animals, nor vessels," says the *Li Chi*.¹⁵

hold (*hu*) in many periods of Chinese history, including the last dynasty, was the basic unit in the machine of the state. Every year its head had to register all those under him for taxation and labor services. Five or ten households—the number varies with dynasties—formed the next unit in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Under the last imperial dynasty (Ch'ing) this larger unit consisted of ten households and was called *pei*; ten *pei* were a *chia*; ten *chia* or one thousand households were a *pao*. The head of the *pao*, assisted by the heads of families, supervised the moral and political conduct of the members and reported on all strangers in the district, thus fulfilling the functions of a local police.¹⁷

Far more important than this outward mechanical police function was the education of family members for acceptance of the authority of the state. This was the ultimate aim in strengthening authority in the family. "Few persons who have been obedient sons and younger brothers are insubordinate. We do not know of a rebellion instigated by persons disinclined to offend their superiors," says Yu Tzu, a disciple of Confucius.¹⁸ *The Sacred Edict*, a collection of moral rules written by the Emperor K'ang Hsi (1662–1722) some two thousand years after the death of Confucius and Yu Tzu, begins with a proposition glorifying piety to the father and submission to the elder brother because, as an eighteenth-century popularizer of the *Edict* puts it: "If everybody is filial and brotherly, nobody will oppose the law."¹⁹

ANCESTOR WORSHIP

One of the main functions of the family was the observance of ancestor worship. This ancient institution, known from the very beginning of Chinese history, was maintained in imperial China, extended to the whole population,* and was used for strengthening the authoritarian family.

Ancestor worship implies that the ancestor is not entirely dead, that his soul continues to live and watches over the life of his descendants. Thus the rites are based on the idea that those who perform them help both the living and the dead. An ancestor living in the beyond is presumed to be endowed with supernatural power which he may use to help his descendants. He is believed to be better off when he is kept alive in the beyond through worship than when his existence ceases altogether, or he has to wander

* Whether the peasants in feudal times were allowed to worship their ancestors is a controversial question.²⁰

in the world as a ghost, as happens with those who have no descendants.

Confucian teaching did not repudiate belief in the supernatural power of ancestors after death. But Confucius and his disciples also stressed the nonutilitarian aspects of ancestor worship, its value as an expression of respect and awe.

Ancestor worship in its more primitive aspect made its chief appeal to the peasants and workers, whereas the more sophisticated members of the educated class probably came to conceive it in a more sublimated form, though they continued to perform the old elaborate rites and duly supplied their dead with whatever would make their life in the other world more comfortable: models of dwellings, vehicles, and even slaves made of ceramics were buried with the dead early in the empire. Later, paper effigies of those objects were substituted and burned by the graves.

Ancestor worship in imperial times was at two levels. The family worshiped its closest lineal ascendants, while the clan worshiped remote ancestors. This worship served to keep family and clan solidarity alive and to enhance the authority of the head of the family, the father. An old man who would be worshiped after his death could not but reflect his posthumous glory during his life.

The existence of ancestor worship gave parents an additional incentive to have sons to perform the rites and thus secure for their parents and grandparents eternal life. "There are three things which are unfilial," says Mencius, "and to have no posterity is the greatest of them."²¹ Thus the by-products of ancestor worship were an increased birthrate, which ultimately multiplied the number of taxpayers in the Middle Kingdom, and justification for the continuation of polygyny, since this presumably provided more offspring.

KIN AND CLAN

Confucius and the imperial government considered the relationship of the individual and individual family with kin and clan of great importance.²²

The kin of the Chinese (*chin-chi*) are those of his relatives for whom he wears mourning. The rules of mourning were set forth early in feudal times in the ancient *Book of Ritual and Ceremonies (I Li)* and were further developed in another *Book of Ritual (Li Chi)* under the empire.²³ The Ritual and Penal Codes of successive Chinese dynasties used these rules for defining the mutual relations and obligations of kinsmen.

Kinsmen are divided into three groups: paternal relatives, maternal relatives, and the relatives of the wife.

The circle of paternal kinsmen included those within nine generations and five collateral grades. Altogether there were twenty-one categories of such relatives including lineal ascendants; lineal descendants; brothers and their wives; sisters; uncles and their wives, cousins and their wives. The length of mourning depended on the closeness of relationship and varied from three years for one's father or mother to three months for remote cousins.

Such a group of paternal kinsmen was often described as staying under one roof and forming an economic unit—a "typical Chinese family." But under the empire paternal kinship groups rarely, if ever, coincided with economic families.

Of maternal relatives, mourning was worn only for grandparents, uncles, aunts, and first cousins. Nevertheless, maternal relatives and especially maternal uncles played an important part in the life of a Chinese.

Although the parents, grandparents, uncles, sisters, and brothers of the wife were also included in the kinship circle, mourning was worn only for her parents and for but three months.

In feudal times a very elaborate kinship terminology was worked out, which still persists. Each relative has his specific name: father's elder brother, father's younger brother, first maternal cousin, second maternal cousin, and so on. When addressing one another even the closest relatives do not use proper names but say for example: "Second younger brother, how are you?" or "what time is it, third younger paternal uncle's wife?" "Pass me the chopsticks, third elder maternal cousin." *

Throughout historic times the Chinese clan has been an exogamous group of the same surname, whose members were held to be related to one another by descent from a common ancestor. Clan members worshiped the ancestors of the whole group.

There are indications that in prehistoric times Chinese society was organized in matrilineal clans,²⁴ but since the beginning of known Chinese history the clan has been a patrilineal group. Men throughout their lives and women until marriage belong to their fathers' clan. Theoretically everyone with the same surname may be considered to be descended from one ancestor and thus as belonging to one clan. In reality, the only effect this has on the behavior of

* The names of different relatives by blood or marriage are contained in the first Chinese encyclopedia, *Erh Ya*, a document of the 2d century B.C.; they are still used in contemporary China.

the Chinese is that those with the same surname do not intermarry. The actual clan is a much narrower group—usually comprising only those whose origin can be traced to the same village. It includes all the members of the economic family and the whole paternal kinship group.

It may be that originally the three categories, clan, kin, and economic family, coincided. In prehistoric times a clan was probably the basic unit and performed the function of the economic family. But early in the feudal period, under the Chou dynasty (ca. 1027–256 B.C.), the clan began to divide into economic families. At the end of the feudal period village communities began to appear, composed of neighbors who were not clansmen.²⁵ Imperial times saw a further dissolution of clan communities; private ownership of land was established; most of the land even in a village inhabited by members of one clan belonged to individual economic families and not to the clan. The land which remained clan property was administered by a council consisting of the oldest clan members which also performed ancestor worship and made decisions concerning the life of its members. The clan land was rented out and the proceeds were used chiefly for organizing clan schools, establishing scholarships, and defraying the expenses of ancestor worship. The rest was distributed among the clan members.²⁶

The government helped to preserve the institutions of kinship and clan by supporting the authority of the old man in them. The penal code distinguished between offenses against kinsmen and clansmen and offenses against strangers. If a junior relative struck a senior, the punishment was more severe than for striking a stranger. A senior relative could strike a junior with impunity unless the blow drew blood.²⁷ Theft from a relative was less severely punished than theft from a stranger.²⁸ Junior relatives were not allowed to testify against their seniors.²⁹ Relatives of the first and second degree living under one roof were not punished for concealing each other's crimes; those of the third and fourth degree were punished less than strangers.³⁰

The courts overlooked the kinship ties, however, when it was a question of a crime against the state.³¹

MUTUAL HELP

Law and customs insisted on mutual help among kinsmen and clansmen. There are many reasons for believing that kinsmen in

China were more helpful to one another than in medieval or modern Europe. We cannot point to a single European community where in a time of distress the people came to one another's aid as spontaneously as they did in Hongkong after the great fire of 1842, when, according to Legge, all the victims were tended by their kin, leaving nobody to private charity.³² But it is certainly an exaggeration to cite such mutual help as proof that wealth was equally distributed among relatives. Both the "Sacred Books" and the novels mention scores of examples of even such close relatives as brothers and cousins being wealthier than their kinsmen. If help was given it was always "help" and not "sharing of wealth," and often even help was refused.³³ As in Europe, rich people in China often felt that their poor relations were an encumbrance. For instance a T'ang dynasty writer, Li I-shan, when writing of the vexations of human life, puts "inability to get rid of a worthless poor relation" as one of them.³⁴

NEPOTISM IN OLD CHINA

Mr. Chu, hero of a *Liao-chai* story, was very unfortunate. After his death, instead of being reborn as a man, animal, or insect, as a good Buddhist might expect, he was condemned to wander around the world as a ghost. A terrible predicament, but Mr. Chu found a way out of it: "My maternal cousin is a secretary in the office of the king of the underworld," he said. "He certainly can arrange for me to be born in the family I like."³⁵

Mr. Chu's idea was perfectly natural. His kinsman had a position of influence in another world organized in accordance with the old Chinese pattern. How could he refuse Mr. Chu in the underworld a service which he would have been obliged to render him in seventeenth-century China?

Public opinion condemned, but not too harshly, rich families who refused to assist their poor kin. An official or businessman who refused to employ or promote a relative met with general disapproval.

The employment of relatives and friends regardless of their fitness for the job was facilitated by the fact that in old China all work depended on personal relationships and involved personal loyalties. Employees served their chief and not the institution of the business enterprise he conducted. The chief felt that he had to have underlings personally related to him, persons he could trust. Business and government offices, whose interests as such

were seldom, if ever, stressed, were regarded mainly as sources of livelihood for their employees. Men were hired not so much because their work was needed as because they needed work. The examination system operated only for the selection of high officials, and there too personal relationship played an important part.

As a result, nepotism in old China reached proportions unparalleled anywhere else. Combined with overpopulation, it produced the notoriously crowded and inefficient Chinese business and government offices. As long as China remained an isolated agrarian society it could afford this type of management. Everything was done in a "more or less" fashion, but somehow it was done, and in certain periods of Chinese history was even done well. But a new situation arose when China started on the path of westernization and industrialization. Then nepotism became a serious encumbrance and began to be considered as such by even the Chinese.

III

Relationships within the Family

PARENTS AND CHILDREN

THE authoritarian Confucian family represented a Confucian state in miniature. "Inside the smaller doors leading to the inner apartments are to be found all the rules (of government). There is awe for the father, and also for the elder brother. Wife and children, servants and concubines are like the common people, serfs, and underlings."¹ The hierarchy in the family took into consideration generation, age, and sex. People of the elder generation were superior to those of the younger; within each generation the eldest had the preference over the youngest; the men were superior to the women.

Confucius taught that parents and children should love one another, but he particularly stressed the devotion of children to parents, filial piety or *hsiao*, which he considered to be "the root of all virtue."² He found new ways to strengthen parental authority.* He and his followers tried to endow the parent-children relationships, and especially the father-son relationship, with more than the mechanical, compulsory pattern prevailing in feudal upper-class families, where the father's relation to his son was in many features reminiscent of that of a feudal lord to his vassal.³ What Confucius demanded of a filial son and his wife was not merely the cold formal fulfillment of obligations but an attitude of warmth and reverence. Those songs of the common people of feudal China, whose preservation Confucius encouraged, often expressed this devotion very impressively.

"Filial piety," said the Sage, "nowadays means to support one's parents. But dogs and horses are nourished too. If care for parents is not accompanied by respect, what is the difference between them and the animals?"⁴

* By authority I mean a relationship of domination-subordination which is based not on pure coercion but on the acknowledged superiority of the bearer of authority. The son who recognizes paternal authority may be afraid of his father, but the fear is accompanied by feelings of love, admiration, or respect. The father who inspires his children with fear only has no authority over them but simply the power of coercion. The character of authoritarian relations changes considerably depending on which feeling prevails—fear, love, or respect. Cf. pp. 305 ff.

But respect was not enough. It had to be imbued with warmth. Care for parents should not be a tiresome obligation; the son and his wife will do it "with an appearance of pleasure to make their parents feel at ease," says the *Li Chi*.⁵ The father is the ruler of the family. But, contrary to the feudal writers, Confucius and his followers distinguished between father and prince. According to them the relations to the ruler are dominated by respect, the relations to the father by love.⁶

The Confucian idea of filial piety differed not only from Chinese feudal ideas but also from the Protestant pattern of respect and fear. The Chinese Sage would never have said, as Luther once did, that "to respect one's parents is better than to love them."⁷

Chinese history and literature show that the Confucian ideas were carried out in practice and that the Sage succeeded in creating a nation of obedient and devoted sons and daughters. Many generations of Chinese children were brought up on *The Twenty-Four Examples of Filial Piety*. Wu Mang, who let himself be eaten by mosquitoes in order to divert them from his parents; Lao Lai-tze, who at the age of seventy put on his gaily colored child's clothes and played with toys to make his parents happy; Wang Hsiang, who during the summer fanned his father's bed and during the winter warmed it with his body, and twenty-one other equally filial characters were presented in this book as models for imitation.⁸

Realistic novels and short stories, too, teem with incidents illustrating the kind of devotion Confucius demanded from filial sons. In the popular thirteenth-century novel, *All Men are Brothers*, the chief concern of the noble robbers is for their parents. When the enemies of the robber chieftain Sung Kung-ming want to lure him out of the fortress, they forge a letter informing him that his father has died: Sung leaves for the funeral at once.⁹ Another robber undergoes many perils in order to visit his mother.¹⁰ When the victim of a robber wants to arouse his compassion, he speaks of his old mother (not of his children, as a European or American would do), and the robber, thinking of his own mother, is moved to be merciful.¹¹

One of the most striking illustrations of the relations between parents and children is the story of Kuo Chü (from *The Twenty-Four Examples*). Kuo Chü is a poor man burdened with a wife, mother, and child. One day he says to his wife: "We are so poor that we cannot even support mother. Moreover, the little one shares mother's food. Why not bury this child? We may have an-

other; but, if mother should die, we cannot obtain her again." The wife does not dare to contradict him. He begins to dig the grave and suddenly discovers a vase full of gold—a gift of heaven to the filial son.¹²

The parents come first: such is the moral of this cruel story. All through Chinese literature the obligations of children toward their parents are emphasized much more than those of parents toward children. James Legge, the famous English scholar and missionary, who was active in China during the second half of the nineteenth century, found this attitude unchanged. When he quoted to the Chinese the maxim of Paul that "the children ought not to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children," he aroused a storm of indignation.¹³

Parental authority had to be exercised in the interests of the family. Parental love (*tze*) was considered important, and many books of ritual and fiction praise it. In addition, Chinese parents thought of children to some extent as a form of old-age insurance, as is shown by the adage, "Grain is stored against famine; sons are brought up against old age." But this consideration was not of primary importance.

FATHER AND SON

Chinese moralists often stress devotion toward both parents, but in effect, parental authority was paternal authority in old China even more than in old Europe. "In filial piety there is nothing greater than the reverential awe of one's father," says the *Classic of Filial Piety*.¹⁴

The customs and laws of the Chinese Empire, imbued with the spirit of Confucianism, gave the Chinese father, husband, and head of the family enormous power, comparable to that of the outstanding exemplar of patriarchalism in European civilization—the *pater familias* in Republican Rome.

The head of the family was its eldest male member. He officiated in all such ceremonies as ancestor worship, marriage, and funerals. He held the title to all family property and he alone could dispose of it, as well as of the earnings and savings of all the family members.¹⁵ He settled the marriages of his children and signed the marriage contracts. Yet, in contrast to conditions prevalent in ancient Rome, where the *pater familias* was the individual owner of all property,¹⁶ the Chinese father was considered merely a keeper of the family property and could not bequeath the estate to a stranger or

disinherit his sons at will. Property had to be divided equally among the sons. Nor did he have absolute power over the life and death of his children, such as the Roman *jus vitae necisque* gave. But for all practical purposes the life of a newborn baby was in the hands of its father, and the punishment of a father who killed his grown-up son was relatively mild: sixty blows and a year of banishment, as compared with strangulation for the murder of a stranger.¹⁷ Furthermore, the law exonerated father or grandfather who killed his son or grandson unintentionally when chastising him "in a lawful and customary manner."¹⁸ Nobody disputed the right of the head of the family to sell its members into slavery. Yet in Rome the father's power to put his son to death was checked by religious influences, public opinion, and even—in the later periods—by law, and therefore the difference between the power of a Roman father and that of a Chinese appears more nominal than real. Moreover, the power of the Chinese father proved to be more permanent than that of his Roman counterpart. In the imperial period of Roman history the pater familias gradually lost all his privileges.¹⁹ The Chinese father kept his power some 2,000 years longer.

Of the three human relations within the family, those of father and son are considered most important. Nevertheless, Confucius did not succeed in making them completely harmonious. Conflicts between father and son, sometimes violent in character, were not infrequent among the nobles in the feudal period, as attested by historians, and their background was often sexual. The system of concubinage prevailing among the nobles tended to create the father-son rivalry described by Freud, particularly as feudal lords often took their wives' sisters and nieces as concubines, thus including women belonging to the generation of their sons among their sexual objects. In the *Tso Chuan* we read time and again of fathers who had illicit relations with their sons' wives and of sons who approached their fathers' concubines.²⁰ *

Under the empire, too, well-to-do fathers took concubines. The fact that a grandson, son, or nephew who married the former concubine of a deceased grandfather or father was threatened with beheading²² indicates to what degree the legislators feared to see men and women of different generations mated, and reflects the

* According to Marcel Granet, these conflicts reflected both sexual rivalry and the survival of elements of the matrilineal family system, when father and son were regarded as strangers. To support his thesis he points out that in the temple of the ancestors the tablets of father and son are never placed in line, and that in ancestor-worship ceremonies sons are never allowed to impersonate their fathers.²¹

desire of the old men to keep their women for themselves even after their death. Several illustrations of these rivalries can be found in the Imperial Annals.²³ There were also antagonistic relations where no traces of sexual rivalry could be found.

Father-son antagonism is described in two of the most popular novels of imperial China—*The Three Kingdoms* and *The Dream of the Red Chamber*. The first of these was written in the thirteenth century, but its action lies in the fourth century when there was a temporary return to feudal conditions. It represents the feudal, heroic trend in Chinese literature. *The Three Kingdoms* contains the story of the tyrant Tung Chou, who was killed by his son Lü Pu for taking from him the beautiful dancer Chiu Chang.²⁴

The antagonism of Chia Cheng and his son Pao-yü described in *The Dream of the Red Chamber* is perhaps even more characteristic of human relations in imperial China. The author makes it clear on several occasions that "dislike and hatred" are usual in the father's attitude toward his son. His hatred reaches its peak in the scene describing how he lets his son be beaten almost to death.²⁵

Pao-yü's attitude toward his father is dominated by fear. His father casts a dark shadow on a childhood and youth spent among his beautiful cousins under the loving care of his mother, grandmother, and aunts. "He shivers before him like a mouse before a cat," says his grandmother.²⁶ Yet paternal authority is too strong to permit resistance. Pao-yü accepts this treatment without conscious protest. For all his fear, the author never suggests that he hates his father. Only indirectly does Pao-yü express antagonism to his father: father and son represent two different tendencies in Chinese religious and philosophical thinking. Chia Cheng is a circumspect official, a Confucian rationalist, free from superstition and belief in the supernatural. Pao-yü, born with a magic stone in his mouth, is devoted to the passive wisdom of Buddhist-Taoist mysticism and in the end leaves his wife, the child she expects, and the brilliant career which awaits him—the whole "red dust of the world"—to follow a mysterious call.

Father-and-son antagonism never reaches open conflict in *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, or for that matter in any other novel of Confucian China. It is significant that despite the injustices committed by Chia Cheng, his authority remains unchallenged. Neither his son nor the author of the novel try to discredit or criticize him, to represent him as a base character, obeyed only because he possesses the power to coerce. Chinese literature did not create characters like John and Theobald Pontifex of Samuel Butler's

novel, caricatures produced by the anti-authoritarian spirit of nineteenth-century Europe. Nor are the ideological differences between Pao-yü and his father comparable to the clear-cut conflict between generations depicted in Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*, a book whose hero, Bazarov, fights not against his own father but against a whole elder generation that acquiesces in social injustice under the masque of vague idealism and estheticism. There was—and could be—no conflict of generations in the stagnant Chinese society.

MOTHER AND SON

As in all patriarchal families, Chinese mothers expressed their love for their children more than did the fathers. The mother was *chia-tze*, the symbol of kindness; the father *chia-yen*, the symbol of dignity and sternness. The *Li Chi* sums up this difference in a striking passage: "Here now is the affection of a father for his sons;—he loves the worthy among them, and places on a lower level those who do not show ability; but that of a mother for them is such, that while she loves the worthy, she pities those who do not show ability;—the mother deals with them on the ground of affection and not of showing them honour; the father, on the ground of showing them honour and not of affection." ²⁷

The Chinese women poets through the ages have offered many illustrations that confirm this statement by the wise old authors of the "Sacred Books." ²⁸

Although Confucius did not list the mother-son relationship among the five most important ones, the mother occupied the first place in the son's heart. He responded spontaneously to her love, and morals, laws, and customs encouraged him not to hide his feelings as unworthy of a man but to display them. Respect was due to the mother, but the "Sacred Books" stressed that the dominant feeling of the son for his mother should be love.²⁹ Chinese writers and poets write with great warmth and understanding of the mutual love of mother and son.

A mother's position became especially strong and responsible after her husband's death. Chinese history contains a gallery of energetic and clever widows who brought up their sons and helped them to achieve success. Perhaps the best known of these is the mother of the philosopher Mencius, a woman who in Chinese didactical literature plays a part equivalent to that of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, in the European imagination. The mother of Mencius supported her son by weaving. She also super-

vised his intellectual and moral education. She changed her dwelling three times to save her son from disturbing influences, and finally chose a house near a school to encourage his scholarly inclinations. Once when Mencius slackened his efforts, his mother suddenly cut the cloth she was weaving to show him the ill effect of interrupted work.

Another mother whose image, cherished by many generations, has become especially dear to modern Chinese youth is the patriotic mother of General Yüeh Fei, famous defender of China against the Mongols under the Sung dynasty in the twelfth century.

Though the mother in China rarely has achieved a position of real dominance in the family, the devotion of her children probably has brought her deeper gratification than in any other country in the world.

FATHER-DAUGHTER

The father-daughter relationship, although Confucius did not consider it important, came closer to his ideal of respectful and tender love than did the father-son relationship. The clever and beautiful girl who is her father's favorite is as common in Chinese poetry, novels, and stories as in our own. Chinese history and fiction also contain heroines as devoted to their fathers as Antigone was to hers; there are many energetic girls who perform deeds of bravery to avenge their parents, such as the "Rainbow Girl," heroine of one of the *Modern and New Strange Stories (Chin Ku Chi Kuan)*, a seventeenth-century collection, who allowed herself to be captured by several men in succession in order to find her father's murderers;³⁰ or Ho Yü-feng, the brave and wise heroine of the *Story of a Courageous Girl*, a favorite nineteenth-century novel of adventure. The greatest exploits of Mulan, the famous girl soldier, were inspired not by patriotism but by filial piety; Mulan joined the army to substitute for her old father.³¹

RELATIONS IN THE JOINT FAMILY

Two other important relationships in the Chinese family—those of husband and wife and of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law—will be dealt with in the chapter on "Women in the Family and Society of Old China." Here a few words must be said about relationships within the joint family, which, though not so typically Chinese as it was often presumed to be, was encountered rather often, especially among the wealthy.

The paragon of Chinese family virtue, Ch'en, of the town of Chiang Chou, was said to have brought about such harmony in his family that all its seven hundred members could take their meals in the same hall at the same time. Even the family dogs were so amiable that if one was late for dinner the other ninety-nine waited for him. Mr. Ch'en does not tell us how this harmony was achieved. But another patriarch does. Asked by a T'ang emperor how he succeeded in keeping nine branches of one family together, Chang Kung-i from Shantung gave an answer often quoted in China. He wrote one word a hundred times: *jen-nai*, which means "patience, forbearance."

But families, to judge from old Chinese fiction, seldom achieved this virtue of forbearance to a sufficient degree. Thus, the author of *The Dream of the Red Chamber* tells of constant fights, intrigues, rivalries, and jealousies. Wives and concubines often fought with each other. Quarrels between sisters-in-law were common and often brought about family divisions. Brothers, especially if they were not sons of the same mother, did not always live in peace.³²

Yet the members of the large family, like kinsmen and clansmen, helped each other in distress and united against the outside world.³³

The warmest relations inside the joint family existed between the members of the small family units composing it. Uncles and aunts were never as close to a family member as his own father and mother; the feelings toward cousins could not match the affection felt toward brothers and sisters.

IV

Love, Marriage, Divorce

LOVE

THE China shaped by Confucius and his followers was not propitious to love and courtship. The stultifying rules of propriety invented by old men, rules which in feudal times had dominated life in the rich manors, now held sway over the humblest villages. Under the empire, dancing on the river banks or by the city gates, trysts and love affairs enjoyed by the peasant youth during the previous thousand years were virtually things of the past.

The beautiful folk songs of feudal times celebrating courtship, love, and love matches, so reminiscent of the European folk songs, were no longer sung in the countryside and no new songs replaced them. The old songs collected in *The Book of Poetry* were studied but not understood. For hundreds of years aged and learned commentators tried to destroy their meaning and flavor.¹

Parents arranged marriages with family interests in view. Personal affection of bride and groom for each other was considered not only unnecessary but harmful. Decent young people did not meet each other even after betrothal; they did not meet until after their marriage. "If the young people, without waiting for the orders of their parents, and the arrangements of the go-betweens, shall bore holes [in the fence] to steal a sight of each other, or get over the wall to be with each other, then their parents and other people will despise them," says Mencius.²

Only prostitutes, women standing outside the family world, could meet strangers freely. No wonder the courtesan is a more frequent heroine in Chinese love stories than the young marriageable girl. These stories tell of men, married and unmarried, falling in love with beautiful girls of the "willow lanes," of courtesans responding ardently to this love and being recompensed by young men who took them home as concubines and sometimes even promoted them to the position of wives. Some of these stories, very appealing to the Western reader, recall Manon Lescaut and Camille.³

But the old men of China did not succeed in eliminating love from the life of the young women. Despite the prohibitions of the sages, girls in China fell in love and were in turn loved. Poor and middle-class families could not afford to keep men and women in separate quarters, and even among the rich it was not always done. Nor was it entirely possible to restrict women to their homes, even when they had bound feet.

To begin with, young Chinese met their cousins. Relatives with the same surname could not intermarry, but those with different surnames could, and their marriages, as a matter of fact, were especially favored.* Their relations were tinged with erotic flavor and their love affairs were the favorite theme of Chinese fiction.

The most famous of these love stories, which after two hundred years still enchants educated young Chinese, is the story of the love of Chia Pao-yü for his cousin Lin Tai-yü in *The Dream of the Red Chamber*. Tai-yü, a sickly sensitive orphan, was brought up in her maternal grandmother's house together with her cousins. She and Pao-yü fell in love. The spoiled, rich, and handsome boy, surrounded by attractive girl servants and slaves, and having free access to the delights of the "willow lanes," passionately loved the frail and nervous Tai-yü. He overlooked her jealousy, depressions, and bad temper. "Dearest Mei-mei," he told her once, "later perhaps I will not be able to tell you how I feel, now I am taking courage to do so. If I die, at least I will have expressed myself. I am sick, sick because of you, and do not dare to tell anybody. I shall recover my health only if you do. I do not forget you even in my dreams."† This touching love story reads very much like a romantic European novel: one scene recalls Jane Austen, another *La Nouvelle Héloïse*; there is even some dialogue reminiscent of Chekhov.

Despite the warnings of Mencius and parents' prohibition, girls in old China stood at the gates, peeped out of the windows, lifted the curtains of their sedan chairs, and walked in gardens or in the streets; sometimes they even served customers in their parents' shops.‡ Travel offered many opportunities. A girl often met her lover in an inn or a Buddhist monastery, where she stopped with her family. Chinese love stories frequently begin this way. One of them, told in many variations, was dramatized under the title *The Westchamber*, a play which enjoyed great popularity. Love at first sight was common.

* It is significant that the same kinship term is often used to designate maternal uncle and father-in-law; paternal aunt and mother-in-law.

However deep-seated or lasting the feelings of the young men and women in Chinese love stories, the affairs described are seldom platonic. Love in old Chinese fiction is sexual love.*

When the student Chu, in a story in the *Liao-chai* collection, meets the charming, laughing Ying Ning under the blossoming pear trees and speaks of his love, the dialogue runs as follows:

"I should like to be with you at night on the same pillow and mat," says the young man. "I am not accustomed to sleep with a stranger," answers the girl.†⁶ But most of the stories dispose even of such preliminaries—boys and girls go to bed as soon as they meet. The parents evidently knew that such consequences were inevitable and tried to forestall them by forbidding their girls to meet boys.

It seems that even in the upper classes the Chinese have a more realistic attitude toward the human body than Westerners. They do not conceal the physical aspects of love. But love does not exalt them as it does people in the West, nor do they need a romantic sublimation in order to accept it.⁸ The Chinese found an outlet for their feelings and emotions in love of nature and friendship; romantic love plays a smaller role.

This approach to love also accounts for the relative poverty of lyrical love poetry in imperial China. Lyrics under the empire ceased to be a creation of the people—no second *Book of Poetry* was produced. Poets were Confucian scholars who did not consider love a sentiment worthy of a "perfect gentleman." A poet preferred to present himself not as a lover but as a friend.⁹ Love themes were relegated mainly to prose novels and short stories.

Chinese love stories seldom have a happy ending, unless the heroine is a courtesan or a fox (a fairy). A courtesan could be brought home as a concubine. The foxes by virtue of their supernatural powers were able to set themselves above general rules.‡

But virgins were not as free as fairy foxes. A love affair for them meant violating moral laws. Pao-yü did not win his beloved Tai-yü.

* The novel called *The Fortunate Union*, whose hero and heroine do not touch each other before marriage, is an exception. So are the stories that reveal Buddhist influence.

† H. Giles quotes this scene to show that there was love and courtship in old China. However, he dedicated his translation of *Liao-chai Chih-i* to his grandchildren, and translated this dialogue as follows: "Husbands and wives are always together," says the young man. "I should not like to be always with anybody," answers the girl.⁷ This was making love in old China Victorian rather than Elizabethan.

‡ See the happy endings of such fox stories in the *Liao-chai* collection. Many of these stories are like sexual dreams and probably offer interesting material for psychoanalysts.

His relatives chose another girl for him. Nor did the student Chang, the hero of the Tang dynasty story which later was known as *The Westchamber*, marry his beloved.¹⁰

The young people, even when brokenhearted like Pao-yü, accepted their fate without protest. They knew marriage was the business of parents, and were themselves afraid to choose their mates. Ping Hsin and Tieh Chang-yü (in *The Fortunate Union*)¹¹ met under highly romantic circumstances and fell in love. Later their parents decided to have them marry. But the scholarly maiden and the brave lover considered their previous acquaintance and love an insurmountable obstacle to marriage. They had been taught that the rules of propriety forbid brides and grooms to meet before marriage. Only the wisdom of the parents, who knew that the ancient sages were against extremes in anything, even in virtue, brought about the love match—one of the few in Chinese literature.

Love and marriage belonged to different spheres of life. Here Chinese usage was similar to the prevalent Western usage until the end of the eighteenth century.¹² Tristan and Isolde are as typical of Western lovers as Pao-yü and Tai-yü are of Chinese.

MARRIAGE

The privilege and duty of arranging marriages for their children was one of the most conspicuous expressions of the authority of Chinese parents. Marriage under the empire was an act performed by families, not by individuals. According to the law, marriage was a legal contract concluded by the heads of the bride's and groom's families. As a rule, the heads signed the marriage contract; the signature of the couple was not required. If a marriage was contracted contrary to law, only the relatives who signed the contract and not the bride and bridegroom were held responsible.¹³

This total neglect of the wishes of the parties concerned is almost without parallel in the world. In ancient Greece and Rome, and in Europe in the early Middle Ages, marriages were arranged by the parents of the partners, particularly the father. But as time went on the influence of the parents decreased. In imperial China the trend was exactly the opposite, and by the end of the imperial period the power of the parents was even stronger than when Ch'in Shih Huang-ti built the Great Wall.*

* In Republican Rome, even at the time when the patriarchal family was still intact, the bride was presented by the father in the marriage ceremony, but the bridegroom acted in his own name. Several hundred years later in imperial Rome only marriage by consent was recognized.¹⁴

The population policy of the Chinese Government, as expressed in the laws of the different dynasties, required the parents to provide their sons and daughters with mates as soon as they reached marriageable age. They complied with this request so eagerly that at the beginning of the imperial era the government was forced to set a minimum age limit for marriage. This minimum was relatively high for Asia. Under the Sung dynasty it was set at 16 for men and 14 for women. This rule was maintained by the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties.²¹ In contrast to India, child marriages were exceptional in China, although the betrothal of small and even unborn children, while illegal, was common.

In selecting their children's mates the parents had to follow strictly the rules of clan exogamy and to exclude relatives of the same surname as prospective marriage partners. This was demanded both by law and custom.²²

The social and economic position of the family of the bride and bridegroom greatly influenced the decision of the parents. As in the West, marriages were made in China for the sake of convenience—"convenience" being differently interpreted, of course. There was a tendency to marry into one's own social class. Several emperors tried to educate the people to eliminate money as a factor in making matches, and many famous writers condemned the practice,²³ but it proved ineradicable.

The English father lost his absolute right to bestow his daughter in marriage in the eleventh century when the law of the Danish king Cnut forbade a father or guardian to "compel either woman or maiden to [marry] him whom she herself dislikes, nor for money sell her."¹⁵ Russian law, at that time, had less respect for women's rights, but the codex of Grand Duke Yaroslav, contemporary of King Cnut, imposed a fine on the parents of a daughter who, after a marriage concluded against her will, committed suicide.¹⁶

Chinese marriage customs seem to show even less regard for the will of the bride and bridegroom than marriage in the Islamic countries. "Her [Moslem woman's] consent to marriage is necessary," states Hughes in his picture of the position of woman under Sunni law.¹⁷ Certainly the Moslem daughter was hardly allowed to oppose her father's will and her consent often proved to be an empty formula in practice. In Russian Turkestan, for instance, the mullah or his envoy appeared outside the bride's home and asked her through a locked door to give her consent, and did not bother to find out whether the answer was given by the bride herself, or by another woman. Even weeping or silence was taken as consent.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the request for her consent proves that she was considered the main factor in the marriage drama. Similarly in Parsi weddings in Persia pressure was used on the woman; she was asked eleven times until she finally gave her consent, but her "yes" was necessary to perform the wedding.¹⁹

The Japanese had a custom of *miai* (seeing each other) so that the bride and groom might express an opinion on the possibility of a union between them.²⁰ They seldom made use of this ceremony to express refusal and, as we know from the memoirs of Japanese women, this custom was often disregarded; nevertheless, the need to obtain the consent of the parties concerned was acknowledged.

When speaking of the "introduction of financial questions into marriage," Chinese writers usually had in mind payments made to the girl's family. The *New History of the T'ang Dynasty* frankly uses the expression *mai hun*, "marriage by purchase," thus anticipating modern anthropological terminology.²⁴

Marriage by purchase, an arrangement also very well known in the West in the early period of its history, was widespread in old China. The difference was only that in the West at about the eleventh or twelfth century men instead of paying for their brides began to receive dowries. In many instances this arrangement almost amounted to buying bridegrooms instead of buying brides. China remained faithful to the old form. The bridegroom's family sent money to the girl's family as part of the marriage ritual.

The use made of this money differed in the different social classes. The T'ang emperor Kao Tsung (650-684 A.D.) gave strict orders that officials taking money from their daughters' bridegrooms spend all of it for the girl's bridal outfit.²⁵ It seems that in the last centuries of imperial China this rule was obeyed in rich families, though exceptions were not uncommon.* Well-to-do families made it a point of honor to give the bridegroom's family the equivalent of the money received in furniture, clothes, jewelry, and even to add an equal sum to pay for the outfit. The more boxes and trunks that were carried in the bridal procession, the more "face" was given to the family of the bride.

But the poor people—and this means the overwhelming majority of the Chinese—not only used the bridegroom's money to pay for the trousseau and other wedding expenses but more often than not appropriated the larger part of it for themselves. The poor man had to pay for the bride. There are numerous examples of this arrangement in the old Chinese novels and short stories.²⁷

As a matter of fact, the husband (or more accurately, his family) acquired real property rights over the wife. He could sell her and, as many historical documents and works of fiction show, sometimes did.²⁸

For the arrangement of marriage matchmakers, professional or amateurs, men or women, were indispensable. No deal in bureaucratic China was concluded without the middleman. This relieved the parties concerned of at least a part of their responsibility; and marriage was a deal like any other.

* See, e.g., the marriage arrangement of one of the heroines of *The Dream of the Red Chamber*. The 5,000 taels borrowed by the father from the bridegroom look very much like payment for the bride.²⁶

For 2,500 years marriage rites adhered strictly to the forms prescribed in the ancient *Book of Ritual and Ceremonies (I Li)*, except for some slight modifications in different regions and epochs, and the same ritual is still observed in the majority of Chinese families.

The procedure began with the matchmaker's visit to the girl's parents. If they agreed to the proposed match they kept the gifts brought by the matchmaker and gave him a card with the girl's personal data. The eight characters standing for her name, hour, day, month, and year of birth were compared by a specialist with the corresponding data of the boy. The particulars about birth included the so-called horary and cyclical characters symbolizing animals like the rat, ox, tiger, and hare. If the girl's birth, for instance, took place on the day and hour ruled by the serpent or tiger and the boy's by the sheep or dog, the match would be considered inauspicious: a tiger is likely to devour a sheep or a dog. The written name may contain symbols of wood, earth, water, fire, etc. A fire symbol in the girl's name would burn the wood symbol in the boy's name; but earth or water would be favorable to wood. Later on the appearance and disposition of the prospective mates were studied as well.

This comparative analysis of the symbolic elements attached to the prospective mates was very important and can be interpreted as an attempt to insure the couple's future harmony. But as a rule, if the parents decided on the match, the symbolic elements were declared fully or "approximately" harmonious.

The next step after the exchange of cards ("the inquiry into the girl's name") was the sending of the betrothal gifts, consisting of a wild goose and a roll of silk—the equivalent of our engagement ring. Very often sums of money accompanied these gifts, the amount being set after consultation with the matchmaker. The acceptance of the gifts was followed by the signing of a betrothal contract, which, contrary to Roman and Western European practices, was legally binding.²⁹

Then fortune tellers helped determine what day was propitious for the "Red Affair," the name given to a wedding because red, the color of joy and happiness, was used in the decorations. A red sedan chair was sent to the bride's home, the girl in red dress and red headgear entered it and was taken to her husband's house.

The ceremony was a family affair; neither priests nor officials were necessary for its performance. When the prescribed ritual had been observed, the marriage was legal. The family head is

himself the minister of the most important Chinese religion—ancestor worship—and the head of the first administrative unit of the state. It was only natural that the state should let him perform the marriage rites.

This was the marriage arrangement for women who became their husbands' first or principal wives. Custom and law allowed only one principal wife. The man who took another was punished and the second marriage was declared invalid.³⁰ But he was allowed to take secondary wives or concubines. Though officially concubines were allowed in order to provide children (sons) when the first wives failed to do so, men took concubines whenever they wished. Their number was limited only by the man's desires and financial abilities.

All over the world polygyny has been predominantly an upper-class phenomenon.* China was no exception to this rule. And the relatively little use made of female labor power in China did not make the acquisition of new wives a good investment, as it was in some primitive tribes and among nomadic peoples. Only rich men could afford to have several idle women about the house. A merchant's wife in a story told by Han Fei Tzu understood this connection very well indeed. "When kneeling in prayer, the wife asked the gods to bestow on the family a hundred rolls of silk and no more. "Why so little?" asked her husband. "If you get more, you will buy yourself a concubine!" answered the wife.³³

For the overwhelming majority of the Chinese one wife was as much as could be hoped for. Chinese peasants (except for the richest), coolies, artisans, most of the small shopkeepers were usually monogamous. Rich merchants and officials were often polygynous. However middle-class men (for example rich peasants, small officials, etc.) could seldom afford more than two wives. Among the poor there was always a group of bachelors who were too poor to get a wife. A man of this kind at the end of the empire is described in the famous *Story of A Q* by the modern author Lu Hsün.³⁴

* "Old men or chiefs may arrogate to themselves an unfair proportion of the women, and where wives are bought the well-to-do are similarly favored. The ancient Egyptians permitted bigamy at all periods and in all ranks of society, but only kings and grandees kept harems. In Uganda . . . the women far outnumbered the men, yet peasants were for the most part monogamous. . . . In Southeast Africa the number of wives became an index of social position."³¹ In ancient Judea "only men of wealth, chiefs or kings had many wives"; in the Middle Ages polygyny among the Jews even in the Orient became an exception," for only the wealthy could afford the luxury of many wives."³²

DIVORCE

The Chinese moralists and legislators of the imperial era did not hold that marriage was indissoluble. "If husband and wife live according to righteousness, they remain together; if righteousness is no more, they should separate," says Ssu Ma-kuang, a noted philosopher and historian of the Sung dynasty.³⁵

Old China knew three kinds of divorce: divorce for which husband or wife was responsible; divorce by mutual agreement; and divorce by compulsion by the authorities. In each case the interests of the family and the clan were considered before the interests of the individual.

A wife could be repudiated by her husband on the following grounds: * (1) If she disobeyed her husband's parents; (2) failed to bear children; (3) committed adultery; (4) exhibited jealousy; (5) had some repulsive disease; (6) was garrulous; (7) stole.³⁶ At a later date the penal codes added some new regulations to the original "seven grounds."

Divorce by mutual agreement, still frowned upon in Europe and America, has been recognized in China since the feudal period. The existence of this liberal feature in Chinese marriage laws is perhaps explained by the very strength of the family institution: if the family heads agreed to dissolve a marriage, the state could be sure that it was really harmful to the interests of the family.

In feudal times and early in the empire, marriages were not infrequently dissolved on the wife's initiative. Later, grounds under which she could obtain divorce became so limited that divorce became exclusively the man's privilege and was practically equivalent to repudiation of the wife by the husband. As women had almost no opportunity for earning a living or remarrying, divorce was for them a great calamity.

In many Oriental countries (Babylon, Egypt, the Moslem states) divorced wives were entitled to all or part of their property or bridal price, and this afforded them some protection.³⁷ The Chinese woman, who had no property rights, could not have this protection. But she was not entirely helpless. Husbands could not repudiate their wives for reasons other than the seven mentioned above; moreover, the ancient sages formulated "three reasons for not repudiating wives." These "three reasons" breathe a spirit of justice unsurpassed in the divorce laws of any country up to the most

* These seven reasons contained in *Li Chi* and Confucius' *Family Conversations* were after the T'ang dynasty incorporated in the legal codes.

modern times. The wife could not be sent away (1) if she had mourned her husband's parents for three years; (2) if her husband's family had become wealthy ("The time of poverty should not be forgotten. The wife of the time when we ate chaff should not be dismissed," says an old adage); (3) if she had no family to take her in.³⁸

Although not all husbands observed the "seven reasons for repudiating" and the "rules for not repudiating" their wives, Chinese women were in fact more efficiently protected than women in many other countries. For instance, Japanese and Hebrew women could be divorced by their husbands at will.³⁹

All in all, divorces in old China were rather rare. Public opinion considered them sad and tragic occurrences and frowned upon them.⁴⁰ Furthermore, peasants, artisans, and coolies could not afford the expense of a second marriage after the heavy expense entailed by the first; and the wealthy man did not have to discard the old wife if he disliked her: he could always take concubines.

V

Women in the Family and Society of Old China

IT is very probable that in prehistoric times Chinese women had a high if not dominant position in the family and in society.¹ But this power was lost at an early date. The first Chinese historical records of the second millennium B.C. indicate that family and society were dominated by men. In feudal times women still preserved a certain degree of freedom. In Confucian China the position of women constantly deteriorated until finally man's supremacy in society and family became absolute. "How sad it is to be a woman! Nothing on earth is held so cheap," cried the poet Fu Hsüan in the third century B.C.²

The low position of women in China is due to a combination of several economic and ideological factors.

ECONOMIC STATUS

While there are indications that in prehistoric times women played an important part in agriculture, they did not, as a rule, do so in historic China. Nor were they employed in handicraft or even as unskilled laborers. This is in sharp contrast to women of Europe who worked in the fields and in handicrafts and were sometimes even admitted to the guilds.³ As everywhere in the world until very recent times, Chinese women were also excluded from civil service, the main source of income of the ruling class.

The occupations open to women were concerned with procreation and sexual life: women were prostitutes, matchmakers, procuresses, midwives. In addition, they could become nuns in Buddhist or Taoist orders, or diviners, or could recite prayers for pay. Women scholars, artists, or writers were rare and practically never derived any income from their activities.

Certainly, peasant women and those of poor town homes were far from idle. Not only all the household chores, including making shoes for the family, but all the main tasks connected with the silk industry were in their hands, as well as the care of the small domestic animals. However, the silk industry played an important

role in the peasant economy only in a few regions and the household chores in poor homes were rather simple. Women's labor power was not used to the full.

IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS

The traditional Chinese philosophy provided a theory of woman's inferiority that was an ideological justification of her lower status in the society of imperial times, and helped to perpetuate it.

According to the old Chinese theory adopted and developed by philosophers of the Confucian school, the world is created by the interaction of two elements: yin, the female, and yang, the male. The yin elements are earth, moon, depth, darkness, weakness, passivity; the yang elements are heaven, sun, height, light, strength, activity. Yin and yang cannot exist without each other and together they constitute a half-black, half-white circle—the symbol of the universe in Chinese philosophy. But although the male and female elements are complementary they are not considered equal, as some Western and Chinese authors insist.⁴ There is no doubt that yin—the female principle—stands for the negative and inferior, and yang—the male principle—for the positive and superior.

Buddhism, in which woman is the personification of all evil, added new ideological propositions to the idea of woman's inferiority.

For twenty-two centuries, hundreds of male and female Confucian writers wrote scores of books on the position of women and their role in family and society, and devised practical rules for their education and conduct.⁵ With slight variations all these books presented the same teachings. Obedience, timidity, reticence, adaptability were the main virtues of women. Three rules of obedience to man shape a woman's life. "An unmarried girl should obey her father and elder brother, a married woman—her husband, a widow—her son."⁶

The worlds of men and women are clearly separated: men have the whole world (they are limited only as filial sons and docile subjects), while the woman's world is her home. "Outside affairs should not be talked of inside the threshold (of the women's apartments)."⁷ Hence, "women should not sit together with men, or peep outside the walls, or go to outer apartments. When going out they should cover their faces and look around with circumspection."⁸

LEGAL STATUS AND PROPERTY RELATIONS

The legal status of a woman was inferior to that of her husband. The wife's position in relation to her husband resembled that of a junior to a senior relative or of a son to a father: if a husband abused his wife, he was punished less than for abusing a stranger; if the wife wronged her husband, she was punished more than if she harmed a stranger. If a husband committed adultery, it was not regarded as an offense, but a husband could kill his adulterous wife with impunity.⁹ Divorce, as already stated, was entirely a man's privilege.

Chinese women had practically no property rights. When a family estate was divided, all property was distributed among the males. Daughters and wives were their fathers' and husbands' heirs only in those rare cases when not a single male relative in the clan survived.

Even among the wealthy classes, the wife as a rule did not come to her husband's family with a dowry in the Western sense of the word; she brought her jewels, clothes, and furniture, but seldom money and never land. Women almost never earned money and even when they derived some income from weaving, spinning, or embroidery, it went to the family and only the father, husband, or father-in-law could dispose of it.

As an indirect result of this situation, the position of the father toward his children was strengthened. The mother, grandmother, or maternal relatives never could bequeath anything; hence the children were economically bound to their father.*

* This total absence of property rights is almost unexampled. For instance, even in Babylonia and Egypt women of the upper classes enjoyed full property rights.¹⁰ Under Hindu laws women of India had certain qualified property rights, including the right to inherit.¹¹ In ancient Judea women had inheritance rights. Both father and mother had estates.¹²

Even in the Roman Republic when fathers and husbands had absolute legal power over them, women gained the right to private property as early as the 2d century B.C. Daughters and sisters could inherit their fathers' and brothers' estates.¹³

European women always had inheritance rights. Their right to separate property was recognized in the early Middle Ages. After the Danish invasion of England, Danish and Anglo-Saxon wives had the right to separate storerooms, chests, and cupboards. From the 6th century on, the Anglo-Saxon wife who bore children was entitled to half the family property. Among the Germanic tribes in the early Middle Ages, during the period of transition from the marriage by purchase to the dowry system, the bridal price was handed over to the bride and remained her private property, like the "morning gift" (received from the husband the day after the wedding) and the dowry given the girl by her family. Married women's property rights were subject to some restrictions, but few were imposed on widows. These rights never disappeared completely, even in the period when the position of women was at its lowest, in the 11th-14th centuries.¹⁴

The property-less woman of China was herself the property of man. Young girls were sold by their fathers and became slaves, concubines, or prostitutes. Husbands sold their concubines, pawned or sold their wives for temporary or permanent marriages to other men. Such transactions were forbidden by law but took place notwithstanding.¹⁶ A woman sold as a concubine was enslaved for her whole life.¹⁷

BOUND FEET

One feature of the inferiority of Chinese women is entirely unique: the custom of footbinding.

The purpose of footbinding was to keep the feet small. Tight wrapping prevented the bones and muscles from developing, curled the toes under, and thus achieved the desired effect. At the same time this crippled the feet to such an extent that women were unable to walk rapidly or for long distances and were handicapped in many other respects.

It is not known exactly when footbinding was introduced into China. Modern Chinese sociologists think the custom dates from the tenth century A.D.¹⁸ It was first practiced by the women of the upper classes but later became general, since, with respect to fashion, class distinctions were not maintained. The fact that the women did little agricultural work probably made it possible for the custom to be adopted even in the poor peasant families. Bound feet became such an indispensable attribute that it was difficult to marry off a daughter with big (natural) feet; she would not even be desired as concubine or prostitute. Only a pauper, obliged to preserve his daughter's ability to work, would thus deprive her of all her chances.

After the Manchu conquest the new rulers, accustomed to give their women more freedom than the Chinese, tried to forbid footbinding. But they met with strong resistance. The custom had become a deeply rooted esthetic ideal; moreover, insistence on its preservation became a symbol of Chinese opposition to foreign rule. The Manchus had to give up.

What was the actual function of footbinding? Ch'en Tung-yüan, Lin Yutang, and other modern Chinese authors stress its esthetic value. Like a fair complexion, thin eyebrows, and a gentle voice, the gait peculiar to a woman whose feet were not permitted

Likewise, in Islamic countries women had the right to inherit; they kept their property, could claim its usufruct after they married, and could retain it in case of divorce.¹⁹

to grow had sexual appeal. Even Lin Yutang, a modern westernized author, describing the beauty of one of his heroines, says: "A pair of big unbound feet would have completely ruined this perfect harmony of line."¹⁹ * But more important than esthetic were social considerations. Whatever the origin, the purpose was clear. Bound feet kept women at home, made them safer, less movable property. This was, in fact, often recognized.

When asked why girls of good families bind their feet, Pan Shou answered: "I hear that the sages approve of modesty in a girl. If her feet are bound she does not leave the women's apartments, and when she goes out she is carried in a curtained chair. She does not have to use her feet."²⁰ *Nü Erh Ching*, one of the numerous books about virtuous women, is even more explicit: "Feet are bound, not to make them beautiful as a curved bow, but to restrain the women when they go outdoors."²¹

Footbinding not only restricted women's freedom but also considerably injured their health. It was extremely painful during the first year. The circulation of the blood was blocked and this sometimes produced gangrene. Sedentary life was the cause of many diseases. To make matters worse, women did not find it easy to obtain medical aid. Male doctors were not allowed to see women patients; at the most the doctor was permitted to feel the pulse of a sick woman who was hidden from him by a curtain.†

Inferiority put its imprint on the whole of woman's life.

YOUNG GIRL

It began with her birth. "No one is glad when a girl is born: By her the family sets no store," says the poet Fu Hsüan.² This was certainly not always true, but in the overwhelming majority of cases a boy's birth was greeted much more joyfully. Since girls worked less than boys and were lost to the family after marriage, they were a bad economic and emotional investment.

It is not surprising that girls were the main, if not exclusive, victims of infanticide, which was practiced in the poor families of China from time immemorial.‡ As in Greece, in Rome, and in

* Several peasants and coolies interviewed for the purpose of this study in 1936 asserted that bound feet, though impractical, are nevertheless much more beautiful than natural feet.

† Even in 1936 when a village girl in Hopeh became ill, the family tried to help her by sending her father and uncle to Peiping to consult the doctor. (An account given to the author by the girl's brother.)

‡ It is mentioned by the sources of the feudal period,²² in the documents of the 10th century, in the decrees of the Yüan and Ming dynasties,²³ as well as by many foreign and Chinese authors of the 19th and 20th centuries.²⁴

medieval Europe, infanticide in China was caused not by lack of parental affection but by poverty and starvation. It persisted there longer than in other civilized societies only because China's standard of living lagged behind that of European countries.

A girl in a rich family was reared with care but in marked inequality to her brothers. A poet of feudal times described the conditions in the royal family which were considered characteristic of the imperial period, where the sons "are put to sleep on couches, clothed in robes, have a scepter to play with," while daughters "are put to sleep on the ground, clothed in wrappers; they will have tiles to play with. . . ." ²⁵ When the children were able to speak, "a boy (was taught to) respond boldly and clearly; a girl submissively and low." ²⁶

As the girl grew up she was taught to help her mother in the household and was prepared to be an obedient wife and a submissive daughter-in-law. To teach her to read and write, to supply her with knowledge about the world was considered unnecessary and even harmful. Time and again the wise old men of China repeated: "A woman too well educated is apt to create trouble." ²⁷ "A woman without talents is virtuous." ²⁸

To be sure, there were many exceptions to this rule. In the families of wealthy scholars the women were often well educated. Some of them developed real talents as poets, artists, even historians. ²⁹ China has had several able empresses. But as a rule the women of even the upper classes were illiterate. ³⁰

The rule that boys and girls were not to meet and fall in love was much more strictly enforced for girls than for boys, who could satisfy their desire for love and companionship with prostitutes and concubines.

When a family married the girl off, she became a member of her husband's family and her relations with her father's family became tenuous.

DAUGHTER-IN-LAW

In her new home her first and most important function was not that of wife but of daughter-in-law. Her husband was himself in a subordinate position in a house governed by his father. The wife had to please her husband's parents. "If he [the son] very much approves of his wife, and his parents do not like her, he should divorce her; if he does not approve of his wife, and his parents say, 'she serves us well,' he should behave to her in all respects as a husband,—without fail even to the end of her life," says the *Li Chi*. ³¹

In her new position the young woman had more duties and fewer rights than in the house of her parents. Offences against parents-in-law were punished not less severely than offences against parents.³² She had to display toward them great affection and obedience.

The young woman had to avoid her father-in-law and her brothers-in-law. The person with whom she was in close contact was her mother-in-law. And here the real drama of her life began.

The harsh treatment of the daughter-in-law by the mother-in-law is one of the most striking features of Chinese family life. The cruel mother-in-law plays in Chinese fiction and folklore the role that the wicked stepmother plays in European fairy tales. The conflict between the wife and her husband's mother is well enough known also in the West. In old China it was particularly bitter because of the authoritarian character of the Chinese family and of the fact that so many young couples stayed in the husband's parents' home.

The husband, out of filial piety, had to side with his mother, who often took advantage of her position. Perhaps she avenged her own unhappy life and bad treatment when she was a daughter-in-law herself.

The famous fourth-century ballad, "The Wife of Chao Chin-ch'un" (A Peacock Flies West of South), contains a classical description of a cruel mother-in-law who threw the beloved wife of her son out of her house and drove the young couple to suicide. The poet displays great sympathy for the wife and her fate.³³

Yet, if a woman committed suicide, her family could sue the husband's family or revenge her in a direct way. The threat of a long and tiresome lawsuit and of "loss of face" was often strong enough to protect the young woman to some extent.

WIFE

Sooner or later, however, the mother-in-law would die or cease to play an active part in the household. The young woman's husband would assume the duties of family head and she would become the first lady of the house. If by that time she had children and especially boys, her position both in her husband's eyes and in the family in general would become much stronger. But now the second law of obedience would come into full force: the wife had to obey her husband and was held inferior to him by law and custom.

To some extent the relations of husband and wife depended on the character of the couple. When the husband was weak or stupid and the wife able, energetic, and attractive, she often played a leading role. And there have been not a few energetic, able, and attractive women in China at all times.

Old Chinese fiction shows a series of domineering wives, termagants maltreating their husbands and even their parents-in-law.³⁴ But such cases should not be regarded as representative, nor should it be deduced after the fashion of some writers that China was a land of henpecked husbands. Tales of rebellious wives are more numerous simply because obedient wives were not so interesting to fiction writers: they were not "news."

There is no doubt that the husband was the dominant figure in the typical old Chinese family. The study of case histories of contemporary Chinese families that live under practically the same conditions as their forefathers confirms this impression.* But we still have to answer the question: Did these unromantic Chinese marriages, which were arranged by parents and which enslaved the woman, lead to real happiness?

Hsi Ch'ün, a charming character in *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, answered in the negative. Around her she saw only abhorrent and discouraging marriages. She shuddered at the thought of being herself a victim of a conventional marriage and decided to become a nun.³⁵ The couples mentioned in another great Chinese realistic novel, *Chin Ping Mei*, were also very unhappy. These examples from literature could be multiplied.

It is, of course, important to remember that in old China people were not taught to expect love and happiness from marriage. Not personal satisfaction but the continuation of the family, of the "stream of life," was the goal of marriage.

Yet certainly personal gratification was sometimes the by-product of marriage. Many couples probably enjoyed what might be called "more or less" happiness. They led the tolerable existence of people accustomed to each other, who developed common views, tastes, and habits and common interests in their children, property, and business. Not infrequently real affection grew up in this marriage arranged by parents.

There certainly were people who longed for more than that and were not satisfied with the relations prevailing in conventional marriages. The happiest marriages we encounter in old Chinese fiction are those arranged by young people themselves. There are

* See pp. 193 ff.

several instances of this kind in the *Liao-chai* collection.³⁶ One can easily imagine that these pictures represented the author's protest against the prevailing practice of marriages arranged by the family.

CONCUBINES

The woman of the upper and middle class had one more difficulty in her marital relations: the existence of the plural marriage.

It is frequently said that concubinage did not bring any disharmony into the old Chinese family and that wives and concubines shared their husbands without protest. This is by no means the whole story.

Certainly the Chinese women's attitude toward polygyny was different from that of the women in the West who were brought up in the idea of monogamy. In old Chinese fiction a great number of women take their husbands' concubines for granted. The wife of an official who does not accompany her husband on his travels but stays home to care for his children and his parents readily understands his taking a concubine. Others willingly accept concubines in their home.

The most striking example is perhaps the wife of Chia She in *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, who tries to help her husband win a girl who had caught his fancy. "What," says she indignantly, "other distinguished people can have several concubines, why not we?"³⁷

The wife of Hsi Men, in *Chin Ping Mei*, amiably receives the new concubines of her insatiable husband; she coöperates with them in arranging house parties, mediates their conflicts, and reprimands her husband when he favors one concubine to the neglect of another: "You are completely captivated by Chin-lien," she says, ". . . one of us, Meng Yu-lo, suffers because you neglect her. You should go to her."³⁸

Examples of this kind could be multiplied indefinitely.

Such situations are understandable. There was no question of love in marriage. Young girls in old China married men they had never seen before. Sometimes love followed, sometimes it did not. In the latter case the wife might consider sexual relations an irksome duty and would not mind having another woman assume it. Polygyny was an accepted institution and a wife was not humiliated when her husband took a concubine. A divorced wife was pitied but not a wife who had to put up with another woman or women in her house. In all circumstances the legal wife maintained her

position. It was forbidden to lower one's wife to the position of a concubine or to set a concubine in her place.³⁹ Moreover, well-to-do Chinese families lived in many small houses sometimes scattered over a wide area. The women could very well be separated from each other. Finally, the wife knew that the law protected polygyny: a jealous wife could be divorced by her husband.

Yet all this gives only one side of the picture. Plural marriage was far from being an idyl. History and fiction show that the old men of China were even less successful in eliminating feminine jealousy than in preventing girls and boys from falling in love. The stories about fights between jealous wives and concubines and about the sufferings of obedient wives who do not dare to protest perhaps outnumber those about wives and concubines who accept each other.

The Dream of the Red Chamber describes the reactions of one of the heroines to her husband's love affairs and her fights with his concubines. When Phoenix hears of her husband's intrigue, she "nearly swoons," feels "a violent pain in her heart," "almost chokes with anger," "trembles with indignation." She violently attacks one of her rivals, stirs up the whole family against her, and finally drives her out. When another woman is set up as concubine, she moves heaven and earth to destroy her, provokes an abortion, and finally drives her to suicide.⁴⁰

Queens and princesses were particularly violent in their treatment of their rivals. The histories of the Sui and T'ang dynasties report that Queen Tu Ku killed her husband's concubine after she bore a son. Princess I Ch'eng cut off the nose, ears, and genitalia of her rival and threw them into her unfaithful husband's face in the presence of the assembled courtiers.⁴¹ The old annals are full of similar stories. Still more numerous are the tales of the battles of imperial concubines. In general it seems that the concubines, whose main function was the satisfaction of their masters' sexual desires, found it more difficult to avoid quarrels than did the legal wife. Thus the concubines of Hsi Men in *Chin Ping Mei* compete for his favors more aggressively than does his first wife who is sure of her position.

The concubine's position in general was precarious. She was legally a member of the family and was thus in a better position than a European kept woman. But she was in an inferior position as compared to the first wife. It was easy to divorce, or more accurately to throw out, a concubine who was protected neither by the "seven grounds for divorce" nor by the "three reasons" against it.

Concubines had to adjust themselves to the situation and not display their jealousy too violently. They protested only when the husband was monopolized by one at the expense of the others. But if Hsi Men's concubines did not mind sharing their husband, they were indignant at his escapades in brothels, with servants, or other women outside the family circle. Polygyny, too, has its laws! *

MOTHER

When a woman grew older she enjoyed certain advantages following from the subordination of the young to the old. The old mother and grandmother were greatly respected. But their power was never as complete as that of the old man. As long as her husband was alive the old woman occupied a secondary position. The Chinese "Sacred Books" contain no parallel to the maxim in the "Laws of Manu" (India): "The mother is a thousand times more venerable than the father."⁴² In conflicts between father and mother the son had to side with his father. As a widow the woman had a powerful position only as long as she had no adult relatives in the family who would act as family heads (her husband's father, brothers, uncles) and manage her children's property.

For all the devotion of the son to his mother, her female inferiority prevented her from dominating him as his father did, and the law urging the woman to obey her son after his father's death was never abrogated. Though highly respected, the old mother was not the official head of the family; the real power lay in the hands of her son.⁴³ The widespread idea of a Chinese dowager with enormous power⁴⁴ does not hold up under careful analysis of the position of women as represented, for example, in old Chinese fiction.

THE WIDOW

The devotion of her children was the only satisfaction of the widow. In China widows were treated less cruelly than in India—

* Certain 20th-century anthropologists refuse to follow their great 19th-century predecessors in their assertion that polygyny is a necessary concomitant to the inferiority of women in a given society. But as yet they have been unable to prove their theory that there is no correlation between the marriage system and the position of women. Thus, for example, among the eighteen pre-literate societies chosen by G. P. Murdock as typical of *Our Primitive Contemporaries*, in all the five monogamous societies the position of women is characterized as "high," whereas that is asserted of only one polygynous society and of two societies where polygyny was accepted but rather rare. The old Chinese society furnishes another example of the low position of women combined with polygyny.

they were not burned after their husbands' deaths. But their life was miserable. The pressure of public opinion prevented them from remarrying. The roads and streets of China are still full of monuments to faithful widows, erected during the empire. This fidelity was expected not only of widows but of unmarried brides as well.

What mitigated the lot of Chinese women was the characteristic moderation displayed by the Chinese in interpreting all rules of behavior. Fathers, sons, and husbands often yielded to women in order to avoid disagreeable conflicts. In the lower classes the women had to work harder but in compensation they enjoyed more freedom. In some families women even succeeded in achieving a position of power. But this was never officially sanctioned, and in the eyes of the community women remained without rights.*

* In one part of China, however, women enjoyed more freedom and influence than in the rest of the country. This was South China—the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Fukien. It is significant that women there from time immemorial worked in the fields and also as coolies, boatmen, and in other manual tasks. These working women never accepted footbinding and some of them protested against the old Chinese marriage practice.

VI

Family and Society

THE patriarchal family was not invented by Confucius and is not characteristic of China alone. Other civilizations too have had family structures in which the father was dominant and in which the family ties were strong. Until the Russian Revolution woman was considered inferior to man in all known societies, including the matrilineal. Yet the Chinese family had unique traits and was perhaps the most extreme expression of the patriarchal family in history.

The economic and political organization of China strengthened the power of the old father, founded his authority not only on fear and compulsion but also on genuine respect and admiration.

Chinese women, as we have shown, have been inferior economically and legally to their sisters in almost all known civilized societies. The most important of women's rights are: the right to economic property, the right to choose a mate, the right to sexual equality, the right to divorce, and the right to be protected against arbitrary repudiation. In China women had not one of these (if we except some means of protection against arbitrary divorce)—and had bound feet. Women in many other civilizations won more rights, perhaps because they played a greater role in production.

The stagnant character of the Chinese economy and political structure helped to preserve the authoritarian family even when its disintegration in the West had become far advanced. The same factor helped to preserve the solidarity of the extended kinship group, which promoted warmer relations and more obligations for mutual aid than prevailed in the West.

Finally, it should be remembered that the Confucian ideas tended more to strengthen the family than did Christianity, which influenced the formation of social structure in the West. To be sure, the Christian thinkers, like the Hebrew prophets who preceded them, stressed the importance of the family and respect for father and mother. But at the same time the church interfered with family life and put its authority above that of the parents.

To one who "hath left house, or parents, or brethren, or wife, or children, for the sake of the kingdom of God," Jesus promised

that he should "receive manifold more in this present time, and in the world to come, life everlasting."¹ This would not appeal to a Chinese educated in the spirit of Confucianism. He would not enjoy any rewards either in this life or in the world to come if he had to forsake his family. The fight of the Christian churches against the influence of the family has been one of the main barriers to the spread of Christianity in China.

Confucius saw no contradiction between the interests of the family and those of society, between family loyalty and community loyalty. For all the stress the Sage put on family relations, the strengthening of the family and kinship groups was to him a means of strengthening the state. As we have shown above, to him and his immediate followers the family was "the root of the state." The most important human relationship is that of subject and prince, and when Confucius lived the prince stood for the whole of society.

But this conception changed with time and in imperial China the family became an end in itself and the interests of the family began to contradict those of the community. The germs of this contradiction appear even in the early Confucian writings. Thus, Confucius taught that the son must defend his father regardless of the interests of the community.

"The people are upright in my part of the country," said the Duke of Ch'e; "if a father steals a sheep his son accuses him." "In my part of the country," replied Confucius, "the upright people behave differently. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, the son conceals the misconduct of the father."² Later on the imperial government followed the Sage's conception and forbade sons to denounce their parents. Further, junior relatives were forbidden to denounce senior relatives, and the wife to accuse her husband.

Confucius recognized friendship as an important human relationship, but later Confucian scholars stated that as long as his parents lived, a son should not die for his friend.³ The body of a son belongs to his parents and he cannot endanger it in any enterprise.⁴ This was often interpreted to mean that a filial son should not die for his country or for an ideal.

Furthermore, "if the son of old and poor parents refuses a lucrative position, he is unfilial."⁵ This remark of a late Han dynasty scholar, Chao Ch'i, in his commentary on Mencius expresses an idea widely accepted by Chinese public opinion which proclaimed any person immoral who did not use his position to help his parents and all his kin. This attitude led to the enormous growth of nepotism which was harmful to the interests of the state.

This contradiction was felt at the very beginning of the empire. The Confucian scholars tried to extend the notion of filial piety. Chang Tzu, in a passage of the *Li Chi* which follows the assertion that a filial son must be careful of his body, says: "If a man . . . in serving his ruler . . . be not loyal, he is not filial; if in discharging the duties of office he be not reverent, he is not filial; . . . if on the field of battle he be not brave, he is not filial."⁶ Chu Hsi, the famous twelfth-century commentator on Confucius, also tried to resolve this contradiction. "Undoubtedly, the main duty of a son is to behave properly in order to honor his parents by acquiring a good reputation; but one who knows how to preserve his body also knows how to lead a blameless life. No one should be careless with his body. How can one be permitted to dishonor his parents by wrong conduct?"⁷ The Emperors K'ang Hsi and Yung Cheng of the Manchu dynasty were thoroughly assimilated into Chinese culture, but they did not lose the military preoccupations of their warlike ancestors and tried to stimulate their soldiers' courage by identifying cowardly conduct with unfilial behavior.⁸

Yet the narrower interpretations of filial piety had more influence on the conduct of the Chinese. Excessive devotion to the family was a great handicap in the fight for the social and national liberation of the Chinese people begun in the twentieth century.

PART TWO

THE FAMILY IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA

VII

The Birth of Modern China

THE Chinese Empire is no more. The Revolution of 1911-12 put an end to the imperial regime and led to the proclamation of the Chinese Republic. The political revolution came as a result of the profound crisis which shook China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and which has not yet ended. This crisis differs fundamentally from those which periodically disturbed the slow course of imperial history without seriously affecting the foundations of Chinese society.

In the middle of the nineteenth century China was in dire straits. Land had been accumulated by rich landlords. Landless peasants suffered severe privations. Deprived of much of its tax revenue, the machinery of the government began to jam. Public works were in decay. All the classical calamities of old China made their appearance in the fatal decades between 1840 and 1870: floods, famine, rebellion (the Taiping), and foreign invasion. But out of this crisis a new China was born. The internal crisis coincided with the penetration into China of the dynamic influence of Western culture, and has resulted in the fundamental cultural change which we are witnessing now and which is instrumental in reshaping the family and human relations of the country.

China had come in contact with foreigners before. Contrary to the common view, she did not consciously pursue a policy of isolation until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and then only as a method of resisting foreign aggression.¹ The famous symbol of Chinese exclusiveness, the Great Wall, was a fortification not unlike the Maginot line. Nor was it more effective; the Mongols, Huns, and other nomadic invaders from Central Asia repeatedly penetrated into China and conquered it despite this impressive monument of Chinese military architecture. But the nomadic conquerors were unable to impose their own inferior culture on the old civilization, and their domination affected Chinese economic and cultural life only slightly, if at all.

China's first contacts with Europe, which began in the second century B.C., were episodic. After a sea route to China was discovered early in the sixteenth century, Europeans began to appear

in great numbers. The material wealth and spiritual values of feudal and early capitalistic Europe did not impress China as being superior or even equal to her own. With her self-sufficient economy and conservatism she did not need foreign trade. The Europeans wanted Chinese silk, porcelain, tea, and other commodities, but were not yet sufficiently strong to enforce trade. When they became aggressive they were driven out.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the power of the Chinese Government had decayed. At the same time the industrial revolution had enlarged the productive power of Europe, created the need for new markets, and provided Europeans with irresistible weapons.

China could no longer defy the West, and suffered one defeat after another. In 1842 the British won the Opium War; in 1860 China had to submit to England and France; 1895 brought a humiliating defeat by the Japanese; and in 1901 the united Western powers, including the United States, crushed an antiforeign popular uprising, the Boxer Rebellion.

But China's immense size and unity, coupled with rivalries among the aggressors, prevented her from being occupied by a single power as India had been, or parceled out like Africa. Upon the initiative of the United States the powers agreed in 1899 to the policy of the "open door," which guaranteed each one an equal opportunity to despoil the powerless Oriental colossus.

While retaining her formal sovereignty, China suffered great territorial losses and ceased to be genuinely independent. She became a semicolony, as Sun Yat-sen put it; a country nominally independent but for all practical purposes under foreign control.

The Western powers compelled China to open her ports to foreign trade. In these so-called "treaty ports" large territories were ceded to foreigners as "settlements" or "concessions." Though nominally Chinese, these territories were subject to foreign administration and law. Such concessions were granted in Shanghai, Tientsin, Canton, Hankow, Chiukiang, Chinkiang, and elsewhere. Huge levies were imposed on China after the foreign victories. Regular payment was insured by foreign supervision of the Chinese maritime and internal customs. Moreover, in 1842 China had lost her tariff autonomy; she was not allowed to levy more than 5 per cent ad valorem on all imported goods. This was a severe blow for Chinese industry at the very moment that it was beginning to develop. The foreigners interfered also with internal affairs. And

unlike the Manchus and the Mongols, the new foreign rulers of China tried to force their culture upon her.

The government's loss of prestige, aggravated by the arrogance of foreign businessmen and missionaries, furthered the disorganization of the administrative machine. Discontent and unrest spread throughout Chinese society. The long series of defeats shook the complacency of the Chinese intellectuals and their deep conviction that their country possessed the most perfect civilization in the world. They reluctantly admitted that the "Western barbarians" possessed superior mechanical devices, and the government decided to imitate them. In 1888 arsenals in Western style were built in Anyang and the first textile factory in China appeared in Shanghai; other factories and arsenals followed.² Private enterprise too began to introduce Western methods. In contrast to Japan, where similar attempts were crowned with success, these innovations did not succeed in transforming China into an industrial country strong enough to repel the foreigners. China's industrialization advanced slowly; the obstacles to be overcome were enormous. But once started, the process of industrialization could not be stopped. Modern factories producing iron, steel, chemicals, foodstuffs, and especially textiles sprang up on all sides. The number of spindles in cotton factories grew from 105,000 in 1896 to 500,000 in 1900.³

Modern methods were introduced in the iron and coal mines, and in transportation. In 1873 the first Chinese steamboats for river and coastal navigation were launched; in the 'nineties several railway lines connecting important cities were built by Chinese and foreign interests; in the 1920's automobiles and buses made their appearance on the roads.⁴

Foreign influences began to be felt more and more in China's cultural life. Foreign missionaries opened churches, religious societies, schools, and hospitals throughout the country; numerous translations of Western fiction and philosophical and technical literature were published. In the 'seventies the first group of thirty young Chinese was sent to study abroad; after a short interruption such pilgrimages in search of Western knowledge became a common occurrence and "returned students" became familiar figures in Chinese cities. New westernized services were created by individuals and government. Peasants and businessmen from South China began to emigrate to America and the South Seas, and those who came back brought with them new ideas.

New classes resembling those existing in the industrial West were superimposed on the old Chinese social structure.

Those merchants who engaged in foreign trade had to adopt foreign methods. The majority served as middlemen (compradors) between the foreign merchant princes and Chinese producers. Others were independent. Modern industry and banking produced new groups of industrialists and bankers.⁵

Another new social group arising out of the Chinese industrial revolution, the industrial working class, grew very rapidly. Together with the railway workers, sailors, miners, and skilled workers in public utilities, they formed a group distinct from the journeymen employed in handicrafts and from the unskilled coolies.

The modernization of the country also created new groups of intellectuals. The teachers in westernized schools were unlike those who taught classics in private homes, family schools, and a few old-time government schools; writers and poets found new functions in society; Western medicine brought with it the concept of a doctor superior in social standing to the old-fashioned physician; engineers, lawyers, newspapermen—these groups had never existed before. The character of the old ruling class of officials also began to change.

The new middle class was more ambitious than the old had been. The modern Chinese businessmen wanted power; they were backed in their demands by wealthy Chinese businessmen living overseas.

After China's defeat by Japan, it became obvious to many Chinese that the old regime was done for. Some liberal officials and literati, led by K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, tried to enact reforms and in 1898 won the young emperor Kuang Hsü over to their views. But the attempt failed. Three months later the emperor was confined by his powerful aunt, the empress Tzu Hsi, who again seized the reins of government and revoked all the new-fangled regulations.

Although the progressives who launched this early opposition movement might have been content with some reforms and perhaps a dynastic change, the rejuvenated Chinese middle class was more radical. In 1907 (two years after the creation of the revolutionary party, the Tung Meng Hui) Sun Yat-sen, its leader, formulated the demands of this class in his famous three principles: nationalism, democracy, and "livelihood." He held that to achieve political freedom a democratic republic had to replace the absolute

monarchy; a "livelihood," or decent living standards for the people, had to be achieved by social reforms. The first of these principles, nationalism, took on a new contour during the Chinese Revolution. It was first directed against the alien Manchu dynasty; later, in the 'twenties, its main purpose was to free China from the Western and Japanese imperialists.

The revolutionary movement directed by the Tung Meng Hui, working through innumerable secret societies, grew steadily and after several abortive revolts culminated in the Revolution of 1911-12. China was proclaimed a republic and Sun Yat-sen its president. But the old society had great powers of resistance. The revolution compromised with reactionary forces. Sun Yat-sen soon yielded his office to a bureaucrat of the old regime, General Yüan Shih-kai. Democratic parliamentarianism in the European manner, constantly sabotaged by Yüan and other officials still in power, did not work in China. Two attempts to restore the monarchy were made in the first six years of the republic.

In 1916, after Yüan's death, the disruption which followed the collapse of the monarchy became apparent. Several war lords—generals of the old army, new chiefs from the soldiers' ranks, former leaders of robber bands—began to compete for power. They held different provinces and defied the Central Government in Peking. Foreign powers increased the state of anarchy by playing off one war lord against another.

The first World War stimulated Chinese industry. Between 1916 and 1925 the number of spindles in the cotton industry increased from 1,200,000 to 2,500,000; ⁶ growth took place both in Chinese and in foreign-owned factories. The factory owners and industrial workers of Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, and other industrial centers acquired new prominence.

Shortly after the first World War a new upsurge of the revolutionary movement occurred. Sun Yat-sen gathered his forces in Canton. The three principles of the national revolutionary movement were reformulated. Unification of the country and its liberation from the war lords were put forward as political aims. The demands for social change and agrarian reform and the struggle against foreign imperialism were stressed more sharply. At the same time a wave of nationalism rose in the North, with students and intellectuals in the forefront.

Sun Yat-sen's party had been organized in 1912 under the name of the Kuomintang (the people's party). In 1917 it established a national-revolutionary government in Canton and soon sought the

help and advice of Soviet Russia. In 1923 a working agreement was concluded between the two governments and Soviet Russia sent its official representative, Borodin, to Canton. The Kuomintang found powerful help in organizations of peasant and industrial workers. In May, 1927, peasant unions had about 5 million members in Hunan, 1,200,000 in Kwangtung, 1,700,000 in Hopeh, 1 million in Honan.⁷ The number of workers in the newly organized trade-unions increased from 300,000 in 1922 to 3,065,000 in 1927.⁸ The Chinese Communist party was founded in 1920 by elements active in the peasant and workers' movements and in turn contributed to their further growth. The peasant and working-class organizations including the Communist party received inspiration and help from revolutionary Russia. Russian cultural influence began to spread.

By 1926 the Nationalist Movement had gathered enough momentum to attempt the liberation and unification of China by armed force. The famous Northern Expedition of 1926-27 was launched. The Nationalist Army swept from victory to victory and in the spring of 1927 reached the Yangtze Valley and occupied three important cities, Hankow, Wuchang, and Anyang.

But certain latent contradictions became apparent. Chinese merchants and industrialists who had large investments in land did not want to sacrifice them to the peasants and refused to make concessions to the labor unions. The Kuomintang, an upper- and essentially middle-class party, split and broke with the Communists; the Nationalist Army was divided and civil war broke out.

The Revolution of 1925-27 was never completed. Political unification remained nominal. In the early 'thirties the Central Government of Nanking had real power only over a few central provinces. China was a bureaucratic military dictatorship, a supposedly transitional stage on the way to a parliamentary system but the end of which was not yet in sight. Neither the labor problem nor the agrarian problem had been solved. The Communist party, despite persecution, was kept alive by continuous popular unrest, and carried on illegally in all the big cities of China and openly in the large territories of Kiangsi, Anhui, Honan, and Hupeh. Driven out of Central China by the government forces, the Communists won a new foothold in the Northwest, in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu.

In her relations with foreign powers China had achieved certain victories. The most important was the restoration of tariff auton-

omy in 1929. Yet the menace of foreign domination was as real as ever.

In 1931 Japan occupied Manchuria without encountering effective resistance. But the six years following the occupation were used by China to prepare to meet a new assault. The government reorganized and trained a modern army. The financial reforms of 1935 improved the economic condition of the country. Political unification made progress. The decision to resist aggression spread to all strata of the population. The Communists and the government of the Soviet districts had considered themselves at war with Japan since the occupation of Manchuria and multiplied their appeals for resistance. The strikes in the Japanese mills in Shanghai in 1936 and the students' movement of 1935-37—both having anti-Japanese slogans—had expressed the real feelings of the people. Finally Chiang Kai-shek came to terms with the Communists and with the dissenting generals in South China.

The contradictions and antagonisms of Chinese society had not been eliminated, but when the Japanese struck in the summer of 1937 they found a united nation which was able to put up a good fight.

All the events of the fateful hundred years that elapsed between the first Anglo-Chinese war and the war of 1937 had been unable to reshape China into a new economic, social, and cultural pattern. The China of today is a motley mixture. The powerful inherited remnants of imperial China exist side by side with elements imported from the West. There have also been original developments which may become the basis of a new culture and society. An appreciation of the relative strength of those elements in the basic social institution, the family, will help to forecast the shape of the new China that will emerge from this war.

VIII

The New Economic and Social Environment: Rural China

CHINA's economic organization today is essentially agrarian and the industrial development that has now been brought about in a few of China's large ports and cities counts very little in China's economic life at large," wrote Dr. H. D. Fong in 1931.¹ And indeed this statement by a prominent Chinese economist describes the situation adequately as far as China as a whole is concerned.

From 75% to 85% of China's population in the late 'thirties was peasants.² The per capita consumption of steel and iron was approximately 1/100 that of England, 1/180 that of the United States, and 1/30 that of the world average.³ The most highly developed Chinese industry, cotton spinning, had had at its disposal before the war only a little more than 5 million spindles, as compared to about 42 million in England and 28 million in the United States.⁴

The slowness of Chinese development becomes apparent when compared with the growth of the American cotton industry after the industrial revolution. "In 1800, America had two cotton mills, in 1810, 102. In 1786 a model of Arkwright's first machine was smuggled into the United States. In 1831 there were nearly 800 mills working 1,246,000 spindles and 33,000 looms."⁵ In America the number of mills increased 400 times in thirty years. In China in the forty years between 1896 (when intensive industrialization began) and 1936, the number of spindles increased from 105,000 to a little over 5,000,000 (50 times).

But for all that we must not forget that in the eastern coastal provinces where the great majority of the big industrial centers are situated, modern industry has become an organic part of economic life, and that industrialization and its accompanying new trends have indirectly influenced the whole country, even its nonindustrialized parts.

The following pages attempt to show the social conditions and

degree of modernization of the inhabitants of the different types of Chinese communities: of villages, small towns, nonindustrialized big cities, and modern industrial centers.

The conditions described here and in the following chapters were those prevailing between 1927-37. During this period China did not undergo substantial changes. The material used was supplied (1) by the field-work material collected for this study in 1936-37 through interviews, questionnaires, personal observations, and from records of the Social Service Department of the Peiping Union Medical College Hospital (referred to as PUMC); (2) by the best surveys of economic conditions in China in 1927-37: J. L. Buck, *Land Utilization in China* (Chicago, 1937); H. T. Fei, *Peasant Life in China* (London, 1938); Li Ch'ing-han, *Ting Hsien: She-hui Kai-kuan Chiao-ch'e* (*Ting Hsien: A Sociological Survey*) (Peiping, 1933); L. K. Tao, *Livelihood in Peking* (Peiping, 1928); S. Gamble, *How Chinese Families Live in Peiping* (London-New York, 1934); "Peiping I Chien Erh Pai P'in Hu-chih Yen-chiu" ("Investigation of the Life of Twelve Hundred Poor Families of Peiping") in *She-hui Hsüeh Chieh* (*The Sociological World*) (Department of Sociology, Yenching University, 1933), Vol. VII; S. Yang and L. K. Tao, *Standard of Living in Shanghai* (Institute of Social Research, Peiping, 1931); *Standard of Living of Shanghai Laborers* (Bureau of Social Affairs of the City Government of Greater Shanghai, 1934); and other works.

The material about rural China collected by J. L. Buck applied to 16,786 farms in 168 localities, and 38,256 farm families in 22 provinces in North, Central, and South China; the PUMC records deal predominantly with the peasants of the northern provinces, and especially of Hopeh and Honan; the author's interviews and personal observations relate to the peasants in Hopeh, Honan, Shantung in the North, Fukien and Kiangsu in the South. The small town and provincial capital described are typical of North and Central China. Peiping was studied by the author and other research workers because it is typical of the nonindustrial, tradition-bound large cities of China. As for industrial centers, three were chosen: Shanghai, the industrial capital of China; Tientsin, an important industrial center and treaty port in North China; and Wusih, the largest industrial center in the interior. Foreign capital played an important part in the industrial life of the two former centers, whereas Wusih was developed by Chinese capital exclusively. For facts on the occupational distribution of the families from whom information was secured through hospital records

and interviews, as well as for some details about the procedure used in collecting and evaluating material, see Appendix, Table I.

The author is fully aware of the limited value of statistical material used in this book. Chinese statistics in general are among the least reliable in the world. Many of the samples quoted below, which are accurate as far as they go, have too limited a base to be considered as statistical evidence. Yet they often confirm each other in a very remarkable way and their value as illustrations of conditions observed seems to be beyond doubt.

THE VILLAGERS AND THEIR PROBLEMS

The social composition of the rural population has not changed in these years of transition. As of old, the village community consists of farm laborers at the bottom and landlords at the top; peasant owners and tenants represent the bulk of the village population. Village peddlers, merchants, and artisans are members of peasants' families; most of them have some land. The village gentry, that is to say the local leaders, have come from the ranks of retired officials and educated members of landlords' and rich peasants' families. The only new elements, teachers in the modern government schools and members of local units of the so-called Rural Reconstruction Movement, are either sons of the landlords and well-to-do peasants or townsmen sojourning in the country.

The main problems confronting rural China are not new. The Chinese peasants still own but little land and pay excessive taxes and rent.

Chinese sociologists usually divide the peasants into three main groups: poor, middle, and rich.* There are no exact figures as to the relative strength of these three groups and they obviously vary in different parts of the country. We have only estimates by vari-

* The Chinese authors quoted did not mention the principles adopted in classification of peasants into different groups. Usually the size of farm holdings and the conditions of ownership (tenant or owner) are accepted by Chinese economists as the main indication of the economic status of the peasants. When classifying the peasants from whom information was secured for this study, the author took into consideration the two factors mentioned above, as well as the fact of employment of hired laborers by the peasants, and their income (when the information was available). In North China those having 10 mu or less were classified as poor peasants; those with 10 to 30 mu as middle peasants; those having over 30 mu as well-to-do. (One mu equals about one-sixth of an acre). Peasants employing laborers permanently were classified as well-to-do even if their landholdings were under 30 mu. In Kiangsu where the land is more fertile the average size of the farms of all three categories is smaller. The peasants of Fukien were classified according to their income and their employment of hired labor.

ous experts drawn from the results of selective investigations of rural conditions. Professor T'ao Chi-fu gives the following approximate picture for China as a whole. Landlords representing 4% of the rural families owned 50% of the land; well-to-do peasants, 6% of the families, owned 18% of the land; middle peasants, 20% of the families, owned 15% of the land; poor peasants and farm laborers, 70% of the families, 17% of the land.⁶

Landlords usually rent out their land to the peasants, and do not work it in a large-scale way. Only a few landlords stay in the villages, the rest live in the cities as absentee owners. It is estimated that about 50% of the Chinese peasants owned their land, about 30% were tenants, 20% owned part of their land and rented the rest.⁷ * The proportion of peasant owners was higher in the North than in the South. The usual rent paid by the tenants was about 45%-50% of the yield; sometimes it ran as high as 70%-80%.⁹ The peasant owners who do not pay rent have to pay high taxes. The average land tax in China in 1929-32 was \$1.79 (U.S. currency) per acre as compared to \$0.46 paid for all farm land in the United States in 1932.¹⁰ To appreciate what such taxes mean for the Chinese peasant, one has to keep in mind that the peasants' income in China is infinitely lower than that of farmers in the United States. In addition to high taxation there are all sorts of illegal extortions.

Numerous civil wars in the thirty years prior to the second Sino-Japanese War, combined with frequent floods, droughts, and famines, as well as the world economic depression, the decline of agricultural prices, and the disintegration of village home industry have imposed additional hardships.

To cope with high rents and taxes the peasants have to borrow money; 39% of the farms investigated by Buck †¹¹ were in debt during 1929-32. The average rate of interest was about 32% a year,¹² but according to the author's and H. T. Fei's information, cases were not uncommon of village usurers charging 50%-60% and more a month.¹⁴ In some cases relief was offered by money-saving societies, organizations existing in China from time immemorial, but many of the peasants and city poor could not afford to make contributions which would entitle them to take loans.

* Buck estimates the percentage of tenants as 17, of part owners as about 33.⁸

† In considering the results of Dr. Buck's study, which will often be quoted in this book, one has to remember that in his sample of 16,786 farms the proportion of poor peasant households (small farms) is lower and the proportion of well-to-do and landlord holdings is higher than in the estimates of the majority of Chinese economists for China as a whole.¹³

This situation has resulted in a permanent agrarian crisis, in the "bankruptcy of Chinese agriculture" as Chinese authors say. A great part of the peasants despite their hard work have been constantly on the brink of starvation. In 1924 C. B. Malone and J. B. Tayler, depicting the life of the peasant, wrote: "In all except the most plentiful years he is systematically underfed. . . . It is this grinding poverty of the rural areas which should be the ultimate aim of any comprehensive scheme for economic betterment of the people of China to remove."¹⁵ Fourteen years later the young Chinese anthropologist, Dr. Fei, summed up his investigation of peasant life in the words: "It is the hunger of the people that is the real issue in China."¹⁶ A Chinese economist confirmed his impression: "Even from a casual study, it seems clear that the land problem in China today is as acute as that of 18th century France or 19th century Russia."¹⁷ All authorities, Chinese and foreign, recognized long ago that only radical agrarian reform could solve the problem. No such reform was carried out by the Central Government.*

FOOD AND HOUSING

Like the poor elsewhere,† the Chinese peasant families have to spend the major part of their scanty incomes for food—mainly produced on their own farms. According to a survey made in the Ting Hsien (district) in Hopeh in 1932, the peasants spent 67%–72% of their income for food, 7%–8.5% for fuel and light, 6.5%–8% for rent, about 6% for clothing and 7%–10.5% for sundries, including gifts, wedding and funeral expenses, ancestor worship, interest for loans, etc.¹⁹

Staple foods have always been millet, kaoliang, sometimes wheat (in the North) and rice (in the South). This diet is supplemented by soya beans, cabbage, carrots, turnips; corn (in the North); sweet and white potatoes have been introduced in the last 200 years. Meat and eggs seldom appear on the tables of the poor and middle peasants, amounting to 2.3% of the food consumed in the rural families investigated by Buck. Vegetable oil and condiments are used in food preparation.²⁰

* Agrarian reforms were carried out by the Soviet Government in Kiangsi and later in the Northwest. After the occupation of the former Soviet districts in Kiangsi by the troops of the Central Government the old conditions were restored.

† The "Engelian Law" applies to China as well as to Western countries. According to this law, first formulated by Ernst Engel in the middle of the nineteenth century, an increase in income is always coupled with a relative decrease in food expenses and an increase in expenses for sundries.¹⁸

The homes of Chinese peasants are small, but the villages are not as congested as poor districts in the cities. The 402 farms surveyed by Buck in 1929-32 had an average of 5.6 *chien* * in North China and 4.5 *chien* in South and Central China; the average number of persons per *chien* was 1.3 for both North and South.²² Yet it should not be forgotten that in many peasant houses livestock is kept in the living quarters.†

It has often been asserted that the standard of living in the villages of East Central China (the provinces with the highest degree of industrialization) is higher than in North China.²³

NEW TRENDS IN THE CHINESE VILLAGE

The Chinese village has not remained unaffected by modern trends.

The surplus of farm labor and the new opportunities for industrial employment have induced an ever-growing number of peasants' families to send their sons and daughters to the cities. Many of these return home after a few years. They speak of their impressions, of new habits, tastes, and ideas. The development of transportation has brought the town and country closer together. All this has not failed to affect family life and family relations.

The village schools organized by the government undoubtedly have contributed to modernization. The new textbooks are written in the language spoken by the people and not in the old classical style. The teachers acquire some modern training in the cities. The school curriculum is no longer limited to the memorizing of classical books but includes some elementary knowledge of natural science, geography, history, modern agricultural methods, hygiene, and civics. The ideas of nationalism and patriotism, neglected by late Confucianism, are taught. Some new ideas about authority in the family and family relations have been sown by these new books.

* The unit of living space in China is not the room but the *chien*, that is, the space between the main rafters of the building. A room can coincide with the *chien* (and often does), can contain several *chiens*, or be only part of a *chien*. In the farms surveyed by Buck a *chien* averaged 173 square feet in South and Central China, 127 square feet in North China.²¹

† In 312 peasant families in North China, from whom information was secured for this study, the housing situation was as follows:

<i>Social Group</i>	<i>Number of chien per family</i>	<i>Average chien per family member</i>
Farm laborers	2.7	0.6
Poor peasants	3.9	0.7
Middle peasants	5.5	0.8
Well-to-do peasants	10.0	1.2

Modern teachers and high-school and college students, sons of landlords and well-to-do peasants, who come to visit their parents during their vacations, have contributed to the spread of new ideas.

The revolutionary peasant unions which were widespread in the country during the second revolution of 1925-27 were very active in propaganda for all kinds of new ideas. All these organizations, however, were suppressed after 1927.

The numerous organizations created in 1927-37 by the government, universities, mission and private societies, like the Village Reconstruction Movement, the Mass Education Movement, and other agencies, were also a factor in the modernization of the Chinese village. Their aims have been the improvement of local administration, the fight against illiteracy among adults, the introduction of new methods of agriculture, sericulture, and animal husbandry, the improvement of peasant handicrafts, the organization of local credit and consumers' coöperatives, etc., as well as of so-called local corps for defense against "banditism and communism," the two words that have often been used in China to designate popular unrest resulting from the poverty of the peasants.

Books, newspapers, and the few modern household gadgets that have found their way into the villages have also helped modernize the Chinese countryside. Yet all these innovations, important as they are, have not substantially changed the old picture.

The school system is palpably inadequate. In 1935 a population of about 450 million (i.e., about 100 million children in the age group 5 to 17) was served by 260,000 primary schools with 13,188,133 students;²⁴ that is to say, only 13%-15% of the youth of school age attended school.* The high schools and colleges served the sons of the landlords and of well-to-do peasants almost exclusively.

For all their progressive features, the new village schools are by no means perfectly modern institutions. The teachers themselves often have superficial notions of modernism and are conservative. The new textbooks stop short of advocating the complete reconstruction of Chinese life on the Western pattern.

Modern books and newspapers have found their way into the villages with great difficulty. For all the progress of elementary education the greater part of the peasants remain illiterate. Dr. Buck's investigation of literacy in 46,601 rural families in different parts of China revealed that 69.3% of the men and 98.7% of the

* In 1938 the United States with its population of 130,215,000 and 30,789,000 children in the age groups from 5 to 17 had 25,975,108 pupils enrolled in the public schools—that is, 84.4% of children of school age.²⁵

women were illiterate.²⁶ Even those classified as knowing how to read and write were for the most part unable to read a newspaper or a book. The difficulty of Chinese script makes relapse into illiteracy more common than in the West and explains the high percentage of semiliterate people, acquainted with only a limited number of characters and unable to read current literature. Moreover, modern books and newspapers often employ foreign constructions and expressions and thus are difficult for the untrained.*

The list of organizations, local branches, and activities of the Village Reconstruction and similar movements appears more impressive on the printed pages of reports and reference books²⁷ than is justified by the actual part they have played in the village life of prewar China. To quote one example: In 1936, among the 400 million inhabitants of rural China, there were 1,643,670 nominal members of coöperative societies (credit, mutual aid, productive, consumers' societies), and 1,551,950 of these lived in 11 leading provinces.²⁸ Despite many efforts very few new agricultural methods have been adopted widely.

VIEW OF A CHINESE VILLAGE

In 1933-37, traveling through the immense plains of North China and hilly valleys of the South, one saw the traditional methods of agriculture still employed in the villages. Ploughs and harrows were dragged by cows, and occasionally by men, in the North; men waded in the flooded rice fields in the South; millstones were turned by blindfolded donkeys and mules in the North and by solemn-looking water buffaloes in the South—and sometimes men, women, and children took their places.

* In 22 families of farm laborers interviewed in North China only 2 persons could read newspapers; there were 5 readers of newspapers in 24 families of poor peasants and tenants, and 4 in 14 families of middle-class peasants. Among families of well-to-do peasants and teachers the proportion of people able to read newspapers was much higher—17 persons in 14 families interviewed. Only 6 persons in 77 families from whom information was obtained read modern books; 4 of these were related to wealthy families or teachers. Thirty-two villagers were found to read the classics, such as old popular novels and sometimes the "Sacred Books"; of these 13 were rich peasants and teachers, 9 middle-class peasants, and 10 farm laborers and poor peasants. Not a single member of 12 poor and middle peasant families interviewed in Fukien read newspapers or modern books, although 12 persons read old books. The percentage of readers of newspapers and modern books among the well-to-do peasants, small landlords, and businessmen was higher here than in Hopeh. Only 1 woman out of 77 families in Hopeh and 6 women out of 40 families in Fukien read old books; none read modern works.

It must be borne in mind that our informants represented elements whose education level and degree of modernization were somewhat higher than the average.

To take a case in point, in the family of a small landlord in Shantung where the author stayed in 1936, only three new elements had been introduced into the labor process: new spades somewhat lighter than the old and shaped somewhat differently; modern fertilizers; and eggs of silk worms purchased at the agricultural station of a near-by town. This was one of the most prosperous families in the village, a family which had one son at college and a daughter in high school.

Improvements have been few though badly needed. In the twentieth century Chinese agriculture has lost its original efficiency. The great discoveries of agricultural chemistry and the improvement of agricultural machinery during the nineteenth century have put Western agriculture far ahead of that of China.*

A number of experts on Chinese agriculture attribute the failure of private and governmental agencies to improve the agricultural process to the fact that the agrarian problem remains unsolved: the farms are too small, taxes and rents too high to leave a margin for investment in new tools or experiments with new methods.⁸⁰

The Chinese village shows more signs of modernity around the house. Some modern objects can be found in peasant homes along with old furniture, household utensils, and tools that may have belonged to their fathers and grandfathers. Of these, factory-made cotton cloth may be mentioned first. Lamps have replaced the old bean-oil wicks even in poor homes. In the villages of North China cans with the trade-mark of Standard Oil or the Asiatic Oil Company are common and are used in the most surprising ways—for buckets, roofing, and stoves. Galoshes have become rather popular in recent years.

There are many more such objects in well-to-do homes. Many rich peasants have clocks and watches, wash with Western-style soaps, dry themselves with Turkish towels (very popular in China), and light their way through the dark streets with flashlights, perhaps the most widespread of all modern gadgets. Sometimes the walls of rich peasant homes are adorned with photographs of the members of the family. Various Western drugs have grown increasingly popular.

Still higher in the social scale, in the homes of landlords one can find foreign mirrors, razors, and hair clippers, and sometimes even battery radios. Young students often bring bicycles from the cities.

* A comparison of the yields of six different crops shows that for all except rice China occupies one of the last places. Even in rice China is outstripped both by Japan and Italy.²⁹

Many well-to-do peasants, too, find bicycles useful and at least in the coastal provinces they have become a common sight. The Chinese have developed astonishing skill at maneuvering their often-repaired, heavily loaded bicycles on the narrow mud roads.

Bicycles and buses, men without pigtails, young women with normal feet, dilapidated temples, occasional glass windows, foreign-style caps and hats—these are the signs of the new times in the streets of Chinese villages. Only in the communities of returned emigrants in Kwangtung and Fukien are there modern dwellings. Usually the houses in the villages are, as in the past, one-story buildings with slanting roofs built of stone in the South and of mud in the North. The mud houses are usually built as they were in prehistoric times: the wall is made of pounded earth placed between two boards.³¹ The houses have no windows overlooking the streets; when passing through villages and small towns one sees only walls and gates. A path leads from the gate to an inner court, but not directly, for a screen is placed against the gate. Most houses consist of one building of one or two rooms, but in the compounds of wealthier people there are several courts and houses.

In addition to the house, a peasant homestead has a barn and cattle shed; adjoining the house are vegetable gardens and often fruit and mulberry trees. The fields are often situated at a considerable distance from the village, and the strips of land belonging to the individual peasant families may be widely scattered—as in olden times.

Inside the house the main feature is still the large brick bed called the *k'ang*, on which the family sleep at night, eat, and sit during the winter, when the heat carried through the flues built inside the *k'ang* makes it the warm spot of the room. All the simple furniture—a few chests, chairs, and tables—is in the old style.

Nor have there been many changes in dress. Both men and women wear trousers and jackets, though different in style. They are usually made of cotton which is padded for winter. From time to time one can see a man in a long gown—the traditional everyday garb of those who are better off and the peasant's "best suit." The long women's gowns that became so common in the cities after the revolution, and which many Chinese women wear abroad, are unusual in the countryside. In 1936 these gowns worn by women professors from Peiping aroused almost as much attention as the author's foreign dress in the villages of western Shantung. The feet of the young women are usually not bound, but in many villages the old custom has not been abandoned and there are

everywhere enough old and middle-aged women left to remind one of the power of tradition.

Children usually wear trousers and short jackets. In the summer little boys, sometimes as old as eleven or twelve, can often be seen running around completely naked—for the sake of economy, no doubt. The girls, however, always wear trousers, though the upper part of their bodies is often left uncovered.

The Chinese peasants amuse themselves as their grandfathers did. The men like to go to tea houses. The local stage provides opportunities for performances of traveling jugglers and of actors playing mostly dramas dating from the Yüan dynasty and dramatized episodes from *The Three Kingdoms*, written in the thirteenth century. In the villages and small towns the peasants listen to storytellers relating with great dramatic skill episodes from the picaresque novel *All Men Are Brothers*, the exploits of the heroes and villains in *The Three Kingdoms*, or various sad and gay adventures from other stories, the rich Chinese literature of the past providing ample material.

To all appearances, in the conflict of old and new in the Chinese village the old tradition has given a good account of itself.

IX

The New Economic and Social Environment: Urban China

THE CHINESE CITIES

SMALL TOWNS

It is difficult to draw a precise line between rural and urban China. When one leaves the villages and enters the walls of a small town—a *chen* (market place) or *ch'ü* (center of a lower administrative unit)—one finds few characteristics of urban life. The inhabitants are mainly peasants and artisans; the well to do are landlords, retired officials, and merchants who, in these unsettled times, prefer the relative security offered by city walls to life in villages exposed to raids by robber bands.

A rural atmosphere also characterizes the streets of the 1,950 district seats (*hsien*). The *hsiens*, however, are real towns and here modern trends are clearly discernible, although the old traditions are still dominant. Behind the stone walls of the *hsiens* are not only old-style markets, but also regular shops, large workshops, and even some manufacturing establishments. The administration building in a district is the *yamen*. Inside its gates, guarded by the inevitable two stone lions, are numerous courts with offices, courtrooms, prisons, sometimes training centers of the local militia, and the homes of the district chief and his helpers. On the office walls are pictures of Sun Yat-sen and sometimes of Chiang Kai-shek and local leaders, as well as posters propagandizing the ideas of the New Life Movement, a reform organization aiming to improve morals and manners. Opium smoking is the chief target of the posters, and footbinding an occasional one.

The appearance of the officials in the *hsiens* is indicative of the degree of modernization of their districts. Those who wear long Chinese gowns are usually old-fashioned men trained in traditional ways. Modern-minded officials wear black coats with high collars, the so-called "Sun Yat-sen jackets," and tight trousers tucked into black or khaki puttees—a Western garment common in China. In

the eastern provinces these "black-coated officials" are in the majority.

The dignified buildings of Confucian temples with dreamy shadowy courts have usually been converted into schools or museums. Many former Buddhist or Taoist temples are used as workshops. There is hardly a hsien without its Catholic or Protestant mission and these missions have introduced residential buildings of foreign architecture—churches, schools, and hospitals.* Some hsiens also have Chinese hospitals with doctors trained in the West. The schools are run by teachers trained in modern institutions. Foreign goods are displayed in stores along with Chinese merchandise. Modern books and newspapers from Shanghai, Peiping, and provincial capitals can be had.

THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL

The provincial capitals in the more developed provinces offer a picture that would startle the Chinese of past generations. Only a few of these cities, mainly in the eastern provinces, have enough modern factories to deserve the name of industrial centers, but almost all have power plants, electric lights, flour mills, match and soap factories, telegraph and telephone installations, as well as modern schools, colleges, hospitals, hotels, and Christian churches. Sometimes there are private houses and government buildings inspired by European architecture of Edwardian times. Some streets are paved with asphalt. Many business houses use

* The first Catholic converts appeared in China in the 16th century. In 1937 there were in China about 3 million Catholics led by more than 5,000 European and American priests (in addition to the Chinese priests). They maintained 415 orphanages for 3,087 boys, 24,781 girls, and 73,217 infants; 2,985 primary schools (123,389 pupils); 58 high schools for boys (11,335 students), 45 high schools for girls (7,267 students); three universities (1,321 students and 908 preparatory students); 236 hospitals and homes for the poor, ministering to 90,452 invalids and 6,331 old people; about 10,000 people a year received treatment in Catholic dispensaries.

The Protestants whose work in China began much later (in the early 19th century) claimed only half a million converts. In 1935 they maintained 1,130 missionary stations with 6,150 foreign missionaries. Their educational activities were more widespread than those of the Catholic Church. About 150,000 boys and girls were educated in Protestant primary schools, 47,940 boys and girls studied in their high schools, and 7,098 in the 16 Protestant universities and colleges. In 1937, 271 Protestant hospitals, among them some of the highest repute, such as that of the Peiping Union Medical College, treated 250,000 patients; and about 4½ million patients were treated in their clinics and dispensaries.¹

In the early 'thirties the Catholics were active mainly among the lower classes, whereas the Protestants made considerable headway among the middle and upper classes. Their excellent schools generously subsidized from abroad have been the main basis of their influence. This influence, however, has expressed itself less in conversions to Christianity than in spreading the general values of Western civilization.

foreign types of advertising and even neon lights. On street corners loud-speakers broadcast news and music from Shanghai or Nan-king, adding a new note to the traditional noises of the Chinese street. Long modern gowns, rare in the hsiens, are frequent. Universities, normal schools, and technical institutes provide the city and its provinces with a modern intelligentsia. Local newspapers print Chinese and foreign news.

PEIPING

In 1937 Peiping was a city of about a million inhabitants and the seat of the Hopeh-Chahar regional government. The population consisted mainly of artisans and journeymen, unskilled laborers (coolies), merchants and shop clerks, active and retired officials, scholars, landlords, and rentiers. Goods for household use like porcelain, pewter, copper and iron articles, lacquer, rugs, textiles, and foodstuffs were produced by various firms. Most of these establishments were workshops in the traditional style; only a few small factories used machines. Numerous stores displayed modern and old-fashioned goods on the main thoroughfares, glowing with neon lights, like the Chinatowns of New York and San Francisco.

Peiping had a power plant, a sewage system, trolley cars, buses, and several cinemas and theaters. Private automobiles contrasted with coaches of Victorian design. But most passengers were transported in small rikshas drawn by men; men also carried loads on their heads, in wheelbarrows, or on bicycles; the dead were transported in enormous coffins on human shoulders. Part of the city was provided with plumbing, but the majority of the population had to buy water from water carriers, conspicuous on the streets. Numerous hawkers peddled haberdashery, vegetables, soup and noodles, soft Chinese wheat bread, yellow corn bread and pastries, loudly praising their merchandise.

Magnificent imperial palaces, temples, and private residences in traditional Chinese architecture dominated the city; the numerous buildings of Western design (as a rule rather unattractive) gave a different tone to a few streets in the center and to the so-called Legation Quarter where the foreign residents were concentrated.

The public buildings of the last decade before the second Sino-Japanese War combined Western conveniences and improvements with old Chinese architecture. Such for example are the beautiful Peiping Public Library, Peiping Union Medical College, Yenching University.

Although no longer the nation's capital, Peiping remained one of the important centers of Chinese intellectual life.

Fourteen of the 107 Chinese universities, colleges, and technical schools were located in Peiping. There were numerous high schools. Many professors in the Christian universities and government institutions of higher learning were foreigners. Many intellectuals and officials had close contact with foreigners. "Foreign devils" were a common sight in the old capital. Nobody turned his head when they passed and only children greeted them with a friendly "hello—good-bye"; two English words familiar to every Peiping urchin.

SHANGHAI, CHINA'S METROPOLIS

Shanghai was the foremost industrial city of China. In 1934-35, 65 of the 141 Chinese cotton mills as well as a large proportion of the other industrial plants of the country were concentrated in Shanghai.² An important commercial center serving the fertile Yangtze Valley, with far-flung connections all over China, it was also the largest banking center of the country.

The city was one of the treaty ports.* In 1935 Shanghai had 3,689,161 inhabitants³ and large parts of it had become foreign concessions. It was divided into three parts: (1) the International Settlement, administered by a municipal council elected by the taxpayers and controlled by foreign powers; (2) the French Concession, ruled by a council elected by French taxpayers; and (3) the Chinese city proper, with a Chinese administration.

Shanghai was an important intellectual center. It was the home of most Chinese publishing; 90% of China's books, magazines, and newspapers were produced there. Their relative freedom attracted to the International Settlement and the French Concession many of the best-known Chinese writers and intellectuals.

Although a large part of it was administrated by foreigners, Shanghai was a Chinese city. Only 57,607 (6.4%) of its inhabitants were foreigners.⁴

It was the most modern city in China. Yet even in Shanghai traditions maintained their hold. The modern factories did not destroy the old Chinese handicrafts, and the side streets of the Chinese city and of the International Settlement were full of small workshops of the traditional type, sometimes utilizing a few modern techniques. Foreign-made cars were less numerous than rikshas. Although modern dress was a common sight, the traditional garb predominated. Many streets were in no way different from those of Peiping, Hanchow, or Paoting.

* See p. 60.

OTHER INDUSTRIAL CITIES

Canton, the capital of the rich Kwangtung province in South China, was in imperial times China's main passageway to the world. Its extensive commerce helped create a large and enlightened upper middle class which in the first quarter of the twentieth century led China's struggle for political and national emancipation. Before the war commerce was the main source of income for the 950,000 inhabitants,⁵ but industry (silk and cotton mills) was developing too. The city looked very modern and was one of the most beautiful in China.

Tientsin in North China, situated on the Hai River, had 1,500,000 inhabitants and was divided into foreign and Chinese districts. It was an important industrial and educational center. In 1937 it had several cotton, woolen, rug, tobacco, and other factories.⁶ Nankai University, destroyed by the Japanese at the very beginning of the war, was one of the best in China.

Wusih, situated in the center of the province of Kiangsu on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, had 170,000 inhabitants.⁷ In imperial times the city was an important trading center for rice, and retained that status until the war. The first cotton mill was established there in 1891, soon after the opening of the first modern factories in Shanghai. In 1930 the district of Wusih had 205 factories using machine power and employing 120,000 workers.⁸ In 1936, according to local information, there were about 50 silk factories, 7 cotton-spinning mills, 10 textile factories, several flour mills, rice-husking mills, etc.

Wusih was the foremost industrial city in the interior of China; its population was often characterized as "advanced" and the Mass Education Movement made considerable progress here. It was also known as "Little Shanghai," but unlike Shanghai and other treaty ports, its development was only indirectly influenced by foreigners. Foreign capital was not allowed to set up factories; most of the foreign missions in the city were run by the Chinese.

*SOCIAL CLASSES IN URBAN CHINA**THE WORKING CLASS AND LOWER MIDDLE CLASS**The Tradition-bound Group*

The conditions of those members of the working class and lower middle class in Peiping * who earned their living by traditional

* The working class, as the term is used in this study, comprises wage earners engaged in manual labor; the members of the lower middle class are workers who do

pursuits may be regarded as typical of this group for all China, though the coolies and artisans of Shanghai have doubtless been more affected by modern trends, and corresponding groups in hsien towns in the interior of China less so. Since Peiping is a non-industrial city, few of its workers belonged to new categories such as railwaymen, trolley-car personnel, power-plant workers, etc. There were not enough of these to influence the character of the working class and they did not form a separate group, although their wages were somewhat higher than the average earnings of workers in traditional occupations.

The wage earners and the lower middle class are closely connected and intermarry. Most of the peddlers were formerly workers or peasants. Artisans like shoemakers or tailors, not employing laborers and working at home, easily shift to home employment for a larger shop or even begin work in shops. Among the riksha coolies—the largest occupational group in Peiping and in Nanking—there was hardly one who had not been in some other occupation. Drawing a riksha requires no particular skill and serves as a refuge for unemployed workers, ruined businessmen, and even dismissed officials.

Wage earners and members of the lower middle class have intimate contacts with the soil. Many workers, apprentices, riksha coolies, servants, and others of this class belong to families living in the country: they send money to their rural homes, leave their wives and children with their old folks, and regard their sojourn in the city as temporary, even when they spend their entire lives there.* Evidently a nonindustrial city does not induce many peasants' sons to establish their families in it, although there are exceptions to this rule.

Working Conditions. The workers of Peiping had to work hard, usually from sunrise till dusk, with two pauses for meals. Sometimes their employers exploited the modern advantage of electricity to prolong working hours till after dark. Some of our informants started work at 4 A.M. and ended at 11 P.M. Even if work not receive wages or salary but are paid directly by their customers: e.g., small artisans, riksha coolies, peddlers, and so on.

The standards of living of the two groups are very similar, although the lower middle-class people are for the most part somewhat better off than the workers.

Sales clerks whose pay does not exceed \$30.00 a month should have been grouped with the working class like other wage earners, but as in their standard of living and social contacts they approach the lower middle class, they have been classified in it.

* Of the 426 families from whom information was secured in 1936, 112 or 26.3% still owned land (from 1 to 15 mu); many of those having no land had near relatives in the village.

in these old shops is less intense than in Western industrial plants, the long hours involve great hardships. There are no Sunday holidays. The only holidays are the New Year (from 5 days to 3 weeks); two festivals connected with ancestor worship (the Ch'ing Ming Festival in the spring, the Chung Ch'iu in the fall), and the Dragon Boat festival in midsummer (1 to 2 days each). In addition, some shops and stores give their employees one month's vacation every year or two months every two years.

The majority of the workshops and stores require their workers to live on the premises. They are not allowed to leave after working hours except on holidays. This arrangement is considered advantageous from the point of view of discipline, but its influence on the family life of the workers is disastrous. The majority of those interviewed seldom saw their families; some who came from the country had not seen their families for two, three, or four years.

The work of the riksha coolies, free artisans, and peddlers is not regimented since they have no bosses, but economic necessity compels them to work as long; they have no more holidays than workers in the shops.

*Income.** What is the payment for such labor? The wages of workers and shop clerks in traditional shops ranged from \$2 to \$15 † a month. Wages of \$3 to \$5 a month were common. (About 30% of our informants belonged to this group.) Artisans, such as carpenters, painters, masons, bicycle repairers, made from 10 cents to \$1 a day but their income was irregular.

The significance of these figures will be better understood if we remember that, according to the calculations of the Social Service Department of the Peiping Union Medical College Hospital in 1936, \$2.60 a month was the minimum required to feed an adult male. It is not surprising that few workers have been able to maintain their families by their individual wages. Other members besides the father had to work. The average monthly income from wages for the whole family was \$14.75; including other sources of income it was \$16.90.‡

* Information on wages was secured from about 800 workers and members of the lower middle class in Peiping (patients of the Peiping Union Medical College Hospital, 1934-37); the data about the income of families was secured from 86 people interviewed in 1936-37.

† Chinese dollars; at the time of the investigation its value was about one third that of the American dollar.

‡ It must be kept in mind that the average income of the 48 families of riksha coolies investigated by L. K. Tao in 1927 was, from wages alone, \$15.57; including other sources, \$17.21.⁹ The group interviewed for this study (as well as those investigated by Tao and the lowest group in the Gamble survey) has an average income

This income is often insufficient, the people are forced to borrow from money-lenders, pawnshops (there were more than eighty pawnshops in Peiping in 1929), and from relatives and friends. These loans cannot really help the badly paid workers who are the only source of income of their families. They can provide sufficient food only to a limited number of family members. This situation has resulted in high mortality rates among children and old people and a subsequent decrease in the size of poor families.*

Standard of Living. As among the peasants, food is the biggest item on the budgets of the Peiping workers and coolies. The expenses of the 48 families investigated by Tao in 1927 were distributed as follows: food, 71.2%; rent, 7.5%; clothes, 6.8%; fuel, light, and water, 11.3%; miscellaneous, 3.1%.¹⁰ Nine years later, in fifteen families interviewed whose income was from \$5 to \$15 a month, expenses for food took 67% to 71% of the total budget.

The diet and clothing of these people is the same as that of their relatives in the country. They eat mostly cereals and vegetables with a great many condiments. Rice as well as meat (mainly pork) and fruit are eaten only on holidays in connection with religious ceremonies. As for clothing, the only articles differing from those worn in the country are men's woolen scarfs, felt hats, knitted caps, and the leather shoes worn by some of the better-paid workers.¹¹

Housing. The poor people in Peiping live in two kinds of houses: those originally built for them and those that had been inhabited by well-to-do tenants and were rented to the poor when Peiping lost its status as the national capital and many of the former inhabitants left the city. Houses of the first sort are similar to houses in the country. Those of the second kind are built of brick with wooden or stone floors and tile roofs. Some have glass windows.

All are overcrowded. The 482 families from whom information was secured in 1934-36 had an average of 2.5 rooms per family with one room for 1.7 persons. The people who had to live in the shops were even worse off: 9, 10, sometimes 20 men had to sleep in one small room. Many shops had no dormitories: their workers had to sleep in the room in which they worked.†

somewhat higher than that of the Peiping lower classes taken as a whole. The groups surveyed for this study included only a small proportion of beggars and paupers, the groups surveyed by Tao and Gamble did not include them at all.

* See pp. 102 ff., 155 ff.

† Among the families investigated by Gamble only 3 of the 30 families having an income of less than \$15 a month had more than 1 room and none had more than 2. Of the 116 families with an income of less than \$25, only 3 had more than 2 rooms.¹²

Overcrowded as they are, the city poor are not able to follow the teachings of Confucius about the separation of sexes. It is not difficult to imagine the effect of these conditions on family life and morality.

Case No. 1, a 23-year-old husband slept in his workshop. His mother, his 20-year-old wife and 16-year-old brother slept on one k'ang.

Case No. 2, a young sister came to help her married sister. She, her sister, her sister's husband and child slept on one k'ang. (The young girl became pregnant.)

Overcrowding is somewhat alleviated in the summer, when families spend much time in the courtyards. These courts, however, are not very large and are used by at least 8 or 9 families who often cook in them. This arrangement contributes to neighborliness. Social workers of the hospital of the PUMC often found neighbors very helpful and friendly toward their patients.

Furniture and utensils belonging to these families are limited and old fashioned. Here again all the objects save some enamel dishes and occasional flashlights and, of course, the cloth of garments and bedding, come from old-fashioned workshops and not the factories of Manchester, Osaka, or Shanghai. Chinese handicraft goods, contrary to most predictions, are cheaper than factory-made goods—the low standard of living of handicraftsmen explains this.¹³ Only in recent times have the Japanese been able to compete successfully with Chinese artisans.

Organizations, Cultural Standards. As of old, journeymen and independent artisans are organized in guilds bearing some similarities to the artisans' guilds of medieval Europe. The guilds are dominated by the employers¹⁴ and offer no real protection to the workers. Numerous regional organizations serve to unite the people of one province or district.

The poor of the cities are somewhat better informed and more influenced by modern trends than the poor of the country. Many families send their children to schools and the rate of literacy is higher in the city than in the country.*

* In 32 of 58 families from whom information was secured for this study there were men who read newspapers. Among our informants shop assistants were more literate and had more interest in politics than any other category; next, in order, came workers in modern establishments (railwaymen, hospital workers, etc.), peddlers, servants. Workers in old-fashioned shops were the lowest in the scale. Seventeen persons in the 58 families investigated read old novels written in the vernacular and 3 were even able to understand new books. Several men told us that they would read if they had more time and money to buy newspapers. The women were backward—only 2 in the 58 families read newspapers, and only one read old novels.

The Peiping worker is not totally ignorant. This is revealed by intelligence tests on record in the Peiping Union Medical College Hospital. For example, one of the workers tested, who had attended a hsien school for two years, knew most of China's provinces and their approximate geographical location. He also knew the different dynasties of China in chronological order and could name the principal emperors. The men in the shops at which the author stopped a few times to have her bicycle repaired had a pretty good notion of what was going on in Europe. Unfortunately, political discussion was dangerous at the time this study was made.

Even the women of Peiping had some idea of political events and new trends. They spoke of the Japanese, the new fashions, of the girl students and their boy friends, and discussed the strange ways of foreigners—topics almost unknown among their rural sisters.

Industrial Workers

The new times have created a new group of industrial workers. Their working conditions, standard of living, relation to their employers, education, and degree of exposure to new trends differ substantially from those of the workers in traditional occupations.

The number of industrial workers in China before the war cannot be stated exactly. Several estimates, however, have been made. In 1930 the Department of Industry counted 1,204,317 industrial workers in the 9 most developed provinces with 29 industrial centers. In 1933, according to the *Chinese Economic Yearbook*, 658,178 workers were in factories employing machines and 30 or more workers. Together with 200,743 miners and 107,500 railway and postal workers, this would bring the total up to 966,421.¹⁵ Of this number 390,000 were engaged in the textile industry, the most developed branch of modern industry in China. The fact that the large industrial plants were massed in a few important centers (about half of the industrial workers were in Shanghai)¹⁶ gave their workers more influence than their numbers alone would warrant. The trends observed in their family life are indicative of future developments in China as a whole.

What proportion of the Chinese workers had proletarian parents? Eighty-seven male industrial workers in Shanghai (mainly fathers of families, between 30 and 50 years old) were questioned as to their fathers' occupations. The men questioned were 44 textile workers, mainly half skilled or unskilled, and 43 highly skilled workers in public utility companies (water works and electrical

power plants). Twenty-three of the textile workers were sons of peasants and farm laborers, only 4 were sons of industrial workers, 4 of other kinds of wage earners. Among the 43 employed in public utilities 19 came from the village, 12 were sons of industrial workers, and 3 belonged to families of artisans and journeymen. The remainder in both groups consisted of sons of declassed merchants, clerks, and petty officials. From 5 no information was obtained.

The results of our investigation of this small but typical group of workers seem to confirm the general view that the great majority of Shanghai workers came from the country. Yet it is not without significance that there was already a group of workers of the second generation, this category being rather considerable among the skilled workers. The presence of many declassed elements in a working-class group is natural in a society in a state of transition.

The percentage of sons and daughters of peasants among the 1,800 workers in the Ch'ing Feng cotton mill in Wusih (according to the data contained in their personal records) was 62%, i.e., somewhat higher than in Shanghai.

Yet the Shanghai workers still had a close contact with the soil not only through their kinship ties (all sons of peasants had relatives in the country and so did several of the townsmen), but also through their property. Thus 28 textile workers (out of 44) and 13 employees of public utilities (out of 43) still owned land. With the majority of them this ownership was purely formal: they derived no income from it (they left the land to their brothers and other near relatives), only retaining title as security against possible unemployment. Some of them rented their land. Several workers expected to inherit land from their fathers.

Working Hours and Wages. In the majority of the big factories in Shanghai the average working day in 1937 was 10 hours and 40 minutes: 12 was the maximum, 8 the minimum.¹⁷ Among workers interviewed, those working for the public utilities were on the job 8 to 9 hours, those in the Hsing Hsin textile mill 9 to 10 hours per day. The hours of women workers interviewed (employed in textile, tobacco, food, and miscellaneous factories) ranged from 9 to 12 hours.

Several modern establishments, including the public utilities and the Hsing Hsin textile factory, where many of our informants were employed, introduced Sunday holidays for their workers and the traditional Chinese holidays were shortened. But in most cases the old holidays were shortened for industrial workers without introduction of the Sunday holiday. Yet generally the industrial

workers had shorter hours than those who were engaged in traditional industries. They had more time to stay at home with their families and to supervise their children's education.

In 1937 the average monthly earnings of Shanghai male workers were as follows: ship construction men, \$40.92; printers, \$36.17; machine workers, \$26.00; flour-mill workers, \$16.58; tobacco workers, \$14.68; silk weavers, \$18.66; cotton weavers, \$15.84; cotton spinners, \$10.54.¹⁸

The monthly wages of the group interviewed were: Textile workers (Hsing Hsin cotton mill): men, \$8.00-\$35.00, average \$15.30; women, \$6.50-\$24.00, average \$9.28. Public utilities: (men), \$12.00-\$60.00, average \$32.00. Various other industries: \$10.00 (workers on steamships)—\$60.00 (printers).*

The Shanghai worker also had a hard time supporting his family on his wages alone, as did the worker in Peiping. The minimum food expenses for an adult male were about \$5.00 a month. Workers from the country solved the high cost of living in the traditional Chinese way: they left their wives and children in the village. This solution, however, was less often adopted by the industrial workers than by those in traditional occupations. Among our informants the heads of 32 smaller families (23 of them workers in public utilities) managed to maintain their families on their wages alone; some of the families received income from land, some had their own houses and did not have to pay rent; some took larger apartments and sublet rooms to other workers; some took boarders. Most frequently the need for a larger income was met by other members of the family going to work. Wives, daughters, and sons found it easy to get jobs in modern Shanghai.

The textile workers, whose pay was lower than that of the public utility workers, more frequently sent members of their family to work. Consequently the average family income in two groups of our informants was almost identical: \$40.45 and \$40.55 a month.

* Our figures are approximate and were obtained as follows: For the workers in public utilities monthly wages, plus bonuses and the value of maintenance, if the worker received his meals in the shop, were added and the sum was divided by the number of workers in the group. The textile workers usually were paid on a daily basis. The daily rates were multiplied by 26 (number of work days per month); the money received for rent (3 cents a day), maintenance, and bonuses were added, and the total divided by the number of workers. (Separate computations were made for male and female workers.) An analysis of the budgets of the families of Shanghai textile workers made by S. Yang and L. K. Tao revealed that the actual earnings in 1927 were smaller than the sum computed according to this method—12.3% less for men and 18.7% less for women—due to stoppage of work, strikes, etc.¹⁹ We took this into account when presenting our average.

Standard of Living. Higher wages and greater opportunities for employment raised the living standard of the industrial workers of Shanghai above that of the workers and coolies of Peiping.* This is clearly revealed by an analysis of their budgets. In 1930 the 305 families of industrial workers investigated by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the City Government of Greater Shanghai (Chinese city) budgeted their expenses thus: food, 53.2%; rent, 8.3%; clothing, 7.5%; fuel, light, 6.4%; miscellaneous, 24.6%.²⁰ †

The Shanghai industrial workers had better food than the workers in Peiping. Cereals were still the main item in their diet, vegetables came next. But meat (mainly pork) and fish were found on their tables more often than on those of workers in Peiping and of peasants. Yang and Tao found that an average worker's family spent \$28.35 a year (13.2% of total expenses for food) for meat, fish, milk, and eggs, as compared with the \$3.20 (3.2%) spent by a riksha coolie family in Peiping.²²

The Shanghai workers were also better dressed. Their garments were better tailored, more stylish (this is especially true of women's clothes), and occasionally were made of wool or silk.

These workers used tooth powder (98% of the families investigated in 1930), toilet paper, and foreign soaps; 10 families out of 305 even had watches.²³

Housing. Housing conditions, however, are worse in Shanghai than in Peiping or in the countryside. The houses in the working-class districts of Shanghai are of two types. (1) Long rows of two-story brick dwellings with two entrances—one from the street and one from the courtyard. These have tiled roofs, cement or wooden floors, and running water provided by one tap for the whole house or even for several houses. There is sometimes one toilet of a rather primitive type for a house with five or six rooms; many houses have no toilet at all. (2) The so-called "straw huts" are similar to but

* As well as above that of workers in traditional occupations in Shanghai. Our data about the income of Shanghai workers in traditional occupations—both wage earners and "independent" artisans and riksha coolies—are insufficient to make generalizations, but it seems that their income was higher than that of Peiping workers in corresponding occupations, yet lower than the income of industrial workers in Shanghai. Thus the average income of 8 Shanghai riksha coolies among our informants was \$13.50 a month, that of their families, \$17.75; the average wages of 5 journeymen were \$14.00 a month; the income of artisans was about 30.00 a month. Thus it appears that among the wage earners and representatives of the lower middle class there were three income groups: industrial workers; workers in traditional occupations in industrial cities; and workers in traditional occupations in nonindustrial cities.

† The budgets of 230 families of textile workers investigated by Yang and Tao show a somewhat lower standard of living: food, 56.0%; rent, 6.4%; clothing, 9.4%; fuel and light, 7.5%; miscellaneous, 20.6%.²¹

worse than the poorest peasant houses. They are small, covered with straw, with dirt floors, and doors so low that one has to stoop to enter.

These houses are more congested than in Peiping, at least for most textile workers (as represented by our group, 31 families). They average 1.13 rooms per family (4.5 persons per room), with 23 families occupying 1 room each, 3 families only half a room each, and 1 family sharing its room with 2 other families. "Three members of our informant's family slept in one bed; the second bed was occupied by another married couple and their child, and the third by two women workers," says our Shanghai investigator.* The utilities workers were better off. A typical family had 2.2 rooms and only 2.3 persons had to share 1 room. Nevertheless about 40% of these families with 2 to 7 members and only 1 room.†

Interiors in Shanghai are drearier than in Peiping. Wooden beds, customary in the South, have replaced the brick k'ang, and, together with the cheap foreign furniture purchased from Shanghai workshops, give the rooms a somewhat foreign appearance. Huts rarely have any furniture other than beds and small benches.

The courtyards in Shanghai are narrower and dirtier than in Peiping and rarely have a bush or a tree.

Unmarried men and women live in boarding houses or in rooms sublet by other workers. Boarders often share their rooms with 2, 3, 4, and sometimes 12 or 15 others.

A considerable proportion of industrial workers, mainly the women, live in the factory dormitories. They are perhaps even more under the supervision of employers and contractors than workers in traditional shops. They live in conditions of virtual slavery. The dormitory system, discontinued by Chinese industry at the beginning of the industrial era when the European factory system was imitated, was revived in the decade prior to the second Sino-Japanese War, largely under Japanese influence. In Japan the system is widespread.

Though the lot of industrial workers in Shanghai is better than that of Chinese workers in traditional occupations, their living standard is among the lowest in the world. Yang and Tao found it to be below that of workers in independent countries like Australia, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan, but to compare favor-

* Of the families of textile workers investigated in 1927, 62.6% had 1 room; 33.5% had 2 rooms; 3.5% had 3 rooms; 0.4% had 4 rooms. The average number of persons per room was 3.29. Average, 1.42 rooms per family.²⁴

† The 305 families investigated in 1930 had 1.65 rooms per family, 2.8 persons per room.²⁵

ably with that in colonies like India and Egypt.²⁶ Housing, however, was worse than in India.²⁷

As in Peiping, most of the workers in Shanghai failed to make ends meet: 54.4% of the families investigated by the Bureau of Social Affairs in 1929-30 were in debt and paid an average of \$10.68 interest per year, or 2.3% of their total expenditure. (The authors of the report of this investigation considered this figure too low to be typical of Shanghai workers' budgets.)²⁸

Organizations, Cultural Standards. The slightly higher standard of living of the workers of Shanghai has been accompanied by cultural progress; they were better educated and more interested in politics than those of the same class living under pre-industrial conditions. The factory workers in Shanghai were passionately interested in the fate of their country: "Almost everybody in the factory reads newspapers," said a worker of the Hsing Hsin cotton mill. Newspapers were read by one or more members in 67 of the 97 families of industrial workers from whom information was secured, including 10 women for the whole group. Many of those who could not read got information from others. An illiterate woman worker declared that she wanted her son "to understand society and the present political situation" and every day she bought him a newspaper so that he could read and inform her in turn.

Old novels, *All Men Are Brothers* in particular, were popular with old and young workers. Many of the young workers read the novels of modern writers like Lu Hsün, Pa Chin, Chang Tze-ping. Authors of more or less outspoken radical tendencies were preferred.

Literacy and interest in politics were chiefly confined to the younger generation; not a single worker over 50 among our informants read a newspaper. Readers of newspapers and modern books were more numerous among textile workers than among the better-paid employees of the utilities. This fact might indicate the existence of a labor aristocracy in China which manifests its conservatism by its indifference toward politics.

Literacy and political interest were found less often among workers in traditional occupations. Only 2 among 14 artisans and journeymen read newspapers; one declared that when employed in a factory he had been interested in politics but he had stopped reading newspapers when he went to work as a barber. Riksha coolies were more alert; 4 out of 8 read newspapers, 2 got their information from their friends, and only 2 were completely uninterested.

The first labor unions were organized in China in 1912 and gained great impetus during the period of Nationalist uprisings that began in 1919. The Kuomintang encouraged the organization of labor unions, considering them powerful allies in the fight against reaction and foreign imperialism. The Chinese Communist party too was actively engaged in organizing workers. After May 30, 1925, when a workers' demonstration was fired on by the police of the International Settlement in Shanghai, labor organizations sprang up everywhere. At the heyday of their power, in 1927, there were 563 unions with 3,065,000 members.*²⁹ Industrial workers played a great part in the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement of 1925-27.

In 1927, after the split in the Kuomintang and the new turn to the Right, the independent labor unions were crushed and supplanted by government unions which, in the words of the chief of the Bureau of Social Welfare of the Canton municipal government, "resembled the Italian [Fascist] more than the English and American unions."† The government tried to make membership compulsory but did not succeed. In 1936-37 the unions became extremely unpopular, though nominally they had about 469,000 members organized in 803 trade and industrial sections.³⁰ The old trade-unions, led mainly by Communists, were illegal but active, and several strikes in Shanghai and other cities in 1928-37 were attributed to their influence.

Reading newspapers and modern fiction as well as discussions and lectures in their organizations had made the workers aware of the new views about the position of women, paternal authority, the role of youth in society, and the relation of family and society so actively discussed in China after the revolution.

THE MIDDLE CLASS

We define the middle class as being composed of small merchants, owners of small workshops and factories, as well as salaried employees, teachers, clerks, and petty civil and military officials, with approximate incomes of from \$30-\$40 to \$100-\$120 a month. Some owners of workshops (artisans employing hired labor), clerks, and merchants live on a slightly higher level than prosperous artisans and peddlers; some merchants, bank employees, foremen,

* Including transport workers, white-collar workers, policemen, etc.

† From a conversation with the author on Oct. 28, 1936.

and teachers approach upper-class standards of living.* Yet the middle class in China is a specific category with living standards, ideas, and social connections of its own.

It is not, however, a homogeneous group as far as degree of modernization is concerned. For instance, in 1937 internal trade, especially retail trade, was carried on in the old style and did not require modern methods or modern education for success. Owners and salaried managers of old-fashioned enterprises were a relatively backward group. But the situation has been different with regard to clerks. For the most part they form a new group. There were not many clerks in old China and their social and economic position was lower than today. Industrialization, the development of modern commerce, foreign trade, banking (Chinese and foreign), and transportation have increased the demand for skilled, relatively well-paid clerks and accountants. Modern education is a necessity for the Chinese "white-collar man," or more accurately, "blue-gown man."

The character of Chinese officialdom has also changed. The modernization of the government has proceeded slowly, but it has proceeded. In 1935-37 there were many officials who had been trained in the traditional way, but modern education had become a definite requirement for higher officials and an important asset for lower ones.

Most of the teachers of the urban elementary, secondary, and high schools have been educated in modern schools and belong to the most advanced group. Together with professionals—writers, actors, lawyers, doctors, college professors, and others—the teachers form the new Chinese intelligentsia. This group is affiliated with both the middle and the upper classes. Teachers, newspapermen, perhaps writers and actors, are nearer to the middle class; engineers, lawyers, doctors, and college professors are nearer to the upper class. The modern Chinese intelligentsia preserve many traits of the old Chinese literati—disdain for physical work and for military valor, scanty interest in natural science. The group, however, is very much inclined toward modern ideas and Western influences.

Modernization also has made progress among the traditional strata of the middle class. Here schools have been an important factor. Members of the middle class send their sons to the high

* Teachers are especially hard to classify. Elementary-school teachers are definitely members of the middle class. High-school teachers, however, have both middle-class and upper-class family affiliations.

schools and their daughters to the elementary schools; some even send their sons to college and their daughters to high school.* Even the old fathers recognize the necessity of modern education.

Before the war the middle class suffered greatly from the economic depression, the agrarian crisis, and foreign competition, which was aggravated by the wholesale smuggling of Japanese goods. Many small businessmen were ruined. Intellectuals, clerks, and government officials experienced severe unemployment, particularly after the Japanese conquest of Manchuria.

Income

Unlike the workers and lower middle class, other sources of income besides salaries and profits from business enterprises have played an important part in the budgets of these middle-class families.† Among "other sources" land, always a favorite form of investment in China, came first. Land was inherited from fathers or purchased. Of 391 middle-class people in Peiping from whom information was secured, 191 or 48% owned land; of 21 of our informants (clerks, merchants, and owners of workshops) in Shanghai, 11 or 52% had land. Investment in pawnshops, workshops, and banks was less frequent. Investment in shares of large industrial enterprises and government bonds was infrequent, although there was among our informants one clerk who had invested money in a small factory.‡

Standard of Living

The diet of the middle classes is of course better than that of the lower classes. In Peiping they eat rice, wheat flour, meat, eggs, fruits. They even consume some milk and butter, a sign of prosperity and of modernization. Milk, butter, and especially cheese

* Of the children of 42 middle-class families interviewed in Peiping all the sons under 22 (except one) attended schools; 11 out of 14 unmarried daughters of high-school age went to high school. Gamble found education an important item on the budgets of families with an income of \$40 and over.³¹

† From statements about the budgets of 42 families interviewed in 1936-37. In Gamble's investigation of middle-class families (income \$35-\$99) "other sources" of income beside salaries and profits came to 18.6%-35.3% of the total.³²

‡ This preference for investment in land was due partly to tradition, partly to the unstable conditions of life in 20th-century China.

Investment in land was practically the best possible form of investment for businessmen in old China. After industrialization the situation remained practically unchanged in this respect. The industrial crisis of the 'thirties, high taxes imposed on industrial enterprises, unstable conditions in the country where civil war has been almost chronic since 1911—all this has made investments in industrial enterprises unsafe.

were abhorred in old China and are still rare and relatively expensive. Their introduction into the Chinese diet was a result of Western influence.

In 1927 Tao found that in the families of 12 teachers whose average income was more than three times that of 48 riksha coolies, a male adult consumed 1,256 grams of food a day as compared with 998 grams consumed by the coolies.³³ At the same time the teachers spent a smaller part of their income on food—38.3% or an average of \$18.27 (Chinese dollars) a month—than did the lower classes.³⁴ The families with incomes of \$35–\$99 which were investigated in 1927 by Gamble spent 32.9%–44.4% of their income on food.³⁵

Silk gowns, fur coats and caps were common; clerks in Shanghai often had foreign suits. The women, except in the remote provinces, have abandoned traditional coats and trousers for long gowns, or own garments in both the old and new styles. Women bob their hair in Shanghai and in Peiping without much opposition from the men; only 4 of the 30 middle-class men interviewed in Peiping and none of the 22 interviewed in Shanghai disliked bobbed hair.

The middle-class people are also better housed. In Peiping they usually live in brick houses with wooden floors and tiled roofs; electricity and running water are not uncommon. The people in the small towns live in dwellings similar to the better houses in the country.

The average number of rooms for the 423 middle-class families in the cities of North China (mainly Peiping) from whom information was secured was 6, with 0.9 persons per room.*

Modern style furniture is used only by the intellectuals. They also have libraries of modern books. Those who can afford it have modern plumbing.

Cultural Life

Most of the middle-class families have surpluses for the theater, cinema, newspapers, and books which have brought them in contact with the new trends. But the old Chinese culture persists. The Chinese theater has been completely dominated by the old plays acted in the old style. Only a few theaters in Shanghai, Canton, and Peiping present modern Chinese or foreign plays performed

* Primary-school teachers, priests, and evangelists were somewhat worse off (4.7 rooms per family, 1.4 persons per room); independent businessmen and shop managers were better off. Thirteen families of clerks in Shanghai had 2.8 rooms per family with 2 persons per room—more crowded conditions than in Peiping.

in a realistic style. These efforts have been promoted mostly during the war, when realistic short plays were widely used for anti-Japanese propaganda, particularly in the Soviet districts.

Old Chinese novels have been favored as much by the middle as by the lower classes. Among 75 middle-class people in Peiping from whom information was secured, 37 read "old books."

Paintings in the old style still dominate the field. Their motifs are also traditional: flowers, trees, birds, landscapes with contemplative old men. As of old, the art of calligraphy has been very highly appreciated and moral and philosophical sentences written in a beautiful hand have often taken the place of pictures as wall decorations. These old Chinese pictures and inscriptions are not framed but put on scrolls which are easy to move. This originated in the olden times, when it was most convenient for their principal owners—officials who had to change their domicile often. The only pictorial art that has developed a new style is woodcutting; in this Chinese artists have scored considerable achievements.

The cinema has been an important medium for the propagation of new trends. In 1936 there were more than 320 moving picture theaters in the provincial capitals of 20 provinces; about half of these (151) were concentrated in the provinces of Kiangsu, Hopeh, and Kwangtung where Shanghai, Peiping, and Canton are situated.⁸⁶ Unlike drama and painting, the cinema is necessarily modern. Most films have been foreign, mainly American, and they have brought foreign ideas. The effect of this has not always been fortunate. Hollywood gangster and G-men films have given a distorted idea of Western life and brought it into discredit, and, as the Chinese complained, contributed to the increase of crime in the large cities.⁸⁷ No wonder many Chinese fathers have tried to prevent their children from seeing these "products of Western culture."

The young men and women, however, have continued to crowd the cinemas. Films such as "The Life of Louis Pasteur," "Mr. Deeds Goes to Town," and superior Russian and French films have given them glimpses of more valuable aspects of Western culture.

The young Chinese cinema industry has produced chiefly realistic films depicting modern Chinese life. National and social struggles and romantic love have been the main themes.

Modern Chinese literature has been popular with the younger members of the middle class, especially in Shanghai.* Thirteen of

* In the 42 North China families from whom information was secured, only 1 man over 35 read modern books, but there were 8 readers of modern books among 21 men between 26 and 35, and 16 among 33 men between 16 and 25. In Shanghai, in 17

the seventeen clerks interviewed were interested in politics. Newspapers were generally read. In only 4 families of 42 interviewed in Peiping and in 3 families of small businessmen in Shanghai none of the members read newspapers.

THE UPPER CLASS

The old upper class of China—the officials, landlords, and rich merchants—has been augmented in modern times by vigorous new groups of industrialists, bankers, and owners of large commercial houses. In contrast to the West, the industrial and financial capital of modern China has been drawn mainly not from the savings of artisans and merchants but from the income of landlords and officials.³⁸ Thus the new upper class of China is more homogeneous than was the ruling class of Europe in a comparable cultural period. Within the upper classes in Germany, Russia, and France the landed aristocracy on the one hand and the merchants, industrialists, and bankers on the other have constituted antagonistic groups. In China the sons of high officials have become industrialists, bankers' sons have been sent abroad as consuls and ambassadors—and all owned land. Inter-marriage in these strata has been taken for granted.

Wu Sung-fu, the hero of Mao Tun's novel *The Twilight*, is a typical representative of this modern upper class. A son and grandson of high officials, he runs several large factories, is an outstanding figure in Shanghai's financial world, and owns large estates.³⁹

Another group in the upper class is the small but powerful circle of militarists: generals who came from the old upper class and in some cases from the lower classes (successful soldiers), and gained great influence and accumulated considerable wealth.

Members of the upper class are the most modern. Modernization has followed from their contacts with the West (more intimate in their case than in that of any other group), and has been furthered by their activities. For example, the manager of a big modern factory must be acquainted with Western methods of business; a high official needs a fair knowledge of foreign relations, international politics, and history. The same holds for professional men—engineers, lawyers, doctors,* and educators. The need for

families of clerks, 10 persons read modern books (mostly technical, but also modern fiction, science, and economics). One of the clerks interviewed was one of the founders of a reading club called The Ants' Club.

* Western medicine is endorsed by the government and completely accepted by modernized strata in contemporary China, but old-fashioned doctors still practice and train young disciples.

modern education has been less urgent among merchants engaged in domestic trade and among landlords.

Among the fathers of college students who filled out the questionnaire sent out for this study in 1937,* the following had a modern education: 56% of the officials (including 47% with college education), 63% of the teachers, 83% of the professionals, but only 33% of the businessmen (including 18% with college education) and 10.2% of the landlords.

In the younger generation of the upper class, modern education at least as far as high school is fairly universal.

Income

When this investigation took place, an income of about \$150 for a family of four indicated an upper-class status. However, among the landlords, industrialists, bankers, and officials of Shanghai, Canton, and Nanking there were many people of great wealth. The salaries of high officials† varied from \$120 to \$1,000 and more a month; the earnings of engineers in the North varied from \$90 (beginners) to \$360; in Shanghai, \$500–\$600; college professors in Peiping received \$100–\$600 (the latter being department heads).

Extra occupational sources of income have played even a larger part in the economic life of the upper than in that of the middle class. An official with a salary of \$200 a month and an income of \$100–\$150 a month from land was not unusual. Informants among merchants often could not say whether their main source of income was business or land.

Of 42 upper-class families interviewed in North China only 2 had no sources of income other than salary. Here, too, land was the most important of the other sources. Of 231 upper-class families in North China who gave information, 126 or 54% (not including landlords) owned land; many owned houses. Investments in stores, factories, and loans played an important part. Four of 8 engineers interviewed in Shanghai had land, 2 owned houses, 1 had invested his money in a small factory, and 1 loaned his savings.‡

* These were the fathers of 687 male college students. It was considered more typical for the upper class than the whole group of parents of 1,700 college and high-school students who filled out the questionnaire. Among the fathers of girl students the proportion of fathers with college education is above the average. The parents of the high-school students belong to both the upper and the middle class.

† Among our informants.

‡ In assessing the income of officials, one should not forget the unofficial sources of revenue which may have amounted to more than their legitimate income. Craft has

New Habits and Ways of Life

The influence of the West has brought more milk, milk products, fruit, and raw vegetables into the diet of the wealthy. A few families in Shanghai and Peiping have begun to take their breakfast as in the West. But on the whole the Chinese have clung to their old style of cooking, a style considered superior to ours not only by the Chinese but also by many Western gourmets.

The dress fashions changed after the revolution; not that the Western style of dress was adopted but a new Chinese style emerged. In treaty ports and Canton men often wore foreign suits in the offices and in the streets. The officials wore Sun Yat-sen uniforms—a cross between the Western suit and the Chinese jacket; many intellectuals and businessmen in the interior preferred to wear a modernized form of the old Chinese gown.

Even the most emancipated women seldom dress in European style, though high-heeled shoes, silk stockings, and foreign style coats are widespread. As to their dresses, they wear long gowns of the type Chinese women use abroad. The fashions change as frequently as in Europe, but the changes affect not the cut but the material. Hats are rather rare, except in the North in winter.

Only in Shanghai are modern houses (apartments and one-family houses) found in any number. The rich families in Peiping, as well as in many other cities, though using modern conveniences—central heating, plumbing, electricity, gas, and even refrigerators—prefer to live in the one- or two-storied Chinese houses with many courtyards. The old Chinese garden architecture has been preserved without changes. In 1935–37 the author saw quite a few gardens with traditional small streams, curved bridges, and artificial rocks adorned with poetical inscriptions, and filled with flowers. Some of them recalled the garden described in the famous passages of *The Dream of the Red Chamber*. In the interior provinces modern conveniences are in a rudimentary stage and rich families in Taiyüan or in Kaifeng have less modern comfort than lower-middle-class families in America. Of course the wealthy can afford many servants in compensation for the lack of modern technique.

In wealthy Chinese homes the clash of two decorative styles,

continued to be a quasi-legitimate source of income. In the hospital records of the PUMC appears the candid admission of a tax collector from one of the remote northern provinces: "If I could stay in office for one year I would be rich." The same source revealed that an official who claimed to earn only \$100 a month and to have no property could afford to fly to Peiping—a very expensive means of transportation in China.

Western and old Chinese, produced rather unfortunate results at first. Even in the 'twenties in many rich Chinese homes was seen "mongrelid furniture that is of no hemisphere, but blends the hideous in both" as Peffer put it.⁴⁰ In the imperial palace at Peiping, among the priceless objects of Chinese art selected by connoisseurs, were to be found two Western products, a carved wooden cuckoo clock from the Black Forest worth about 25 cents and an equally cheap porcelain baby doll lying on its stomach on an exquisite carved table of the Ming dynasty, near a Sung dynasty landscape. It may be recalled, however, that the first contacts of Europe with Chinese art produced similar misunderstandings.

One still could see similar anomalies in 1935-37, but on the whole the Chinese had begun to solve the problem. In cultivated homes in Peiping old Chinese tables, desks, and chairs, large southern beds, and long scrolls were happily combined with shelves of modern books, glass windows, running water, and other Western appurtenances. In the houses of intellectuals in Shanghai modern furniture was tastefully combined with Chinese pictures, porcelains, and embroideries.

The influence of the West has brought about many changes in hygiene. Aside from the toothbrush which conquered all classes in the cities, and changes in the diet mentioned above, new table manners, new sleeping habits, ventilation, etc. have appeared. Many educated people no longer put their chopsticks into a common bowl; belching and spitting are no longer considered good manners; babies have sterilized bottles and drink orange or cabbage juice. The home economics classes introduced in all the women's and coeducational colleges in China have helped spread these hygienic habits, though sometimes the imitation of Western habits has been somewhat mechanical. Yet modern hygiene still is not completely accepted and the younger generation has to fight for it.

The upper class continues to be the educated class of China. The old and the new generations maintain their perennial interest in literature, arts, and politics. There is hardly an upper-class home without a library and at least a few valuable paintings, porcelains, or carvings.

Even in the small cities all upper-class families read newspapers. *Ta Kung Pao*, *I Shih Pao*, and others were written in Chinese classical style somewhat simplified, instead of using the vernacular current in the popular newspapers and in most of the modern magazines. Many families possess books by modern authors, though

in the older generation there are numbers who, though educated, find it difficult to read books and newspapers written in modern style by writers like Lu Hsün, Pa Chin, and Mao Tung—the idols of modern youth.

CULTURAL CHANGE IN CHINA

The process of cultural change has been dependent to a large extent on occupational and regional factors. No group has escaped change (with a few exceptions in remote rural areas). No group has been completely modernized, or come to depend exclusively on new methods of production and be entirely permeated with Western culture. (A few families of modern industrialists and intellectuals in Shanghai may be regarded as exceptions.)

According to the degree of modernization the population of China can be divided into the following groups.

I. Traditional Strata. Peasants (minimum degree of change); wage earners and lower middle class of the nonindustrialized cities (moderate change); middle-class businessmen in the nonindustrial cities, employees and clerks in traditional establishments (somewhat greater change).

II. Modernized Strata. *Slowly changing groups:* industrial workers, middle-class employees and officials; landlords; upper-class businessmen in nonindustrial cities and nonmodernized branches of trade. *Rapidly changing groups:* middle- and upper-class intelligentsia (educators, physicians, engineers, high-school teachers, and college professors, writers, motion picture actors, etc.); upper-class officials and high employees, owners of modern industrial and commercial establishments and banks. The process of modernization of these groups has been more rapid in industrialized cities.

How these economic changes and modern ideas have influenced ways of life, attitudes, and behavior is a more complicated problem which we shall attempt to answer, at least in part, by investigating the changes in the family life of the different groups.

X

The Old Family Under Attack

WEAKENING OF THE OLD FAMILY PATTERN

THE process of cultural change has slowly molded new conditions of economic and social life—conditions incompatible with the old forms of family life characterized by absolute domination of the youth by the old, of women by men, of the individual by the family. This incompatibility has become more and more evident with the progress of time.

The old men have gradually been losing their importance in the world outside the family. The new dynamic society does not require their experience and knowledge of tradition. The modern epoch stresses mental alertness, ability to learn quickly, and adaptability to new situations. Now young men are wanted everywhere: in leading as well as in subordinate positions—in industry, in government, in the professions.

Even in agriculture, the backbone of Chinese economy, the old man's experience has been more often harmful than useful—he has been an impediment to the introduction of new techniques. Then, too, as a result of invasions and civil wars China, without becoming militarist, had nevertheless begun to break with its peculiar pacifist ideology, which was so suited to the rule of the old. It is significant that an army man—General Chiang Kai-shek—is now the head of the state.

The old have also been losing their intellectual authority. In a society striving to rid itself of the past, the old no longer represent wisdom and virtue but degenerate traditions. The youth has begun to play an independent role in the political and cultural life of the country.

Industrialization, accelerating the disintegration of the self-sufficient peasant economy, has gradually deprived the family of its role as a productive unit and consequently the family head has lost his position of leader of the work of the family members. Industrialization and better transportation facilities have increased the mobility of the population, have made it possible for young men and women to get work far from their homes, weakened the family control, and encouraged new family units.

Industrialization came to China under the aegis of competitive capitalism. This has favored the development of an individualism incompatible with the old idea of the subordination of the individual to the family. The demands for efficient work and the new nationalism have been inimical to nepotism and narrow family loyalties.

WOMEN CHALLENGE MEN'S SUPREMACY

The rise of modern industry has provided a vast market for female labor which was not utilized in the old economy. In China as elsewhere the textile industry employs a considerable number of women—in 1927, 72.3% of the cotton-spinning workers in the Shanghai factories were women.¹ There is also a large percentage of women in the tobacco, match, electrical appliance, and other industries. The percentage of women in all Chinese industry is very high—in 1927, 58.7% of the factory workers of Shanghai were women.² Moreover, women continue to be the main producers in such traditional industries as embroideries, lace, paper flowers, straw hats and fans, garments and shoes; this type of work is performed mainly at home.³

Once women had become factory workers, old restrictions began to vanish; they began to be employed also as shop assistants, waitresses, barbers, beauticians, etc.*

Women with bound feet were of course unsuitable for work, and the movement against bound feet, feeble before the era of industrialization, became widespread; after the Revolution of 1911 it was endorsed by the government. The Chinese of all classes offered relatively little resistance to this new trend; in regions where women could get work the men soon agreed that bound feet were objectionable; in the middle and upper classes the new esthetic ideas were an additional consideration. Yet even in the late 'thirties, among the peasants in localities situated far from industrial centers, one could still find the old practice.†

Paralleling the increased employment of women in industry and agriculture came the extension of educational facilities to women. These were first opened to the upper classes.‡

* In Kwangtung and Kwangsi the women, as of old, frequently do men's work as coolies, woodcutters, mineworkers, rovers.

† Though much progress was achieved bound feet did not disappear as quickly as expected. "In twenty-five years there will be no bound feet in China" predicted a revolutionary pamphlet in 1903.⁴

‡ In interrelation between the employment of women in factories and the cultural emancipation of the upper-class women was observed also in Western Europe after the industrial revolution: "Individual women among the middle classes were awak-

The first school for girls was founded by Catholics in 1800; in the early 1840's the Protestants opened schools in Hongkong. In the 'eighties the number of girls' schools began to grow. In 1884 the Methodists started the well-known school in Pao Kai-shan in Chekiang; others sponsored by foreigners followed, but the movement, which was distrusted by the government and the people, progressed slowly. After the impetus given to industrialization by the Sino-Japanese War there was a definite change. In 1905 the government officially recognized the need for women's education and worked out a program for girls' schools. After the Revolution of 1911 the first public schools for girls made their appearance. In the beginning female education was limited to elementary schools and teachers' seminaries; since 1912 facilities comparable to those in American high and normal schools have been developed. In 1920 the first three female students were admitted to the University of Peking. In 1935 there were 106,075 girls enrolled in the high schools (about 20% of the total number of pupils), several thousand in the normal and vocational schools, and 6,272 (16%) in colleges, universities, teachers' colleges, and technical high schools.⁶ In 1907 three women from the province of Kiangsu were sent abroad to study.⁷ Thirty years later many young Chinese girls studied abroad, some at government expense. Most of them went to Japan and the United States; the Chinese girl student became a familiar figure in many American colleges.

This development was followed by the influx of women into professional work. Women began to compete with men as teachers. In the late 1920's women lawyers, social workers, doctors, dentists, and nurses were active in Shanghai, Canton, Tientsin, Peiping.* Women made their appearance as government officials (including the diplomatic service), radio announcers, journalists, and even as police. Women's property rights were now recognized and they began to participate in business. Many firms, among them restaurants, shops, beauty parlors, and even two banks—the Women's Commercial and Savings Bank in Shanghai and in Peiping—were managed by women.

Women began to enter politics. Wives and daughters of scholars

ening to a consciousness of their position, and the importance of the economic emancipation of working women was at once manifested in its influence on better class women and their demands for a wider sphere and the right to individual independence," states Ivy Pinchbeck.⁵

* In the late 'twenties Mrs. Tsao Pang-yüan passed her surgeon's examination in Bellevue Hospital, New York—the first Chinese woman to graduate from this hospital.⁸

and officials helped pave the way for the Revolution of 1911. The greatest of these was Ch'iu Chin—schoolteacher, poet, and revolutionary leader who gave her life to the cause—she was executed in 1907. This remarkable woman came to the revolutionary movement of her own will, against the opposition of her husband, a high official who sided with reaction.⁹ Another famous woman who arose to public eminence in the early stages of the movement derived her convictions from her husband and teacher but later carried on the fight in defiance of her family and many former friends. This was the beautiful and gentle Sung Ching-ling, wife of Sun Yat-sen.

During the Nationalist Revolution of 1925–27 working-class and peasant women, streaming into the trade-unions, peasant unions, the Kuomintang and Communist parties, and even into the army, joined forces with the educated elite of their sex. Energetic and independent, the women of Canton were particularly prominent. These women were treated with great respect by their male comrades and enemies. Over a thousand were killed during the split in the Nationalist Movement in 1927, more than two hundred perished during the Canton insurrection of 1927 (the so-called Canton Commune).¹⁰

In the 'thirties there were outstanding women intellectuals in all camps. The First Lady of China, Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek (Sung Mei-ling), the sister of Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, has played an important role. She ably assisted her husband before the war and her work during it has shown her to be an indefatigable and brilliant organizer. The third Sung sister, Mrs. H. H. Kung, is, according to some biographers, the ablest of the three, but her activities, mainly confined to business and banking, have not always been beneficial to her country.¹¹

Another outstanding woman in the political field is Cheng Su-mei (Mrs. Wei Tao-ming), wife of the present Chinese ambassador to the United States. She was active in the revolutionary movement and was a prominent member of the Kuomintang. After World War I her country sent her to the peace conference as a member of the Chinese delegation. She was the first woman lawyer in China, the first woman to be admitted to the mixed court in Shanghai; she was the only woman member on the commission which drafted China's legal code.

Many other woman doctors, professors, college presidents, teachers, and writers could be mentioned. The most outstanding of the liberal woman writers is undoubtedly Ping Hsin ("The Ice

Heart”), writer of poems and children’s stories. In the field of education there is Dr. Wu Yi-fang, president of Ching Ling College in Nanking.

In the Soviet districts one of the most outstanding women is Tsai Ch’ang—the only woman on the Central Committee of the Communist party. Coming from a rich family, she studied in Paris and Moscow in the early ’twenties; she was one of the leading members of the Kuomintang before and during the Northern Expedition and joined the Communists in 1927, after the split. She was one of the fifty women who accompanied the Red Army during its legendary Long March from Kiangsi in Central China to the Northwest. Another outstanding woman is Ting Ling, a writer who was imprisoned for several years for her revolutionary activities. Liu Chien-hsien, a former textile worker from Wusih, occupied in the late ’thirties the position of Director of National Mines and Factories of the Soviet district in the Northwest—a position equivalent to minister of state.¹² There are many others, though their names as political leaders, party organizers, propagandists, and professionals have been somewhat overshadowed by their husbands’.

The educational and professional achievements of Chinese upper-class women are highly impressive considering the general development of the country. In the eighteenth century, when Europe was on an economic level comparable with present-day China, European women had fewer educational and professional opportunities than Chinese women have now.

There are 28 women (1.5%) among the 1,900 names cited in *Who’s Who in China*. This compares not unfavorably with the achievements of American women, who began their fight for emancipation much earlier and under infinitely more favorable conditions and who in 1934–35 could boast of only 6% of the names listed in *Who’s Who* (1,953 women among 31,081 outstanding Americans).¹³ Nevertheless, the great bulk of the peasant and working-class women of China are on a lower level than were European women 250 years ago.

The pioneers of women’s emancipation and education had to fight hard. Pa Chin vividly describes the fight of the girls for the right to study in a coeducational school, for modernized dress, for bobbed hair. When one of the characters in his novel *Chia (The Family)*, Hsiang-yü, cut her pigtail it was a revolutionary act—that is, it was conceived as such. She had been influenced by a magazine article which praised the economic and hygienic advan-

tages of short hair, claiming that it would "diminish the social and psychological difference between men and women." After she first appeared on the street with her pigtail cut off, she told her friends: "I certainly needed courage! On the street on my way to school schoolboys and loafers followed me and laughed at me. Everybody looked at me contemptuously and mockingly. They shouted: 'Little Nun,' 'Duck's tail . . .' and other bad words, pointed at me and laughed. . . . I went on my way pretending to pay no attention, but my heart beat fast. My old nurse wanted me to be carried to school in a sedan chair, but I wanted to test my courage. Why should I be afraid? I am a human being. . . . If I want to do something—I do it!"¹⁴

For some educated Chinese women who have not entered public life but have devoted themselves to their homes, modern education has often been a cause of painful maladjustments. In the beginning modern schools blindly imitated foreign ideas and neglected the realities of Chinese life. Today this has been remedied. Contemporary Chinese schools, for all their frequent blunders, now strive to take over only those elements of foreign culture which are suitable for China. An educated Chinese woman, even if she is "only a good wife and mother," is a progressive element in Chinese life.

THE SLOW RATE OF CHANGE

Despite all these new developments it should not be forgotten that before the war the process of change was only beginning. The old system and its main beneficiary—the old man—has not given in without a struggle. Industrialization has been slow. The introduction of new agricultural methods has been an even more difficult matter. Trade and the government machine have not been transformed overnight and in the interior the officials trained in the traditional way are still in the majority. Newspapers, schools, books, and other agencies for the propagation of new ideas have had only a limited sphere of influence.

Chinese women, even the educated ones, are far from having achieved equality. It is certainly an exaggeration to say as did Dr. Wu Yi-fang: "Economic independence is an easy thing for the modern Chinese lady to achieve . . . If she is well trained and qualified she may compete equally with the men for any position from the highest government office down . . . Unlike her American and European sisters, she does not have to battle opposition from members of the other sex."¹⁵ Even today there are few women

in the professions and in civil service. The number of girls at school is still very small.

Nevertheless, since new processes have been at work and have affected the whole life of the country, Chinese family life has undergone deep changes. The best minds of China welcome this change and have tried to accelerate it.

THE PROTESTS AGAINST THE OLD FAMILY SYSTEM

The advent of the new order, born of military defeats, has imposed on the intellectual leaders of China the grave task of revaluating the old Chinese culture and building a new ideology suitable to the new times.

Before creating new values, the old have had to be overhauled. Confucian philosophy, classical education, the old administrative system, and forms of social organization have been subjected to criticism. That venerable institution, the Chinese family, has not been spared either.

Protests against the old family system had appeared even in old China.

Several ancient writers decried the low position of women. These were Fu Hsüan in the second century, who described the fate of women in a moving poem already quoted; Yüan Ts'ai in the eleventh century, who mourned women's inequality and their dependence on husbands and sons;¹⁶ Lin Chien in the sixteenth century, who saw all the injustice of the old Chinese divorce procedure;¹⁷ and the author of a feminist novel in the early nineteenth century, Li Ju-chien.¹⁸

Perhaps stronger than the men's protests were those of women themselves. In all classes of society there were girls who refused to marry. It is quite characteristic that the classical family novel, *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, shows two heroines who abhorred the conventional Chinese marriage and preferred to become nuns. Buddhist convents offered escape for many girls who felt the same way. In the early nineteenth century in the Shun-te district in Kwangtung this protest against marriage took the form of an organized movement. Many girls of this district, mainly workers in the silk industry, belonged to a movement called "Girls Who Do Not Go to the Family" (*pu lo chia*). They refused to live with their husbands after marriage, remained virgins, and went to so-called "Girls' Homes" where they stayed with others of their kind. Sev-

eral female farm laborers and other wage earners of Kwangtung made similar arrangements. The movement was so widespread in this part of China that the Kwangtung authorities were forced to establish special homes for these unattached women who had lost all contact with their father's families and had no real contact with their husbands, thus becoming helpless in their old age. The movement was still in existence in the late 'thirties when the author visited several of these Girls' Homes and old women's homes in Canton and vicinity.

Yet these protests have never attacked the foundations of the family system, filial piety and subordination to paternal and male authority. While, as we have seen in Chapter VI, there have been contradictions between the interests of the state and those of the family, in the last analysis the Confucian family was economically, politically, and ideologically adjusted to the Confucian state.

With the advent of industrialism the old Chinese family system has become a serious obstacle to progress.

The new criticism at first failed to go to the root of the problem and regarded the emancipation of women as the most urgent task, but after the Revolution of 1911 it became more radical.

THE CHINESE RENAISSANCE

In 1916 a powerful frontal attack on the old family system was launched by the so-called "Chinese Renaissance Movement" which spoke for the youth in a magazine edited by young professors of Peking University, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Hu Shih, and others. The name of the magazine, *The New Youth*, was in itself a challenge to the old system, to the rule of the old man. The Renaissance Movement, which in a short time had rallied under its banner all the most progressive elements in North China, aimed at radical changes in Chinese social and political life, demanding real democracy and popularization of culture, advocating as a first step in this direction the use of the vernacular as the literary medium. It proclaimed the right of the individual to happiness and self-realization. The aims of the youth movement were in many respects similar to those put forward in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by the promoters of the Italian Renaissance.*

Freedom and democracy could not be achieved by compromise

* In China the movement is known as the "New Tide" or "May Fourth Movement"—May 4, 1919 being the date of the demonstration when the youth showed its power for the first time. The term "Chinese Renaissance" was introduced by Dr. Hu Shih in his lectures on China published under this title in America in 1934.

with old forms of life, asserted the young Chinese. *The New Youth* proclaimed a relentless struggle against Confucianism. "Confucianism is incompatible with freedom, with a constitutional regime. . . ." "The new China must eradicate the Confucian rules of obedience [of subject to his sovereign, of son to his father, of wife to her husband] which make slaves of men," wrote Ch'en Tu-hsui.¹⁹ Indeed, in the early phases of the Chinese Revolution it seemed that the Chinese youth would destroy, in addition to Confucianism, the habit of compromise so deeply ingrained in China.

The political implications of the Confucian theory of the family were clearly understood. "The Old Chinese Family System Is the Basis of Absolutism" is the title of an article by Wu Yü, another member of the group. He adduced quotations from the "Sacred Books" and the commentators on Confucius to prove that the Confucian family was a school of obedient subjects in an absolutist state, who respected only power and authority and had no regard for the poor and humble—an attitude incompatible with democracy. The citizen of the Chinese Republic could not be like the obedient sons and grandsons praised by Confucius.²⁰

The youth was forced to carry on the fight. "It is the youth who must save this great revolution from the powers of the past."²¹ But to do so, said Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the young men of China have to be regenerated. To the "old youth"—weak, effeminate, devoid of militancy, seeking only wealth and high position, he opposed the ideal of a "new youth," valiant, strong, free from paternal authority, idealistic.²² In another article the enthusiastic young professor appealed to the young men of China to develop the sentiment of patriotism, which, though not totally unknown, was not deeply felt in old China.²³

It was only natural that the Renaissance Movement tried to enlist the Chinese women—"the unhappiest creatures in the world."²⁴ In its very first issue *The New Youth* published an article praising family life based on the mutual love and respect of husband and wife.²⁵ Later in a series of articles it advanced a complete program for women's emancipation, stressing their right to enjoy economic independence, to choose their mates, the right of widows to remarry. One author, doubtless under the influence of Socialist and Communist ideas, demanded full emancipation of women from household drudgery, proposing that the care of children, the preparation of food, washing, and housecleaning be put on a collective basis.²⁶

The new Chinese youth of the Renaissance Movement pro-

ceeded to translate their words into deeds. On May 4, 1919, with the historic demonstration against Japan and the reactionary government in Peking, the educated youth assumed a powerful role in the political life of the country.

The Renaissance Movement undoubtedly influenced the attitude of the Kuomintang toward the problem of the family. Sun Yat-sen felt keenly the contradiction between the old type of family loyalty and the patriotism he wanted to inculcate in the new citizen. "In the new China," he said, "the idea of family and clan unity has to be replaced by the idea of national unity."²⁷ He also repeatedly stressed the necessity for the equality of women and the need to enlist them in the fight for freedom.²⁸ His wife Sung Ching-ling became one of his best assistants and carried on his struggle after his death.

The congresses of the Kuomintang repeatedly passed resolutions urging reform of the family. The decisions of the 1926 Congress—when the Kuomintang was the ruling party at least in South and Central China—considerably influenced the legislation of the Chinese Republic.

The propaganda of *The New Youth* group and the generally revolutionary atmosphere encouraged the leader of the Reform Movement of 1898, the old scholar K'ang Yu-wei, to publish the drastic criticism of the old Chinese family that he had formulated in the 'nineties. He presented his views with great violence. According to him all the virtues connected with family life which the Confucian scholars advocated were either empty words or actually harmful to society.

Filial piety, said K'ang Yu-wei, is unnatural. "Birds and animals care for their young but ask no reward. Real love does not ask for recompense."²⁹ If one has an obligation toward the parents who have reared him, it does not differ from obligations toward creditors.³⁰ But alas, while the Chinese talk much of filial piety, it exists in name only. "In my village hardly one out of 1,000 people provides for his father, hardly one out of 100 provides for his mother."³¹ The people are not to blame, they are too poor. Peasants, artisans, officials—all of them can hardly provide for themselves, their children, wives, and concubines; they cannot take care of their parents.³² But if the poor are unfilial by necessity, the rich are unfilial of their own volition.³³

As for the large joint families, "they present a harmonious picture from the outside, but inside there is an unescapable and overwhelming atmosphere of hatred."³⁴

Mutual help among family members is the greatest curse that

can be inflicted on a community. In fact, people take care of their own children but are not concerned with the children of others. People try to enrich their own families and to transmit their fortunes to their heirs. "Thus their cupidity is boundless. They lie and forge documents. They become corrupt—one step more and they steal, kill, betray . . . The cause of all this is the desire to enrich the family."³⁵ People who are not related do not assist each other. They fight like enemies. "They don't care for their country, they care only for their kinsmen."³⁶

K'ang took a hostile attitude toward any kind of family life. The family had to be abolished and only reluctantly did the rebellious scholar grant the necessity of marriage: there was no possibility of procreating without women!

Subsequently the members of *The New Youth* group and their allies—the democrats and radicals—continued and broadened their criticism. They attacked the patriarchal joint-family system and the concept of family loyalty for impeding national liberation and progress.

Some eighteen years after the beginning of the Renaissance Movement Dr. Hu Shih formulated his criticism of the old Chinese family in equally sweeping terms. "The Chinese family of old times rarely, if ever, possessed the virtues which have sometimes been attributed to it or read into it," he declared. He attacked the suppression of the individual for the sake of the family, a system under which the incompetent members of the family were supported by parental and ancestral charity, or the common income made by the more enterprising and productive brothers; and a system imposing obligations to find employment for good-for-nothing relatives.³⁷ Life in the joint family was marked by "frictions, suspicions, intrigues, oppression, and even suicides." And the much-idealized virtue of filial piety simply did not exist: "in those rare cases where it was consciously cultivated the price paid for it was nothing short of intense suppression resulting in mental and physical agony."³⁸

About the same time a distinguished sociologist, L. K. Tao, bitterly remarked that the Chinese family system "makes the whole atmosphere of family life extremely oppressive . . ." Moreover, this system, "together with its accompanying patterns of thought and behavior which they should follow, have made them [the Chinese] the most docile of all races, conformist in nature, and lacking any spark of revolutionary spirit. . . ."³⁹

Lin Yutang criticized the Confucian ideology for preventing the

Chinese from becoming good citizens concerned with people outside the family circle. ". . . Seen in modern eyes, Confucianism omitted from the social relationships man's social obligations towards the stranger, and great and catastrophic was the omission. . . . In the end, as it worked out, the family became a walled castle outside of which everything was legitimate loot."⁴⁰

H. D. Fong regarded the joint family and the system of mutual aid for family members and kinsmen as one of the serious obstacles to industrialization.⁴¹

The famous novelist Pa Chin expressed his criticism in his novel *Chia (The Family)*, where he described the life of a Chinese upper-class family during the Renaissance period and the fight of the youth against the tyranny of the elders. Before the war this novel was a favorite with educated youth who identified themselves with its heroes.*

WESTERN INFLUENCES

The critics and reformers of the Chinese family were of course influenced by Western thought. Resentment against foreign imperialism has not prevented the Chinese from borrowing Western ideas and techniques. This borrowing has been helpful in the organization of the new society and in the fight against imperialism.

The translation of Western novels, short stories, political and philosophical works begun in the 'eighties continued after the revolution. It is significant that from the cultural treasury of Europe and America young China has selected works expressing the struggle of modern capitalist society against feudalism. They read books extolling nationalism, democracy and individualism, industry, energy and thrift, romantic love, and those arguing for the rights of the youth and of women.

Goethe's *Werther* and *Faust*, the works of John Stuart Mill, Macaulay, John Dewey, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Maupassant, Dumas, A. France, Bernard Shaw, Dickens have been highly appreciated. Ibsen's ideas and particularly his attacks on convention and the enslavement of women have been warmly received. Ibsen inspired the play of Hu Shih, *The Greatest Thing in Life* (marriage). This play which treats the problem of woman's emancipation has influenced a whole generation of young women.⁴² Sociological and anthropological literature has found many readers. Havelock Ellis,

* This book will be often quoted and referred to in later chapters. As far as I know, it has not been translated into any Western language. For the story see pp. 227 ff.

Ellen Key, Morgan, Westermarck, Hobhouse, Frazer, Malinowski, Mowrer, Folsom, Park Burgess, and Goldenweiser have been much discussed.

At the beginning of the Renaissance Movement family problems were generally treated from the point of view of middle-class democratic ideals. But in the 'twenties, under the influence of Russia, revolutionary Marxism began to play an important part in Chinese intellectual life, and Russian revolutionary fiction enjoyed great popularity.

Modern Chinese fiction has borrowed a great deal from the West. The realism of the old novels has been adhered to, but the style has been brought up to date. The modern writers have concerned themselves with social and moral problems. They have dealt with revolution, strikes, the students' movement, floods, famines, the struggle between young and old, the new sexual morality.

The twenty years between the first appeals of *The New Youth* and the beginning of the war with Japan were strenuous dramatic times. The industrial boom of the first World War was followed by the depression of the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, and the heroic period of the Northern Expedition gave way to a reactionary decade.

The ideas of reformers of the Chinese family system have reflected these vicissitudes.

Between 1928-36 an attempt was made to revive Confucianism. This was the so-called "New Life Movement" sponsored by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his wife, which advocated a way of life based on a mixture of Confucian rules of conduct and forms of behavior adapted to modern capitalism.

A mixture of old and new also characterized the programs for the organization of the family which were advanced in this period. The conservative scholars were supported by new conservative statesmen and professors trained in Europe and America. These Chinese "young Tories" tried to combine Confucian discipline and devotion to the family with Malthusianism, eugenics, and other Western concepts, some of which have a strong fascist tinge. The new idea was: "Both the Western and the Chinese types of family have their good points. Why not combine them?" An outstanding representative of this trend, the sociologist P'an Kuan-tan, while criticizing the old family system in which "children and young people are deprived of sunshine,"⁴⁸ stressed the importance

of inculcating "racial discipline" and of preserving the strong points of the old system—discipline, mutual help, etc.

However, the main trend remained liberal and progressive. One of the outstanding Chinese intellectuals, Professor Mai Hui-t'ing, advocated equality of women, freedom in the selection of mates, the radical abolition of polygyny, educating children to be independent, comradely relations between parents and children, the adoption of the conjugal family (though he insisted on proper care for old parents).⁴⁴ These ideas were shared by the majority of writers on family problems.

THE NEW CODE

Even under the old regime the demand for change was so strong that two years after the Boxer Rebellion the Imperial Government set up a committee charged with the task of formulating a new legal code. It was not until 1930 and 1931, however, that new penal and civil codes were promulgated. The two books of the Civil Code which dealt with family and inheritance raised the most difficult problems for the legislators. They studied Japanese, German, Swiss, and Brazilian codes, the Code Napoléon and Swedish legislation, and prepared four drafts of Book IV and three drafts of Book V. The first drafts were still imbued with traditional ideas, while the final draft adopted the progressive program of the Kuomintang.⁴⁵ The Chinese Republic did not create a system of political and social philosophy comparable in scope to Confucianism. The only systematic arrangement of ideas concerning the family is the new legal code.

The provisions of this code leave no doubt that the legislators were inspired by the desire to remold the Chinese family on an essentially Western pattern, preserving only a few characteristics of the old Confucian organization. The code completely disregards ancestor worship—a pillar of the old family and kinship system. Thus it breaks away from the idea that a male heir is a vital family necessity.

The Power of the Male

The Chinese family, according to the code, is still patronymic, patrilinear, patrilocal, and patriarchal.

The wife has to reside in her husband's home (Article No. 1002) and assume his surname (No. 1000), and the children assume their

father's surname (No. 1059).^{*} Paternal relatives receive preferential treatment, although the legislators recognize only three categories of relatives: (1) relatives by blood, (2) relatives by marriage, and (3) husbands and wives (Nos. 967, 968, 969). Blood relatives of the same generation are forbidden to marry persons within the eighth degree of relationship, but the provision does not apply to cousins with different surnames (children of the father's sisters and maternal cousins), i.e., they are not considered as closely related as relatives with the same surnames; guardians of orphans are selected from paternal relatives (No. 1094); in the appointment of the members of the family council paternal relatives have preference over maternal ones of an equal degree of relatedness (No. 1131).

Woman's position is greatly improved, but man still retains first place in the family. Thus, although father and mother are both legal representatives (statutory agents) of the child (No. 1086), the father's opinion is decisive when the parents disagree (No. 1089); after divorce, the father as a rule keeps the children (No. 1055); if the "joint property regime" is established, the husband is the legal owner and manager (Nos. 1017, 1018, 1019).

Nevertheless the new code deals hard blows to the authority of the former absolute ruler of the family—the eldest male. According to the spirit of the law he must earn the authority he exercises.

Marriage

The provisions of the code do away with the old idea that marriage is a family affair, and thus take from the family head the right to choose his children's mates. Consent of the parties concerned is required for the agreement to marry (betrothal) (No. 972). There is however no law requiring that a contract of marriage shall be signed by the bride and bridegroom. This omission is psychologically interesting and opens the way to a reactionary interpretation of the law. But as Marc van der Valk suggests,⁴⁶ the omission can be explained by the fact that the law takes for granted that a formal betrothal for which consent is required always precedes the marriage ceremony. Moreover, Article 997 of the code gives the parties concerned power to appeal for annulment in case of fraud or duress.

^{*} This provision does not apply to a husband who lives with his wife's family. Then he takes his wife's name, as do the children.

The Position of Women

Though the idea is not carried through with absolute consistency, the equality of women is recognized in principle, and in this respect the new Chinese code compares favorably with much European legislation. Women are entitled to choose their mates. Their property rights are recognized. The laws of inheritance put daughters on an equal footing with sons (No. 1185). The laws on matrimonial property (Nos. 1004-1048) protect the married woman's property rights. The wife's right to maintenance after her husband's death is legally guaranteed when the property is inherited by the children.⁴⁷ The right to be a family head is implicitly granted to women by No. 1124 which does not exclude women from candidacy for this position. The system of concubinage loses its legal character and concubines are not mentioned in the code; this and penalties for bigamy (which, however, also existed in the old law) establish monogamy. In making adultery an offense equally punishable whether committed by men or women (No. 1052) the law does away with the old double standard. Women are also granted equal treatment with respect to divorce (Nos. 1049-1052); this equality, however, is formal; the inferior social and economic position of women is not given consideration.

The Position of Children

Man's authority as father is also drastically attacked. He can no longer kill his children with impunity. The family council is allowed to interfere when parents abuse their power (No. 1090). When a person reaches his majority (at 20) his status is legally changed. Property rights are granted to children; though a minor's earnings are not considered his personal property, gifts, inheritances, etc., are (No. 1087).⁴⁸ The right to leave the family is granted children who have come of age and married minors (No. 1127), although the effect of this law is impaired by the fact that it does not provide for the property rights of the children concerned.

The family head can be elected, at least in theory, and this weakens the position of the eldest male. The law, however, clearly does not anticipate the holding of such elections, and it designates the eldest member of the family (not necessarily a male) as family head when elections are not held (No. 1124).

The right to bequeath property by will gives the father the opportunity to discriminate among his children (No. 1165), but

this power is checked by provisions insuring a minimum share to each of the heirs (No. 1223), and limiting to a period of twenty years the validity of a will prohibiting the division of family property (No. 1165).

Kin and Clan

The code takes a new attitude toward kin and clan. Members of the clan are not mentioned as being entitled to preferential treatment, and the kinsmen are mentioned only once (in the Penal Code). The penalties for maltreatment, for unlawful confinement, false accusation, and murder are heavier when these offenses are committed against parents, grandparents, or great grandparents (lineal ascendants), but all the other relatives are treated on the same basis as strangers. Remnants of the old kinship traditions appear only in the treatment of theft: the penalty for theft from relatives having joint property and living in the same house can be suspended, and no one can be prosecuted for theft from relatives within the fifth degree of relationship (by blood) and within the third degree by marriage without the victim's complaint (No. 324 of the Penal Code).

The kinsmen who are entitled to support are: (1) lineal ascendants, (2) lineal descendants, (3) spouses, (4) brothers and sisters, (5) the head and members of the family (No. 1114). But there is one very important qualification: only parents and grandparents are entitled to maintenance even if they are able to earn a living; all other kin have to prove that they are unable to do so. Thus all relatives, not excluding children and grandchildren, have to be in need to claim support. If someone does not want to help a cousin or uncle separated from the family, or even an able-bodied brother or sister living in the same household and refusing to work, he can refuse to do so without violating the law.

It is interesting to note that the new code preserves the idea that care for parents takes precedence over care for children (No. 1116).

While not mentioning concubinage, the law recognizes that it exists and will not soon disappear. Hence the code's provisions for illegitimate children are liberal (children by concubines are now considered illegitimate, but they can easily acquire the status of legal offspring).

Enforcement of the provisions of this liberal code has proved difficult. The new law is certainly a great step forward, but the question remains whether any considerable section of the population is advanced enough to avail itself of it. While some foreign

and Chinese writers assert that life in China today has been organized into a wholly new pattern, Jean Escarra, the well-known French authority on Chinese law, claims that "these laws are at variance with the actual social conditions of the country except for some families living in large cities which are open to international commerce. The majority of the peasants are ignorant of this legislation and will continue to be ignorant of it for a long time to come."⁴⁹

The rapid developments stimulated by the war make it impossible to say exactly what conditions prevail now. But, as the reader will see, the situation of the family in China in 1936-37 as described in this book was very different from the one the new code was designed to create.*

* *The Chinese Soviets and Family Law*. The government of the territory known from 1927 until 1937 as the Soviet Republic of China and now called the special districts has also issued new laws concerning family relations.⁵⁰

The decree of the first session of the Central Educational Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic states the new principles. "In 'feudal' times the family was a barbarous and inhuman institution. Women were oppressed and little attention was paid to children. In the new society, there is equality between men and women, and children have achieved a new status of importance." The new laws, evidently influenced by Russian legislation, are based on the following principles.

Marriage is concluded by mutual consent of the parties concerned. No compulsion is permitted. No marriage can be concluded on the authority of the parents alone. It is forbidden to send a little girl to another family to be reared as a future bride. All vestiges of the old marriage by purchase are abolished, including dowries and gifts. Polygamy is prohibited. The lowest age at which one may marry is 18 for women and 20 for men. In contrast with the usual Chinese practice, the law insists that marriages be registered with the local government. However, the Soviets still recognize the old taboo prohibiting marriage between blood relatives within five degrees of relationship.

Divorce is permitted either by mutual consent or at the emphatic insistence of one party. Divorces likewise have to be registered with the local government.

The law protects divorced women and their children. A wife has the right to the children, but the husband is responsible for their support. He must also support the divorced wife until she remarries. The alimony, never more than two thirds of his earnings, must be paid either in money or in labor.

The law is concerned only with conjugal families and ignores other types.

It was unfortunately impossible to make an investigation of conditions prevailing in the Soviet districts.

XI

Love and Marriage in Contemporary China

ROMANTIC LOVE

MADAME WU! Tomorrow morning I am leaving Shanghai. I am going to the front. This time I probably shall not return. I see you for the last time. Here is something I want to give you.' . . . Staff officer Lei reached in his pocket, brought out an old ragged copy of *Sorrows of Young Werther* and offered it to Mrs. Wu. Between the pages was a withered white rose.

"'. . . Five years ago, on an evening as sultry, as unusual as it is now, this rose was given to me by a most splendid, most noble, most adorable, most beautiful person as a reward for my adoration. This book . . . We read it together. Madame Wu, you will not deny it was a real love . . .

"'. . . I was a poor student and did not dare to speak my heart. I left. . . . I went to Canton, I entered the Whampoa military school. I took part in the Northern Expedition. I was promoted. I took part in the battles of Changsha, Wuchang, Chenchow, and Peiping. . . . I saw thousands and tens of thousands dying around me. Even in moments of the greatest danger I kept this book and this flower with me. . . . I still hoped. Then I came to Shanghai. For half a year I searched. Now I know . . . I have no luck and no hope. . . .'"

With these words the young officer left his beloved, a former student in a missionary school who had become the wife of a wealthy businessman in Shanghai.¹

Werther read by a Chinese officer! This book was written when Europe was undergoing great changes and capitalism was emerging. The European youth of that time passionately identified themselves with the hero of Goethe's novel, adopted his individualism and romanticism. Among the admirers of *Werther* was a young French officer who read the book many times and took it with him on all his expeditions. This officer's name was Napoleon Bonaparte.

Romantic love and individualism, almost unknown in old China, have taken possession of modern Chinese youth. Thou-

sands of young men and women have been deeply moved by Werther's fate and also by the unhappy love of their own romantic hero whose confession has just been quoted. Thousands have read other romances, foreign and Chinese, and are enthusiastic over romantic moving pictures.

Romantic fiction reflects realities. The old rigid separation of the sexes is gone. At college young men and women frequently play games and spend their leisure time together, read the same books, go to meetings and demonstrations together. Young lovers have become almost as common in the parks and streets of Peiping and Shanghai as in New York. There is a difference, however—lovers in China can be seen holding hands, but there is no kissing in public places—the young still observe the old rules of reticence.

Romantic feelings are not confined to the upper classes. A riksha coolie in Peiping may tell you of his love for a neighbor's daughter or of his decision never to marry again after the death of his beloved. A girl in a factory in Shanghai may meet a young man there who may ask her to marry him. And in Wusih girls and boys sing: "My sister is sixteen, the matchmaker begins to visit us. Keep away, matchmaker, boys and girls marry for love!"

Romantic love does not necessarily mean platonic relations. Among the patients of the Peiping Hospital, whose records I studied, unmarried mothers were increasingly frequent—working-class and middle-class girls. Yet—and this has not been true in the past—many of these pregnancies had had romantic preliminaries. Moreover, Chinese lovers read and talk together, and often work for the same political cause. A girl friend now is not only a woman but a companion as well.

Romance has brought with it tragedies, broken hearts, frustrations, suicides. Dr. Bingham Dai, who studied several hundred cases of mental disorders in the Peiping Union Medical College Hospital, asserts that love situations are a frequent cause.² Mao Tun's popular story of a girl who committed suicide when her lover left her reflected real conditions.³

Unlike the romances of old China, modern love stories can end happily. Love and marriage now are no longer separated, and the modern Chinese have begun to consider romantic love a necessary preliminary to marriage.* Ellen Key and Havelock Ellis, who con-

* This opinion was often expressed in private conversations and in literature. In 1925 the answers to the questionnaire circulated among the readers of the Shanghai newspaper *Shih Shih Hsin Pao* revealed that about half those with a college education considered romantic love the most important consideration in marriage, giving it

sidered marriage without love immoral, found many followers in China.⁵ The two lovers in Pa Chin's novel *Chia*, Kao Hsüeh-min and his cousin Ch'i, were widely emulated; * and "they confessed to their parents, the parents blessed their union, and they lived happily ever after" was a frequent ending of Chinese love stories in life and fiction.

THE MARRIAGE ARRANGEMENT

A revolution in human relations has occurred. But side by side with the new, in love as in every other sphere, the old pattern has persisted.

A girl student on her way to meet her lover encounters scores of young women of her own age who have been married for three or four years to men they had never seen before marriage. And her lover may very well have been brought to the place of rendezvous by a riksha coolie to whom it would never occur to choose his own mate.

Even in their own circles students see marriages arranged in the old way.†

In spite of the new civil code only a tiny fraction of the population marry persons of their own choosing. The parents, backed by tradition, have not given up their power without a struggle and few children insist on their rights. In the villages it is absolutely impossible for the young people to choose their own mates.

"The command of the parents, the assurances of the matchmaker are, as of old, the most important preliminaries to marriage," said a young sociologist who made a survey of a village not far from Peiping in 1932. "All the marriages are arranged by parents," repeat the authors of a survey of one of the most modernized districts in North China. "In the village sons and daughters give their parents a free hand in the arrangement of their marriages and are

precedence over obedience to parents' wishes and the desire to have children; however, only 26% of readers with high-school education and none of those with elementary-school education shared this opinion.⁴

* As in the olden times marriages between cousins of different surnames are rather frequent. The old rule of clan exogamy is however preserved both in law and in custom. An amusing case occurred during the author's stay in Peiping. The parents of two students obstinately opposed their marriage because they happened to bear the same surname, Tseng, though they came from different parts of the country and no blood relationship could be proved. The solution was ingenious. The girl was adopted by the family of her maternal aunt, received the surname P'u, and thus the marriage was permissible.

† Among the 1,074 male college and high-school students who answered our questionnaire 194 were married; 83 of these had never seen their brides before marriage and only 40 had chosen their brides themselves.

obedient," stated another author in describing a village in Kiangsu, the most industrialized province of China.⁶

We investigated 360 marriages in 170 families in the villages of North China, of Fukien and Kiangsu. In only one case did the parents ask the consent of the young man (a college student). Out of 170 rural inhabitants interviewed only 3 women admitted ever having heard of "modern marriages."

Parents have clung to the conviction that it is absolutely impossible and even dangerous to permit children to choose their mates. "And what if your son refuses to marry the bride you pick for him?" a Hopeh peasant was asked. "Then he would have to leave my house," was the answer. Another peasant at first refused to permit his daughter to marry a boy of her choice, though she had become pregnant by him; the father finally yielded to the persuasion of his relatives.

Even among the workers and lower middle class of Peiping the old ways have continued. In only 3 out of 112 marriages in 81 families did the bridegroom show an awareness of modern trends. A young mason and a peddler chose their wives themselves, though the marriages were arranged by matchmakers. (No romantic love!) In addition to these a blacksmith said that while his father chose the bride his own consent was asked.

Yet parents in the cities are less conservative than in the country. Thus 6 out of 16 Peiping workers over 35 years of age who were interviewed on marriage declared that they would permit their children to choose their mates. "But this is unlikely to happen," said several Peiping coolies, "this new idea is something for the rich people, like modern dress and automobiles."

In the cities three deviations from the old pattern appear: (1) parents arrange matches and ask their children's consent; (2) children choose their mates and ask the parents' approval; (3) children marry without asking their parents' approval. The first two deviations are compromises. The third often involves a complete break with the parents and is rather uncommon.

In many cases concessions to modernism are only formal. A Peiping official might show his son a picture of his future bride. The boy remaining silent, the father might assume his approval and then boast that he had arranged his boy's marriage in a modern way. On the other hand, many who choose their own mates ask their parents' consent only for the sake of appearances.

Modern marriages, exceptional among the industrial workers of Tientsin and Wusih, were more numerous among the industrial

workers in Shanghai. In about 25% of 95 families of industrial workers there were deviations from the old pattern. Twenty-six of 124 marriages were concluded with the consent of the parties concerned.

Among the hidebound Peiping middle class, modern arrangements took place in 9 out of 46 marriages.

In the upper class the landlords and rich merchants have resisted change rather effectively and among 18 families belonging to this class from whom information was secured there were no modern marriages.

Among the officials, professional workers, and educators in Peiping and Shanghai, old-fashioned marriages have begun to fall into discredit. Only 2 out of 10 engineers and doctors interviewed in Shanghai were married in the old way and in 23 families of professional workers, educators, and officials in Peiping from whom information was secured there were 16 cases of modern marriages.

Yet many parents even in these relatively advanced circles still insist on their old privileges and, as we shall see later, not all the children fight for their rights.*

Even when parents are not stubborn there are many obstacles in the way of the new marriage. One is the old betrothal arrangement. The new laws declare void betrothals arranged without the consent of the parties concerned, but there is always something binding on children about a promise made by their parents. The law is also susceptible to various interpretations. "You can't break your engagement," said a friend to Tan Shih-hua, who related the story of his life to the Russian writer S. Tretiakov, "the bride's family will start a lawsuit and your family will be ruined." ⁷ This conversation took place in the 'twenties, before the new legal code had been promulgated. But my Chinese teacher had the same problem in 1936, long after the enactment of the new code.

Yet the Chinese newspapers in 1935-37 often announced the breaking of engagements concluded by parents. Such announcements were especially numerous in Shanghai.

Moreover it was not easy for the young people to make their own arrangements. Except for the small group of students in co-educational colleges, it is not easy for boy to meet girl in China.

In the upper classes young people can meet at house parties, but in middle-class homes the sexes are still segregated and mixed parties are infrequent.

There has been little in the way of dances, concerts, public lec-

* Thus, 56 out of 96 men and women workers interviewed in Shanghai insisted on choosing mates for their children. Among those 56 there were several who chose their

tures, sporting events. Working-class girls and boys, much less peasants, have had even fewer opportunities to get together.* Many pregnancies among unmarried working-class girls have proved the congestion of housing conditions in Peiping and Shanghai rather than the existence of romantic affairs.

As of old, Chinese marriages in all social classes are concluded with the help of matchmakers. Even modern young people will ask friends or relatives to assume this role. Yet the old rule forbidding the prospective mates to see each other before marriage is often broken. Some matchmakers not only carry on negotiations between families but also introduce the young people to each other, in the style of Jewish and Eastern European matchmakers.

Another modern device for meeting members of the other sex is to put advertisements in the newspapers.

Here is one:

"Looking for a Wife. I want to find a wife for my friend. He studied abroad, is a man of good behavior and excellent character. He earns \$300 a month, lives alone, and is not married. The prospective life companion must be under 25, a high-school graduate, come from a good family, and be in good health and beautiful. Write full particulars to . . ." ⁸

Most of the advertisements are published not by the parties concerned but by friends and relatives. But sometimes a young girl will take her fate into her own hands. In 1936 the magazine *Wan Ying* in Shanghai (issue No. 8) praised the 'courage of a certain Miss Wang Ching-ying, a rich orphan surrounded by selfish relatives who wanted to marry her off to one of their sons or nephews (one of the candidates was thirteen years younger than the girl). She refused to submit and decided to look for a husband herself. A notice with her picture and a list of her qualities was published in the magazine, which invited educated men of good character to compete for her favor. More than two hundred young men sent in their applications. But such cases are exceptional.

THE SCARCITY OF WOMEN

For poor peasants and workers marriage is still not a question of romance, psychological suitability, emotional satisfaction, or similar considerations so often discussed in modern Chinese publications.

own wives themselves. (One of the many examples of change in behavior preceding change in attitude often encountered among the Chinese industrial workers.)

* In a village in Honan where the author stayed in 1936 the young girls and matrons withdrew when a male entered the room.

Despite the improvement in the position of women, the new trends have not altered the sex ratio among the poor in China. The mortality of infant girls is still very high, many girls are taken into rich homes as concubines or become prostitutes. As a result there are not enough women of marriageable age among the peasants and workers.* Women are scarce and as one of the people we interviewed put it, "it is easier to marry off a girl than to find a bride for a boy."

Marriage is still a great expense. Payment for the bride is still common in both country and city. In the North only the poorest people demand money for their girls and public opinion is against this custom (in some villages it has been banned altogether). In the South even middle peasants and industrial workers adhere to it and we were often told in Wusih and Shanghai: "The girl's family usually wants \$100-\$300; part of this money is for her trousseau, part of it remains in the family." Our informants considered this the most natural thing in the world, as had the authors of old novels and short stories. We were even assured that the poorer the prospective bridegroom the more he has to pay.

D. H. Kulp, observing marriages in the village of Phoenix near Canton in the early 1920's, found that sometimes marriage was equivalent to a pure purchase of the bride. "Cases have been known," he says, "when purchase was effected as coldly as that of any chattel in the market place."⁹

Among workers in Shanghai and Peiping several cases were reported of wives and widows sold outright for \$200-\$300 by their husbands' relatives.

A poor man wants to have a wife, to have children, and to continue his family's "life stream." All methods for acquiring a wife are good. "I do not mind my sons finding wives for themselves," said a Peiping peddler who was anything but modern. "Wives are hard to get nowadays and wherever they come from, we are glad to welcome them."

It is still considered improper for widows to remarry. But poor men marry widows because they are easier to get than virgins. Any widow or divorcee can find a husband if she is willing to marry beneath her social status.

Premarital chastity is still required and parents watch their daughters closely, but many workers we interviewed admitted that even if a bride turned out not to have been a virgin, she would be tolerated notwithstanding—it would be too expensive to acquire

* See pp. 150 ff.

another bride. Thus, the mother of two girls from Tungchow made pregnant by a soldier was not too upset. She knew they would be able to marry just the same.

In every town and village of China there is a considerable group of bachelors—laborers and coolies—who cannot afford marriage. Even if no money is demanded for the bride, the bridegroom's family almost always has to bear the bulk of the marriage expenses. Marriages remain costly propositions. It was customary for families in Peiping to spend four to five times their monthly income on a wedding;¹⁰ the peasants in Hopeh spent from three months' to half a year's income.* If a wife dies and the husband has to remarry it is a real catastrophe. One peasant family interviewed was forced to arrange five marriages for three sons; as a result these well-to-do people were reduced to tenants.

In order to avoid expenses many people arrange to have their sons' future brides brought up in their homes—a practice especially widespread in the South.† Sometimes money is paid for these little girls too. A Shanghai worker told us: "We had no daughter so we decided to buy a little girl in order to marry her later to our son. A little girl is cheaper than the grown-up one and we send her to work in the factory in the meantime."

DOWRY

In the upper and middle classes of modern China—as in the olden times—brides are not paid for and good trousseaus are considered indispensable for the reputation of the girl and her parents. Even an independent modern woman will work hard and save in order to appear in her bridegroom's house with good furniture and clothes. Moreover the new inheritance laws have begun to exert their influence and some girls have begun to receive a dowry. In the villages the new laws are almost unknown, and only a few factory girls actually obtain their share of their fathers' land and other property. Yet in the cities the women are aware of their rights and fill the courts with suits if the male relatives try to exclude them from inheritance.

* In Ting Hsien in Hopeh the bridegroom's family had to spend from \$45 to \$120 (rich peasants); the girls' families had to spend more—from \$70 (poor peasants) to \$400 (rich peasants). Therefore, says the author of the survey, "the people are willing to feed the boys and unwilling to feed the girls."¹¹

† The custom was well known in old China (it was mentioned even in the legal code of the Yüan dynasty). Though it did not become universal, the number of arrangements of this kind always increased in hard times.

THE MARRIAGE RATIO

In spite of the limited possibilities for marriage of poor people, the marriage ratio in China has been higher than among her western and eastern neighbors, except for India. Of 88,872 Chinese between 15 and 44 years of age, investigated by Buck, 68.1% of the males and 84.8% of the females were married, as against only 48.6% of the men and 48.5% of the women in England and Wales, 50.3% and 63.9% in the United States (rural population), 54.5% and 66.7% in Japan. Only in India (72% and 80.7%) is the ratio as high as in China.¹²

THE AVERAGE AGE OF MARRIAGE

The custom of early marriage, this legacy of the old Chinese family, is still widespread in contemporary China. The provisions of the new civil code prohibiting marriage of women under sixteen and of men under eighteen are not observed. In 1929-31, of 3,360 peasants interviewed by Dr. Buck 7.3% of the men and 9% of the women had married before they were fifteen.¹³ It seems that townspeople marry somewhat later than villagers. In a group of 1,174 people from Peiping and Shanghai that the author investigated (in 1935-37) 3.4% of the men and 4.5% of the women had married before the age of fifteen.* The average age of marriage for males in rural China (information collected by Dr. Buck in 1929-31 from 1,600 males and 7,760 females) was 20.5, whereas in England and Australia it was 29, and in New York State (excluding New York City) 28.8; the average age for females was 18.2 in China, 26.5 in England and Wales, 25.3 in Australia, and 25.2 in New York State.¹⁴

It would appear that in the tradition-bound strata the age of marriage, especially for men, varies with class. People who are better off marry earlier than those who are poor.

The new trends seem to favor marriage at a later age. Factory workers marry later than peasants and workers in traditional industries. In South China, where industry is more developed, the average age of marriage is slightly higher than in North China.¹⁵

* When comparing the author's information with Dr. Buck's, the reader should keep in mind that Dr. Buck's figures refer to the ages at the last birthday, according to the Western method of computation, whereas the author's informants gave their ages in the Chinese way. According to the Chinese method of computation, a year is added to a person's age on the New Year and not on his birthday. A Chinese would give his age as a year or a year and a few months older than a Westerner born the same day.

Among girl workers some are unmarried at 24, 26, and even 27—an age at which village girls are considered old maids and are unable to conclude good matches. But neither the factory girls nor their parents are disturbed: “The mother does not want the elder sister [aged 25] to marry early—she supports the family.” This statement of a Shanghai factory girl is typical.

The same trend is noticeable among the modernized upper class. A college student who wants to build his own family, marry the girl he likes, and assume responsibility for his wife and children marries after graduation, not before. College or high-school girls postpone their marriages in order not to be hampered in their studies. Girls who are not able to find a suitable partner prefer to remain unmarried. Spinsters, unknown in old China, are beginning to appear among educated Chinese women.

The trend toward later marriage has been noticed by Chinese publicists and sociologists and the subject has been debated. The majority of progressive writers are inclined to approve it, though they warn against excessive imitation of the Western habit of late marriage.¹⁶

In most marriages husbands are older or the same age as their wives. This relation changes in the country and many observers report that in some localities wives are as a rule older than their husbands, the difference sometimes being as high as 9 or 11 years.

The information at my disposal confirms this. Only in 20% of 3,004 urban couples in North China from whom information was secured were wives older than their husbands. But this ratio rose to 45% (169 of 370 couples) in the country. Older wives were to be found particularly among the poor peasants, who wanted the woman to be useful in the household.

As was to be expected, the number of wives older than their husbands decreased among industrial workers and in the modernized upper class where wives are regarded as life companions and not as household drudges.

THE WEDDING CEREMONY

Most marriage ceremonies are of the old type,¹⁷ but in the big cities extremely advanced types of marriage ritual can be found. A young couple, for instance, might invite their friends to dinner and declare themselves man and wife. According to the new Chinese law such a declaration is sufficient to legalize marriage. On such an occasion the couple would wear their finest clothes and

serve an excellent dinner but this would be all there would be to the ceremony.

Another innovation is the so-called "collective wedding" advocated by the government for purposes of economy, in order to reduce the usual enormous expenses involved in marriage. The New Life Movement, a government-sponsored society, organized ceremonies in which many couples were simultaneously married by the city authorities. Brides and grooms are dressed for the occasion, the hall of the yamen is decorated; the official makes an impressive speech filled with quotations from Confucius and Sun Yat-sen, and all this evokes a festive atmosphere. At the same time the expense of the whole procedure is so low that it can be borne by the poorest coolie. There were several collective weddings in Shanghai and Nanking. They were about to be introduced in Canton and even in Peiping. During the war many collective weddings took place in Chunking.

More common among the modernized groups is a modified old-fashioned ceremony similar to one which I attended in the autumn of 1935.

A WEDDING IN PEIPING

(Notes from the author's diary)

As is customary now, the celebration took place not in a private home but in a restaurant, or more accurately, in two restaurants: the bride with her friends and relatives gave a banquet in one, the groom in another. The joyful atmosphere was felt even outside: the entrances were lavishly decorated with national flags; red paper flowers brightened the jackets of the guests, servants, and numerous riksha coolies crowded about the place; neighbors watched outside the gates and all the children of the neighborhood seemed to have been attracted to the red lacquered doors by an invisible Pied Piper. The day (September 9) was considered auspicious for weddings and several were being celebrated in the restaurant.

When I arrived my party was having dinner in two different rooms: according to the old rules men and women ate separately. My friend Liu Hsiao-mei introduced me to the women.

The bridegroom, who came to greet us at the door, was an engineer who had studied in Shanghai; he was a rather prosperous man and looked very modern indeed in his tails. He was about thirty. The bride was a high-school graduate, about eight or ten

years his junior. My friend explained as we sat down to dine that the marriage was of a modern kind. Mr. Liu knew the bride's family, saw the girl, and asked his friend to arrange the betrothal. And the bride? Was she willing to marry this man? Hsiao-mei did not know the girl very well, but thought that she probably was not opposed: her family did not permit her to meet young men and Mr. Liu was no worse than other possible candidates.

One dish followed another. Suddenly children's voices rang out happily: "Lai la, lai la!" (They come, they come!) We rushed out of the room. A red sedan chair was brought into the courtyard by six coolies in green embroidered gowns. It was not the bride. Two girls in their early teens, in bright red and green dresses, heavily rouged and powdered, ascended the chair and were carried away: they were the sister and niece of the bridegroom and were going to fetch the bride.

One, two hours passed. I sat with the women in the courtyard, nibbling watermelon seeds, talking and studying their elaborate modern dresses and make-up. Then we went to look at the gifts: three or four pieces of silk, a fountain-pen stand, a silver shield bearing the names of the bride and bridegroom and several characters symbolizing luck, happiness, etc. (a decorative piece one can find in almost every Chinese middle-class home); a terrible Western product—a kind of screen with a Swiss landscape—and two beautiful Chinese scrolls with birds and flowers.

Then "Lai la, lai la" sounded again. The red sedan chair reappeared. The bridegroom's little sister leaped out and helped the bride descend. The bride did not wear the red dress and heavy flowered headgear of the Chinese bride of olden times; neither did she have on the white dress traditional in the West (white is the color of mourning in China). Like most other modern brides she chose a color which represented a compromise: her dress, veil, and bouquet were soft pink, blending charmingly with her black hair and delicate pale brown skin.

The bridegroom took the bride by the hand and led her on a red carpet over the courtyard. She covered her face with flowers to protect herself from the guests who rushed to greet her, showering her with confetti instead of the traditional rice and wheat. The children threw paper missiles with gusto; among them a servant discovered several shabbily dressed street urchins who were unceremoniously thrown out.

A few firecrackers went off.

The brass band—six men in red coats and white caps of Western

pattern, reminding one of a British soldier's full-dress uniform—produced some very loud notes which were supposed to be Mendelssohn's "Wedding March."

The bride was taken to a room upstairs in which the kinswomen of the bridegroom combed her hair, made up her face, adjusted her veil, with expressions of approval and disapproval. I was asked several times what I thought of her. The slim shy girl looked uncomfortable. She was among strangers—only her father and mother had accompanied her—all her friends and other relatives had been left behind.

And now the main part of the ceremony was about to start. We went downstairs and entered a large hall, decorated with long red pennants and scrolls extolling filial piety, wifely virtue, longevity, and fertility. The chairs behind the long table covered with red cloth were occupied by half a dozen old gentlemen, some in Western, some in old-fashioned garb. They took their places after long disputes accompanied by polite bows and mutual apologies. Mr. Liu senior, who was the bridegroom's uncle and his elder relative, sat in the middle; the bride's father was seated to his right, the two matchmakers to his left. The bride and groom stood before the table. Standing to the left with his face turned to the guests was the groom's nephew acting as master of ceremonies (this role is spoken of in the 2,500-year-old *Book of Ritual and Ceremonies*). He was in charge of the order of events: "Now Mr. Liu speaks." "Now bow to the elders." "Now bow to the guests." Tradition demands that the ancestors of the groom, as represented by their tablets, be present at the ceremony. But no ancestor tablets were brought in and Hsiao-mei doubted whether the bridegroom, who lived alone, would have such tablets around in his modern apartment.

Mr. Liu, who presided over the ceremony in place of the defunct father of the bridegroom, read the marriage contract. This was an innovation. Formerly the contract was signed during the ceremony but not read. The contract was modern, too. The girl received a dowry from her parents and the contract specified that it would remain her own property but that the husband would manage it as well as any property they might later acquire jointly. Mr. Liu deliberately stuttered to cover up his omission of the names of the bride's and bridegroom's parents—it was considered unlucky to pronounce them.

The young people, directed by the master of ceremonies, made several bows. Then came a long speech by Mr. Liu full of quota-

tions from the classics, examples of happy marriages of olden times, and wishes for many children from this union.

Another bow and the ceremony was over. The firecrackers went off again. The bridegroom's friends rushed to his side, thumped him, laughing and shouting: "Now be brave," "Many children!" "Show what you can do," and some more precise recommendations.

Another banquet followed. The newly-weds went from table to table, greeting the guests and asking them to partake of "the miserable food." . . . The young bride looked even paler and more frightened than she had before. . . .

In another hour it was really over. The couple left the place in a rented motorcar.

XII

The Type and Size of the Family

THE TYPE OF THE FAMILY

How have the new trends changed the composition of the Chinese family? What kind of relatives and how many now live together in a single family unit? Are people in the country and the traditional urban groups organized into the same sort of families as before? Have the modernized groups—industrial workers, modern industrialists, and intellectuals—completely adopted the “Western type” of conjugal family consisting only of parents and children?

Now, as in the past, Chinese and Western anthropologists and sociologists, journalists and fiction writers continue to answer these questions by sweeping generalizations. Even some very well-informed scholars still credit the old myth of the joint family of three or more generations as typical of China.¹

Others go to the opposite extreme. Sons and daughters of rich families in Shanghai or Nanking, studying in American or European universities, assert that, whereas in old China everyone lived in joint patriarchal families, now “we have changed all that” and modern China knows only families of the modern conjugal Western type.

The actual situation does not fit either of these views.

There are no unimpeachable statistics enabling us to establish with complete certainty the composition of the family throughout the country—nor do we have statistics about many other aspects of Chinese life—but quite a few characteristic samples have been collected in recent times which, together with other existing data, should throw some light on the question.

The author was able to analyze for type about 6,000 families investigated in several sociological surveys conducted in China in recent years and some 3,200 families of PUMC Hospital patients and persons from whom information was secured for the present study.*

* Lewis Smythe, professor of Sociology in Nanking University, analysed data on 2,422 rural families in four districts in different parts of China (near Canton in the

It is not easy to classify Chinese families. The establishment of a new family unit is not always clear cut. Formerly a new family unit either was a natural continuation of the family of the father by his son or was established after family division. Today many families split up without any formality. Many "joint families" are in reality fictitious units: married brothers stay in one compound but have only part of their property in common; they retain the common kitchen but eat by themselves and do not pool their expenses. There are also many families that have been formally or practically divided but continue to live in one compound and appear to the superficial observer as one family unit.* This has often led to an exaggerated estimate of the number of joint and stem families in China.

Moreover, in defining whether or not a relative belongs to the family, one cannot simply accept the conceptions of the modern legal code and refuse to regard as family members those who do not reside with the family.³ Investigators of standards of living usually do this to simplify their records of family incomes and expenditures, but for a student of family life this method is impossible. A young man may work at a place very distant from his family's residence, yet remain a member of his father's or brother's family. For example, he may send money home, he may return to marry a girl his parents or brother have chosen for him, and later may leave his wife and children with them.

However, temporary absence is often the beginning of permanent separation, and people are frequently unaware that they are about to establish a new family unit. A son who lives with his wife and children in the city may still consider himself a member of his father's family in his native village, but in reality his establishment of a separate residence in the city is the beginning of his separation from his father's family.

South, near Hankow in Central China, near Shanghai in the East, and near Peiping in the North) and on 2,027 families in Nanking. He took the data concerning rural areas from Buck's study of *Land Utilization in China*, the material for which was collected in 1929-32. The data on Nanking were collected in 1931-32. Ava Milam presents material on types prevalent in 1,270 middle- and upper-class families.²

Several studies of living standards and surveys give fairly conclusive evidence on the size and composition of families in different social groups (mainly workers and peasants). These studies were referred to in Chapter VIII; a good summary of the findings was made by H. D. Lamson in his *Social Pathology in China*.

The data collected by the author contain information about 528 rural and 1,637 urban families collected from patients of the PUMC Hospital in Peiping and various persons interviewed in Shanghai, Wusih, and Fukien, as well as from 741 families of college students and 342 families of high-school students.

* There were many such cases among our informants.

In doubtful cases, for instance when members of families that had not formally split up lived separately, we usually accepted the version of our informants. Married people, however, were classified as members of the husband's father's family only if the husband left his wife and children with the family when working in another place. But if he took his wife and children with him—as did the great majority of Shanghai workers and young professionals in Shanghai, Peiping, and Nanking, thus breaking the old tradition—we assumed that he established a new family.

The tables show the distribution of types of families * among people of different social classes in the localities where information was secured for this study.

Table I shows that now as in olden times all three types of families, conjugal, stem, and joint, exist in all the strata of the population, in the country and in the cities, among modernized and old-fashioned people. Our sample also seems to indicate that

TABLE I
FAMILY TYPE AND SOCIAL CLASS
1. VILLAGES IN NORTH CHINA † (458 FAMILIES)

	<i>Farm Laborers</i>	<i>Poor Peasants</i>	<i>Middle Peasants</i>	<i>Well-to-do Peasants</i>	<i>Landlords</i>
Number of Families	61	163	125	58	51
<i>Family Type (per cent)</i>					
Conjugal	54	41	27	17	12
Stem	35	44	44	42	35
Joint	11	15	29	41	53

2. NONINDUSTRIAL CITIES IN NORTH CHINA
(MAINLY PEIPING) (1,365 FAMILIES)

	<i>Wage Earners</i>	<i>Lower Middle Class</i>	<i>Middle Class</i>	<i>Upper Class</i>
Number of Families	426	251	496	192
<i>Family Type (per cent)</i>				
Conjugal	58	51	50	52
Stem	34	36	34	28
Joint	8	13	16	20

* For a definition of different family types see pp. 12 ff.

† The distribution of family types among the 30 peasant families in Kiangsu and 40 peasant families in Fukien from whom information was secured was similar. (See Appendix, Table II.)

3. SHANGHAI * (208 FAMILIES)

	<i>Industrial Workers</i>	<i>Lower Middle Class</i>	<i>Middle Class</i>	<i>Upper Class</i>
Number of Families	143	42	15	8
<i>Family Type (per cent)</i>				
Conjugal	71	62	73	50
Stem	24	33	27	50
Joint	5	5	—	—

the joint family—the so-called “normal Chinese family”—predominates only among landlords, a numerically insignificant rural group.

Also in contradiction with the old view is the fact that in our sample practically no families were composed of more than three generations. There were only 40 families comprising four generations out of 1,717 † urban families (2.3%) and 15 out of 528 rural families (2.8%). Smythe found 16 families comprising four and five generations among 2,027 urban families (0.8%) and 69 among the 2,422 rural families (2.9%). ‡ 4

TOWN AND COUNTRY

A comparison of rural and town families, taking into account the social strata to which they belong, reveals that there are more conjugal families and fewer joint families in the cities than in the country. The percentages are as shown in Table II on page 138.

When we go from Peiping to the industrial cities of Tientsin, Wusih, and Shanghai, the difference becomes still more pronounced. (See Table I above and Appendix, Table II.)

Now the question arises: Which is the prevalent family type in the Chinese village? It must be the type that occurs most frequently among the largest groups of the village population, i.e., among the poor and middle peasants. It seems that two types are prevalent: the conjugal and the stem family (see Table I). The stem family in many cases is a “broken stem family” and consists of one parent—

* The distribution of family types among the families of 64 wage earners and lower-middle-class families in Tientsin and Wusih was similar. (See Appendix, Table II.)

† In addition to the 1,637 urban families mentioned in Table I and footnote, this number includes a few families whose social status was difficult to define.

‡ Our figures on families of four generations agree with Dr. Smythe's for the rural groups; for the urban groups ours show a higher proportion, probably because we included members of the middle and upper class who on the average live longer, whereas Dr. Smythe's group, composed of inhabitants of a “poorer and older part of Nanking,” consisted mainly of poor people.

TABLE II
PERCENTAGE OF CONJUGAL FAMILIES *

	<i>Wage Earners</i>	<i>Lower Middle Class</i>	<i>Middle Class</i>	<i>Upper Class</i>	
Peiping	58	51	50	52	
	<i>Farm Laborers</i>	<i>Small Peasants</i>	<i>Middle Peasants</i>	<i>Well-to-do Peasants</i>	<i>Landlords</i>
Rural	54	41	27	17	12

usually the mother—a married son, his wife and children (often one child). This is also the view of so keen an observer as Dr. H. T. Fei. The typical family in the village of Kaihsienkung in Kiangsu, which Dr. Fei studied, consisted, according to his testimony, of four persons: husband, wife, one child, and one old woman.⁵

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE FAMILIES

A glance at Table I suggests that the composition of the family is largely determined by its social and economic status. In the city as in the country, in tradition-bound Peiping as in modern Shanghai, the proportion of joint families increases and the proportion of conjugal families decreases as one ascends the social scale.

Among the wage earners the conjugal family is definitely the prevalent type. Nor are there many joint families among the lower middle class in the cities.

The conjugal type prevailed (66%) among the 2,027 urban families investigated by Smythe. As these families lived in "the poorer and older part of Nanking" it may be assumed that the great majority of them were wage earners or belonged to the lower middle class.†

In our sample the percentage of joint families among the middle- and upper-class groups is definitely higher than among the poor living in the same type of community.

The effect of the economic and social status on the family type

* Dr. Smythe's sample shows 45% of conjugal families in the rural group against 66% in the urban group. The only fault one can find with his excellent analysis is that he takes his urban and rural groups as a whole without differentiating on the basis of social strata.

† The fact that the proportion of conjugal (or small, to use the Chinese term) families in Dr. Smythe's Nanking sample is larger than in the two lower classes in our Peiping sample can perhaps be explained by the fact that he took into consideration only members living together, omitting those temporarily absent and those staying in the country.

is described in Pearl Buck's well-known trilogy, *The House of Earth*. Her intimate knowledge of Chinese life enabled her to depict a different but always typical family background for each stage of her hero's life. When Wang Lung was poor he lived in conjugal and stem families. Before he was married there were only two men in the family—he and his father (a broken conjugal family). Later his family became a broken stem family: he, his wife, his children, and his old father. But when he became rich he established a joint family: himself, his wife and concubines, two married sons, their wives and children, an unmarried son, an unmarried daughter, and several slaves.

The fact that the family type depends on the family's economic status also in the tradition-bound strata seems to confirm our hypothesis about the prevalent type of Chinese family in the past.* The joint family, which was the ideal of the Chinese, actually was nowhere prevalent except in the upper classes.

The myth that the joint family of several generations and branches is the "normal" has arisen because conditions in the upper class have been taken as representative of the population as a whole. The Chinese who have spread this myth in the West have usually belonged to rich families and have not known how the poor lived. Moreover, the Chinese emigrants to America and to the islands of the South Seas came mostly from South China, where the joint family (as well as the clan) tradition was more pronounced than in the North.

Many an observer who has investigated the family has found that the joint family was *not* typical in the particular section of China he studied. But it was supposed that it was in the rest of China. ". . . curiously enough," says Dr. H. T. Fei, "in this village [Kaihsienkung in Kiangsu] the large [joint] family is rare. In less than 10% of the total number of *chia* [families] do we find more than one married couple." ⁶ L. K. Tao, however, found that the prevalent type among the riksha coolies in Peiping, as well as among the textile workers in Shanghai, was the conjugal or "modern" family. He says: "Generally speaking, the typical Chinese family [i.e., the large joint family] exists nowadays only in the country districts and among wealthy classes, while the family of the modern type has become general in urban districts and among comparatively poor classes." ⁷ Buck and Smythe concluded not only that the joint family was rare but also that the great majority of Chinese families belonged to the "Western" (conjugal) type.⁸

* See p. 16.

This is doubtless an exaggeration, but it is nearer the truth than the assertion that the joint family is the normal type.

We can now say with reasonable certainty that the joint family is not and never was the "normal" type of Chinese family; the family type in China is not and never was uniform, but has depended largely on economic and social factors and on whether the family lives in the city or in the country.

WHY ARE THERE FEWER JOINT FAMILIES AMONG THE POOR?

One explanation lies in the fact that the poor have (and probably always have had) fewer old parents alive by the time they marry than the well-to-do. The percentage of persons above 50 years of age among the peasants investigated by Buck in 1929-32 was 13.5%. This compares with 21.2% in England (1927), 25.2% in France (1928) and 17.1% in the United States (1920).⁹ This is the result of the fact that both birth rate and death rate in China are higher than in the Western countries. There can hardly be any doubt that the proportion of older people is still lower among the lower classes. Disease, famine, malnutrition, and bad labor conditions take a heavy toll among them and the death rate in the ranks of the poor is undoubtedly higher than with the upper- and middle-class people. There are some reasons to believe that the birth rate among the poor is somewhat lower than among the well-to-do, but the difference is hardly great enough to influence substantially the proportion of persons above 50 years of age.

The higher child and infant mortality rate in the poor families combined with the somewhat lower birth rate * is responsible for the fact that among the lower classes there are relatively many families with only one son. These families can never belong to the "joint" type, which implies the existence of more than one married son in the family.

Moreover, poor families divide more frequently, both after the parents' death and even during the father's lifetime, though old peasants and artisans, as our informants told us, dislike the idea of family division as much as do merchants and landlords. More sons and brothers of poor peasants and artisans must leave the miserable paternal farm or shop and try their luck elsewhere. Many never return. The classic description of quarrels in a peasant family by the eighteenth-century official Wang Yu-po (in his para-

* See pp. 152 ff.

phrase of the *Sacred Edict*) still applies to contemporary China. This is proved by descriptions of family divisions given by our informants and by storytellers in Chinese villages and cities.¹⁰ The women of the family are usually blamed for instigating the quarrels.

"How lazy and what a spendthrift your younger brother is," says the elder brother's wife in Wang Yu-po's text. "You work so hard to support him and he finds fault [with everything you do]. Have we to behave towards him as if we were his son and daughter-in-law who owe him filial piety?" The younger brother's wife in her turn complains to her husband. "To be sure, your brother makes money, but you make money too. You work at home just as much as he does, but no hired laborer is treated as badly as you are. And his children are treated as children should be treated. [One constantly hears:] 'Buy this for them to eat, buy that for them to eat.' And what about our children? Have they to die?"¹¹

Such conflicts naturally arise mostly in poor families where every bite of food is counted.

As one large farm in China is, as elsewhere, more profitable than two small ones of the same acreage,* the peasants have naturally been reluctant to divide their property. But farm laborers, very poor peasants, and especially workers—riksha coolies, etc.—have had no economic incentive to remain together. Many have felt that they would be better off in small family units. "Divided because of poverty" was an explanation frequently given by the poor among our respondents.

That the number of small conjugal families in the cities is larger than in the country can be explained also by the greater mobility of the city population.

INFLUENCE OF MODERN TRENDS

When we compare the tradition-bound groups in the village and in nonindustrialized cities with the modernized groups, we see the effect of modernization on the family type. The conjugal family type was more frequent among the relatively well-off industrial workers of Shanghai, the most modern among the wage earners of China, than among the poorer workers of Peiping.†

* J. L. Buck found that "the most economical size unit of farm is in the large, or the very large size group."¹²

† See Table I; the 250 families of textile workers investigated by Yang and Tao and the 305 families investigated by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the City Government of Greater Shanghai show similar proportions.¹³

The same situation exists in the upper and middle classes. Thus, for example, among the families of college students we investigated, 81% were of the conjugal type in industrialized modern Hongkong and treaty ports, as compared with 51% in provincial capitals (mostly non-industrial cities). In the villages the percentage dropped to 24.

But modern trends have influenced the structure of the family in tradition-bound Peiping also. There were more conjugal families and fewer joint families among officials, professionals, and teachers—the groups we characterized as “modernized”—than among businessmen, landlords, and managers of old-fashioned shops, who lived and worked in the old style.

TABLE III
FAMILY TYPES AMONG TRADITION-BOUND AND MODERN-
IZED GROUPS IN PEIPING

	Middle Class		Upper Class	
	<i>Tradition-bound Groups</i>	<i>Modernized Groups</i>	<i>Tradition-bound Groups</i>	<i>Modernized Groups</i>
Number of Families	171	320	103	107
<i>Family Type (per cent)</i>				
Conjugal	39	56	24	65
Stem	40	30	34	24
Joint	21	14	42	11

The fact that in the modernized groups more conjugal families are found in the upper than in the middle class seems to contradict the previously made assertion that in all the groups more conjugal and fewer joint families are found when descending the social scale. But this contradiction is deceptive.

In the old Chinese society the social and economic factor was primarily responsible for the family type—and Table III shows that in the tradition-bound groups there are more joint families and fewer conjugal families in the upper class than in the middle class. With the modernization of China these economic factors remained important, but another set of factors began to operate at the same time. The influence of modern trends has become a great factor for the adoption of the conjugal family system. The upper classes had more intimate and sustained contacts with the sources of Western culture than the middle classes. Not only are there more modernized people among them, but

they have been modernized to a higher degree than middle-class people, who also could be classified as "modernized." Thus, for example, college education, the most important medium for modern trends, is more common among the upper than among the middle classes. Therefore the upper-class people are more likely to assimilate some features of Western culture, among them the conjugal family system.

That modern education and especially college education induces the Chinese to give preference to conjugal families and discourages joint families is indicated by the distribution of family types among the 1083 families of students from whom information about this was secured.

TABLE IV
EDUCATION OF FATHER AND FAMILY TYPE

	Traditional		Modern			Total
	<i>Private School</i>	<i>Degree under Old Examination System</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>Other Schools *</i>	<i>College</i>	
Number of Families	337	109	137	28	472	1,083
<i>Family Type (Per cent)</i>						
Conjugal	41	43	50	54	67	54 [†]
Stem	33	33	32	28	22	28
Joint	26	24	18	18	11	18

New family units have begun to appear in modernized circles, such as old parents who had married sons and yet live alone, not with their children. These old couples were rather numerous among our informants—industrial workers of Shanghai. Of 64 heads of families interviewed 15 had parents (couples or widowed) living alone, without children. In 10 of these 15 cases the parents lived in the country; in 5 they lived in Shanghai, the old fathers worked and had no economic relations with their sons.[‡]

There are fewer such cases among the modernized people who are better off. Evidently only where modernization has been

* Military academy, YMCA schools, etc.

[†] In the group Ava Milam studied 864 (68%) families were of the conjugal type and 406 (32%) were of other types.¹⁴ It must be borne in mind that among the families she investigated the percentage of Christian and modernized families was very high.

[‡] Though the poor people in China almost unanimously consider poverty a motive for splitting up the family, there were very few cases of old parents living alone among our informants of the tradition-bound poor classes.

coupled with economic difficulties have sons challenged the old Chinese idea of propriety to the extent of leaving their old parents and letting them live alone.

*WHY DO THE MODERN TRENDS FAVOR CONJUGAL
FAMILIES?*

The cost of living in industrial cities prevents industrial workers from bringing their parents and elderly relatives to stay with them. Moreover, workers' wives and children have many opportunities to add to the family income by working in factories, and thus can stay with their husbands and fathers. This leads to the establishment of new families of the conjugal type.

The cultural discrepancy between modern sons and their wives on the one side and their tradition-bound, old-fashioned parents on the other sharpens family conflicts to a degree which was unknown in old China. Separation is often the natural result.

One factor working against the joint family system has been the theoretical opposition by the modern educated classes, especially the educated youth. As we have seen, all the critics of the Chinese family system have been outspoken opponents of the "large family," as they call it, in all its forms, including the stem family. An overwhelming majority of the 1,700 students who answered our questionnaire considered the conjugal family superior to the joint and stem families.

As early as 1924, about twelve years before our survey, 226 readers (194 men and 32 women) of the Shanghai newspaper *Shih Shih Hsin Pao*, in answering Professor P'an Kuan-tan's questionnaire on family problems,¹⁵ condemned the joint family. Only 25% of these readers (79 men and 12 women) favored it.

The reasons for this condemnation continue to be the same as those expressed by the early critics, related in Chapter X: the joint family creates enormous friction, hampers the development of personality, leads to the oppression of young people by their elders, favors parasitism, and does not allow an able man to enjoy the earned reward of his labor.

Yet quite a few Chinese doubt whether the conjugal family of the Western type is ideal for their country. Only 40.5% of the people questioned by Professor P'an were in favor of adopting the Western family system.¹⁶

The joint family system has been rejected almost unanimously, but the prospect of leaving old parents to live alone has made

reformers uneasy. Professor P'an, who struggled for the reform of the old family in contrast to the radicals who demanded that it be entirely eliminated, proposed a compromise. He wanted the Chinese to adopt the stem family, "the middle-way system," as he called it.

Another compromise was suggested in Professor P'an's questionnaire: the adoption of the conjugal family system, but with the qualification that all the sons have their parents with them in turn. This was approved by about 65% of those who answered the questionnaire.

Professor Mai Hui-t'ing, representative of the most outspoken enemies of the old system, was against the stem family. In his opinion it would not eliminate the main evil of the Chinese family: the conflict of generations and the oppression of the young people by the old. He proposed what he called "a Chinese small [conjugal] family system": the married sons were to live apart from the parents, but, unlike people in the "heartless West," they would not neglect their parents but keep them in separate establishments.*¹⁷

Like many other problems, that of the family type was not solved in China before the war. All the old types persisted with two predominating: the conjugal and the stem family. Under the impact of industrialization and Western thought the joint family was disintegrating, but the stem family has resisted modern influences rather well. The percentage of conjugal families in China appears to have increased at the expense of the joint rather than of the stem families.

The question remains: Does the war favor dissolution of joint and even stem families by scattering so many millions of Chinese all over China? This was the impression of Edgar Snow after three years' stay in China during the war. And it is not unlikely. As we have seen above, economic difficulties often are a factor for family division in China. But, on the other hand, in hard times people tend to huddle together in large groups and thus achieve greater security. Moreover, the diminished contact with the West and the temporary halt to the process of industrialization may also slow the new trends already discussed.

And what about the regions which were occupied by the Japanese? There people no doubt felt the need for mutual protection

* Professor Mai evidently believes in the legend, apparently originating with K'ang Yu-wei, that the Chinese have a patent on love and respect for their parents and that these feelings are completely unknown in the West.

against the foreign oppressors and the family's importance may have increased in a situation where all voluntary organizations were suppressed. Among the Chinese in foreign countries, in the South Seas, in Hawaii, and in the United States there has been no weakening but rather a strengthening of family ties.*

** Joint Family in Russia and in Serbia*

We have some intimations about the future fate of the joint family in China from the development of the *zadruga* of the Western Slavs and the Russian large family (*bolshaya semya*), which have many features in common with the Chinese joint family.

The *zadruga* and the Russian large family united several conjugal families and unattached relatives in one household ruled by a male family head.¹⁸ The family head—called *domachin* in Serbia and *bolshak* in Russia—was in most cases the oldest male of the family, usually the father or grandfather of male heads of conjugal families composing the large unit. More often than in China the family head was elected by the male members.¹⁹ It would seem that in Russia the oldest male of the family kept his position as head only as long as he was able to work.²⁰

The *domachin* or *bolshak* enjoyed great power, but sociologists stress that it was not as great as that of the Roman father or, for that matter, of the Chinese father. He was first among equals and all decisions concerning the family were made by the family council, composed of the men of the family.²¹

As in the Chinese family, the individual was subordinated. The family members as a rule had no private property, those working in the cities or elsewhere outside the family sent their earnings home, and it was considered immoral to keep money for oneself.²²

The belief that the joint family prevailed in Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia seems to be as fallacious as the belief that it prevails in China. The average family in Russia in the middle of the 19th century—before the emancipation of the serfs—was somewhat larger than the Chinese family: in the four districts of the provinces of Ryazan and Voronezh, for instance (districts typical of central Russia), the average was between 9.7 and 11.4 members.²³ But a family of this size could not have contained several generations and branches.

Sociologists have pointed out the correlation between economic status and the size and composition of families. Thus, for instance, Alexandra Efimenko observed that there were more large families in the fertile areas of the region she studied than in the other areas.²⁴

According to the observations of Russian sociologists, it was economic difficulties that forced families to divide. The people concerned blamed the women (sisters-in-law) who could not get along with each other.²⁵ But when Efimenko investigated the problem she found that the number of family divisions increased in lean years, in years of economic depression. "Many divisions take place in the spring, when the peasants are without bread and it is difficult to care for old people and children," she was told by an old peasant.

The joint family in Russia was dealt a deadly blow by industrialization, which also marked the diffusion of Western ideas among the masses of the people, whereas prior to 1861 these influences were felt only by the upper classes. Even in the 19th century noblemen lived in conjugal families; the joint family was common only among the peasants and the unmodernized middle class.

After the Emancipation the joint family began to disintegrate. The government tried in vain to halt this process by issuing (1886) a law forbidding family divisions even with the consent of the family head. The law proved ineffective and in the '80's the family size was already much smaller than it had been 30 years earlier: the average was from 6.4 to 7.8 (in the four districts of the provinces of Ryazan and Voronezh).²⁶ Disintegration progressed unabated.

THE SIZE OF THE FAMILY

The large joint family of several generations and branches is not, and apparently never was, typical in China. Moreover, the "normal" or typical Chinese family has few members. This was true in the past and, as modern investigators have shown, still holds true today.

According to the statistical survey carried out in 1934-35 by the Chinese Government in 22 provinces with about 180 million inhabitants, the average size of all Chinese families was 5.5, the average size of the peasant family, 5.9 persons.*²⁹

J. L. Buck in his often-quoted survey of agrarian conditions found that the average size of peasant families in North China was 5.5, in South China 5.0 (including all the social groups).³⁰ The mean size of rural "nonfarm families," i.e., of farm laborers, was found to be 4.2.³¹

In 1931 the average size of 5,255 peasant families in Ting Hsien in Hopeh province (the province where the majority of the peasants from whom information was secured for this study live) was 5.8.³²

An investigation of 1,200 poor families in Peiping, conducted by members of Yenching University in 1932, showed the average family size to be 4.1;³³ for 155 lower middle-class and working-class families investigated by Gamble (those with an income of \$5 to \$34) in 1926-27 the average was 4.1;³⁴ for Tao's 48 families of riksha coolies it was 4.6;³⁵ for 1,350 families of riksha coolies in Nanking (1933) 3.7.³⁶

Two surveys of families of Shanghai workers, conducted by the Bureau of Social Affairs and by the Institute of Social Research (the latter directed by Yang and Tao), showed that the average for the first group was 4.6 (workers of different occupations) and for the second 4.7 (textile workers exclusively).³⁷ In 1928 the average family size for the Chinese section in Shanghai was, according to the Bureau of Public Safety, 4.98.³⁸ Using the data collected by

The *zadruga* in barely industrialized Serbia persisted much longer than the joint family in Russia, though recent years have revealed signs of its disintegration. Many sociologists claim that foreign domination encouraged the Serbs and Montenegrins to cling to this old form.²⁷ Thus, the oppression by the Turks stimulated these protective large family units.²⁸

* The definition of the family unit in the survey quoted above was almost identical with our definition of the economic family. The official census spoke of the household, which for an overwhelming majority of the Chinese population was identical with the economic family.

Tao about the families of urban workers, H. D. Lamson states their average size to be 4.5.³⁹

The surveys of middle- and upper-class families have shown the following figures: The average for 610 families (mainly upper class) investigated by Ava Milam in 1923⁴⁰ was 9 members. For the families investigated by S. Gamble in Peiping in 1926-27 the average was: for 101 middle-class families (income \$35-\$124) 4.5; for 27 upper-class families (income \$125-\$300 and more) 7.5.⁴¹

Among 2,101 families from whom information was secured for this study, the average size varied from 3.7 in the poorest urban group (wage earners in Peiping) to 11.8 in the richest rural group in South China (Fukien landlords). Even at its maximum the Chinese family is not a crowd, as is popularly believed.

TABLE V
AVERAGE FAMILY SIZE AND SOCIAL CLASSES

1. VILLAGES IN NORTH CHINA (458 FAMILIES)

	<i>Farm Laborers</i>	<i>Poor Peasants</i>	<i>Middle Peasants</i>	<i>Well-to-do Peasants</i>	<i>Landlords</i>
Number of Families	61	163	125	58	51
Average Size	4.3	5.1	6.9	7.5	8.9

2. NONINDUSTRIAL CITIES IN NORTH CHINA
(MAINLY PEIPING) (1,365 FAMILIES)

	<i>Wage Earners</i>	<i>Lower Middle Class</i>	<i>Middle Class</i>	<i>Upper Class</i>
Number of Families	426	251	496	192
Average Size	3.7	4.6	6.1	6.4

3. SHANGHAI (208 FAMILIES)

	<i>Industrial Workers</i>	<i>Lower Middle Class</i>	<i>Middle Class (Clerks, etc.)</i>	<i>Upper Class (Engineers, etc.)</i>
Number of Families	143	42	15	8
Average Size	5.2	3.3	4.4	6.7

Average size of 40 families in the villages of Fukien: poor peasants 5.7; middle peasants 6.5; well-to-do peasants 10.2; landlords 11.8. Average size of 30 families of peasants in Kiangsu: poor peasants 4.5; middle peasants 6.0.

The table shows that, as with family type, family size varies with economic status. This correlation has been noticed by several investigators of the Chinese family. Buck found that "the size of the family increased sharply with the crop area of the farm," 3.96 for the smallest and 7.31 for the largest farm.⁴² "Nothing so much indicates the social status of a household in the Chinese countryside as its size, which is a matter of pride, more especially, when it contains a large number of males," says Ta Chen in his survey of emigrant communities in South China.⁴³

Tao and Yang, and the Shanghai Bureau of Social Affairs, in their investigations of the standard of living of Shanghai workers, compared the family size in different income groups and found that the average size increased with income (from 3.95 to 5.75 in the Bureau of Social Affairs' study and from 3.45 to 4.76 in the Tao and Yang study. The curve was reversed only on the highest level of income.)⁴⁴ The same tendency was noted by Gamble,⁴⁵ Tayler,⁴⁶ and Lamson.⁴⁷

The main reason for this fact is that the poor people in China have fewer children than the well-to-do and that their life expectancy is lower.

The suggestion that in China the poor have fewer children than the rich is in striking contrast to the tendency observed in America and in almost all European countries.⁴⁸ Yet there are many indications that this is the case.

In 624 complete conjugal families of our urban informants in North China we found that wage earners and lower middle-class families had 1.9 children per family, middle-class families 2.4 children, and upper-class families 3 children.* The average for 140 rural conjugal families of our informants (mainly poor and middle-class peasants) in North China was 2.4.

Dr. Smythe's sample of 670 poor urban conjugal families revealed an average of 2.1 children per family—a figure very close to ours. The average number of children in 620 rural families (all social groups, but probably mostly poorer groups) † was 2.5.⁴⁹

The fact is that the old ideal, according to which many children are the greatest of blessings, is still prevalent in all strata. But poor people simply cannot support many children. For instance, at the time of our investigation a riksha coolie in Peiping earned about

* This figure seems to be too low to be typical of the upper class of all China. The families investigated included a large number of young couples.

† The poor groups should constitute a majority in each fair sample of the Chinese rural population—See p. 68.

\$10 a month. He had to spend about 28% of his income for clothes, fuel, light, rent, etc. This left \$7.20 for food,* when the minimum an adult male needed for food was \$2.60 a month. Thus the coolie could support at most 2.8 male adults: or his wife and one grown child, or his wife and two small children, or, as was often the case, his wife and his mother.†

The Chinese peasants were well aware of this situation: "To feed a family of five a peasant must work like an animal. But even with whipping, an animal couldn't support a family of six," runs an old adage in Tsingyan, Shansi.

The most important factor keeping poor families from increasing has been child and infant mortality. There are no exact figures on infant mortality in China. Estimates vary from 29% to 50%; according to Dr. J. P. Maxwell it is at least three times as high as in Western countries.⁵⁰ Unquestionably more children die in the poor than in the well-to-do families.

Where "natural" death has failed to eliminate the extra "mouth" artificial methods have been used.

Female infanticide has continued in contemporary China. The author learned of many cases from both Chinese and foreign observers. The hospital records used for this study contained matter-of-fact references to infanticide made by Chinese social and medical workers indicating that it was taken for granted.

Much more often, however, infant daughters have not been killed outright. What happens is that the small amount of food available for the family is unequally distributed: the son gets the larger share and the daughters are practically starved. Hence the frequent epidemics have taken a heavier toll of girls than of boys. The selective population statistics at our disposal almost all tell the same tragic tale. In the group of children under 5 there are as many or more girls than boys, which proves that as many were born and that not many of them were killed after birth. In the next group the males begin to exceed the females—evidently something happens to the girls before they become 5. This sex ratio persists until the age group of about 50. Over that age the women outnumber the men.‡

The sex ratio is probably more favorable for women in the modernized groups, particularly among the industrial workers,

* See p. 83.

† According to the Atwater scale: 1 unit for the husband (the first male), 0.9 for wife or mother, 0.6 for a child of eight or ten.

‡ Two examples of selective statistics illustrate this point:

TABLE VI
MEN AND WOMEN IN DIFFERENT AGE GROUPS
(in a rural district in Ting Hsien [Hopeh] and among 1,200
poor families in Peiping.)

<i>Age Group</i>	TING HSIEN ⁵¹		PEIPING ⁵²	
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
Under 5 *	249	294	177	200
5-9	188	169	285	219
10-14	203	161	314	240
15-24	362	278	469	299
25-34	249	233	347	226
35-44	235	217	403	326
45-54	164	171	398	290
55-64	110	109	211	218
65 and over	75	104	119	183
	1,835	1,736	2,723	2,201

where girls are more appreciated because they can earn money. It is perhaps symptomatic that in a group of 97 typical families of our respondents (industrial workers in Shanghai) women slightly outnumber the men: 268 (50.4%) women and 264 (49.6%) men.

But the modernized groups are not important enough numerically to swing the balance, and the ratio of 108 men to 100 women found by Dr. Buck for rural China in his large-scale investigation is probably characteristic of China as a whole. (The ratio is larger than for any other country whose vital statistics are known.) † ⁵⁴

* In the whole group in Ting Hsien there were 106.2 men and 100 women; in Peiping 124 men to 100 women. In the village of Kaihsienkung surveyed by Fei the ratio was about 112 men to 100 women. Fei attributes the low number of women to infanticide, whose victims are mainly girls.⁵³ The data on p. 78 on the Catholic orphanage also illustrates the unequal treatment of girls and boys in poor families. About 8 times as many girls as boys had to become the object of Catholic charities (3,087 boys to 24,781 girls).

† Dr. Buck ascribes this unfavorable ratio partly to higher female mortality, partly to the fact that females are less completely listed than males. Though the latter factor is not negligible, and family heads often consider women too unimportant to mention when they enumerate their family members, it can hardly influence the general result. Otherwise, how can one account for the fact that in so many samples the number of infant girls is equal to or even larger than that of the boys? It would certainly be easier to omit the new born girl than the grown-up daughter or daughter-in-law. Dr. Buck's analysis of the distribution of men and women among the 38,256 families investigated shows the same picture. In the great-grandson generation (little children) the number of boys and girls is the same (0.1% of the total sample); in the grandson's generation the number of boys is larger (5.1% as compared with 4.2% of girls of the same generation); in the son's generation the males are 24.9% of the total,

The poor lose their daughters not only by direct or indirect infanticide. Many are sold into slavery. Some poor people send their little daughters to their future husbands' families. Many poor women are sold as concubines or prostitutes.

The better off the family, the more girls. The daughters remain with their parents, less of them die as a result of inadequate care (naturally there is no direct infanticide anywhere except among the poorest families), and additional women come from the lower classes as slaves and concubines.

Moreover, it seems that fewer children are born in the poor families. The scant data we have about the differential fertility in China show that in this respect, also, the situation is the reverse of the one existing in Europe and America. The poor in China seem to be less fertile than the well-to-do.

J. L. Buck has established a correlation between the crop area of farm land and the fertility of women. Among 10,700 women of 45 and over * the number of children born per 100 women was: ⁵⁶

<i>Size of Farm</i>	<i>Number of Children Born</i>
Small	503
Medium	506
Medium Large	528
Large	535
Very Large	551

For the cities there are two small samples obtained by J. G. Griffing and the author. Griffing found an average of 5.75 births per family in 310 families of students. Of these, 39 illiterate fathers with illiterate wives [i.e., the poorest group] had an average of 5.15 births; 197 literate fathers with illiterate wives had 5.67; 74 literate fathers with literate wives [i.e., a group which was relatively better off] had 6.29.† ⁵⁷

Among 68 women over 45 interviewed for this study, the average number of births for 29 lower-class women was 4.4; for 19 middle-class women, 4.8; for 20 upper-class women, 5.7.

the women 21.2%; in the family head's generation, the men are 20.7%, the women 18.7%; but in the generation of the head's father the situation changes—the women constitute 4.0% of the whole, the men only 0.7%; and in the great-grandparents' generation there are only a few old great-grandmothers (0.2% of the total) and no great-grandfathers. In the total sample there are 51.5% men and 48.4% women.⁵⁸

* A similar correlation was established by the same author for women under 45. (Only at the highest level is the tendency reversed.)

† As in most countries, a high educational level in China is indicative of a high economic status.

All this is far from conclusive but possibly indicates the existence of an important trend.

We have a good deal of evidence about the use of contraceptives in tradition-bound poor families. Abortion, though illegal both under the empire and the republic, is practiced.*

Still another important factor in this negative influence of the socio-economic status on family size is the fact that the poor do not live as long as those who are more comfortable. More poor people, especially men, die before they can see their children married.

Among the poor there are more incomplete families than among the well to do: more conjugal families where only one parent is alive, more stem and joint families where only one grandparent is alive. This of course reduces the average in this group.†

And of course the average family size is also largely influenced by the prevalent family type. As one might expect, in each socio-economic group the average size of the conjugal (parents-children) family is smaller than that of the stem family, and the average size of the joint family is the largest of all. Therefore the groups having the largest proportion of conjugal families naturally tend to show the smallest average family size.

But as we have shown above, the same two factors—fewer children and fewer old people among the poor—in their turn influence the family type prevalent in one or another social strata. On the other hand, the increase in the number of broken families and decrease in the number of children as we descend the social scale result in every type of family among the poor having fewer members than among the well to do.‡

Families classified as belonging to the same type are in reality very different in different social classes. A conjugal family of a Peiping tinsmith, consisting of himself, his wife, and their only son, is very different from the conjugal family of his neighbor, a

* H. T. Fei found that contraception and abortion were practiced in the village of Kaihsienkung, where the number of births was limited.⁵⁸ The existence of these methods among the tradition-bound strata of the population has been confirmed by several doctors and social workers of the PUMC Hospital in Peiping. These strata use old-fashioned "native" methods. The birth control movement organized by Mrs. Sanger and her Chinese disciples in the 'thirties was almost unknown, even in Shanghai.

† The proportion of incomplete families (those with only one parent or grandparent) among the different social groups in our sample is as follows: Urban population (Peiping mainly): wage earners and lower-middle class, 36%; middle class, 26%; upper class, 21%. Rural population (North China): farm laborers, 43%; poor peasants, 43%; middle peasants, 36%; well-to-do peasants, 21%; landlords, 30%.

‡ See Appendix, Table III.

drugstore owner, whose wife and concubine together bore him 16 children and succeeded in keeping 13 of them alive. The joint family of poor peasants consisting of an old father, his 2 married sons and their wives, each of the couples having only 1 child, is not the same as the joint family of a landlord in which the grandparents preside over a huge crowd of 4 married and 2 unmarried sons, 4 daughters-in-law, 2 concubines, 15 grandchildren, and an old aunt staying with the family (not counting slaves and servants).

PROSPECTS

It would appear that the new trends have not altered the traditional longing of the Chinese for numerous progeny. An American-trained head of a government agency in Nanking is as anxious to have children as his father, who had been an official under the Manchus. A Shanghai worker regards children as a blessing just as does his brother, still planting rice on the paternal fields in Chekiang province. The tendency noticed among career women and modern socialites to limit the number of their children is far from widespread.*⁵⁹

Moreover, modernized people earn more money than the tradition-bound of the same social class and can therefore maintain their children better. More of their children survive. It seems that modern conditions offer more opportunity for the realization of the old Chinese desire for many children than old China offered in the years of its decay.†

* In our sample the 95 families of industrial workers in Shanghai had an average of 2.5 children each, as compared to 1.9 children or 2.1 children in the tradition-bound strata of the same class in Peiping and Nanking (Lang's and Smythe's samples). In the upper- and middle-class families which we investigated, the average number of children was 4.6 (when the father had college education) and 4.2 (when the father had traditional education).

† These observations have only a provisional character. Confirmed, they would have a bearing on the controversy over the increase in Chinese population in the last 40 or 50 years. If our sample, Dr. Smythe's sample, and Dr. Fei's observations are typical, and the poor families in the old cities have an average of 2 or 3 children per family and the peasants not more than 2.5, it will confirm the opinions of W. F. Willcox, W. W. Rockhill, and W. S. Thompson, who asserted that the population did not grow much if at all during the last few decades. The calamities of these years were responsible for a death rate high enough to nullify the effects of the relatively high birth and marriage rates in China. Dr. Fei found that the population of a typical Chinese village was stationary.⁶⁰ This may be true of 20th-century China as a whole.

But population pressure in contemporary China has nonetheless persisted. The backward agriculture of China cannot feed its members adequately. Industrialization and the modernization of agriculture will no doubt relieve the population pressure, even if under new conditions the population increases.⁶¹

XIII

Family Coöperation

THE MAINTENANCE OF THE FAMILY

RECENT years have brought many changes in the modes of family coöperation, that is to say, in the division of labor in the family and in the relative importance of the contributions made by the different members to the total income.

THE FAMILY AS A PRODUCTIVE UNIT

As we know, in imperial China only the families of peasants and of certain artisans and merchants were units of production. Industrialization and the continuous agrarian crisis of the last 40 to 50 years have compelled even these strata to send more and more of their members to work outside. Young boys and girls, and sometimes even heads of peasant families, have had to toil on other people's land, to peddle, and to work in the shops and factories of the cities.* The average size of farms in China is so small that even in moderately well-to-do families one able-bodied male can handle all the work.† Moreover, the influx of factory-made goods has ruined many branches of home industry, especially spinning and weaving, thus setting free additional female labor power.

The same development has taken place in the families of artisans and small shopkeepers. The rich peasants and landlords have preferred to hire labor while their sons and younger brothers looked for more lucrative jobs in the cities. Similarly well-to-do businessmen have tried to educate their sons and let them become officials or professional workers, instead of keeping them as helpers in the fathers' businesses.

DIVISION OF LABOR IN THE FAMILY

In the families of peasants men continue to be the main providers, working either on their own land or for others, or migrating

* Buck's investigation of 15,316 farms showed that 41% of them had members working at least part time outside.¹

† In 21 families of poor peasants (our informants), only 6 sons helped on the farm, 26 worked outside; 26 families of middle peasants were able to employ 17 addi-

to the cities to become artisans, peddlers, shopkeepers, or factory workers. But in the last 30 or 40 years, with the gradual disappearance of bound feet, women's contribution to the support of the family has increased. In the fields women now plant rice, pluck tea leaves, and even harvest. Their contribution has been larger in the South, where the binding of feet was never as widespread as in the North. As of old, women have raised silkworms and gathered wood for fuel; they also have done most of the weaving and spinning, though recent reports from localities where modern machinery is employed tell of whole families participating in spinning, weaving, and knitting so as to keep the machines going 24 hours a day.² But what is new is that women have begun to work outside their homes as factory workers.

Children's share in the maintenance of the family has increased only in so far as they are admitted to the factories. The great majority of children employed in Shanghai factories and workshops are of peasant stock.

On 15,316 farms surveyed by Buck in 1929-32, 79% of the labor was done by men, 14% by women, and 7% by children.³

In cities without large-scale industries women's contribution to the family income has hardly increased during this present century, as almost no new occupations have been open to them.

In 82 families of workers, small artisans, peddlers, etc., from whom information was obtained in 1936-37, wages earned by women brought in 9.7% of the family income derived from wages alone. In families of 48 riksha coolies investigated by Tao in 1927, wives alone accounted for 9.7% of the income from wages and 8.8% of the total income.⁴

In the families of textile workers in Shanghai (the typical Chinese industrial workers' families), women's contribution to the family income was much greater. In the 230 families investigated by Yang and Tao in 1927, women brought in 34.6% of the family income (wives, 15.5%; daughters, 10.2%; other women, 8.9%).⁵ In 31 families from whom information was secured in 1937, women brought in an even higher proportion of the income: 40.2% (daughters, 16.8%; wives, 19.8%; other women, 3.6%). In Shanghai and in the other industrial cities some women bore practically the whole burden of maintaining their families.*

tional males and send 5 boys over 16 to school; 21 young men had to look for employment elsewhere. Of 30 peasants' families in Kiangsu which sent their daughters to the Ch'ing Feng factory in Wusih, 24 were poor peasants and 2 farm laborers.

* The larger part played by women's work in our 1937 sample as compared to Tao's might be accidental, but it is also possible that women's labor increased in the ten

If women went to work it was because of sheer economic necessity. Thus the "labor aristocrats," mostly workers in public utilities in Shanghai whose wages were about twice as high as those of the textile workers, did not send their women to the factories. In 41 families belonging to this group women accounted for only 8.5% of the total family income—a smaller proportion than was earned by the women in rural areas and among the workers in Peiping.

In the modernized upper class unmarried daughters and young wives have begun to enter professions newly opened to women—they have become teachers, clerks, officials, etc. In 42 upper-class families interviewed in Peiping there were 3 daughters and 3 young wives who went to work; of 693 students (mainly upper class) from whom information was secured, 33 declared that their mothers worked and 108 that their sisters, wives, and sisters-in-law did.

Middle-class women do not work. Considerations of prestige forbid them to do manual labor outside their homes. Professional and clerical jobs require college or at least high-school education which the middle class can afford only for sons. Moreover, women are responsible for the housework, which has not become much easier than in their grandmothers' time. Labor-saving devices are rarely found in Chinese homes. Domestic help is still very cheap, but many middle-class homes in the lower income brackets cannot afford it.

The Contribution of the Family Head

The traditional position of the father as the main source of family income has been modified in the modernized groups. Among the families of the textile workers in Shanghai the fathers provided less than half the income (39.2% of the income from wages in the 31 families interviewed in 1937 and 43.5% of the income of the 230 families interviewed by Yang and Tao in 1927). In the upper class, educated sons often earn more than their fathers.

In contrast, fathers accounted for the bulk of income in Peiping working-class families. In 82 families interviewed in 1936-37 the father's part constituted 57.5%; his sons brought in 28.6%, other male relatives, 3.9%; Tao's investigation: the head, 63%, children (mainly sons), 23%, other males, 3.7%.⁶

In the middle class, fathers are also the main providers. Forty-one of 55 middle-class families in Shanghai and Peiping from whom

years between the two investigations. Operators certainly prefer to employ the relatively more docile and lower-paid women.

information was secured in 1937 had only one breadwinner—the father.

POOLING THE INCOME

The Chinese family has often been praised or condemned for its so-called "communism." As late as 1922 Sing Ging Su wrote: "Every male member must contribute all his earnings to the support of the whole family and, of course, he has a claim on the earnings of all the others." ⁷ It is doubtful whether the above statement holds even for the imperial period. Complete family "communism" has certainly not been found among the rich, as we have shown in Chapter II. Nor is Mr. Su's description confirmed by observations made in contemporary China.

The management of the family income and organization of family consumption seem to vary with the social strata and the type of family structure. In the conjugal family the father is the sole breadwinner, except in the lower classes. The unmarried sons of middle- and upper-class families usually go to school and do not earn money, and few unmarried daughters bring in income.

As a rule, the young wage earners in the traditional industries have not taken advantage of the new legal code which gives them the right to dispose of their wages. A riksha coolie belonging to one of the families we interviewed would be reprimanded and even beaten by his father, and would feel guilty if he spent part of his earnings on himself. Those who do not live with their parents send them all their earnings above what they need for subsistence.

This does not hold for the workers in modern industries. Thus, for instance, in 27 of 125 families in Shanghai, in 3 of 27 in Tientsin, and 2 of 8 in Wusih from whom information was secured, the sons and daughters did not give their parents all of their wages but kept part, and sometimes the whole, for themselves.

In the stem families the situation is more complicated. Even among the peasants the married son has his own quarters, and the belongings brought by his wife, such as her trousseau and jewelry, are considered her own property. What is earned by common labor on the farm is administered by the family head. A son and his wife working outside, however, have begun to keep part of their earnings for themselves. Yet there are almost no cases of a daughter-in-law or son refusing to contribute anything—they know how important their contributions are for the maintenance of their own children, let alone the old parents.

In middle-class and upper-class joint and stem families the income of the members is pooled only in exceptional cases, and small family units have a certain economic independence within the greater family. Some of the sons or younger brothers pay the family head for their board and that of their wives and children, and keep all the rest of their income. This arrangement was very common among the industrial workers of Shanghai. There are also families in which the father does not expect his married sons to pay their own and their families' board, but wants them to take care of their own and their wives' and children's clothes, of their children's tuition, pocket money, and similar expenses. Married brothers living together after their father's death often share only their inheritance. Such arrangements as a rule mark the beginning of the disintegration of the family.

FAMILY CONSUMPTION

Consumption in common has often been prevented by the mobility of the population. This has been an old story in the upper and middle classes: under the empire higher officials were not allowed to occupy one position for a long time, and thus preferred to leave their old parents, wives, and children at home and visit them from time to time. Minor officials and merchants acted similarly. This tradition has continued in contemporary China. But now the young, too, have begun to move from place to place and many sons and daughters stay at colleges and boarding schools.

In Central China there are localities in which almost every family has sons and daughters working in the city; and in the South some villages consist almost exclusively of women and children, as the men have emigrated to the South Sea Islands, Hawaii, the Philippines, America, etc. Modern influences, however, seem to favor smaller families, all of whose members live together.*

In conjugal families each member consumes an equal share. But in many families the working sons, daughters, and daughters-in-

* Thirty of our 87 working- and lower-middle-class informants in Peiping had left their families in the country. In 11 of 57 families both parents stayed in one city while the sons worked in another. In 13 of 42 middle-class families in Peiping sons had left home. In 42 upper-class families in Peiping 13 sons (aside from students) were officials, businessmen, employees who lived apart from their families. But in Shanghai only 1 family head of a group of 43 higher-paid workers of public utilities had left his wife and children in the country. Seven of 44 textile workers had left their wives and children in the country. Only 1 of 10 engineers and doctors had his wife in the country.

law who obediently hand their wages over to the parents are rewarded by extra clothes, candies, and "luxuries" denied to the other children.

In the joint families where the members give only part of their income to the common fund, or where only one member provides for the others, there is no equality of consumption. The author knew a high official in Peiping who provided dwelling, food, and services, letting his younger brother and sons take care of their other expenses. In this family any visitor could see that the family head and his son who helped him in business lived more luxuriously than the younger brother who earned little and his son who did not work at all.

In the joint families of brothers staying together after the death of the father there is even less equality. Each is anxious to get a full return for his contribution, and the manager of the house (*tang chia*) usually keeps a detailed account of income and expenditures.

Of course the members of the joint family are entitled to maintenance and often abuse this privilege, remaining idle and living off their more industrious relatives. But it seems that this evil feature of the Chinese family system is unknown among the poor. The old parents are fed, the sick are taken care of, but loafers are not supported, and many peasant families split up because one brother has been accused of being a drone. There is a feeling that each small family unit is entitled to a share corresponding to its contribution to the family income and not more. There was a woman in a joint peasant family who carefully watched the expenditures for the school education of her nephew and insisted on an equivalent for herself and her small children each time tuition was paid for the boy or even a pencil was bought for him.

Contrary to current ideas, the poor often avoid throwing themselves on their families, even when in adversity. Several of our informants declared that they preferred not to go home even when unemployed, though their families had not divided and they had rights to family property. They felt they would lose face by returning home as failures.

In 522 workers' and lower-middle-class families we interviewed there were very few able-bodied men living off their relatives. Three were supported by their wives—a situation not unknown in the West! But among the upper- and middle-class groups many lived off their relatives. In 42 upper-class families interviewed in

Peiping there were 6 jobless sons and 2 jobless brothers of the family head.

Thus the evil of parasitism, imputed for so many years to the Chinese family, appears chiefly in the well-to-do families.*

FAMILY RITES AND RULES

THE DINING TABLE

In the West the dinner is the occasion for a general family reunion and the dinner table, rather than the hearth in the living room, is the real center of family life. Only recently has the dinner table, placed in the middle of the room or on the brick bed, begun to assume a similar importance in China. Even now in many homes the family is not united at mealtime. Separation is sometimes determined by sex, sometimes by differences in age.

Such rules were strictly adhered to in the Shantung village in which I stayed in 1936. When we, the guests, organized a common family dinner, the women in this rich peasant family ate together with men for the first time. This was a thrilling experience for them and the girls giggled as though committing some slight sin.

The old rule is, however, on its way out. It has probably never been completely adhered to in poor families due to lack of space. Among the poor peasants in North China each member of the family often eats separately, sitting wherever he can find a place—on the brick bed, on the threshold, or in the court. Among our informants the poor had adopted the practice of eating in common more readily than had the well to do. Among industrial workers and modern intellectuals the families eat together whenever possible.

The observance of a hierarchy of seats at the table is another custom which is disappearing, although more slowly. As everywhere, the head of the table is occupied by the oldest male; the daughter-in-law is put in the lowest seat, nearest the door, where she can easily serve the others.

In joint families the conjugal family units often eat by themselves, though the food is provided from the common kitchen.

* D. H. Kulp's observations of family life in "Phoenix" village in Kwangtung led to similar conclusions. "The nearest the people come to a communistic arrangement is in the smaller moiety [joint family] and in the natural [conjugal] family. Especially might this be true when the natural family coincides with the moiety, or branch family. . . . But . . . there is no more communism than is found in an ordinary well-organized family in England or America." 8

CHILDREN AND ANCESTOR WORSHIP

The Chinese have always felt that not to have offspring is a tragic failure and, as we have shown above, modern influences have not changed their attitude. The bearing and rearing of children is still the main aim of the Chinese family.* Moreover the old idea that the family is but a link in the chain of generations has not been forgotten. The most superficial observations of the streets of Chinese cities and villages make a visitor aware of the fact that belief in the posthumous life of dead relatives persists in China. Paper models of objects of daily use are carried in funeral processions; modernization has expressed itself in the addition of some modern objects like safes, rikshas, automobiles, to which wealthy people have been accustomed in modern times. Ancestor worship, however, has undergone certain changes.

As we know, there are two kinds of ancestor rites in China—one is performed with clan members in the ancestral hall, the other in one's home or at the graves of deceased parents and grandparents. Unquestionably the clan ceremonies are disappearing, but the other type of rite has remained.

Only 35 of 305 peasants and workers from whom information was secured in Peiping, Shanghai, and Wusih declared that their families did not observe ancestor rites. Not all of these 35 were influenced by modern rationalist trends; some worshiped Buddha, the kitchen god, or fox fairies. The remaining 270 families duly burned incense and paper money before the hieroglyphs carved on wood which symbolized their parents and grandparents † or before their photographs. They also visited their graves twice a year, on the Ch'ing Ming and Chung Ch'iu festivals (in spring and in autumn).

Ten of 52 upper-class families in Peiping and Shanghai did not worship their ancestors. Four of these were Christians; in 6 cases the family heads were intellectuals with college education. But there were quite a few college men who either performed the

* The results of a poll conducted by the Shanghai newspaper *Shih Shih Hsin Pao* may be regarded as typical. When asked about motives for marriage the great majority of readers with elementary and high-school education (i.e., mainly middle-class people) answered that to have children is the main object of marriage. Romantic love was second in importance and the old notion of marriage for the sake of parents was third. Only among college graduates the majority declared that romantic love was the main aim.⁹

† These inscriptions evoke the dead for the Chinese as vividly as portraits do for other people. That the written word can symbolize a personality may be explained by the original pictographic nature of the Chinese script.

ceremony themselves or let their wives or mothers perform it. The compulsion to participate in ceremonies performed by parents was strongly objected to only by the most rebellious youths.

The first Christian missionaries tried to compel their converts to discontinue ancestor worship. But it proved to be too difficult and the missionaries and Chinese Christians modified their attitudes.

In 1935-37 the Chinese Protestants were reluctant to fight ancestor worship, preferring to regard it as a simple tribute to the dead, similar to the commemoration of defunct relatives in the West. They thought that Christians should not object to ancestor rites performed by their relatives if it was made clear that such rites did not replace true worship of God.* This was of course a compromise, but in China, as we know, a poor compromise is almost always preferable to an open conflict.

A retired official from North China told us the following characteristic story. His mother and sister were converted to Christianity and wanted to destroy the ancestor tablets of the family. Despite his respect for his mother he would not permit this. Finally the tablets were removed from the shrine and locked in a closet in the country house. The mother and sister did not worship them—they were good Christians—but every year the son wrote the names of the ancestors on a piece of paper and performed all the ceremonies. His relations with his mother and sister were most cordial.

FAMILY GOVERNMENT

As of old the Chinese family is ruled by the family head. This rule takes different forms.

One form may be compared to an absolute monarchy, for the family head rules alone without consulting anyone. He alone decides how the family enterprise is to be conducted, what grain is to be sown, what fertilizers used, what new markets sought. He decides whether property is to be bought or sold, from whom money has to be borrowed or to whom savings lent; how the family budget has to be distributed, whether the children are to be sent to school, where they are to work, whom they are to marry, etc. His decision is final in all matters concerning the family.

More common are families in which the rule of the father is

* See Chao Liu Chu-shih, *The Chinese Nation through the Eyes of Jesus* (Shanghai). Mr. Chao thinks that this attitude will create "a Confucianized indigenous Christianity."¹⁰

tempered by consultation. This system has always been popular in China. There is an intrinsic relation between consultation and bureaucracy. Unlike the man of the sword, who has to take quick decisions and bear the full responsibility for them, the bureaucrat has time and can indulge in conversations. The Chinese like to talk; so does the paterfamilias. More than one of our informants explained that consultation is a very good way to keep one's wife and children contented. But the fathers do not always take these consultations seriously. (It is only in the poorest homes that people do not carry on these consultations: "We are so poor, there is nothing to consult about," said several of our informants—poor peasants and coolies.)

In some families the advice of the "subordinates" carries great weight with the head of the family. His power is limited, like that of a king in a constitutional monarchy.

In some instances the power of the advisers (the wife or son) is very great. They practically run the family, and the husband or old father is head only in name.

In joint families brothers and uncles are consulted. In moments of crisis the family council is convoked. In old-fashioned families daughters and daughters-in-law are usually excluded; in modernized families, especially if they are educated women or workers, they have begun to be admitted.

Very often the family head delegates some authority to one of his subordinates. Thus in many families the functions of the family head (*chia chang*) and of the homemaker (*tang chia*) are separate, the latter function being assigned to the mother or wife of the family head or to an able daughter-in-law. Yet in many families the male head supervises the functions of homemaking, leaving for the woman the actual work but not the power to make decisions. Control over the marriage of children is often relegated to the woman. The son may be given the direction of the farm or shop. In rich families there are many instances of grown sons managing estates while the father remains in the city to manage the shops or factories.

THE FAMILY HEAD

While the law does not bar women and younger people from assuming the position of family head, in the overwhelming majority of Chinese families the head is still the oldest male, despite all the changes resulting from modern trends.

The young have wrested more rights from the old than women have from men. The father without function, "retired," has made his appearance, although he is still seldom encountered. For instance, in 38,256 village families investigated by Buck in 1929-32 there were only about 120 "retired" fathers.¹¹ Families ruled not by the oldest male but by his son were somewhat more frequent among modernized groups, but they were not typical even there.

Women have made some progress in their struggle for equality, but they are still a long way from becoming family heads. Not only can a woman not take over such authority while her husband is alive and of sound mind, but even as a widow she will not be recognized as family head if she has grown sons. "Nobody in the country will recognize a woman's signature if she has a grown son," a Hopeh peasant told us.

But men have had to rule their families in a changing world and constantly to defend their authority against the younger generation. At the same time the younger men in the modernized strata are confronted with modern young wives who have begun to assert their rights. This fight of the women and the young for their rights gives a new color to the inner relations of the modern Chinese family.

XIV

Extended Kinship

THE Chinese people continue to accept the old gradation of kin established about 2,500 years ago in the "Rules of Mourning." As of old the circle of kin embraces the paternal kin within five degrees of relationship (*wu fu*) and only a few of the closest relatives on the mother's and the wife's side.*

Within this group there is a narrower circle of nearest kin. According to several of our informants in North China—a poor peasant, a well-to-do peasant, a clerk, a merchant, and a modern young nurse—whose definitions of the kinship circle corresponded to the concrete details supplied by several hundreds of other informants, it comprises primarily the members of the family who fall under the category of kinsmen after family division: parents, brothers and their families; next come paternal uncles of the first grade and their offspring, married sisters, and paternal aunts. The maternal grandmother and uncle, the father-in-law, and the families of married daughters also belong to this circle. The maternal grandfather was mentioned only rarely and there was disagreement as to whether the mother's sister was a near relative.

The terminology of kinship has undergone few changes. The most interesting is the tendency noticed by H. T. Fei in Wu Kiang (Kiangsu) to extend the term formerly used for uncles to aunts. Fei sees in this an indication of a change in the position of women in the family. Also interesting is the growing tendency of relatives to address each other by proper names in addition to, or instead of, the names designating the relationship.¹

Many of our informants did not consider the degree of kinship decisive in determining one's relations. "Good relations with kinsmen depend on friendship" was the most commonly expressed opinion, especially among workers.

EXTENT OF KINSHIP

How large is the kinship circle? How many kin does the average Chinese have?

* See pp. 19, 20.

"The poor have few relatives, the rich have many," several of our poor informants remarked. "When I was poor I lost all my relatives and friends. When I became rich and prominent I discovered that I had scores of relatives, though many of these were not within the five grades of relationship," an official observed ironically.

Is this really the case? We asked 382 of our informants in Peiping and Shanghai to list their relatives. Of course the lists we obtained are far from complete but they give an approximate idea of the number of people the average Chinese regards as his relatives.

TABLE VII
SOCIAL CLASSES AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF
RELATED FAMILIES

<i>Peiping</i>		<i>Village in North China</i>		<i>Shanghai</i>	
Wage earners	4.3	Farm laborers	4.4	Textile workers	5.3
Lower middle class	4.6*	Poor peasants	8.9	Utility workers	5.4
Middle class	6.7	Middle peasants	6.0	Coolies	5.9
Upper class	50-60	Rich peasants	9.6	Artisans	6.6
		Landlords	18.0	Clerks	6.2
				Miscellaneous middle class	7.2
				Engineers and doctors	11.9

Only 6 families (4 workers in Peiping and 2 workers in Shanghai) claimed to have no relatives at all. Several landlords, industrialists, high-ranking employees, and officials claimed to have many more relatives than were listed above; some even declared that members of as many as 1,000 families came to them for help. A merchant in Peiping said that he was related to about 300 families in his native town and that he visited them all when he returned—it took him 2 to 3 days!

Table VII shows that, like the size and composition of the family, kinship relations are influenced by social and economic factors.

The poor have fewer relatives than the well to do because they do not have as many children and do not live as long.† Moreover, they have fewer opportunities of visiting distant relatives and therefore lose touch with them.

* The clerks in this group had the largest average number of relatives, 5.6; the riksha coolies the smallest, 2.8.

† See pp. 140, 150 ff.

MUTUAL HELP

The people of prewar China had no insurance, their educational and health institutions were poorly developed, and coöperative and state credit facilities were still in the first stages of development.

"But the Chinese can do without all this," we are often told: "don't they have the most efficient type of insurance in their kinship and family system? People are helped by their brothers, children, and relatives."

Is this correct? We have seen that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese do not live in joint families, which provide help for sick and unemployed members. But how about kinsmen? Do they really share their wealth with poor relatives so that, as the claim goes, it is difficult to accumulate great wealth in China since fortunes are consumed by relatives? ²

The generally accepted notion that relatives in China help one another seems to have more truth in it than the "joint family myth," but in real life the relationship is and probably always was more contradictory, thorny, and unsatisfactory than the apologists of old China would like to admit.

Relatives are helped in three different ways: (1) services which do not involve material grants; (2) material grants (money, goods, land, etc.); (3) jobs in one's own or in other people's businesses or business contacts, scholarships, etc.

Personal aid, such as the lending of tools and assistance, is of particular importance in the villages. This often has a mutual character, but cases of people doing the work of their old or disabled kinsmen are frequent. Public opinion demands that such help be given. When a peasant who tilled the land of his widowed sister-in-law took half the crop for himself (the regular tenant's fee in North China) he was severely criticized by his neighbors.

Relatives also help each other with gifts. It is customary in China for visitors to bring presents. Poor people often fail to give the usual birthday, New Year's Day, and other gifts. But gifts at weddings and funerals are mandatory. The amount spent for gifts varies with the social group and the grade of relationship.

What is interesting here is that such gifts have an outspoken character of financial assistance to the family engaged in the costly enterprise of a wedding or a funeral. Especially among the poor such practical things as flour, cakes, grain, and so on, or simply

money, are given. In fact, the main wedding present is almost always given not to the bride or groom but to the family head.

Everyone, rich and poor, banker and peddler, high official and worker, has a special "gift book" in which the exact value of the presents received from relatives and friends is entered. These entries are made so as to calculate the amount to be spent for return gifts.³ Not to reciprocate means a serious loss of face. As a result, some poor folk invite only their closest friends and relatives to funerals and weddings.

There are exceptions, of course, and near relatives sometimes contribute large sums as gifts without expecting compensation. Such gifts fall into the class of material help. But, generally speaking, gifts in China can be regarded as a kind of insurance payment against the expenses of weddings and funerals—those most outstanding examples of conspicuous consumption in China.

Public opinion demands that the well to do assist their needy relatives without expecting reciprocation. Some dare to defy this demand: "It's hard enough to support myself; how can I help my relatives?" a shopkeeper in Fukien said testily to our interviewer. There is a popular adage that comes handy to such kinsmen: "Ten rich families cannot maintain one poor family." *

But our observations show that in the great majority of cases people do help their kinsmen, either because of their own inner urge or under the pressure of public opinion. Many of the students who filled in the questionnaire distributed for the purpose of this study said that their relatives helped them to go through school. Forty per cent of the same group of students said that their families helped poor relatives.

We heard a touching story about a Peiping worker, an electrician. On \$22 a month he supported his wife, old mother, and seven children, yet he took an orphaned nephew and later his sister, her husband, and their two children into his home. When interviewed, he did not reproach his brother-in-law who had been unemployed for four years. "The man is willing to work, but times are hard," he said.

But such cases of wholehearted unselfishness are rare. Many rich relatives fulfill their obligations with such ill grace that the recipients of their aid are full of resentment. One of our informants, for example, hated his uncle and brother-in-law who maintained him but constantly reminded him that he ought to be thankful. There

* Heard in Fukien.

are many cases of poor people working as servants in their relatives' houses.

Not one of our informants was ready to maintain a needy kinsman on the same standard of living he enjoyed himself—although this would be natural if kin were really an extension of the family in which all members are treated equally without regard to their material contribution. We have seen that such equality is not achieved even in joint families. In the great majority of cases the sums given to needy relatives amount to very little.

LAND RENT AND MONEY LENDING

All of our informants—tenants and landlords—reported that relatives collected the regular rate of rent for land. No one was shocked by this. Among about 50 cases there were only 2 of relatives who did not pay rent and 3 of relatives paying less rent than strangers.

Nevertheless, a personal element enters into the attitudes of related landlords and tenants. "If my brother-in-law is in bad straits and doesn't pay his rent on time, I won't be able to eject him as I would a stranger," said a landlord in North China.

When loans are involved the attitudes are even less businesslike. We found that in most cases relatives paid no interest or were charged a lower rate, although there were plenty of instances of loans made on a businesslike basis. Only 9 of 109 of our informants had to pay the usual rates, but among these were several who didn't abide by their agreements. In 17 cases the rate of interest was lower than for strangers; in 38 cases no interest was charged; in 29 cases the money was not returned; in about 16 cases we have no clear information. It would appear that peasants and poor townsmen take a more businesslike attitude in dealings with their relatives than do well-to-do townsmen.

These facts at first sight would seem to confirm the conventional idea that kinship is a substitute for generous credit institutions and social insurance. But more careful scrutiny shows many negative elements. Upper- and middle-class people looking for profitable investments unanimously complain against the unwritten law that relatives must get better terms than strangers. They have been seconded by a few peasants and workers eager to invest their savings profitably. On the one hand, losses resulting from granting easy terms might be ruinous; on the other hand, it is impossible to violate the rules of propriety. The solution is formulated in an

old adage: "*No financial dealings with relatives, financial dealings ruin relationships.*" We often heard this aphorism from our informants and often verified the truth of the second proposition.

Even those who need loans are often reluctant to apply to relatives for them. "Even before I open my mouth, my cousin knows what I want and this seals my lips," complained a poor peasant. "What is the use of borrowing money from a cousin at no interest if he feels entitled to ask it back at any time? It is better to borrow from a stranger," said a Hopeh peasant.

Yet there are also considerations favoring business transactions with relatives. Some of the poorer moneylenders think that lending money to relatives is a safe investment. "You can't make profit on them, but at least they won't run away with your money," said a Wusih worker, the daughter of a peasant.

As always in China, a compromise has been sought and found. Sometimes relatives pretend that the money they lend is not their own, that they only function as middlemen. Sometimes borrowers, to save their relatives' face, pay them interest in the form of gifts.

But the prevalent tendency is to avoid real business transactions with relatives. This was strikingly illustrated in a Fukien village, where tenancy was quite common—25 of 40 families interviewed (all of them belonged to 2 clans) either were or had tenants. Of these 25 only 3 rented land to relatives: 1 to an uncle and 2 to remote relatives, members of their clans. The terms were the same as those offered to strangers.

It seems that the emotional and social contacts among kinsmen also are less close than was commonly believed. Thus, only a few people among our informants consulted kinsmen outside their immediate families about important problems.*

Very often after family division the advice even of brothers and fathers is not sought. As in the West social contacts among relatives belonging to different social strata have been broken. "It is customary for peasants to keep away from their learned kinsmen, especially if they are officials," commented one of our assistants, a young anthropologist. Poor relatives are helped by their more fortunate kin, but this does not mean that they are socially accepted by them.

I found that modernized groups have preserved the traditional attitude toward relatives. The industrial workers in Shanghai had even greater regard for their kinsmen than workers in Peiping.

* Only 26 families among 215 from whom information was obtained reported such consultations (17% of the village families and 9% of the urban families).

Most of them considered loans to relatives and friends an expression of human sympathy and usually did not expect interest for money lent to relatives. "Interest is poison for poor people," said one. The only new feature in their attitude was that they valued friends even more than did the tradition-bound people, and often said that friends were dearer to them than relatives.

XV

The Clan

WHAT IS A CLAN?

MODERN Chinese of all classes are clan conscious, but their ideas about the nature of their clans differ.

For an inhabitant of a Kwangtung village, for instance, his clan at the time of our investigation was a functioning social unit affecting his and his family's economic and social life in various ways. For a businessman in Peiping the word "clan" or "clansman" evoked the ancestral temple and graveyard which he helped to maintain, as well as several individuals who claimed his support because they were called by the same name as he and came from the same village. A riksha coolie from Peiping whose father and grandfather were born in the city would associate the word "clan" with the vague notion that people of the same surname belong together in some way.

Unlike the institutions of family and kinship, which preserve their old functions, the clan is in the process of losing its importance. This process has only begun in South China; it is more advanced in the central provinces; in the North the clan has in many cases lost all its functions.

SOUTH CHINA

In 1936 a visitor in Kwangtung or Fukien could easily see that the clans were still functioning organizations. The rich villages, with their spacious white stone houses set among rice fields and orange and pomelo groves, are usually dominated by three kinds of buildings: ancestor temples in which the ancestors of the clan are worshiped; pawnshops, whose profits serve to increase the clan's fortune, and blockhouses built to protect wealthy clan members from bandits and rebels. Here at least 4 out of every 5 people belong to one of the clans ruling the village.

The temples and graveyards are well kept. Twice a year the whole clan, including women and children, gather in the graveyard to worship their dead, to burn paper money on their graves, and to decorate them with white paper ornaments. Then another

ceremony, for men only, is conducted by the clan leader according to the ancient rites. A banquet follows during which clan affairs are discussed. Collective ancestor worship is still a meaningful ceremony in these regions.

In the temples children's choirs can be heard reciting moral maxims of Confucius and Mencius from *The Four Books*, or more often phrases from modern primers published in Shanghai. These children study in clan schools, or in government schools sponsored and financed by the clan. The temples also serve as archives for the genealogical books of the clan, deeds to clan property, and other documents. In the clan offices, charged with administration of the clan property, men write, compute on abacuses, and talk and drink tea with visitors.

The property of the clans of Kwangtung is considerable, including several ancestor temples, houses, stores, pawnshops, and real estate. A large part of the rice fields, orange and lemon groves, vegetable gardens, and ponds around the village belongs to the clans. The proportion of land belonging to the clan varies; among the 24 clans of Kwangtung investigated in 1937 the variations extended from 10% to 90%. These extremes are rather rare. In the majority of cases the clan claimed 50%-70% of the land cultivated by its members, the rest being their private property. This ratio seemed to be typical of Kwangtung. The clans of Fukien possessed less land, but here too the clan was an economic unit and the members depended on it for their livelihood.

The clans differed in size, wealth, and influence. The smallest of the 26 clans investigated had only 4 families, the largest 546, but most had between 40 and 70. The large clans are subdivided into subclans or branches, each having its special ancestor temple. Some villages are inhabited almost exclusively by members of one clan, but in most places, two, three, or four clans live side by side.

Members identify themselves with their clan and are eager to defend its interests against outsiders. In the numerous conflicts between clans (disputes over water distribution, local administration, etc.) the leadership can count on the loyalty of clan members. But the inner life of the clan is far from harmonious.

Nominally each clan member or, more accurately, each family in the clan, has equal rights to the use of clan property, and theoretically a wealthy clan insures prosperity for all its members. In fact, clans are heterogeneous socially and economically and probably have been so for many centuries. Most of the members of a typical clan are middle and poor peasants and farm laborers; but

on the lowest level there were farm laborers working for 30 Chinese dollars a year, and on the highest level there were merchants earning thousands and hundreds of thousands of dollars on properties in the Dutch Indies, British Malaya, and the Philippines.

The socially and economically powerful members of the clans have kept the leadership of the clan and have used their position to enrich their families further at the expense of the less fortunate members.

The clans of Kwangtung and Fukien had two sets of leaders: (1) the clan elders, and (2) the clan executives. The first group, led by the clan head, consisted—theoretically at least—of the eldest men of the eldest generation of the clan. Exceptions, however, were not uncommon: among the 24 Kwangtung clan heads investigated there were 15 men under 61 years of age; 3 of these 15 were under 50. Respect for old age is still part of the moral pattern of rural China, but it is more and more an empty form. In 1936 the clan members of Kwangtung could say, with a character in *Chin Ping Mei* in the fifteenth century: "Nowadays it is money and not age that counts."¹ In many discussions of clan leadership our informants often asserted that real clan leaders had to be well-educated, socially prominent men—age was not everything.

But the clan elders are only venerable figureheads. Real power is in the hands of the clan executives: managers, treasurers, committee members. These men have, of course, to belong to the socially prominent and wealthy families if merely because the well to do alone can afford the degree of education required of them. Most of them were over 50 years of age, but advanced age was not of first importance in these cases.

Some of the clan heads have inherited their position: one powerful family has supplied the clan with heads for generations. Other clan heads are elected, as are the executives. These elections can hardly be called democratic; the dignitaries are brought into the governing body by coöptation or by acclamation at the annual meetings of the male members of the clan held in the ancestor temple after the rites of ancestor worship. The general consensus of opinion is that members have little say about these elections.

The social composition of the group of 52 clan leaders investigated in Kwangtung is characteristic: 26 landlords, 2 officials, 16 merchants (most of them landowners), 2 rentiers supported by their sons (businessmen overseas), 1 teacher, 1 school principal, 1 geomancer, and 11 peasants. All but 3 of these 11 peasants were well-to-do and employed several laborers. The leadership of the

2 clans investigated in Fukien consisted of 2 merchants, 1 landlord, and 1 owner of a private school.*

The clan management is responsible for the upkeep of the ancestor temples, the conduct of ancestor worship, the defense of clan interests before the local authorities, the settlement of clan conflicts between the different families and branches of the clans, and the administration of clan property. The latter function is exclusively in the hands of the managers.

The main source of income for almost all the clans is land. This is not cultivated collectively but rented out to individual tenants: clan members and outsiders. The clan members usually pay the same amount of rent as strangers. (There are rare exceptions.) In our findings the rents were high, usually around 50% of the crop. Sometimes an auction is arranged and the land is ceded to the highest bidder. Clan members, however, have one privilege: their claims are considered first, a privilege of no small importance in regions where land is relatively scarce and clan land is usually of good quality. Other sources of income are clan houses, stores, pawnshops, and loans. The rates of interest for loans were the same for clan members and outsiders and were often above the "normal" 24%; 30% and even 50% were not uncommon.³

This income as in the olden times is used for maintaining the clan temples and graveyards, for organizing defense against bandits, for defraying the costs of annual banquets, for maintaining schools and providing scholarships for children of clan members. In the clan or government schools subsidized by the clans, the children of the members were entitled to reduced tuition rates and sometimes were admitted without any payment.

The rest of the clan's income is either saved or distributed among the clan members.† Sometimes it is distributed among the families according to their size. A few clans hold to the old custom of helping poor members, but the help is limited and consists mainly in paying for their funerals. Some clans, as for instance those in the Liao-ch'ang village in Whampoa which the author visited in 1936, distribute the money among the unmarried young men of the village. The share of boys under 16 is handed over to their fathers, the others receive the money directly. (A sign of dwindling paternal authority—in olden times young men had no money of

* Chen Han-seng states that the executives of the clan have to be "rich and reliable," "learned and rational." 2

† The budget of the Li clan in Lu-hou village (Whampoa in Kwangtung) was as follows: maintenance of the ancestor temple, 60%; education, 30%; savings, 10%. (Information secured by the author.)

their own.) But in some clans where the surplus is not distributed everybody knows that the money has been illegally appropriated by managers who are practically uncontrolled by the membership.

The clan managers also have other ways of enriching themselves and their families at the expense of their less fortunate clansmen. They are usually able to secure for themselves the best lots of clan land. As a rule clan land is not supposed to be sold, but when exceptions are made (and they have become more and more numerous in recent years) the clan managers usually sell it to themselves or to their nearest relatives. Clan scholarships also have gone most often to the sons of clan executives or of other powerful clan members supporting the leadership.

Chen Han-seng considers this abuse of clan property typical and compares the Kwangtung clans with the public utilities in the United States which are owned by many shareholders but controlled by a few who appropriate most of the profits.⁴

The clan administration can get away with these practices because it has the power to silence all opposition within the clan.

Even in the South the clan leaders have no real authority over the private lives of clan members' families. The education and discipline of the children, the choice of their occupations, the arrangement of their marriages, the settlement of conflicts within the family are purely family affairs. The advice of the clan head in important matters concerning selling or buying property, immigration and family division, is asked only if he is a family intimate, and it carries no more weight than advice given by any other respected relative or friend. Only if the parents are unable to manage their unruly children do they ask for the assistance of the clan elders. The clan is not invited to weddings or funerals; only kinsmen and friends are invited and the head of the family conducts the ceremony.

But the clan elders exercise a kind of general supervision over the morals of the clan members and this enables them to restrain rebellious individuals.* The powerful gentry in the administration also have enough influence in courts to deprive clan members—poor peasants or farm laborers—of all possibility of legal redress.

The Republic introduced a new authority in the villages: village and subdistrict officials. These new dignitaries did not weaken the power of the clan administration. Elected by the population and appointed by the government, they were recruited exclusively from

* "Immoral" clansmen are not allowed to worship their ancestors. Sometimes they are driven out of the village.

the same strata of wealthy scholars, landlords, and merchants as the clan managers, and government posts and clan offices were often held by the same men.

Clan life in Kwangtung seemed to be decaying. Land owned privately by clan members was increasing, while land owned collectively was diminishing. This process was going on though the sale of clan land was prohibited and though the practice of bequeathing privately owned land to the clan is still common. The concentration of land in the hands of the rich has sharpened the conflicts within the clans. The clans are far from idyllic paternal organizations: thus, in 1925-27 during the Nationalist Revolution, Kwangtung, the province where the clan system was most intact, was the scene of the most violent peasant uprisings and the seat of the strongest peasant unions, which united poor and middle peasants as well as farm laborers of different clans in the common fight against their clan brothers and clan enemies—the rich landowners and merchants.

CENTRAL AND NORTH CHINA

The very appearance of the villages of Central and North China testifies to the diminished importance of the clans. In these parts, especially farther north where wheat and kaoliang fields replace the rice paddies of the South, beautiful and well-kept ancestral temples are rare. I recall the clan temple of the Wei family in a village in the Wenhsien district in Shantung. The once proud edifice had evidently not been repaired for many years and it was hard to believe that people came to visit it. The doors could not be closed, the paper of the latticed windows was torn, there was a thick coating of dust on the floor, on the sacrificial urns, and on the ancestor tablets. Many of the tablets had fallen from their stands. Weeds covering the path and court completed the melancholy picture of neglect and decay.

Most of the villages in Central and North China are not clan villages. Their inhabitants have several surnames. The decay of the clans seems to have been uneven: in one village in Hopeh one can find a relatively strong and large clan organization with a clan head, common ancestor rites held twice a year, and a fairly well-kept ancestor temple. In the neighboring village there may be almost no traces of clan life.

Even the strongest clans in Central China, let alone North China, lack the essential of clan life—a fair amount of common property.

As a rule, if a clan does own land, the income from it is barely sufficient to maintain the temple and graveyards, and to organize the traditional biannual banquets.

In these regions the clans have only one dignitary—the clan head, usually the eldest man of the eldest generation, who keeps his post for life, though sometimes he is elected for a limited term. As in the South, the clan head has to be well educated and socially prominent, so that poor peasants can never hold this position. But as the wealthiest clan members usually live in the cities, clan heads in the North are never such pompous figures as in the South. They have fewer functions and less authority. It was not uncommon for people we interviewed to characterize their clan head as “an old man who does not know much.” To officiate at ancestor worship is his main function. Sometimes he serves as arbiter in family divisions and in conflicts between different families. As of old, his agreement is necessary for adopting a son as a legal heir.* He also keeps the genealogical books of the clan.

Some of our informants from Kiangsu and Chekiang and a few from Hopeh told how the clan head guarded the morality of the group: he ostracized girls caught in illicit love affairs,⁵ punished unfilial sons whose parents were unable to handle them (one of these young men was ordered by the clan head to kneel for several hours before the tablets of the ancestors in the temple). For the remarriage of widows and divorcees the consent of the clan head is sometimes required. The attempts of the New Life Movement and of some modern-minded communities to simplify the wedding and funeral procedures have often met with opposition from the clan head who, backed by public opinion, insists on preserving the ancient rites, at least at funerals of the members of the elder generations. Most of our informants, however, knew nothing about these functions of the clan. As a rule, the clan interferes in family life as little as, or perhaps even less than, in the South.

Clan heads are definitely on the way out in Northern China. More and more they have surrendered their functions of arbiter of conflicts and supervisor of morals to the village heads who, in villages inhabited by more than one clan, are elected without regard to their position in the clan. Also, clan ancestor worship has gradually fallen into disuse. Many farm laborers, poor and even well-to-do peasants reported that they had no clan ancestor cere-

* The difference between the status of boys adopted as legal heirs and adopted “out of charity” was abolished by the legal code but was still observed generally: the legal heir had to be a member of one’s clan.

monies and worshiped only their own deceased fathers and grandfathers in their homes; some had given up ancestor worship entirely.

Clans exist only in villages or small towns. There are practically no clan ancestor temples and no clan heads in the cities. Though a few wealthy families maintain clan membership, they have no special organizations in the cities, except clubs, in which membership is open to people coming from the same localities. Poor city workers, riksha coolies, peddlers, etc., seemed to have the vaguest notions about their clans. Many had never heard of their clan heads. More than half the wage earners and lower-middle-class people interviewed in Peiping said that they had no ancestor temples, no common clan graveyards, no clan heads.

The well to do are more clan conscious. Many (more than half the middle-class and upper-middle-class people interviewed in Peiping) had common graveyards and ancestor temples in the villages where they, their fathers, or grandfathers were born, and contributed toward their maintenance.* Some believed that dead ancestors, if worshiped, would exert a beneficial influence on their lives. Others worshiped their clan ancestors for reasons of prestige. Some of our informants spoke of ancestral temples in the country as a mark of wealth and power.

Even if they want to, upper-class people are not able to forget their clans—too many clansmen knock at their doors asking for assistance. The assistance demanded is rarely of a financial kind. While people are still held bound to help their kinsmen with money, they do not have to help their clansmen in that way. Even in the South clansmen and strangers had to pay the same rent for their land, the same rate of interest on loans. With a few exceptions, clansmen were treated in a purely businesslike way. The taboo on financial dealings with relatives did not extend to clansmen.

The situation is different with regard to nonfinancial assistance. Here the members assert their rights and an influential clansman cannot easily refuse positions, government contracts, and similar favors.† As in the South the clan, along with family and kin, continues to function as an offensive and defensive weapon against the outside world.

* The attachment to the land of one's origin was still very strong. "I am a Southerner," said my Chinese teacher in Peiping, "my family came here from Kwangtung only 200 years ago!"

† In both North and South all our informants told us that financial help was seldom, if at all, offered, but indirect aid—especially in the form of recommendations for jobs—was quite common.

XVI

Nepotism

Now suppose, Yin-ching, that you have completed your studies and have become an influential official, a president of a university or something like that. One day a Mr. Chou, a remote relative of yours, presents himself and asks you to give him a job. What will you do?"

"I must get him a job," answered my friend, Chou Yin-ching.

"And if your brother wants your help?"

Yin-ching thought for a while.

"Him I must get a good job. I certainly cannot employ him as an underling; he must have something better than that."

"And suppose you have only one job and there are two candidates, your relative, Mr. Chou, and a Mr. Ch'i. What would you do then?"

"Oh, I would certainly choose my friend Mr. Ch'i. He is a very clever fellow!"

"No, Yin-ching, I don't mean Mr. Ch'i, your friend, but a Mr. Ch'i whom you don't know."

"Then I would take Mr. Chou—why should I give a job to a stranger?"

"Even if he was better qualified for the job than your relative?"

Yin-ching looked embarrassed.

"Please, don't ask me such questions," he said. "After all, I am only a student."

This conversation, which took place in 1936, illustrates how strong the old idea of family loyalty was even at that late date.

Providing relatives with jobs is considered a more natural and inescapable duty than lending them money or helping them in other ways. Several people interviewed in Peiping, Shanghai, and Tientsin who declared that they would rather lend money to friends and strangers than to relatives took for granted that the best available job must be offered first to one's kin.

This traditional view however has not remained unchallenged, and even Yin-ching, for all his devotion to his family, was embarrassed when the problem of qualification was raised. Of all the moral obligations laid by the old Chinese family on filial children,

tender parents, and good kinsmen, the function of serving as an "employment agency" has had most influence on the political, economic, and social life of the country. The overcrowding and inefficiency of Chinese government and business offices, felt as a handicap even in olden times, became unbearable when the country started on the path of modernization and industrialization.

The government offices could no longer operate with traditional methods. They have had to carry out the reorganization of the country and have been constantly confronted by new difficult problems. Modern industry and commerce from the very start have had to cope with the competition of foreign industry with its superior organization, machinery, and discipline. To survive in this new world China has had to put an end to the "more-or-less" attitude. For industry the problem of efficient personnel has been perhaps as important as the problems of mechanization.

Is nepotism really synonymous with inefficiency? After all China did manage to survive for thousands of years although her offices and business enterprises were staffed with relatives appointed regardless of qualifications. The question seemed worth raising and often came up in formal and informal conversation with Chinese of all classes.

"Relatives! They are the main reason why I am so sick!" exclaimed a middle-aged clothing-store manager whom we interviewed in a Peiping hospital. "Their sloth almost ruined the business and made me lose face before my shareholders. I hate to employ them, but—" he paused, and concluded in despair, "I can't help it."

Other managers and shopowners confirmed this view.

"Relatives are a nuisance. . . . They are much less efficient than other workers and demand better clothing and food. They are arrogant to their fellow workers. . . . They cannot be treated like other employees. . . . * The main trouble is that they know they can't be fired and they take advantage of this. . . . They are offended when their mistakes are pointed out. . . ."

A typical employer in Chinese modern fiction, the hero of Mao Tun's novel, *The Twilight*, is of the same opinion: "A factory full of relatives and friends cannot be operated efficiently."¹

The only dissent to this view came from some workers and shop clerks. But their opinions were not disinterested. They were po-

* The relatives of the bosses treated as ordinary employees felt they were losing face. "Formerly when I came into my father-in-law's place," said a young shop assistant, "I was treated as a guest of honor. Now I have to sweep the floor and deliver goods to the customers. I have to work like the others. I can't stand it!"

tential candidates for employment in posts controlled by relatives, and even to the neutral interviewer they were reluctant to admit that they might be inefficient. One of them told a story that clearly contradicted his expressed conviction that "relatives work as well as if not better than others." He admitted that in his own shop the two nephews of the manager were impossible: they were lazy, they wrecked machines and materials, and in the end their uncle found that it was cheaper to grant them a little pension and keep them out of the shop.*

That nepotism has resulted in inefficiency has been confirmed also by research workers who made extensive studies of industrial conditions in China. H. D. Fong, one of the outstanding authorities in this field, considers nepotism a serious obstacle to the industrialization of the country.²

Arguments were advanced, however, in favor of the employment of relatives: they might be less efficient but they were more trustworthy, and they would not steal. Such arguments, which hark back to the old days when Chinese kinship, friendship, or other personal relations played so large a part in business transactions, were advanced only by workers and small shopkeepers, not by more-or-less well-to-do businessmen.

One clerk maintained that the relatives of a boss would do better when working for him in a modern factory than in an old-fashioned enterprise. Managers of modern factories interviewed in Shanghai and Tientsin did not share this view and did all they could to get rid of their own relatives and those of their assistants.

If there was a slight difference of opinion as to the effects of nepotism in private enterprises, there was none with regard to government offices. Workers, businessmen, officials, and newspapermen unanimously condemned its bad effects on government work.

"On our newspaper our boss's relatives are completely inefficient and get better pay. This is bad but nothing compared to the situation in a government office whose chief employs his relatives," said a Peiping newspaperman.

"Relatives of high officials in government offices get better jobs but do bad work," said an employee of a Christian university near Peiping.

* I do not know whether the five salesmen in Peiping who performed the Herculean task of selling me twelve buttons were related to the manager of the store, but they were akin in efficiency. One of them was the chief salesman—he did the talking. Another fished the buttons out of a box containing a mixture of buttons of every size and description. The third stood by holding a piece of wrapping paper. The fourth brought my money to the cashier, and the fifth played with the lantern on my bicycle.

In addition to soft jobs, relatives receive various other favors and privileges. If one's relative is a bus driver, a streetcar conductor, or a railroad employee, one is likely to get free transportation. Equal favors can be expected of relatives in public utilities. Dr. Dettmar says that one of the main problems of the electrical industry in China has been that a large part of the current supplied was not paid for. Electrical plants have had to supply free illumination not only for street and government offices but also "for the employees and workers of the plant, as well as the relatives of the owners and those who invested money in the enterprise."³ It is not improbable that the relatives of the engineers, department heads, and even foremen were on this list.

In academic circles one often heard complaints that many scholarships were given to those who had influential relatives in the right places. The same kind of complaint was voiced in 1936 when the Chinese delegation did so badly in the Berlin Olympics. The Chinese are not very good in athletics, but, in addition, it was alleged, the people sent to Germany were not the best athletes but were relatives of influential officials.

THE FIGHT AGAINST NEPOTISM

The harmful effects of nepotism have been clear to almost everybody in China, to workers and journalists, to American-trained industrialists, and to half-literate shopkeepers.

The new patriotism and nationalism have given rise to a mentality incompatible with the old attitude toward work and the old forms of family loyalty. The principle of imperial Confucianism—"Family above everything"—began to give way to a new slogan—"The nation first." Nepotism has been condemned by public opinion and the fight against it has been proclaimed to be of major importance.

What have been the results of this fight?

The first impression of an observer of China during the 'thirties was that while everybody spoke against nepotism, nobody did anything about it.

Government bureaus, including the highest, workshops, stores, schools, and universities were staffed with relatives and friends of high and low officials, with the friends of their relatives and the relatives of their friends. It would take many pages to list the Chinese public institutions entirely staffed with relatives. And this list could be drawn up exclusively on the basis of information

collected during this investigation from patients in the PUMC Hospital and from students who answered our questionnaires.

Many private enterprises were like "closed shops," reserved for the kinsmen and clansmen of the boss, and making exceptions only for his friends and countrymen.

But a more careful scrutiny revealed that the struggle against nepotism really was going on in deeds as well as words. In all the establishments headed by foreigners, such as the Salt Gabelle, the Customs Service, the missionary schools, etc., the directors, chiefs of departments, and even clerks and foremen were forbidden to hire or even to recommend their relatives. Many wholly Chinese institutions, such as banks, factories, schools, universities, did the same. The new civil service examinations were designed to secure efficient government employees. Even many old-fashioned stores and workshops refused to employ relatives.

But there were many ways of circumventing the new regulations. Thus a young employee of the Customs Service was not recommended to his position by an uncle, a high official there. Oh, no! This was strictly forbidden! He was just "advised" to go there by his uncle who knew of the opening and—strangely enough—he was hired! Carl Crow in his *Four Hundred Million Customers* tells of a foreign manager who vainly tried to keep an outsider in a shop dominated by the clan of his Chinese assistant. Nobody said anything against the stranger, but his work was so skillfully sabotaged that he had to be dismissed.⁴

Business and government offices that were not such "closed shops" seldom if ever were free of personal influence. Nepotism was still the dominating form of the "spoils system," but now other variations familiar in the West began to play a more prominent role. Many government offices were entirely dominated by regional cliques. One university might be controlled exclusively by professors who had studied in America, another by people trained in England. Secret societies also provided positions for their members. It was a common occurrence for the whole staff of an institution to resign when a new director was appointed; they knew that the new chief would insist on appointing members of his own clique.

ATTITUDES TOWARD NEPOTISM

These difficulties are understandable. The elimination of nepotism is a cultural adjustment required mainly by the trend toward

industrialization. But industrialization is slow and its development in the large cities has little influence on the economic life of the country as a whole. As behavior patterns are even more persistent than economic forms, the policy of anti-nepotism has many obstacles to surmount.

The people who have to carry out the new policy are not subjectively ready for it. This is clear from our investigation. Our informants were asked: "If you had to fill one job and had three candidates: a relative, a friend, and a stranger, to whom would you give the job?" This question was submitted to 316 persons of various occupations in the industrial cities of Shanghai, Wusih, and Tientsin, as well as in nonindustrial Peiping.* Also, 978 college students and 407 high-school students answered a similar question in our questionnaire on family problems.† (Here the students had to choose from four candidates: brother and kinsman were substituted for the more general term "relatives.") We deliberately avoided mentioning the problem of efficiency in our question, as we wanted to see whether this consideration would spontaneously occur to our informants. It occurred to only about one quarter of them.

The answers revealed that occupation, social class, and degree of modernization influenced the attitudes toward the problem. The younger generation, represented by the students, took a different position from that held by those already active in business or public life.

In the middle- and upper-class groups‡ there was a definite cleavage between the attitudes of the businessmen on the one hand and officials, professionals, employees, etc., on the other. Thus, 9 of 14 businessmen in Peiping were in favor of "impersonal" choices: a stranger, or the man best qualified by his abilities, honesty, or devotion to work. Only a small fraction (2 of 18) of the nonbusinessmen in Peiping and 10 of 27 engineers and clerks in Shanghai were for an "impersonal" attitude.

In the working-class and lower-middle-class group 25 out of 81

* Among those interviewed were 8 directors of modern industrial establishments in Shanghai, Tientsin, and Wusih; 14 owners and managers; 18 officials, professionals, and landlords in Peiping; 27 engineers and factory clerks in Shanghai; 81 workers, riksha coolies, servants, shop assistants, peddlers, artisans, and farm laborers in Peiping; 26 artisans and riksha coolies in Shanghai; 91 industrial workers in Shanghai (mainly men); 35 female operatives of the Ch'ing Feng factory in Wusih; 16 female workers, students of the YWCA industrial school in Tientsin.

† These students belonged to the group of 1,164 college students and 536 high-school students who filled in the questionnaire on family problems.

‡ The two groups are considered together, as their attitudes practically coincide.

of the workers, artisans, shop assistants, and peddlers of Peiping and 25 of 107 industrial workers of Shanghai and Tientsin favored an impersonal attitude. A higher percentage of workers than of middle-class people was in favor of having friends or relatives. In Peiping the majority favored friends, in Shanghai and Tientsin relatives.

It was stressed by many that strangers were preferable to relatives and friends—it was easier to dismiss them. The problem of firing an intimate still troubled them. Many who declared that they would not hire relatives explained that once a relative was hired he was there for good.

Some of those who made relatives their first choice were convinced that this was their moral duty. Some argued that even if relatives were less efficient than strangers they were more reliable. Others were sensitive to the disadvantages of employing relatives but could not resist the pressure of convention. "That's the way it's done." "It can't be helped," was the tone of many answers. "I must employ my relatives and friends because our people depend on this practice," a young man remarked not without bitterness. "Everybody does it. Who would help me if I violated the rule?" "We who insist on refusing to employ our relatives are in a precarious position," a professor of a progressive university in North China told the author. "We cannot return to our home town, we would be ostracized there. The people are indignant at our 'cruelty.'" In many cases officials, engineers, or higher employees were educated at the expense of their kin or clansmen who considered the money given an investment and expected repayment in the form of positions. The refusal to comply was considered a breach of good faith.*

Friends appear to be more trustworthy, better workers, and more amenable to businesslike treatment than relatives. From the answers of many workers and students it seemed that friends were chosen as a compromise between the employment of inefficient kinsmen and of total strangers.

Turning to the young generation of the middle class represented by high-school and college students we found that 45% of male students and 58% of female students were in favor of an impersonal choice; 35% and 26% respectively chose friends. Only 20% of the young men and 16% of the young women were in favor of hiring brothers and sisters (other relatives were seldom mentioned).

* Pearl Buck in several of her stories tells of the difficulties arising for the young men as a result of this assistance.

The old Chinese pattern is still asserting itself against the new trends. But the old rule "relatives first" is no longer uncontested even among the most backward groups.

The motives which have been leading many of the Chinese to break with the old tradition are of the kind that always appear when another civilization is adjusting itself to Western patterns.⁵

Personal advantage, for instance, has played an important part in the repudiation of nepotism. The stimulus of self-interest is stronger than considerations of public welfare. One's own property has to be protected even against kinsmen, but the world outside is considered "legitimate loot for one's family [and kinsmen]," as Lin Yutang once put it.⁶

Thus, among our informants, the businessmen were less willing to employ relatives in their own enterprises than officials, higher employees, and others who managed public institutions or private enterprises not belonging to them. Their children displayed the same tendency. In the colleges, 55% of the children of businessmen (51% of the male and 62% of the female students) made impersonal choices, as compared to 42% (40% of the male and 53% of the female students) of the children of officials and 37% of the children of landlords and rich peasants (32% of the male and 73% of female students).*

Considerations of personal advantage might explain why the workers of Peiping had a more impersonal attitude than those of Shanghai. The former, when speaking of possible employment, thought of themselves as imaginary owners of imaginary shops. But the workers in Shanghai did not care about the efficiency of the large factories in which they were employed. Several Peiping workers and coolies put it bluntly: if they ran a shop of their own, they said, they would employ strangers or friends only; if they were in the government service they would employ "as many relatives as possible."

Yet it is not easy to fight against the pressure of the environment even in protecting one's interests. Thus a cloth merchant in Peiping who complained that his relatives were ruining him by their inefficiency still felt it impossible not to employ them. "It can't be helped!" A Shanghai cotton manufacturer trained in America frankly admitted that he could keep relatives out of his factory only because it was in Shanghai. In his native Canton it would have been a different story.

The businessmen opposed to employing relatives still felt obliged to help them in other ways: with financial assistance, fare

* See Appendix, Table IV.

back home,* or jobs in other people's shops. The last solution was the most frequent. It would seem that the old-fashioned businessmen in China have had a kind of protective organization against relatives. You employ my nephew, I will employ yours. They will realize that they can be fired and will work hard enough to make for efficiency in an establishment where no special skill is required.

Another factor has been the influence of the industrial environment. The owners and higher personnel of modern industrial establishments in Shanghai were more anti-nepotic than their colleagues in Peiping. This attitude on the part of the higher employees reveals a definite progress toward loyalty to a nonfamily world. Workers, being less able to identify themselves with their factories, were more old fashioned in this respect. Yet significantly enough, about 25% of our Shanghai workers were against nepotism. It is also worth mentioning that the women workers of the Ch'ing Feng factory in Wusih, whose American-trained owner waged a determined struggle against nepotism, were influenced to such an extent by this that, more than any other group investigated except the businessmen, they placed efficiency above kinship. (These women were asked whom they would prefer to employ if they owned shops.)

Modern education and especially college education also have been important factors in the formation of the new attitudes. Officials educated in colleges and those who have studied abroad seem to have fewer relatives around them. Among our student informants, impersonal choices were made by 50% of the children of officials with college education, and by only 36% of those whose fathers' education was limited to the memorizing of the "Sacred Books." The corresponding figures for children of businessmen were 63% and 57%.

As college men are becoming increasingly prominent in Chinese business and political life, and as the young men and women who were students in 1937 are now officers, officials, doctors, engineers, organizers of industrial coöperatives, professors, and teachers, their attitudes are deserving of more careful study.

THE ATTITUDES OF THE STUDENTS

The answers of the students showed (see summary on p. 188 and Table IV in the Appendix) an increasing recognition not only of

* Not only businessmen felt this obligation. In the progressive university mentioned above there was a special fund to pay the fares back home of disappointed relatives who had come to apply for employment in the university.

efficiency but also of community loyalty. Our questionnaire did not distinguish between employment in private businesses and in public offices. The general tenor of the answers, however, indicated clearly that the majority of the students were concerned not with private but with the public interest. "I don't want to be a selfish woman but an example to future generations," said a 17-year-old girl from Foochow, to explain her favoring efficiency. "We serve society, not families," said a sociology student in Peiping.

Even students who favored hiring a brother or friend would not do so unconditionally. About 25% of these asserted that in any case the brother or friend would have to be as efficient as the other candidates.*

It is interesting to note that friends were preferred to remote relatives and even to brothers. Friendship means a great deal to modern Chinese youth, who have continued and developed this old Chinese tradition. Young people choose their friends because "The friend is the nearest." A few of the students, however, were not so idealistic. "Friends must help each other," "I will help my friend, he will help me."

But efficiency was so thoroughly accepted as valuable that even many of those who favored friends justified their choice on the grounds that friends produce better results. "My friend and I have the same ideas . . . we can coöperate better." "I know my friend's character and abilities." "A friend can be dismissed if he does not work well."

Many explanations revealed that the students felt that in choosing friends they were breaking with the "evil feudal custom of nepotism" and were being "unselfish." They could not think of a better solution either from the point of view of efficiency or of social justice.

The majority of those who remained faithful to the "family first" idea were frank. "Why will I choose my brother? To save him from unemployment." "He will help me to support the family." Or simply: "Because he is my brother."

More than one explained his choice by family pressure: "To avoid family conflicts." "If I don't give my brother the job I will have trouble with my relatives." "I have to help my brother. Others do too."

Some of them felt it was wrong to choose relatives. "Theoretically I should give the job to the best-qualified candidate. But I

* Certainly, in many cases this explanation was only an up-to-date disguise for a choice guided by personal sympathy. But the necessity of this disguise is significant.

am selfish, I will choose my brother." "I should not do it, but I have such deep family feeling."

A Peiping student said that he would choose a stranger as his servant, a friend as the chief of a department, and his brother as his personal secretary.

As was mentioned before, family environment was an important factor in determining the attitudes of the students. Yet the students were able to go farther on the path of community loyalty than their fathers. About half of them admitted that their families would disapprove if they gave jobs to friends and strangers instead of to relatives. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority were prepared to do so.

The atmosphere of the colleges, the influence of Chinese and foreign professors, books and periodicals, and ideas of patriotism and political and social reorganization have had a great deal to do with the position taken by the student. "I would employ my brother, but this is not permitted by modern society," one of the students confessed.

The influence of the college also appears when we compare the answers of college students with those of high-school pupils: 24% of high-school boys preferred relatives as compared to 18% of college boys; the figures for girls were 23% and 15% respectively.

We interviewed students in purely Chinese schools and schools run by Christian missions. The latter have been considered the more efficient transmitters of foreign influences. Yet our questionnaires showed that while in the foreign-controlled high schools the students were more anti-nepotic than in Chinese high schools, the difference disappeared in colleges, except that more students in Christian colleges who chose brothers or relatives for jobs insisted that they also should be qualified. (In the Christian colleges 23% answered in this manner as compared to 8% in non-Christian colleges.)

There seemed to be no clear correlation between the political attitudes of the students and their attitudes toward nepotism. Radical and fascist-minded male students seemed to favor the employment of friends more than the others did, but the difference was not marked. Of the radicals 46.5% and of the fascist 43.5% preferred to employ friends as compared with 37.4% of the conservatives and 38% of the Christians and democrats.

The female students displayed a progressive attitude in the vital problem of nepotism, as in all other problems. A comparison of answers given by children of officials with college education showed

55% of the women for impersonal choices as against 42% of the men; among the children of businessmen with modern education the corresponding figures were 72% and 58%.

How can we explain this difference? To begin with, the Chinese educated woman who has borne the full burden of the old family system hates it more than the men do. Moreover, young Chinese women feel less responsible for their families. They know that after marriage they will transfer their loyalty to their husbands' families. Also, women seem less interested in friendship than are men. As everywhere else, the tradition of friendship is, in China, a masculine tradition. Possibly, too, it has been easier for the young woman to adopt an ideal solution since there is less likelihood of their ever having to face the responsibility of having employees.

It may not be an exaggeration to say that one factor accounting for the strength of the Chinese resistance to Japan in World War II is the new loyalty to society and the new feeling for serving it efficiently—values acquired by Chinese leaders during their youth.*

* The author had an opportunity to compare this anti-nepotistic trend among the educated youth of prewar China with the attitudes of Chinese students in Hawaii. A group of 129 Chinese students of the University of Hawaii and 236 students from McKinley High School in Honolulu answered the question, "To whom would you give a job—" Unlike their counterparts in China, most of the Chinese students in Hawaii came from the working and lower middle classes, but in spite of this difference a comparison between the attitudes of the two groups is not without interest.

Among the Chinese in Hawaii the "family first" attitude still prevailed: 65% of the boys and 62% of the girls declared they would give the job to a relative (brother or sister); only 8% of each favored friends; only 27% of the boys and 30% of the girls gave the answer which is considered "modern" in China and correct in America—favoring the best-qualified candidate. (See Appendix, Table V.)

The students of Hawaii lived in a "more-or-less" American environment. Almost all of them had been born in Hawaii and were American citizens; a good many were the children of American citizens. They studied in American schools, read American books and newspapers, were exposed to the influence of a public opinion opposed to nepotism. Nevertheless their attitude was more traditionalist than that of their counterparts in China. "My brother is of my own blood and according to Chinese tradition those who are of your own blood are the nearest," said a high-school student.

Perhaps the explanation for this conservatism is that family and kinship take on a new protective significance in a foreign environment. The discrimination against Orientals in America prompts them to stick together. But evidently family solidarity is considered more important than racial; otherwise friends would have been favored to a greater extent. Answers to other questions, too, revealed that friendship was far less important in Hawaii than in China.

The Chinese students in Hawaii were much less politically conscious and less patriotic than in China. They were good Americans to be sure, but their love for America at that time did not go with a feeling of responsibility, with a desire to improve it.

It may be interesting to note that, as in China, the children of businessmen were more opposed to nepotism than were the other children. About 40% of the sons of businessmen took only qualification into consideration, as against 27% of the whole group. The girls were somewhat less devoted to family and friends than were the boys.

XVII

Husband and Wife

WHAT have been the relations of husband and wife during the period of transition? How much of his old absolute authority has the husband been able to keep? Have the Chinese found greater or less happiness in marriage than formerly?

The old pattern has been slowly changing while the new patterns are slowly being created by individual couples.

No longer does the law grant the husband his former ascendancy over his wife, but tradition is stronger than the law. Whether the woman is her husband's equal as the law assumes, whether she dominates him or is dominated has depended largely on the woman herself, on her husband, and on the social and economic environment in which they live.

THE OLD-FASHIONED WIFE

The women of the tradition-bound strata—peasants, coolies, artisans, clerks, shopkeepers, petty officials, etc.—living in a non-industrial environment have not differed much from the women of old China in their upbringing and outlook. Their married life has also been much the same. They have lived much more in the past, in old China, than in the present, and have been concerned mainly with their homes. Only during the Nationalist Revolution and later in the Soviet districts and in some of the most modernized rural districts around Shanghai, Nanking, and Canton, has it been possible to arouse the interest of some young peasant women in politics. This was true also during the last war.

Few old-fashioned wives in contemporary China have had more power than their husbands and either have made all family decisions themselves or imposed their opinions when their husbands disagreed. But the rule that government by consultation is the best has been generally accepted, and there are very few families in which the wife is never consulted.

We tried to find out how important family decisions were made and how families were run, by asking the following questions: (1)

Who makes the decisions in business matters? (2) Who decides about the amount and details of household expenditures? (3) Who makes the decisions in problems concerning the children: education, profession, and marriage? (4) Who decides whether a patient should be sent to the hospital? (This question was put only to the patients in the PUMC Hospital.) We also wanted to know whom the various members of the family consulted. Among 194 wives * in families belonging to traditional strata, only 10 women had more power than their husbands and only 24 were never consulted by their husbands. In all the other families the ruling male granted his wife a certain degree of authority.

PROPERTY

The legal recognition of women's property rights has not changed the position of the old-fashioned wife as far as family property is concerned; nor has it eliminated the old idea that business problems are outside the sphere of women's competence.

The outside world has refused to accept the wife as the representative of the family in business matters. The woman actually manages family business only when the husband is incapacitated, completely taken up with his profession, or weak and incapable. A scholar devoted to his studies may very well permit his wife to handle the family estate; a businessman compelled to live in the city may permit his wife to manage the family property in his native town. In all other cases the husbands take the responsibility for all the decisions. But nearly half of them consult their wives about such problems.

In 11 of 85 peasant families of North China and Fukien from whom information was secured we found that the wife's advice was an important factor in the husband's decisions about business problems. The husbands stress the cleverness and capabilities of their wives. In 29 cases the husbands consult their wives just to keep peace in the family. "I talk things over with my wife, but the women understand very little about such matters," said a 36-year-old peasant from Fukien, expressing the opinion of many other peasants. Other peasants and their sons did not hesitate to state that wives were never considered.

Of 60 working-class and lower-middle-class families in Peiping and Shanghai, including peddlers, artisans, and riksha coolies, 24

* In this chapter are considered only families in which the husband is the eldest male and his mother is either dead or retired. The wife in such families is the only woman able to dispute her husband's power.

wives were consulted and in 6 cases there is good reason to believe their opinions carried real weight.

Fewer such consultations take place in middle-class groups and still fewer in the upper class. In the middle-class group 10 of 40 wives and in the traditional group of the upper class (landlords and merchants) only 3 out of 24 wives were consulted. This may be explained by the fact that the affairs of a merchant and factory owner require expert handling.

THE HOUSEHOLD

The household has remained woman's domain. *The Book of Rites* compensated for women's exclusion from the world outside by giving them, theoretically at least, great power inside the house. It is doubtful whether this part of the bargain was always kept in the past—nor is it always kept in contemporary China.

In most urban families in Europe and America women organize the household, plan meals, budget expenses, shop, and decide what clothes are needed by the family. In the working class in England and Germany, for instance, the usual arrangement is for the husband to hand over all his wages to his wife who is the custodian of the family purse.*

In the middle and upper classes in the West some wives have joint checking accounts with their husbands, some have monthly allowances for household expenses, some must answer to their husbands for every penny they spend. This last is very much resented by European and especially by American wives, and according to R. E. Baber is gradually disappearing in the United States.² Yet even under such an arrangement the wife is the equal of her husband when it comes to determining the family expenditures and the husband leaves the household to his wife. It has been asserted, for example, that the American woman handles about three quarters of the income of the lower class and about nine tenths of the income of the middle class in the United States.³

In rural areas things are somewhat different. E. A. Schmiedeler in his investigation of 150 households in a Western state of the United States in 1927 found that out of 50 urban homes 24 were

* The author had an opportunity to observe this arrangement in many working-class families in Berlin (1926-34). In a survey of working-class life in England we read: "Money matters are left entirely to the wife; it is she who decides whether an increased rent can be paid or an article of furniture bought, whether a boy shall be apprenticed or must take the work he can find, and what insurance clubs, etc., shall be joined. The custom of leaving the management of money to the wife is so deeply rooted that children always speak of the family income as belonging entirely to her."¹

managed entirely by wives and 26 by husbands and wives jointly, whereas in the country the overwhelming majority (47 out of 50) were managed by husbands and wives jointly and only 3 were exclusively in the hands of the wife.⁴

This is understandable. In rural areas production and consumption are not so clearly separated as in the city where the husband and other family members work for an employer and all the goods the family needs have to be purchased. In the country a large part of the family food is produced on home ground. The farmer is about the house more often and helps more in the household than does the city dweller.

But the wives even of Western farmers are at least on an equal footing with their husbands in managing the household. In China it is different.

More than 500 interviews organized by our group, personal observations and inquiries of the author, as well as the observations of other investigators seemed to indicate that the management of the household was often not in the hands of the head's wife or even in the hands of his mother but was handled by the male head himself.

In 62 peasant families of North China only 13 wives ran their homes independently, and 8 in 35 families of Fukien peasants. In all the other families the husband was in charge, sometimes consulting his wife, sometimes giving her orders. But the work itself was done by the wife, helped by other female members of the family.

The author observed such households during her stay in a Shantung village with the family Chang. The Changs owned 12 or 13 acres of land. Mr. Chang was on good terms with his wife and consulted her on all important problems. She was a clever and vivacious woman and in no sense gave the impression of being oppressed. Nevertheless, she did not run the home. She almost never had any money. She never did the shopping—her husband did it. Before the war it was still considered indecent for a village woman to go to market. In Hopeh, for instance, only the poorest women did this; * moreover, women, except for the youngest, were still handicapped by bound feet. Mr. Chang planned the meals; Mrs. Chang and her daughter-in-law cooked. Sometimes Mr. Chang even prepared the meals himself and seemed to enjoy it. In China

* See P'an Yu-mei's survey of peasant women's life.⁵ Buck in his early investigation of village life in China noted: "It is he [the head of the family] who does most of the buying of family supplies rather than the homemaker."⁶

men like to cook. Mr. Chang bought the materials with which his wife made clothes for the family. He paid the bills, managed the property, collected the rent, and so on. Among the peasants this situation seems to prevail.

In the city the Chinese husbands, often occupied outside the house, turn the household over to their wives, and many wives do their own shopping. In the middle and upper classes many husbands are constantly away from home and the wives have full freedom of movement. In quite a few families the wife receives a monthly allowance for expenses.

But in most cases, even in the cities, the wives have little real independence and the husbands not only hold the purse strings but supervise everything.

The poor wives have more freedom than the rich. Of 60 lower-middle-class and working-class families in Peiping from whom information was obtained 28 wives ran the house independently; in 4 families the housekeeping was supervised jointly by husbands and wives, and in 28 the husband was in charge. In 39 middle-class families 19 wives ran their homes, 20 did not; in the upper-class group 13 wives belonged to the first and 19 to the second category.

Here is what one of our respondents told of the way his mother, the wife of a middle-class businessman, ran the house: every morning an account keeper from the family store came to the house and handed over to the mother 60 coppers for vegetables and other things. Rice, flour, oil, coal were ordered by the account keeper who reported all the expenses to the father. The father and his employee also bought cloth for the family.*

In the upper class there are noticeable differences between the household regimes of tradition-bound and of modernized families. The modernized housewives seem to enjoy more rights. Yet even so they have less to say than their husbands. Even a foreign woman is not immune. When setting up housekeeping in Peiping the author imprudently remarked to her cook that her husband liked boiled potatoes while she herself liked them fried. During the whole year fried potatoes never appeared on the menu except on the author's birthday.

* Young Chinese acquainted with American ways often disapproved of this way of managing the house. "My father does not give my mother a monthly allowance and I firmly believe that he should," said a Chinese student in Hawaii. "He seems to think that as long as he gives her a place to live and three meals a day, she must be satisfied (an old Chinese idea, I suppose). However, after constant conflicts over this situation my mother now gets an allowance." (Answer to a questionnaire distributed in Hawaii for the purpose of this study.)

OTHER PROBLEMS

Other serious problems confronting the family arise from the obligations toward ancestors and children.

As of old, ancestor worship is directed by the male family head. The woman's role is of secondary importance, though her assistance is required (however, in some cases the old mother officiated).

Procreation is still the main function of the old-fashioned wife. A childless woman suffers not only because she has failed to satisfy her own and her husband's parental instincts but also because she loses face. Among the patients of the PUMC Hospital there was a middle-class woman who had contracted syphilis from her husband and as a result had several miscarriages. Her position in the family became untenable. Finally, after a stillbirth, she decided to adopt a child and to bring him home as her own: this restored the family's respect for her and her husband.

The home education of children is to a great extent in the hands of the mother. But at the age of 6 or 7, according to the old rule, the boys have to come under the supervision of men, and this rule is more or less kept in contemporary China. The education of daughters remains in the mother's hands, though in most families the husband has the final say concerning the education of both boys and girls.*

When primary schools opened in many villages and cities, peasants or coolies had to face the problem of whether they could afford to send their boys and girls to school. The well-to-do families had to choose between old-fashioned and modern schools and make up their minds about higher education. The decision in such cases is almost always made by the husband. "Women have little knowledge about such things," said a Fukien peasant. It seems that the wives of city workers and lower-middle-class people have more influence in these matters than women of other classes.†

When it comes to deciding what profession a child should follow, the wife's opinion carries great weight only if the child is a girl. Many factory girls told us that they were sent to work in factories with their mothers' consent or on their mothers' initiative.

* For further details about education see pp. 245 ff.

† Among our informants the proportion of wives consulted about their children's school education was as follows: peasants in North China—2 in about 80 families; 9 in 35 families of peasants in Fukien; 23 in 61 workers' and coolies' families in Peiping; 5 in 37 middle-class families in Peiping; 6 in 24 landlords' and merchants' families in Peiping.

With the boys it was almost always the father who made the decision.

In questions concerning the engagement and marriage of children, the mother's views have most weight. Few husbands in either city or country will permit their sons and daughters to become engaged without the mother's consent. Often the whole business is arranged by the women. Only 24 wives in 194 families belonging to the traditional strata were not consulted in such questions.

This is understandable. Daughters are under the mother's care and it is only natural that she should supervise the most important event of their lives. The reasons for her influence on her sons' marriages were plausibly given by one of our peasant informants: "My wife will have to deal with the new daughter-in-law, so she should select her!" (The fact that his son would have to deal with his future wife evidently appeared an irrelevant consideration to the father.)

All in all, in these strata the position of the wife does not differ much from that held by her mother or grandmother. The wife is not a slave, her personality is almost never suppressed completely, but the authority of the husband remains as strong as before.

When comparing conditions in the different social classes of the traditional group one gets an impression that women among the city poor enjoy more authority than peasant women or women in the middle and upper classes.

An unusual amount of power is concentrated in the hands of the women of all social classes in certain districts of Fukien and Kwangtung. Here even in olden times women were in a better position than in the rest of China. They became still more powerful after the end of the nineteenth century when the men began to seek employment in the South Seas, America, and other countries, and in many families the wives and mothers were left alone with the children. They managed all family affairs: business, home, etc.⁷

Those women in the traditional strata who are the managers of the family usually contribute to the family income by working outside their homes.

One of these, a servant in Peiping and the wife of a land laborer, not only had more power than her husband but was even able to overrule her father-in-law (her mother-in-law was dead). She lent grain or money to neighbors without consulting the men in the family. When at home she managed the house. The income of the

family came from a small piece of land (less than one acre); her husband's wages, \$42 a year; and her own wages, \$44 and tips. As servants' tips in wealthy Chinese families are considerable, her contribution was probably greater than her husband's.

Few women among our informants boasted of their ascendancy in the family. A domineering wife is "un-Chinese," and they represented their husbands as lords and masters. One had to question them closely to discover that in fact they made decisions without consulting their husbands or that their husbands "always agreed" with their proposals. "However high the water rises, it should never be above the bridge," said a peddler's wife smilingly, when the interviewer bluntly asked her whether she was the boss of the family. (Evidently she was.)

It must be noted, however, that some working-class women, although contributing to the family income, have a lower position in the family than many housewives. (Six of 13 working-class women in Peiping, contributing to the family income, were in such a position.)

In the traditionalist groups the women, even when they work, are isolated in their homes and their ideas remain old fashioned. Equality with men never crosses their minds, and even when they contribute to the family income, their position often remains inferior. But modern women—factory workers or career women—are able to adjust their position in the family to their new economic role.

THE OLD-FASHIONED MARRIAGE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

Many contemporary Chinese condemn the old-fashioned marriages arranged by parents. "Very few people married in the old way are happy," said a Tientsin woman worker whose marriage had been of the old-fashioned type. "The husband [a coolie] does not like his wife because the marriage was arranged by the parents," said a social worker in one of the hospital cases studied. (She evidently believed that such marriages are always unhappy and did not hesitate to attribute the unhappiness of her client to this cause.) "Old-fashioned marriages with wives who do not understand their husbands are unsatisfactory," writes a modern sociologist, Ch'en Tung-yüan.⁸ His young colleague Miss P'an Yu-mei who investigated a North China village in 1932 concluded that "many husbands are unkind toward their wives."⁹ Love is still not ex-

pected in the traditional marriage. The women are taught to restrain their emotions and their sexual education is neglected, which accounts for many unhappy marriages, according to a modern critic of Chinese family life.¹⁰ The husbands are supposed to be stern and cold. "Even if the husband likes his wife, he tries not to show it, otherwise he will be laughed at by his relatives and friends," observes P'an Yu-mei.¹¹ In 1936 in a Peiping cinema I remember seeing on the screen an old couple embracing each other before an enforced separation. The audience chuckled as at something unusual or indecent.*

Among the peasant and working girls, let alone the modern educated women, some fear the old-fashioned type of marriage to such an extent that they prefer to remain single. In Kwangtung such cases were common in imperial times; several working girls interviewed expressed the desire to remain single and many educated women definitely preferred spinsterhood to a traditional marriage.

In the prewar period traditional marriages were doubtless accompanied by greater unhappiness than in many other periods of Chinese history. Wars, floods, famine, and unemployment put great strain on the families and on the marriage relationship. The newspapers of Shanghai, Peiping, and other cities in the years before the war were full of stories about husbands selling their wives, wives running away from unemployed husbands, suicides of cruelly treated wives, or young wives unjustly accused of adultery. It was quite common for husbands to beat their wives. There were also many cases of husbands committing suicide because they were unable to support their families or quarreled with their wives. According to the records of the Ministry of Justice about half the people executed between May and September, 1925, had killed their wives or their husbands. "Does this not prove 'bankruptcy of the old morality' and the inadequacy of the old marriage?" asks Ch'en Tung-yüan.¹²

As of old, wealthy husbands found relief in concubinage and prostitution. The red light districts in the Chinese cities, though not as prosperous as the famous Yoshiwara in Tokyo, had plenty of customers during those days. Second-rate brothels were frequented by many poor workers and coolies who were either too

* Francis L. K. Hsü tells of harsh treatment experienced in the early 1940's in Yünnan by a modern young man from Hongkong who was walking down the street hand in hand with his bride. The local residents found his conduct immoral and in order to punish him poured a bucket of excrement over the couple's heads.¹²

poor to marry or had been forced to leave their wives in the country.

AN OLD-FASHIONED WIFE AND A MODERN HUSBAND

The traditional marriage can be accepted with resignation by people who have little contact with modern trends; but it is the cause of real tragedies among modernized Chinese.

The people who adopted Western ideas of love and marriage cannot be satisfied with the old Chinese division of one's emotional life: a wife for the home, a concubine for sexual satisfaction, and a friend with whom to share ideas, dreams, and hopes. The modern Chinese wants a wife who will not only bear him children but will be sexually desirable and a good companion. Such a mate he has to choose himself.

Yet only a few of the present generation are able to choose their wives themselves and often the parents' choice is a girl unsuitable even as a tolerable companion. "A college man was married to a country girl—hence the tragedy." This remark is repeated almost without variation by several students who were married in the old style. Their wives either were completely uneducated or had received only the traditional education, and there was a great cultural hiatus between husband and wife.

Some of the young husbands try to educate their wives. One of our informants, a student, the son of a businessman, was successful in his effort. "Before the marriage," he said, "my wife was completely uneducated. I taught her diligently. Now she can understand my ideas and she loves me. How happy I am!" Pearl Buck describes a similar development in the novel *East Wind—West Wind*. But patient husbands and wives willing to learn are rare.* Usually an old-fashioned wife, bound feet or no, remains a stranger to her modern husband.

Emotional difficulties are not the only problem. If the husband is a high official, a businessman in a treaty port, or does professional work in a large city he needs a wife who can help him keep a modern house and entertain in a modern way. An old-fashioned wife cannot cope with this task.

The most common arrangement in such cases is to leave the wife chosen by the parents with them and to live separately. Many young men adopt this solution. They are then likely to come in contact

* Of 94 student informants who married wives selected by their parents 41 said they have tried to educate their wives and only 2 reported that their efforts bore fruit.

with modern young girls suitable as lovers and companions; and they see their unmarried colleagues having love affairs with coeds, with sisters of friends, and with cousins. They do not remain unaffected by all this. Sooner or later they fall in love with a modern girl.

The most modern and radical solution is divorce. It is also a cruel solution. For a woman in old China to be divorced was to be disgraced. And these old-fashioned wives live in old China! Worst of all, they cannot understand why they are abandoned. They know that they have been married like their mothers and grandmothers, according to the rules of propriety. They know they have been dutiful wives and obedient daughters-in-law, they have done everything to please their husbands, even borne them sons. If their husbands were not satisfied, why did they not take a concubine? As first wives they would still have taken care of the household and children. Neither are the parents of the husband pleased by divorce. They pity their daughters-in-law, or value their services which they know modern daughters-in-law would never perform. But modern girls refuse to be concubines, they insist on clear-cut decisions. They demand that the first wives be divorced.

The wife whose tragedy was so movingly described by Pearl Buck solved her problem by suicide.¹⁴ It is not an uncommon solution.

Many young men, in order to avoid tragic situations, try to compromise and to marry again without divorcing the first wife. In some cases this arrangement amounts to concubinage under another name. In others, however, the first wife is left in the country and the second marriage, except for a few missing formalities, is a modern monogamous marriage.

THE MODERN WIFE

THE FACTORY WORKER

Her Contribution to the Family Income

One result of industrialization has been the appearance of a new kind of wife—the factory worker. The pay of a woman factory worker, however small, amounts to more than a servant or a seamstress could earn—it even very often exceeds the wages of men engaged in traditional occupations.

In peasant families the money brought in by women working in factories plays an even greater part in raising the living standards

of the family. Thus, an investigation of 30 families in Kiangsu where the young women worked in the Ch'ing Feng factory in Wusih showed that the married women workers earned from 30¢ to \$1.10 a day. The average monthly wage, after deduction of losses caused by illness, involuntary absence, fines, etc., was about \$14.50. Workers who lived in the factory dormitory, in workers' homes, or in private apartments had to spend from \$4.50 to \$5.50 a month for food and lodging. They sent home from \$3.50 to \$10.50 a month, an average of \$5 to \$6 a month or \$60 to \$72 a year. At the same time, in south Kiangsu the peasants who paid their rent in money had to give the landowners from 4.20 to 6.00 Chinese dollars for each mu a year.* The rent in kind ranged between 1 and 7 t'an of rice a year.† The price of 1 t'an of rice in 1936 was about \$5.46. This means that the money sent by a wife or a daughter-in-law enabled a family of tenants to pay rent for about 10 to 12 mu of land.

Among the families of the workers we interviewed in Wusih there was, for example, a family which rented seven mu (a little more than an acre) of land and paid \$35-\$42 a year for rent. The young daughter-in-law sent home \$4-\$5 a month, which was more than the family needed for rent.

In another family the husband owned five mu of land and rented five additional mu. With the \$10 a month his wife sent him he had much more than he required for rent.

One peasant family fell into debt because of the high cost of their son's marriage. The young wife, who had been a factory worker for seven years before her marriage, volunteered to go back to the factory to repay the debt. She sent home \$3-\$4 a month and in two years the whole debt (\$80 plus the interest) was repaid.

According to the estimate of Dr. Fei, who made a survey of conditions in a south Kiangsu village, the average peasant family needed \$263 in cash a year (including taxes, foodstuffs, raw materials for silk weaving, etc.) in addition to the foodstuff produced by the family.¹⁶ Thus a young woman who sent home \$6 a month contributed from a third to a fourth of all the cash needed by the family.

The position of the woman at home has been changed not only

* According to the investigation carried out under the auspices of the Rural Reconstruction Council of the Central Executive (Administrative) Yuan in 1932.¹⁵ The data on rent in kind and money rent in the villages around Chang Shang in south Kiangsu are in agreement with information secured from the Ch'ing Feng factory workers interviewed in 1936.

† T'an = 1 picul = 133½ pounds avoirdupois.

by the fact of earning money but by the manner of earning it. Unlike her old-fashioned sisters, who do sewing or embroidery at home, or are servants in private houses, she works in a big city and is a member of a group which includes men as well as women.

She has been brought in touch with modern ideas. She speaks with other women workers and sometimes even with men. She hears discussions of modern marriage and of the advantages of a family without a mother-in-law. She learns that she is not legally bound to surrender her wages to her husband or parents. Though her pay is often lower than that of men workers, she performs essentially the same functions as men do, and she cannot help being aware of it.

She also has come in touch with organizations and movements advocating new ideas, though the factory management has done its best to prevent such contacts. At the time of the Nationalist Revolution many workers belonged to trade-unions and were rather militant members. "The Amazons of Shanghai" was the name given them by a Western journalist reporting a strike in Shanghai in 1927. Later, during the period of reaction, when the militant trade-unions went underground, women remained in the organizations and some even joined the Communist party and the Red Army.

The husbands and their families know and fear the influence of the factory environment on the young women. When one of our informants, Tsao Ching-ai, a young peasant girl in Kiangsu who had worked in a factory since the age of 14, finally married her betrothed, the young man and his mother did not want her to go back to the factory. "Once back in the factory, you won't be satisfied with the life of a peasant housewife," they said. When she finally persuaded her husband to let her go in order to earn money and pay the debts of the family, her sister and aunt had to guarantee her conduct: the husband was afraid she might run away.

Actually some women workers have used their independence to escape from an impossible situation at home. And even those who do not go to such extremes are no longer the obedient peasant wives of olden times. They live in the present, not in the past.

The Factory Worker as Wife

A typical married factory worker, especially one who has been married for some time, is well informed about the income and property of her family, the current price of land, rice, and wheat, taxes, fair rates of interest, and so on. She has this information

because she is always or almost always consulted by her husband and often has more to say about these matters than he. The education and the future profession of her children are very much her concern. Working outside, she leaves the management of her household to her mother-in-law or to her husband; but she keeps an eye on the house and everything is arranged in accordance with her will.

We investigated a group of 46 wives who either were employed in factories or had been. They lived in Shanghai, Wusih, and in villages in Kiangsu. Of this group 17 had more power than their husbands, 5 had equal power, 10 were consulted by their husbands in all matters and their advice carried weight though the husbands had the last word, 4 were consulted from time to time, sometimes only for the sake of appearances, and 10 were never consulted, had no right to dispose of their earnings, and were like old-fashioned wives.

In a group of 14 wives in Tientsin—students of the industrial school of the YWCA and thus more exposed to modern trends—the proportion of women with authority was even greater: 6 had more power than their husbands, 3 had equal power, 3 were consulted, and only 2 were never consulted. (The women who were not consulted in the two groups analyzed above were mainly young women of 18 to 22 years of age and belonged to stem families, that is to say, lived with their parents-in-law.)

A 24-year-old peasant woman who worked in the Ch'ing Feng Cotton Mill in Wusih had married at 19 after working in the factory for seven years. Her opinion was decisive in all family matters. She explained, "My mother-in-law is not very competent and my husband comes to me with all his problems." The young woman directed the management of the house, though she came home only twice a month.

Two other peasant wives of the same age explained their position of superiority in the same way: "My husband is not very competent and never has any ideas."

We must not infer, however, that the husbands of these women were morons or weaklings. They just lacked experience. One of the women explained: "I have worked in the factory since I was very young and I know more of the world than my husband, who never left his native village." The roles of husband and wife were thus reversed. The wife's sphere of activity was the outside world and the husband's was the home.

In one such family, the 22-year-old wife who sent home \$4-\$5

a month had more to say about family problems than her husband; she took it for granted that she would decide about her son's education; she doled out the money she earned and directed her husband as to how it should be spent. But the marriages of the children had to be arranged by the husband: "This is as it should be," she said. The relations were thus an exact reversal of those in a traditional Chinese family.

In the cities, where husbands are as experienced and often more educated and alert than their wives, the women either enjoy a superior position (but conceal this with traditional tactfulness) or are on an equal footing which makes possible harmonious relations even in marriages of the old type. (Only 3 of the marriages, 2 in Shanghai and 1 in Tientsin, in the 64 families investigated were love marriages.)

In Shanghai several working wives controlled the family purse. The husband gave his wages to his wife, who gave him small sums when he asked for them. (This arrangement began to be encountered also among Shanghai workers in families in which the wives did not work—evidently under the influence of women factory workers.)

A 30-year-old cotton weaver of Wusih married to an accountant seemed to enjoy the most satisfactory marital relations, according to modern Western standards. The young wife came from a peasant family, her mother contributed to the family income by weaving and had a strong position in the home. The girl had been sent to the factory at the age of 12, she married rather late—at 24—and stopped working after marriage. Two years later, however, she went back to work and at the time of the interview she was earning \$28 a month; her husband was earning \$20 plus keep, that is, somewhat less than she. The family consisted of the couple, their 6-year-old son and an 18-year-old nephew, and was relatively well off. With part of their savings they bought three mu (half an acre) of land and a house in the country; with the other part they loaned their relatives money without interest and without insisting on speedy repayment. The land brought some income, supplied all the rice the family needed, and gave them a feeling of security.

All problems were decided by husband and wife jointly. The husband managed his earnings and the wife hers. The son was under the care of his father's sister but his education was closely supervised by his parents. He went to school and his parents hoped to make him a bank clerk. Neither the son nor the nephew was ever beaten.

The wife fulfilled all her duties: she cooked, sewed, and made shoes for the whole family. On Sundays husband and wife went shopping together. The wife was illiterate, but her husband read newspapers and told her about events in China and abroad. She was one of the best-informed workers of all the group interviewed in Wusih. She was acquainted with the new ideas of sexual equality, modern marriage, and even knew of labor unions and approved of them.

The few love matches encountered among the factory workers seemed to have led to satisfactory relations. A Tientsin worker who was a partner in a love match spoke of her life with great satisfaction. All the family affairs were decided by her and her husband together. "My husband loves me," she said, "therefore I can spend my wages as I like." It may be interesting to note that this woman had studied in the YWCA school and thus belonged to an advanced group of women workers. Less enlightened women did not always achieve such equality even when they selected their own mates.

Marital relations among the advanced workers sometimes have reached a high degree of mutual affection and understanding.

Hua Han, a modern Chinese author, gives a moving description of such relations in a short story, "The Sorrow of Shih Ku." Shih Ku was a factory worker in Hongkong. The story describes an exceptionally trying day of her life. The work was hard, the boss was particularly nasty, suspecting his workers of preparing a demonstration; the Chinese foreman, "the running dog of the owner," pursued the young woman with obscene proposals. But Shih Ku found comfort when she came home to her straw hut. "Her husband was just an ordinary worker, but he loved his wife and treated her tenderly. He asked her what had happened to her, tried to comfort her. At first the more tender he was, the worse she felt; the worse she felt, the more tender he became. Soon she cried like a little girl. But afterward she told him all that had happened to her." Husband and wife discussed the event and the political situation in Hongkong in connection with the coming demonstration and were proud to feel that they were not just victims of their oppressors but active fighters against them.¹⁷

The Factory Worker as Mother

The female factory worker and her family no longer consider childbearing her main function. Several women informants who enjoyed a strong position in their homes had no children. Women

workers bear children later and less frequently than nonworkers of the same class. This is especially true of those women who live apart from their husbands, seeing them only once or twice a year.

After delivery women workers try to remain home for several months or even longer. But many cannot afford this and have to go back to the factory. For a mother who has no milk, for instance, factory work is the only way to keep her child alive. In some cases the worker leaves her infant in the care of another woman, preferably a relative. One of the Wusih woman workers boarded her child with her mother at \$2 a month (the mother charged a reduced rate) and sent home \$10; this meant a profit of \$8 for the family.

The children of women workers are brought up somewhat differently from other children of the same social class. The working mothers do not believe in corporal punishment and their strong position in the family enables them to have their way.*

Though women workers are uneducated, they want their children to go to school. Some still believe that girls need less education than boys, but none, in contrast with the views of many peasant housewives, believe that girls should get no education at all.

Working mothers are rather ambitious for their children. They reject the old idea that "the son has to follow the trade of his father" and that "the daughter should be a virtuous wife and mother and nothing more." No, the sons of the workers must be "better" than their fathers: they will become merchants or officials. "To be a wage worker is not a career for a man," said a woman from Wusih, who apparently considered factory work something for women alone. A clerk's wife wanted her son to go into the banking business.

Many mothers want their daughters to learn a trade. Some expect their girls to become factory workers, others want them to escape the hardships of factory life and either marry rich men or enter the white-collar class. The teaching profession, though desirable, seems unattainable: "The family cannot afford to send the girl to school for so long a time."

But when it comes to marrying their children, the ideas of these working women seem much less modern.

Despite their contact with modern trends and the fact that their own old-style marriages were usually unhappy, most of them were for the traditional marriage: 35 of 49 women from whom information was secured were against modern marriages. "Modern mar-

* See pp. 241 ff.

riages are improper." "We don't have such things in our native village." "Children should be married as their parents were," they said.

Even factory workers, students of YWCA schools interviewed in Tientsin who were relatively progressive, expressed similar views. Although they did not disapprove of modern marriages in upper-class circles and saw the good points of the new ways, this seemed very remote from their lives.

Another group investigated was more modern. Eight women from Wusih had no modern couples among their acquaintances but said they would not oppose modern marriages for their children if the new tendency became general and if the children insisted on the right to choose their mates.

A few were even wholehearted partisans of modern marriage. Six of these belonged to the progressive group of YWCA students, six lived in Shanghai, the most modern Chinese city; 2 women in Wusih also took this view.

These women recognized that old-fashioned marriages were often unhappy. "When husband and wife are in love, life is much sweeter," said one of them, a Tientsin worker, who had been married in the old-fashioned way. "No love, no real marriage," said another worker, who had married the man she loved.

It would seem logical that factory work for wives would have a disintegrating effect on family life. This is true in some cases. Separated from her husband, a young wife living alone in the city is often separated from her children also.

Yet more frequently women are able to join their husbands by getting factory jobs for themselves. By placing their rights as wives and mothers above the duties incumbent on daughters-in-law, they actually strengthen the ties of the most important family unit—the community of parents and children.

The Attitude of Working Women toward Their New Position in the Family

Many of the working women who have improved their status in the family actually do not realize that their position is different from that of their mothers and grandmothers. They behave in a new way but they retain old ideas. But those who are aware of their changed situation know that factory employment has something to do with it. "Since I earn money, my husband asks my advice," said the wife of a Kiangsu peasant. "Ever since I have worked in

the factory, my father-in-law has consulted me," said a Tientsin worker. "I don't have to show so much respect for my mother-in-law now," said a Wusih worker. "My position at home improved after I went to the factory," asserted a woman worker in Shanghai. "My husband cannot beat me now and I can spend my money as I please," declared a young woman worker in Tientsin.

Yet many would give up their new independence in order to escape the hardships of factory work. Some find factory work less burdensome than work in the fields (especially in Kiangsu where, as in all of South China, women do more work in the fields than in North China). But the majority take the view that to be a housewife is preferable to doing factory work.* "The foremen are harsh and cruel," complained a young woman in Tientsin. "The hours are long, the work is tiresome," said another woman. Wives of peasants resent the enforced separation from their children and families, as do the wives of townsmen who have to board their children with strangers.

Nor is this new authority in the family attractive enough to tempt them to work in factories. Only a few would agree with the students of the YWCA school who said, "Women must work. If they earn money their husbands treat them better." "Wives must earn money, otherwise they are despised."

If most of our informants want to continue to work in factories it is because this is the best way to earn money badly needed by the family.

We asked our informants whether they believed in equality between men and women. Many answered in the affirmative, but it seems that most referred only to equal opportunity in education and work. Only a few believed in equal authority in the family. Generally they clung to the old ideas: "Men are stronger than women and therefore they should rule." Others repeated the old formula: "Men should rule outside the house, women inside."

It is interesting to note that the most passionate rejection of equality for women came from three women who actually ran their families. One of them was a forewoman in Wusih who earned a dollar a day, while the income of her husband, a Taoist priest, was very low. The wife made all decisions without even consulting her husband: "My husband's advice is no good," she said. As a Taoist, believing in the doctrine of *wu wei* (do not move, do not be active),

* They evidently did not share the opinion of an English investigator who studied the conditions of female labor during the industrial revolution and declared that factory work was easier than household drudgery.¹⁸

he was not interested in the worldly problems of managing property and household. His wife was unhappy. "I would rather be a peasant housewife than a factory worker," she said. She would have left everything to her husband's decision if it had been possible.

"If my husband were competent," said a worker, a peasant's wife who was the boss of the family, "I would let him decide about everything. I do not believe in equality."

Another peasant's wife said that she was looking forward to the moment when she would cease working and when her husband would have more power "as he should."

It would appear that these Chinese women suffered because their relations with their husbands seemed to them to violate the old Chinese idea of propriety. They felt that the improvement of their position had gone too far, that "the water was rising above the bridge." To be a pioneer is never easy. The women workers had not sought to change their position, the change was imposed on them by their new economic role.

It seems that the best-adjusted marriages are those where the women do not dominate their husbands but are equal to them or at least exercise their domination in a traditional tactful form.

"Of course I believe in equality," said a spinner in Wusih whose husband was a carpenter. "And there is equality between men and women now that wives earn more than their husbands." "But are not husbands who earn less than their wives browbeaten?" asked the interviewer. "Not at all," answered the worker, "I never make a point of my higher earnings. I do not want to dominate my husband the way my mother-in-law dominated hers. I don't like that sort of thing."

THE EDUCATED MODERN WIFE

An educated woman is not a totally new phenomenon in China: the intelligent girl able to quote the classics and to ply her writing brush with skill and elegance, the pride of her learned father, was a familiar figure even under the empire. But the intellectual women of modern China are something quite different. Their accomplishments are of a different kind and have practical consequences in their family environment. They are also more numerous.

They are also different as wives: they demand more authority in the family and often obtain it.

Even if the marriage has been arranged by the parents, the hus-

band has to treat a modern wife differently. Such a woman can understand the modern world and converse with her husband about his problems.*

In modernized upper-class families more housewives ran their homes than in old-fashioned families.† This can be explained to some extent by the fact that modern men are more interested in their work than in household affairs. Then, too, the husbands of educated women have more confidence in their wives' capabilities with money.

"Of course my wife manages the house," said a professor of geology whom the author met in Peiping. "Chinese women are usually more thrifty than men and therefore make better managers. Besides, my wife studied home economics and knows all about vitamins and germs. I even think she makes the children wash too often, but that's not so bad!"

It seems that the position of women with college education has improved more than that of women of high-school education. This is clear from the evidence we collected from 1,164 college students. Questioned as to whom they go to for money the overwhelming majority said to their father; 13% of the boys and 17% of the girls said to their mother; 23% of the boys and 63% of the girls mentioned both parents and other family members. Where the mother was a college graduate, the situation was different: 25% of such mothers were the only source of money for their sons, 86% of such mothers for their daughters; 50% of mothers with college education were mentioned equally with their husbands, by their sons.

Modern educated mothers also have more influence over their children and enjoy their confidence to a far greater extent than do old-fashioned mothers. This is especially noticeable in relations between mothers and daughters. The educated mothers are told of their daughters' love affairs more often than uneducated ones; 70 of 170 mothers with traditional education (41%) and 8 of 11 with college education (73%) were confidantes in their daughters' love affairs.‡

* In the families interviewed, women with college education were always consulted by their husbands; high-school graduates were not always but more often consulted than old-fashioned wives of the same social group.

† Among 21 families belonging to traditional strata in Peiping there were only 5 housewives who ran their homes, while 8 of 11 did in modernized families.

‡ These data refer to those girls who replied to the questions about whom they consulted in schoolwork and love affairs. Those girls who did not consult their mothers consulted friends, sisters, brothers, etc. (About the questionnaire see pp. 270, 296 ff.)

Not all the college girls marry the men they want to marry and many, if not most, high-school graduates marry in the old-fashioned way. Many are unhappy in their married life. Their modern education imbues them with romantic ideas, brings them into conflict with their environment, and makes the conventional marriage a much heavier burden than it is for the women brought up in a conventional way. Their improved position in the family is not sufficient compensation for the frustrated dreams of their youth.

A typical example of such an unhappy woman, illustrating the difficulties of adjustment in a period of transition, is the wife of the rich Shanghai industrialist Wu Sung-fu in Mao Tun's novel, *The Twilight*. Mrs. Wu was educated in a missionary school where the girls read *Ivanhoe*, *The Tempest* and similar romantic works. "They dreamed of brave knights and kings, of solitary islands, waning moons, ruins in the woods and other accessories of poetic landscapes and tried to discover them in the environment of their school in the western part of Shanghai." This "midsummer night's dream," as Mao Tun calls it, was broken first by personal misfortunes—the death of the young girl's parents—then by the "real tempest" of the revolutionary movement. She was not strong enough to take part in the movement and to emancipate herself from the Chinese tradition and the pseudo-romantic dreams of her school days. When, instead of a medieval knight, a young representative of the new movement appeared in her life she was "half startled, half pleased," but neither he nor she had enough strength to seize the opportunity presented for love and happiness. After a semi-conventional marriage to a Shanghai industrialist she still could not understand that "her big determined husband with the pimpled face was a real knight of this mechanized century, in which heroes use abacuses and ride in autocars instead of mounting fiery steeds and swinging swords."¹⁹

This romantic education and inability to adapt herself to reality spoiled the life of this Chinese Madame Bovary. Unlike her French counterpart, however, Mrs. Wu did not take the path of adultery. She remained the suffering neglected wife of a man who did not need her love, advice, or companionship. It seems that her behavior was not altogether typical. Other modern society women in Shanghai took life less seriously and had love affairs which were tolerated by their husbands and society. They led a lazy dissipated life similar to that of the Western leisure class.

But the partners in love marriages are more often the wives who have had a modern education; this deeply affects their relations with their husbands.

ARE MODERN MARRIAGES HAPPY?

This question is of great consequence and involves an even more fundamental problem: what lasting benefits have westernization and modernization achieved for China?

As to happiness, this is what a 24-year-old student, married for five years to a woman he loved, said about his wife. "She is the only one with whom I can discuss my problems frankly. She comforts and encourages me and helps me solve my difficulties. She guides me and helps me more than anyone else. The sympathy between us is the basis of our love. She is my ideal wife and I am her ideal husband. She is my life, my soul. I live and work only for her."

Such intense feelings, such complete happiness could never have appeared in old-fashioned marriages, though some of them were more or less satisfactory. New values were brought into marriage by love, freedom of choice, the comradeship of intellectual equals sharing each other's convictions. The new marriage enriched the life of the modern Chinese, enabling at least some of them to achieve that perfect spiritual and bodily union which is perhaps the greatest experience of human life.

But is the experience of the student just quoted really typical? Are all modern marriages as successful as his? Perhaps not, but it would seem that more modern marriages are crowned with happiness than old-fashioned or semimodern marriages. Of 203 married college and high-school students (9 of them were women) * 87 had their marriages arranged by their parents and did not even meet their mates until after the ceremony. Of these 27 (or 31%) declared themselves satisfied in their marriages; 3 could not say positively whether they were satisfied or not; 57 (66%) were definitely dissatisfied. The marriages of the 53 who had seen the mates chosen by their parents before marriage and probably exercised some degree of choice showed a higher average of satisfaction: 28 (53%) were satisfied, 4 were uncertain, and 21 (40%) were definitely dissatisfied. The average of satisfaction goes up considerably when we turn to the 48 students who chose their mates themselves (6 had to obtain their parents' approval and characterized their marriages as "half my own choice, half my parents' choice"): 38 (80%) were satisfied; 2 were uncertain and only 8 were dissatisfied! (Fifteen students of this group gave no information about the circumstances of their marriage.)

It is interesting to note that the modern group was much more

* Who answered the questionnaire distributed for the purpose of this study.

explicit in expressing its satisfaction—all of them stated that they had common interests with their wives, discussed problems with them, whereas in the other group only a few volunteered similar explanations.

The results of an investigation of the marital adjustment and happiness of a hundred educated couples carried out by Dr. Smythe in Nanking in 1935 seem to confirm this impression: 50% of his informants characterized their marriages as happy and 22% as "very happy." Unfortunately Dr. Smythe does not separate marriages arranged by parents from those in which the young people chose their mates themselves, but from the composition of his group (67 men and 12 women were college graduates, others were high-school graduates) we can surmise that there was a high proportion of modern marriages. Dr. Smythe's summary of his investigation states that the free selection of mates and long period of courtship (about a year and a half)—characteristic of modern marriages—are more productive of marital happiness than the old-fashioned methods.²⁰

There have been many modern marriages in the Soviet districts. Almost all the leaders and outstanding women are married to mates of their own choice who have shared their convictions and fought for the same cause. Yang K'ai-hui, the first wife of Mao Tse-tung, the chairman of the government of the Soviet districts, was a brilliant woman, an active Communist leader. Their marriage was celebrated as an "ideal romance" among the radical youth of the time.²¹

Chou En-lai, the representative of the Soviet districts (special area) in Chungking, and his wife Teng Ying-ch'ao fell in love in 1919 while they were active in the student movement in Tientsin and married six years later; the wife of the Red commander-in-chief Chu Te was a partisan leader; Po K'u, who occupied a high post in the Foreign Office, married a woman whose importance in the movement equaled his own—she was Liu Chien-hsien, a former factory worker of Wusih, who during the war was Director of National Mines and Factories and the leader of women's organizations in the Soviet area. These examples could be multiplied. All these women have combined their duties as wives and mothers with active political work. Reports on life in the Soviet districts state that these marriages are "amazingly successful."²² So are many other love marriages observed throughout China.

Like their progressive sisters in the factories, the educated Chinese women value their new equality in marriage and unlike

some "women powerful in spite of themselves," whom we met among factory workers, feel no need for a "strong man" in the family.

In 1935 the Chinese YWCA, which in the 'thirties organized many of the best elements among the Chinese women, published a symposium on family problems which contained an article by Cheng Sheng-tsu on marital relations: "How to Preserve Love After Marriage." Miss Cheng stressed the necessity for mutual understanding. The wife must know the husband's interests; he, for his part, must value her hard work as a housewife and respect her desire to be active outside the family. Like the Chinese moralists of olden times, Miss Cheng recognized the need for forbearance and compromise in family life. But these virtues must not be carried too far, excessive compromise is an evil—it creates resentments which lead to explosions. Patience, mutual understanding, and concessions are better than unconditional yielding on the part of the woman. Miss Cheng also discussed sexual adjustment to which, despite their naturalistic approach, the Chinese never gave due consideration.²³

It seems that the independent modern woman—the career woman or the worker—has one quality often lacking in Western women, which makes for success in marriage: Chinese women are today, just as in their grandmothers' time, extremely tactful and whether equal or superior to their husbands act in a way that does not hurt their masculine pride.

But the defenders of the old marriage system point to the fact that divorce, formerly almost unknown in China, has begun to spread, particularly in large cities like Shanghai, Canton, and even old-fashioned Peiping.* The courts, they argue, have to deal not only with unions imposed on couples by their parents but also

* The divorce statistics in China are very deficient as they are available only for a few large cities and do not include the rather numerous divorces by mutual consent which take place outside the courts. But even so the number of divorces in the large cities appears to be considerable. According to the data of the Bureau of Public Safety in Shanghai, 645 divorces were registered in 1929 and 853 in 1930; in 1930 the Peiping district court registered 62, Canton 174. The data for Shanghai evidently covered only the Chinese city section—about 1,500,000 inhabitants. Thus there were 43 divorces per 100,000 in 1929 and 57 per 100,000 in 1930—a proportion comparable to that prevailing in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden in 1922 and rather lower than that in England and France. This comparison, however, may be misleading as Western statistics are taken for the country as a whole, whereas the Chinese figures relate only to Shanghai, a city by no means characteristic of China as a whole. The rate of divorce in the rural districts and in the small towns probably has not changed much since the 19th century. It is to be noted that many divorces, especially in Canton, have been initiated by women.²⁴

with love marriages. The partisans of the new marriage system reply with the argument that was often used by the advocates of the right to divorce in Europe and America: the discontinuation of an unhappy union is a more sound solution than its continuance. Is not divorce preferable to degrading concubinage? Were not many old Chinese marriages unhappy? Divorce only brings into the open the hidden weakness of Chinese family life; once exposed, this weakness can be dealt with. And it should not be forgotten that the abnormally high number of divorces can be expected to decrease in the future, when the main cause of divorce, the old-fashioned marriage, has disappeared.*

There are indications that, in contradiction to the views of the traditionalists, the right to divorce will not destroy the Chinese family. In fact, radical public opinion recognizes the undesirability of divorce without good reason. According to the testimony of Nym Wales, the people in the Soviet districts are opposed to divorces "on purely esthetic grounds," for instance, and sound family life is much extolled.²⁶ The Chinese radicals who learned so much from the Soviet Union have apparently also adopted the recent Soviet attitude toward divorce: though not prohibited, it has been made more difficult.

THE CONCUBINE

Perhaps nothing is more shocking to the sentimental lover of things Chinese who enters the country with a glamorous picture of a brand new China in mind, than to be introduced in Shanghai society to two Mrs. Li and to discover that they are not sisters-in-law but the two wives of some elegant modern gentleman.

In the struggle against polygyny the partisans of modern trends have had a real fight on their hands. They took up this fight at the very beginning. The early feminists protested against concubinage, so did the young enthusiasts of the Renaissance Movement; the radical-progressive movement as well as moderate liberals opposed it. The Christians, of course, were ardent crusaders for monogamy.

The problem has been discussed in periodicals and newspapers and has often been treated by modern writers. The prevalent trend is against concubinage. Fictional literature has stopped describing concubinage as normal, and novels or short stories ending with the

* One hundred and fifty-four divorces reported in the *China Times* were analyzed by a student of H. D. Lamson. The analysis shows that of 104 cases in which the type of marriage was ascertainable, 98 were old type and only 6 were modern marriages.²⁵

hero marrying two girls at once, or with wives approving of their husbands taking concubines, are no longer written. One of the heroes of the novel, *Chia*, by Pa Chin loves two women: his cousin whom he wanted to marry and from whom he has been separated by the family, and his wife, a fine woman, who was selected for him by his mother. When his cousin becomes a widow he feels his love for her with tragic intensity, but the idea of taking her as a concubine simply does not occur to him. His wife is actually prepared to yield her place to her rival. Yet, in a frank and dignified conversation between the two women, who are both concerned primarily with the happiness of the man they love, the idea of a triangular solution never comes up.²⁷

Several modern short stories directly condemn concubinage. One of the most impressive of these is Jo Shih's "Slave Mother," which tells of a poor woman sold temporarily to a rich family in order to produce a child, only to be sent away afterward leaving her child behind.²⁸

The anti-concubinage trend prevailed in the political and sociological literature of the 'thirties. Thus Lo Tung-wei and Mai H. T. were uncompromising in their condemnation of the system and considered the fight against it extremely important.²⁹ In 1925 the Shanghai newspaper, *Shih Shih Hsin Pao*, conducted an inquiry among its readers. Most of the 317 persons who answered the questionnaire were against polygyny (84% of the women and 79% of the men).³⁰ The overwhelming majority of the college and high-school students who answered the questionnaire distributed by the author were unquestionably against concubinage. Very few students whose fathers had concubines approved of it.*

Yet there were also some outright defenders of polygyny as a system "based on the innate instincts of the male." They argued for the old Chinese system of concubinage as more open, honest, and human than Western hypocritical practice which supplements monogamous marriage with adultery.³² Chinese realities were such that even a westernized Christian like Professor P'an Kuan-tan declared that he personally considered monogamy more beneficial for the race and the family, but ended up by advocating leniency toward the existence of concubinage: "I think that monogamy should be propagated, but that polygamy must be tolerated. . . . Strict prohibition would have as little effect as the prohibition of alcohol in the United States. . . ." ³³

* Ava Milam, who conducted a similar inquiry among students and middle-class people in 1923, supports this statement.³¹

The defenders of the old system found unexpected allies in the radical proponents of advanced Western theories of free love. "Sexual morality is a private affair," they argued. "Society must insist that the interests of minors be protected and that children be taken care of, but the acts of grown men and women should not be interfered with." "If one marriage partner does not protest against the other's sexual relations with another man or woman society should not interfere."³⁴ "That is all very well in theory," replied their opponents, "but under Chinese conditions of inequality this would practically lead to the justification of concubinage . . ." "That's fine," the reactionaries would say, "to have concubines does not contradict the old Confucian teachings and modern morality is not against it either."³⁵

The ideological confusion reflects both the stubborn resistance of the old Chinese society and the tardy growth of the new trends.

Concubines are not mentioned in the new legal code and thus have no legal status. The man who, having one wife, marries another, is supposed to be prosecuted by the law as a bigamist. As bringing a concubine into one's house is accompanied by a formal ceremony—a kind of second-class marriage—thousands of businessmen, officials, landlords, and others are open to prosecution. But actually they are not prosecuted, for China still applies its laws in the old "more-or-less" way! * Thus, for instance, the Chief of police in a Shantung town in which the author stayed in 1936 introduced both his wives to his guests and proudly showed pictures of both weddings. And he was supposed to enforce the new law!

As of old, the most effective check on polygyny is economic in character. In contemporary China concubinage is, as it was in feudal and imperial times, an upper-class and to a lesser extent a middle-class phenomenon. There were, for instance, no concubines in the poor or middle peasant families or in the lower-middle-class and working-class families † that were investigated. Some notion as to the number of concubines among the upper and middle classes can be gained from an inquiry conducted for this study

* Men who marry a second time without warning the new wife that another exists are sometimes prosecuted. But bigamy of this kind was punishable under the old law, too.

† In these the concubines appeared only in declassed families which formerly had belonged to the upper class. When a poor family became prosperous a concubine was apt to appear. Thus, the foreman of the Kailan coal mines, when he became a contractor with an income of \$800 a month, got a concubine along with gonorrhea and an addiction to opium.

among 1,700 college and high-school students. In 193 cases (11.4%) the students admitted the existence of a concubine in the family, and in 99 cases (5.8%) there was reason to suspect that a concubine existed although the student would not admit it.

Concubines were most frequent among army men, officials, and businessmen. There were fewer among professionals and educators. The proportion of concubines increased with income. Thus, in the richest group of families of college students 14.3% had concubines, whereas only 11% had them in a less prosperous group. In 1923 Ava Milam found that the average income of families with concubines was \$3,600, while the average income of the whole group of 1,270 families investigated was only \$960.³⁸

The desire to have children or sons is still the most common official explanation for taking a concubine. "My wife bore me one daughter and no other children for eight years. As I was the only son my relatives urged me to take another woman to bear me a son who could continue the family. Finally I did so," said a drug-store owner in Peiping. According to his story, the appearance of the concubine had unexpected consequences. His desire for children was more than gratified. The concubine bore him a son very soon. Four months later his first wife bore him another son. The following year the concubine bore twins—both boys; the wife followed with twins of her own; and at the time of the interview the man was the happy father of thirteen children!

In the changing environment concubines sometimes assume new functions. A general in the province of Shensi is said to have instituted an ingenious division of labor in his family. His first wife took care of the children; the second managed the household; the third, an educated young woman who had studied abroad and been politically active during the revolution, was the general's private secretary and interpreter and helped him entertain; the fourth wife was a beautiful young girl whose role was apparently to care for the general's sexual life. But as a rule the main function of the concubine is that of sexual partner. As of old, the brothels are the main source of concubines. Some concubines were originally house slaves or were brought from poor families. Buying a concubine is a common thing. Our informants told us freely the sums they paid for them. One, who loved his concubine very much, said that he had paid \$700 for her and spent about \$1,000 for her clothing. "That's not too much," said our young Chinese assistant, who interviewed him.

In old-fashioned families marital relationships remain as of old;

wives and concubines not infrequently live in relative outward harmony, as did many heroines of old Chinese novels and short stories.

Thus, the druggist whose story we told above testified that his wife and concubine were fond of each other. The two women did come together to the hospital to see him, but it is to be doubted that the concubine was completely satisfied with her position. The wife managed the household and controlled the concubine's food and clothing. The husband always consulted his wife, never the concubine, and ate with his first wife and her children while the concubine ate at a separate table with her children. In other households the situation has sometimes been reversed and the concubine has had more power in the family, though it seems that this is not typical; the opposite seems to have been more frequent.

In many families, however, the first wife and the concubine quarrel constantly—as they have throughout the centuries. From numerous reported suicides of concubines or wives, from the violent quarrels which sometimes require police intervention, and from hospital records ascribing nervous disorders in old-fashioned women to the existence of a concubine in the family³⁷—we can see that things have not changed very much since *The Dream of the Red Chamber* was written. In fact, wives are now more intolerant of concubines. The New and the Old World in China are not separated by an impenetrable wall and the fact that modern public opinion is against concubines influences the attitudes of the traditional circles. Concubines are especially resented by children. The concubines themselves also have complaints. Fewer of them take their position for granted, more try to break their ties and even demand regular divorce and alimony.

THE CONCUBINE IN MODERNIZED FAMILIES

There are concubines even in modernized Chinese families. Our young assistant Miss J., commenting on case histories of the Social Service Department of the PUMC Hospital, noted in the margin of a record concerning a man with three wives: "He was educated abroad and yet takes one concubine after another!" Miss J. need not have been so surprised. Many college graduates have concubines, and the proportion is only slightly lower than among people lacking modern education. Thus, for instance, among students of wealthy families from whom information was secured

10.4% of the college men had concubines as compared with 16% of those educated in the old way. The difference in a somewhat less prosperous group was even smaller.*

What accounts for this persistence of concubinage among people who might have been expected to accept the concept of monogamy along with other modern ideas as a result of their studies in modern institutions of learning?

To begin with, the pressure of the old environment is very strong. The dominating mother who wanted to have a grandson and urged her son, a college graduate, to take a concubine is not untypical; and few sons would have had enough stamina to resist such pressure.† There are even cases of young barren wives urging their modern husbands to take concubines to continue the family line.³⁸ This family pressure sometimes results in tragi-comic situations. An informant of H. D. Lamson's told of a young man, an only son and the only nephew of four childless uncles. On him fell the burden of continuing the family line for his father and all his uncles. Each of the old men got him a wife with the understanding that her offspring would be considered his own grandchild. Thus the young man had to deal with five wives vying with each other for his favor, and in addition to cope with five old men clamoring for offspring. The poor fellow finally ran away and all attempts to find him proved futile.³⁹ Nora Waln tells of a young man who, upon returning from America where he had graduated from a university, found that he had to marry a girl selected by his family and that she had a twin who refused to be separated from her sister and insisted on being taken as a secondary wife.⁴⁰

Very often there is no family pressure—the "modern" man finds

* The comparison shows the following picture:

TABLE VIII
FAMILIES HAVING CONCUBINES
EDUCATION OF HUSBAND

	<i>College</i> 430	<i>High School</i> 157	<i>Traditional School</i> 453
The Richest Group, per cent	10.4	18.8	16
The Less Prosperous Group, per cent	9	12.1	11.7

The figures confirm our impression that the number of concubines is correlated with the economic status of the family. The possession of a high-school education does not seem to affect the attitude toward concubinage—one of many examples of the slight effectiveness of high-school education in China.

† See p. 236.

it convenient to return to the habits of his fathers and grandfathers and less of a problem to take a second wife than to go through the procedure of divorce.

A concubine in modern families causes more discord than in old-fashioned families. Concubines are often resented even by old-fashioned wives—how much more so by women with modern education! This is especially true when a wife selected by the husband himself, a wife expecting love, companionship, and happiness, is confronted with concubines.

At the time of the Renaissance Movement in the early 'twenties there was a modern young couple in Canton, both students—the husband of medicine, the wife of education. By 1937 they had three children. The husband, who was two years younger than his wife, one day brought home a concubine. His wife stayed with him. Was it for the sake of the children or because she was indifferent to the presence of the concubine? ⁴¹

We have dealt with the tragic plight of wives disgraced by divorce. But in this period of transition when modern ideas are spreading but the old ideas are still alive, what could the second wife do but insist on divorce—that is to say, on a clear-cut solution? If she does not the consequences might be tragic for her. A young high-school graduate in Peiping fell in love with a modern young veterinary who reciprocated her affection. Far away in the veterinary's country home lived the woman to whom he had been married in his teens, whom he did not love, and who was his wife in name only. "Why should I divorce her? Where could she go? We'll let her stay with my parents—she is not my wife and will never be." The young girl consented. A year passed in happiness. One day a riksha stopped before the house. A woman stepped down and entered the house with perfect self-assurance. She was the first wife and she had come to stay. Another woman was there? Well, a concubine, she had heard of that. After all, many men had concubines, her husband was a learned man, he earned enough money, he could afford one! It would not impair her position.

Despite his progressive ideas the veterinary did not divorce his first wife. He even discovered that she was not so unattractive, particularly since his young wife was in the eighth month of pregnancy. . . . The ending of this story appears in a hospital record: "The young woman attempted suicide. The child was stillborn."

Such an outcome is not uncommon—the newspapers in the big cities tell of similar tragedies in which the women are either first or second wives of individuals who were once modern. But many

modern energetic women will neither kill themselves nor permit their husbands to have concubines. They divorce their husbands or simply leave them. Thus a student of the Peiping Teachers' College, whose husband, a professor at the same school, had married her without telling her of his first wife, took the case to court and finally won compensation.⁴²

Chinese educated youth have a rather peculiar attitude toward the problem of polygyny. To be sure, the overwhelming majority are against concubinage. But how many really want monogamy for themselves? We tested them by asking married college students (in the questionnaire on family problems): "What would you do if you fell in love with another woman?" Only 47 out of 111 young husbands who answered this question (33 did not answer *) replied in a way which indicated that they took monogamy seriously; 20 said that they would stay with their wives and suppress their love for other women; 20 said they would divorce their wives and marry the woman they loved; 7 said they did not want to meet other women. Sixty showed themselves to be potential polygynists. The effect of modernization is seen in the fact that only 14 admitted they would take concubines (i.e., a proportion only slightly smaller than that of college men with concubines in their fathers' generation). The remaining 46 said that the best thing to do would be to take the new woman as a mistress †—an arrangement not totally unknown in old China or in the West which they had been taught to admire and imitate.

But this picture does not tell the whole story. To begin with some change may be seen in the families of men with modern education. Thus, in the families of the students we investigated the proportion of concubines was lower among college men than in nonmodern strata. Other factors besides modern education have helped monogamy to prevail. Christianity has proved to be very effective. Among the Christian fathers of the 226 college students we questioned, only 2 had concubines. (It might be argued that even 1% is too high for a Christian group, but those who know China will find 99% accord between theory and practice rather encour-

* An unusually high proportion (23% as compared with the usual 5% to 10% of refusals to reply). It is possible that those who abstained from answering had in mind a solution which was against modern trends.

† A concubine in old China had the legal status of a secondary wife; the man lived with her openly, she was a member of his household which she joined after some ceremonies had been observed. In modern times she has lost her legal position but actually she is still recognized as the secondary wife. The mistress, like her Western counterpart, represents a more casual kind of relationship.

aging.) Monogamy is also strictly observed among the radicals. It is the officially accepted form of marriage in the Soviet districts and is adhered to rather strictly. Not a single observer reported bigamy among the Communist leaders or rank and file in the Soviet regions. Nor are any of the well-known progressive leaders in Shanghai or Peiping polygynists.

Another important weapon in the fight of modern China against concubinage is undoubtedly education for women. Despite instances of backsliding into the old mores, concubines have become relatively rare in the families in which the wives have received modern education. Marriage to an educated woman who can understand him brings the husband more satisfaction and his desires for other women are lessened. The following statistics secured from our group of college students may be significant. There were only 21 families with concubines in the 288 families in which the wives had had some modern education (college and high school), or 7.3%; whereas among the 531 families where the wives had had the traditional education 97, or 18.3%, reported the presence of concubines.

There is no doubt that there are fewer concubines among people who have had modern marriages. The student mentioned above as having had a very happy marriage said: "I believe it is impossible for me ever to have another woman because I can love only my wife. I cannot imagine anyone else whom I could love as deeply as I love her."

XVIII

Old Men and Women

THE REVOLT OF YOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

MODERN trends have not only shaken the position of the male in the family but have also gravely affected another important principle of Chinese family life: the supremacy of the elder generation, of old age over youth.

The old men, formerly the uncontested rulers of the family, have been less affected by the emancipation of women than the younger men, who have had to deal with modernized wives. The old man's wife was an old-fashioned woman and her behavior and attitudes remained unchanged. But he has had to face the revolt of his children clamoring for independence. Open conflict between father and son, familiar in the dynamic West but almost unknown in old China, has manifested itself with great vehemence in this period of transition.

Young people began to fight for their rights as early as the beginning of this century and their struggle entered a dramatic phase during the Renaissance period of 1916-20. It was brought to a new pitch by the Nationalist Revolution of 1925-27. As a result of this social movement the revolt of youth spread to some progressive workers and peasants.

One of the favorite books of modern Chinese youth, the novel *Chia* by Pa Chin to which we have referred several times, describes the beginning of this conflict.

The action is laid during the Renaissance period in the large family of a rich businessman in West China. The head of the Kaos rules over his sons, their wives, children, and grandchildren. The old grandfather is a perfect type of the old Chinese family despot. His grown sons submit completely to his authority, at least overtly. The old man does not hesitate to administer corporal punishment to his son, who is well over 30, when he discovers that he has a mistress.

The punishment is described with great force and realism. The whole family—children, concubines, slaves, and servants—are as-

sembled outside the room. They hear the grandfather fuming: "A grown man, a father and still a ne'er-do-well! You aren't setting your child a good example. Put him to shame, Cheng. Look at him, he does not deserve to be your father. . . . You shameless man!" After some more words of abuse, the listeners hear the grandfather ask: "Why don't you slap your own face, as I order you?" A grandson peeps through the keyhole: "The fifth uncle was kneeling and unceasingly beating his cheeks with his own hands. His usually sallow face had turned red. Yet he did not look ashamed, although his wife and daughter were present."¹

None of the family members who witnessed this scene seemed disgusted by it except one grandson, an 18-year-old student, one of the heroes of the novel. Kao Hsüeh-min, this grandson, and his brother represent a new generation of the Chinese educated youth. Unlike their forefathers, unlike the hero of *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, the brothers Kao violently resent their grandfather's tyranny, and this attitude is part of their general rejection of the old Chinese political and family system.

One of the brothers is engaged in political activities—he is an editor of a local students' magazine similar to the *New Youth*. The grandfather forbids him to participate in the political movement and punishes him with house arrest. But the grandson continues his political activity in spite of his grandfather's opposition. Another brother takes up the fight on a personal issue. He is in love with his maternal cousin who, with her friends, represents the new Chinese woman striving for emancipation. The young man refuses to marry the girl his grandfather has chosen for him and runs away from home. His beloved valiantly opposes her mother who wants to marry her off in the conventional way.

The author describes the psychological difficulties accompanying this revolt of youth. Unlike the author of *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, who does not find a single word of criticism for the cruel father of his hero, Pa Chin pictures grandfather Kao as an ugly, tyrannical old man. The grandson's attitude is mixed: he sees the old man's shortcomings but at the same time does not lose his respect for him, a respect mixed with love and fear. "From his childhood he has been taught to respect his father and grandfather. These feelings are deeply rooted in him."² The young girl, too, is ardently devoted to her mother and it hurts her to contradict the old woman and not to do her bidding.

Between the submissive generation belonging to the old Chinese world and the revolting younger grandsons stands the tragic figure

of the eldest brother of the rebels, Kao Hsüeh-hsing, who is another Pao-yü in a twentieth-century setting. As a young man Hsüeh-hsing, too, was in love with his maternal cousin and wanted to marry her; he also read modern books and accepted many modern ideas. But he was too weak to achieve anything and submitted to his grandfather's tyranny. His plans were frustrated and a conventional marriage was imposed on him, while his beloved was married to another man. She was utterly unhappy and died young. Later Hsüeh-hsing looks on passively when the superstition of ignorant women drives his own wife to her death. Instead of helping his younger brother to avoid a fate similar to his own, he preaches submission. "Do not resist evil"—Tolstoy's teaching, akin to the Taoist wisdom—was the only foreign idea he made his own.

In Pa Chin's novel the young heroes are victorious—one of them obtains his grandfather's consent to the breaking off of an engagement that had been imposed on him and marries the girl of his own choice; another leaves the family to devote himself to political struggle. But in real life such victories are not the rule. During the twenty years between the Renaissance period and the second Sino-Japanese War many "Kao grandsons" were defeated, and at the time of our investigation all the problems raised by their struggle were still very much alive.

In 1935-37 the young men who had begun the emancipation movement and had later fought in the ranks of the Nationalist Army were fathers themselves, active as businessmen, politicians, or intellectuals. A few of them remained faithful to their old ideas and continued to fight for the new China in the ranks of the Red Army or in illegal organizations. Hundreds and thousands of them were killed during the years of reaction (1927-34) that deprived China of a whole generation of progressive leaders. Some continued their fight as a moderate liberal opposition. The majority, however, renounced the glamorous ideas of their youth, slipped into a comfortable Chinese gown instead of the cumbersome foreign dress (as Lin Yu-tang once put it), and joined their fathers in the ranks of the reactionary "old generation."

THE OLD MAN AND HIS MARRIED SON

We tried to get some picture of the present-day position of the old fathers with regard to their grown-up married sons of the generation that revolted. With that in view we investigated 126 families with gainfully occupied married sons, most of them with chil-

dren, all of whom lived with their old fathers. The sons ranged in age from 26 to 55, the majority being between 30 and 40. In 59 (47%) of these families the father's authority was absolute; in 42 (33%) he consulted his son; in 16 (12%) the son took over the reins of government and consulted his father; and in only 9 was the father dethroned and not interfering with the family affairs at all.

What caused the decline in the old man's position in more than half the cases? Age and physical weakness certainly played some part. The majority of the dethroned fathers and fathers ruling nominally were over 70 or had a physical handicap. Yet among our informants there was an 87-year-old Hopeh peasant who dominated the family completely and his 50-year-old son admitted that the father never consulted him. A 69-year-old Peiping shopowner did not let his 49-year-old son have anything to say in the management of the family business.

The father's authority in the family often seems to be greatly dependent on the weight of his work and advice in the family enterprise—on his contribution to the family income.

In the cities the fathers who are not family heads any longer (whether consulted by their sons or not) have almost all ceased to be gainfully occupied and have no property. In a few cases when they continue to work or have property their income is smaller than their sons'. This was the case, for example, with an old peasant from Manchuria who owned only 20 mu of land, whereas the tailor shop started and developed by his son independently had made the family rich. The son, a man of 40 but completely tradition bound, said that he appreciated his father's advice very much but admitted that the old man never contradicted him.

In the villages, even in those with modern institutions, there are many old fathers managing their farms and ruling their families, married sons included, with an iron hand. In the nonindustrial cities of North China many cases were reported of married sons who were the main or the only breadwinners and who handed over their earnings to their fathers.

But if in the unmodernized strata the tradition has been strong enough to maintain the paternal authority even when the father's economic role has lost its former weight, it is different in the modernized strata. Among the industrial workers of Shanghai we did not encounter a single case of an old man who was considered a family head even though he no longer worked. Neither was it true in the upper-class families, though the appearances of respect were more carefully maintained there.

Even if the father keeps the control of family affairs completely in his hands he can no longer command his grown-up sons as easily as he did before. The chastisement of a married son, still considered by Pa Chin typical in 1919, was evidently exceptional in the upper and middle classes in Peiping and among industrial workers at the time of our investigation.

Yet among the peasants and Peiping workers there were some cases of married sons who had to endure beatings. Thus, in a peasant's family in Hopeh both the two married sons and their wives were beaten by the parents; the discussions of a Peiping shoemaker with his 30-year-old son often ended with slaps on the son's cheeks.*

As to the care given the old parents, there were indications that among the industrial workers it is less tender than of old. Sometimes the fathers are simply neglected. More than that, some fathers serve their sons—or their daughters-in-law! And they do it without protest. "They go to work, I have to prepare their meals," explained an old man in Shanghai to our interviewer. The father of another Shanghai worker who lived apart from his son's family did not complain about being deprived of his son's care in his old age. On the other hand not only among the peasants and the tradition-bound groups in the cities but among the modernized strata as well there are parents who enjoy all the respect prescribed by the sages of antiquity. The author knew a foreign daughter-in-law in a rich family of government officials who, when staying with her parents-in-law, had to bring them tea every morning, "greeting them in a gentle voice"—just as was prescribed by the *Li Chi*.

There are also other fathers who, after a long life spent in ruling, tyrannizing, and serving their families, have become tired of it all. The old man will leave his house for his son to rule from then on. He will enter a monastery or go wandering about as a mendicant monk or simply as a beggar who possesses nothing but can see "doors and stars," as one of our informants put it.

THE OLD WOMAN AND HER SON

We have stated that in old China the mother, although loved and respected, seldom had real power over her married son. At the time of our investigation this situation was unchanged.

Filial sons—and most of the sons of China are filial—exercise

* Three cases of beating of married sons were reported among 31 peasant families investigated in Hopeh; 1 among the 14 peasant families in Fukien; 3 among the 27 wage earners and lower-middle-class families in Peiping; and 1 among the 17 middle-class families in Peiping. (None among the upper-class families in Peiping and Shanghai.)

their power in a tactful way. They consult their old mothers, but from comments of many of our informants we know that the opinions of old mothers are not valued as highly as those of old fathers. As a matter of fact this is in conformity with the teachings of Confucius, for the Sage says that what a son owes his mother is primarily love, not respect.

The modern Chinese of all classes are, as of old, fond of their old mothers, but the old women have less authority over their sons than is the case among tradition-bound groups. They cannot understand the affairs of their modern sons and even the pretense of consultation does not need to be kept up in modernized families. Moreover, in such families the mother-in-law has a serious rival in her modernized daughter-in-law who is no longer the obedient slave she was in olden times.

MOTHER-IN-LAW—DAUGHTER-IN-LAW

AN OLD-FASHIONED DAUGHTER-IN-LAW

A country woman of contemporary China told this story: ³

"Oh, how I suffered during my childhood in my mother-in-law's house. Aya! I can't tell it to you in one word! The other girls in the family were all of the same age, they had good dresses, but I was in rags. The others had warm clothes, but what about me? My bones became numb under the cold northern wind. When it was cold other people could stay at home. But what about me? I had to shoulder a basket and go to the mountains to collect firewood. I would come back in the evening and see everybody sitting on the k'ang eating warm food. But what about me? I would be hardly able to catch my breath when the mother-in-law would start scolding. If she did not complain that I had come home too late, she certainly would say that I had not brought enough firewood. If I had not gathered enough, I would not be allowed to eat but would be again sent out hungry and cold with my basket in my hands. If I came late there was no food left for me to eat. Aya! When I recall this time I feel that dogs and cats were treated better."

In the villages and the nonindustrial cities the most important partner of the young bride in her married life is still her mother-in-law. Not a few of them, like the young woman whose complaint we have just heard, are sent to their future husband's house in early childhood.*

* See p. 127.

The mothers-in-law in the traditional strata of contemporary China are as demanding, despotic, and hard to please as in the old times. As of old, the daughter-in-law is the family drudge, she has to get up earlier than anybody in the family, to serve not only her mother-in-law but her sisters-in-law and the men.* In the well-to-do families she is responsible for the supervision of the servants' work.

In Chinese newspapers and hospital records we find innumerable stories of unhappy young women tortured, persecuted, and driven to suicide. Many of them sound like the story of Chao Chun-cheng's wife in modern setting. Poverty and privations increase the friction between these girls and their mothers-in-law: a young sociologist who investigated 50 such conflicts in 1933 concluded that the majority had an economic basis.⁴ But conflicts in well-to-do families are by no means rare: they are often caused by jealousy, rivalry, and cultural dissensions.

The records of the PUMC Hospital for 1936 mention a case of a young landlord's wife whose life might have been saved by an operation. She died because her mother-in-law decided that it was not worth while to waste money on her. A peasant's wife complained bitterly of her husband's mother who did not let her take care of her own mother, who opened the linen chests she brought from home and said hatefully: "Not only your clothes and jewels but you yourself are the property of the family."

The mother-in-law's jealousy is also a reason for bitter complaints. The 20-year-old wife of a medical attendant said that her mother-in-law made violent scenes whenever her son was affectionate to his wife; the young woman even maintained that the mother had sexual relations with her son. Another mother took her son's future bride to her house because she needed domestic help; when the son was 18 the young people were married. But the mother would not allow them to become husband and wife: "It would be detrimental to the boy's health," she declared. The young spouses continued to live as brother and sister and constantly quarreled like two children.

Of course the daughter-in-law is not always a passive victim. She often tries to wrest control of the household from her husband's mother. This in peasants' families and in other families of the traditional strata is as difficult to achieve as in former times. The

*In 86 of 101 families of traditional strata from whom information was secured (Peiping workers and lower middle class, middle class, and upper class) the daughter-in-law got up earliest, as against 10 families where the mother-in-law did and five where the daughter did. (The daughter-in-law had to get up early and do the household chores even when she was gainfully occupied.)

mother-in-law retires and allows the younger woman to take over only very late in life.

A MODERN DAUGHTER-IN-LAW

A Factory Worker

One sees many retired mothers-in-law in the families of factory workers. Immediately after the son's marriage the mother—who is usually less than 60—hands over the house keys to her son's wife. If she does not go that far, she treats the newcomer with courtesy.

A model obedient daughter-in-law is evidently a passing figure among the factory workers. They show outward respect to the old women; some of them help with the household and if the order of seats is preserved, the mother-in-law keeps the upper seat at the table. But the tyrannical regime is no longer tolerated.

When speaking with factory workers you hear of more "kind," "friendly," "good-natured," and also "incapable" mothers-in-law than you ever supposed existed in China. Many mothers-in-law manage the household only because the daughters-in-law are too busy to do it, but turn to their juniors for advice and directions. At the time of our investigation it was not unusual in Shanghai and Wusih workers' families to encounter mothers-in-law cooking and washing for their sons' wives.

Yes, the daughters-in-law are now independent wage earners and one has to be kind to them. Only a few of them give all their wages to their parents-in-law: Among our informants only 3 of 19 daughters-in-law in Wusih, 3 of 8 in Tientsin, and 1 of 3 in Shanghai did. Others gave as much as they considered right. In Shanghai some of them just paid board and kept the rest for themselves. It was the almost unanimous opinion of our Shanghai informants that the position of the daughter-in-law had infinitely improved. Some even said that the roles were reversed now and that as a rule the mother-in-law served the younger woman.

The young woman's advice is sought by her husband, her mother-in-law, and even by her father-in-law. She participates in the family council. One young woman in Wusih succeeded in persuading her father-in-law to give up gambling and improved his relations with his son. Among the factory workers in Tientsin there were two young widows who stayed with their children and fathers-in-law, managed their households independently, and were consulted by the old men on all important problems.

And if this respect is denied her the factory worker does not need to suffer, she can free herself.

One mother-in-law tried to behave in the old style. She treated her daughter-in-law badly and, like the old North China peasant mentioned above, disposed of the young woman's trousseau. But the end of the two stories was not alike. The peasant housewife in North China was thrown out of her mother-in-law's house and her husband was unable to protect her. The factory worker in Kiangsu left her mother-in-law and went back into the factory; her husband arranged for the division of the family and followed his wife. The mother-in-law was left alone and had to come to town to beg her daughter-in-law for money. "Sometimes her request is granted," said the young woman.

An Educated Daughter-in-law

The tendency of modern educated people to break the joint and stem families has liberated the modern woman from too close a contact with her in-laws. Yet the upper-class woman has achieved this liberty less often than the factory worker. Parents-in-law live longer in the upper classes and they are less often left alone than in the working class.* This life in common is not easy, in certain respects even less easy than in the nonmodernized strata. When a modern daughter-in-law has to live in one household with her old-fashioned mother-in-law their traditional antagonism is intensified by a cultural conflict. The young woman wants her child to sleep in a room with an open window and the older woman secretly steals into the room and closes the windows lest the cold air harm the precious heir of the family; the mother wants her child to follow a careful diet while the grandmother gives him candies bought from a street vendor; the old woman may tell the child of ghosts and fox fairies, thus flouting the mother's modern pedagogical ideas. And what to do with the grandmother who favors the boys and neglects the girls, thus creating a situation a modern mother wants to prevent? The conflict may become tragic when an old mother opposes the treatment of a sick child by modern methods and insists on helping him by praying to Buddha or asking an old Chinese doctor's advice. The old woman is indignant when she sees her son's wife smoking, enjoying the society of men, not serving her husband but letting him do little services for her.

More often than not the modern daughter-in-law is victorious

* See pp. 140, 143.

in this struggle. Very often, as in the case of the factory worker, she is in a better economic position than the old-fashioned housewife. This is, of course, always the case with career women; moreover, nowadays more and more women begin to make use of their new property and inheritance rights. But the modern wife has other assets besides economic ones. If hers is a modern marriage the probability is that her husband loves her and wants to protect her; he does not believe in the old idea of the young wife's subjection to the mother-in-law. Moreover, she is more competent to manage the house in a modern fashion.

Sometimes the young woman preserves decorum but often she does not and the life of an old woman in a modern family is bitter indeed. Such was the life of a woman whose history was described by Miss Yao Tze-ai of Yenching University in her investigation of mother-in-law vs. daughter-in-law conflicts in modern China.⁵ She had lost her husband when she was still a relatively young woman. Her only son was the center of her life. By hard work, thrift, and privations, she managed to send him through college. Before and after her son's first marriage to an old-fashioned woman, the old mother was the uncontested ruler of the household. But the first wife died and the son married again, this time a college graduate. The new daughter-in-law took the household into her hands and controlled all the expenditures. She even bought the old woman's clothes for her. Conflicts arose and became worse from day to day. Finally actual separation took place: the family continued to live in one compound, but the old mother and her son's daughter by his first marriage lived by themselves and the unfilial son was left undisturbed with his modern wife.

Of course, there are still many old women of strong character who control their sons and modern daughters-in-law. But a modern young woman is not as helpless in dealing with her husband's mother as she used to be. The records of the PUMC Hospital contain a tragi-comic story of such a successful fight with an old lady. Her son was happily married but had no children. The old mother, who wanted a grandson, insisted that he take a concubine. "But we don't want any concubine!" husband and wife insisted.* What could be done? An adopted child would not satisfy the old lady who wanted to see the perpetuation of her own flesh and blood. Finally an ingenious plan was hit upon. The young woman stayed in Peiping with her relatives, simulated pregnancy, came to the

* In a conversation with the head of the Social Service Department of the PUMC Hospital.

hospital, and finally "bore" a child provided by the foundling society—of course, a son—why not let the gods go the whole way in their mercy? The parents were happy to settle the problem without a concubine and the old mother who came to the hospital was very pleased. "Is he not a charming boy?" she said beaming. "He is exactly like his father, especially his neck!"

The study of 50 cases of mother-in-law vs. daughter-in-law conflicts mentioned above shows that the old woman is dominant in the overwhelming majority of coolies' and workers' families, whereas the situation is reversed in the families of modern intellectuals.⁶

The fate of these old women with modern daughters-in-law is tragic indeed—poor victims of the transitional period! They suffered under their own mothers-in-law and now, when the time has come for them to take revenge and enjoy what they have long desired, the times cheat them of their rights.

XIX

Children

BABIES

WHEREVER Chinese babies are said to come from—whether they are found on the city wall, or hidden inside a yellow pumpkin, or in the flowing skirts of the Goddess of Mercy—they all are welcome in every family that can feed them. Modernization has not diminished the desire of the Chinese for children or their pride in them.

This pride is shown by fathers and mothers alike. On her second day in China the author saw a coolie in the Market of the Heavenly Bridge in Peiping. He carried in his arms a lively handful of a baby in a scarlet gown and a yellow and black tiger cap; his older boy, a child of about three, clung to his father's right hand. The boy's eyes sparkled like black cherries under the red-ribboned tuft of hair left on his clean shaven head; his little buttock protruded from a split in his pants; and in his right hand he held a newly acquired treasure—a straw cage with a huge cricket inside. The father's face shone with pride in his offspring. No less proud was the bespectacled face of a university professor whom I saw walking on the campus of a missionary university with his graceful little boy and girl dressed in modern style white clothes. Many such fathers crossed my path in towns and villages in the North and in the South.

In feudal China and under the empire the eldest son was supposed to enjoy a privileged position in the family as the future family head and officiator in ancestor worship. His younger brothers and sisters owed him respect and obedience. Respect for the elder brother has been preserved, but he certainly enjoys no preference as far as his parents' affection is concerned. The smallest child—boy or girl—is the pet of the family. Thus, for example, in the families of students we investigated about 70% of fathers and mothers who had favorites among the children preferred the younger ones. Modern critics of the Chinese family consider this partiality one of its shortcomings.¹

EDUCATION IN THE FAMILY

Children under 2 years of age are the only family members not subjected to any discipline. At the age of 2 and sometimes before, the children hear the first "don'ts," as their education begins. As of old the main aim of education is to raise obedient children, devoted to their family, working hard at school or in the house, and living peacefully with their sisters and brothers and with the neighboring children. The old Chinese virtues of filial piety, forbearance, and good manners are still highly appreciated.

As elsewhere, children in China are taught not to steal, not to lie, to be courteous, not to be noisy. Street fighting and brawls in general are considered still more abhorrent by Chinese parents than by their Western counterparts.

New educational ideas imported from the West—the importance of developing the child's ability to think independently, his self-respect, energy, will, imagination, esthetic appreciation, etc.—have been eagerly propagated in modern Chinese pedagogical literature.*² They are applied however only by a few progressive college-educated mothers.

We found that some children had heard in their homes of their duty toward their country, of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his work and of the other great Chinese patriots like General Yüe-fei who fought the Mongols in the twelfth century. But the great majority even of middle- and upper-class children had never heard of these things from their parents. "In their homes children are not educated as citizens. They are taught to think of the family only," complained a student informant.

To educate their children in the spirit of obedience and virtue Chinese parents of all classes now as in former times find it useful to submit them to strict discipline. "Children should not be spoiled. Parents should not show their affection too much," said a woman textile worker in Wusih, using almost the same words the wise men of China used centuries ago.

PUNISHMENT

Punishment is applied widely. Beating is known in all its forms, from a gentle slap on the hands and spanking that the mother be-

* Many college students expressed the same ideas when speaking about necessary changes in Chinese family life.

gins to administer to her 1½- or 2-year-old to severe flagellation with a bamboo rod from which a boy does not recover for a month.

Usually spanking begins when the children are 5 to 6 years old. About two fifths of the male students who admitted having been subjected to corporal punishment and one fourth of the Peiping workers and peasants of North China declared that this form of punishment was discontinued before the age of 10. The majority of the upper- and middle-class boys, however, had to endure it until they were 15 or 16. In the families of peasants and workers beating ceases only after the boys leave their homes to work or enter school. Marriage usually means a definite end to the practice, although we know that in some cases married men have had to endure their fathers' and mothers' blows.

Upper-class girls are beaten less often than boys and their beating is discontinued earlier.* Girls in the families of industrial workers are treated more or less like the boys in this respect; in families of peasants parents think that the girl deserves less leniency than the boy, who is more valuable to the family.

If the family has only one child, he is considered too precious to be beaten. Orphans, too, are spared—the stepmother is usually not allowed to touch her stepchildren and the father pities his motherless children too much to punish them. Widowed mothers have the same feeling about their children.

It must be said, however, that in general a fair number of children grow up without being beaten and the number is increasing. The following table gives an approximate idea of the use of corporal punishment in the different classes as revealed by the people interviewed for this study.

Table IX seems to indicate that corporal punishment is practiced more in the villages than in the cities (the Kiangsu group is exceptional in so far as each of the families has a woman industrial worker among its members) and that there is a tendency toward its abolition in the modernized strata. This tendency is less noticeable in the slowly changing strata—among the middle class and some upper-class groups in the nonindustrial cities. The presence of women industrial workers in the family tends to decrease the use of corporal punishment. The mothers who work usually have more influence in the family than housewives† and

* See Table No. X for the upper and middle class. Of 218 girl students who had been beaten 158 said that beating ceased when they reached the age of 10 or earlier; only 10 of them were beaten after they were 16.

† See pp. 205 ff.

TABLE IX

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT ADMINISTERED TO CHINESE
BETWEEN THE AGES OF 1½ AND 25

	Children were			Total Number of Families
	Beaten	Seldom Beaten	Never Beaten	
<i>I. Traditional Groups</i>				
Peasants in North China	47	1	11	59
“ Fukien	35	5	—	40
“ Kiangsu	5	3	18	26
Lower classes * in				
Peiping	42	—	17	59
Tientsin	7	7	8	22
Wusih	4	—	11	15
Shanghai	4	—	1	5
<i>II. Changing Groups</i>				
Middle class in Peiping	16	2	4	22
Upper class in Peiping †	13	4	3	20
Clerks in Shanghai	6	1	3	10
Upper class in Shanghai and Peiping ‡	9	2	6	17
Industrial workers in				
Shanghai	38	4	22	64
Tientsin	1	3	3	7
Wusih	—	—	4	4
	227	32	111	370

* Wage earners and lower-middle-class people engaged in traditional occupations.

† Slowly changing groups: businessmen, owners of old-fashioned establishments, and landlords.

‡ Engineers and factory doctors in Shanghai; officials, professionals, and higher employees in Peiping.

they use it to educate their children in a kindlier way. Therefore the Wusih and Tientsin families in our sample, as well as the Kiangsu peasants' families, show a lower proportion beating their children than do other groups of the same social status, which have no women industrial workers among their members.*

The data tabulated above refer to persons born after the Revolution of 1911. Information secured from people over 25 (born before the revolution) on the methods of discipline used in their childhood revealed a higher percentage of children who were beaten and thus confirms the impression that modern developments have brought about a mitigation of such disciplinary methods, in accordance with the ideas advocated by modern Chinese

* H. T. Fei, who made a survey of a village in Kiangsu in the region many of our informants came from—but where there were not many women industrial workers—says that beating was widely applied there.³

educators.⁴ Modern humanitarian trends have also asserted themselves in the schools. Modern teachers use the terrifying bamboo rod less often than old-fashioned teachers.

Modern Education of Parents and Corporal Punishment

Information secured from a group of 1,700 high-school and college students (1,074 boys and 626 girls) revealed that college-educated parents make less frequent use of corporal punishment than do others.

TABLE X
EDUCATION OF FATHER AND METHODS OF DISCIPLINE
(percentages)

	Male Students			Female Students			
	<i>Father's Education</i>		<i>Total *</i>	<i>Father's Education</i>			<i>Total *</i>
	<i>College</i>	<i>Old-fashioned School</i>		<i>College</i>	<i>Old-fashioned School</i>	<i>Degree †</i>	
<i>Beaten</i>	44	52	50	35	43	32	35
<i>Never beaten</i>	35	33	33	42	43	50	45
<i>Never punished</i>	10	5	6	15	8	6	9
<i>No answer</i>	11	10	11	8	6	12	11

* Including fathers educated in high schools, military schools, elementary schools, etc., as well as those whose education could not be ascertained.

† Degree under the old examination system.

Fathers who received high-school education behave like those with old-fashioned education. The sons of those fathers who had achieved degrees under the old examination system are beaten no less often than the sons of the fathers who had no degrees. It is different with the girls, especially with college students. In the families of old scholars with degrees girls are beaten even less often than in families of college men. This can possibly be explained by the fact that those girls, often the youngest daughters, are their fathers' favorites. Otherwise it would have been difficult for them to overcome the old-fashioned fathers' opposition to higher education for women.*

* It must be stressed that according to our information this mitigation of disciplinary methods is a result of modern education and not of the influence of the Christian Church (Protestant denominations—the Catholics were not approached during this study). In the families of Christian college and high school students beating was more common than in the non-Christian families. See Appendix, Table VI. In general in the 300-odd Christian families approached, by interviews or questionnaire during this study, the author could not discover much difference between them and the other modernized families.

Our sample however is too small to allow definite conclusions about the influence

Humane methods of education were penetrating also into the modernized working-class groups, much less exposed to foreign ideological influences than the upper class. As Table IX shows, the workers of Shanghai and the families of women workers of Wusih and Tientsin resorted to beating less often than the peasants and the workers in the nonindustrialized cities. The women workers interviewed in Shanghai, Tientsin, and Wusih were almost all against beating. Nor did the overwhelming majority of the male Shanghai workers believe in thrashing and they advocated gentle treatment of children.

The following statements are characteristic of the opinions of many Shanghai workers:

"I do not approve of beating. So many children hate their parents and run away from home because of that."

"If parents know how to persuade their children, they need not resort to beating."

"Beating cannot teach children to understand what is right and what is wrong."

The women workers of Wusih and Tientsin were of the same opinion:

"Beating only frightens children instead of improving them. Persuasion is sufficient to keep children from mischief."

"Beating is cruel." *

Other Methods

Even in many of the families that accept corporal punishment the children are not beaten very often. Only 10% of men and 5%

of Christianity on Chinese family life. This problem has to be studied more carefully than has been possible for the author. It would be advisable, for example, to make a study of the Chinese Catholic families.

* It seems that the proportion of families in the modernized strata that beat their children in China compares not unfavorably with the West. Thus an investigation carried out by the Institute of Social Research in Switzerland in 1934 showed that in 263 middle-class families from whom information was secured 37% of the children admitted that they were beaten and 27% gave no answer; among the children of 242 working-class families 45% admitted that they were beaten and 25% gave no answer.⁵ Further analysis of the questionnaire suggested that most of those who did not answer were beaten. As to the Chinese industrial workers' families, in 60% of them the children were beaten (10% of them seldom) and their parents were perfectly candid when speaking to the interviewer about the methods of punishment applied. As to the upper- and middle-class modern families (with college-educated fathers) the children were beaten, according to their own testimony, in 38% of the families. Only 11% of the students did not answer this question—and there were no indications that a substantial part of those who refrained from answering were prompted by a feeling of shame, as was evidently the case in Switzerland.

of girl students reported that beating was the only method of punishment used in their families. Another method mentioned frequently was scolding.* Less frequent were confinement to a room, standing or kneeling in the corner, withholding of meals or pocket money. Sometimes the children who committed offenses had to take the brush and copy complicated Chinese characters. "The most severe punishment for me is when my parents do not speak to me," a boy student from Hankow told us. This method, however, was mentioned but seldom.

Scolding is widely used by peasants and workers also, but not the other more "refined" methods of punishment: "We cannot afford such niceties," said a Peiping worker, "that is for the rich."

Sometimes other disciplinary methods are more efficient than punishment, and make it unnecessary.† One of these is appeal to tradition. "They spoke about their obedience to their own parents when persuading me to be obedient"—this formula was most frequently checked by the students who answered the questionnaire. Next in importance are lessons in Chinese ethical philosophy, and books on filial piety. "The twenty-four examples of filial piety" ‡ are still known to the modern generation. In a primer widely used in Chinese elementary schools in the 'thirties one can read the following story: "A little crow flies to and fro. He is looking for food. He finds it and returns home to feed his mother. He is not afraid of the wind, he is not afraid of the rain. He is only afraid that his mother is hungry and is sitting in the nest crying: Baby, baby!"

The story is illustrated by a picture: a fat old mother crow is sitting in the nest with her big beak wide open and a little bird is hastening to her with a huge worm in his mouth.⁶ The Chinese educators evidently deemed it more urgent to foster filial piety than to offer a realistic description of birds' habits. As of old, parents come first and there is no such thing as the "age of the child" in China!

Of course, Chinese children also learn about great historical personalities who always displayed filial piety. The neighbor's children and cousins are invoked to shame their less virtuous companions. The unworthy ones are pointed out as terrifying examples.

Some mothers tell their children that obedience is rewarded by

* Severe scolding, as different from gentle reprimand and persuasion, was considered by our informants as punishment.

† The following data were provided mainly by the students who filled out the questionnaire mentioned above.

‡ See p. 25.

the gods and disobedience punished. This argument is seldom used, however; Chinese parents are not very religious. Ghosts, fox fairies, dragons that carry away unfilial children, and other supernatural beings are invoked still less often—at least in the middle- and upper-class families to which we are mainly referring now. This absence of superstition among “heathens” unfamiliar with Western civilization is noteworthy.

“None of the methods listed [in the questionnaire] are right, but I cannot tell why,” wrote a student from Peiping.

“It seems that some invisible power makes me listen and obey,” said another student.

“My father can make everybody obey him unconditionally,” remarked a third.

“Our children are obedient by nature”—this explanation was often offered by people of all classes.

What is this “invisible power”? What are the foundations of this “natural obedience”?

Some of our informants identified it as the love, tenderness, and warmth which permeated their family life. “My parents are so kind, they never punish, never scold us. . . . We obey naturally,” said a young student of psychology. “Children whose parents are kind never disobey,” another stated categorically.

Yet many young people made it clear that much of the parents’ authority was based on fear.

“I was simply afraid of my father,” said a 19-year-old clerk of Shanghai.

“Just to hear the voice of my father was enough to make me comply with his wishes,” said a student from Changsha.

In these answers we hear clearly the tunes familiar to imperial China. They invoke the vision of the young hero of *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, who was so afraid of his father that he would “rather die than go near him,” or of a Chinese student in America, Li Jou-k’ou, who wrote some twenty years ago describing his childhood: “Though the occasions when I required punishment were comparatively rare, I remember a constant sense of dread lest I do something unbecoming a well-bred Chinese lad.”⁷

ATTITUDES TOWARD PARENTS

In spite of all the changes, even men who are considered modern remain as of old the *chia yen*—the stern, severe one of the house.*

* “The father has to be severe, otherwise he would feel that he is losing his authority,” said Mai H. T., characterizing the Chinese father.⁸

It was interesting to see some of my Chinese friends, westernized and progressive though they were, suddenly assume a dignified countenance when they addressed their growing children.

Like boys and girls all over the world, the Chinese children see their father less often than they see their mother (this was especially true for urban families), but they soon understand that all the important decisions depend on him. When the children are young, it is mainly the mother who punishes them, though even then it happens that "the mother punishes more often and the father more severely," according to a student from Peiping. When they are older the boys are punished by their fathers, the girls by their mothers. This rule is especially strictly adhered to in the country. "In our village," said a peasant in North China, "only the mothers beat their girls. The fathers do not even scold them." In the city in upper- and middle-class families this division is not so strict, but as a rule the child of school age is under the care of the parent of his own sex and punishment is carried out by the father for the boys and by the mother for the girls.*

But no matter who administers the punishment, the father always remains the chief judge of the family. All serious offenses are reported to him and the threat of telling a child's misdeeds to his father is the most efficient method of keeping him from mischief. As a result Chinese fathers, like Western fathers, arouse in their children more negative feelings than do their mothers.† "My children are more afraid of me than of my wife—I punish them," said a Peiping artisan, who found this situation perfectly natural. The author heard the same thing said by parents and children of differ-

* According to information secured from 985 college students, 19% of the boys and 8% of the girls were punished by their fathers exclusively, 18% of the boys and 37% of the girls by their mothers exclusively; of those who were punished by both parents 35% of the boys and 17% of the girls reported that the father punished them more often, and 18% of the boys and 28% of the girls saw the mother do it more frequently. Eight per cent of the boys and 6% of the girls did not say who was more responsible for their punishment; only 2% of the boys and 4% of the girls mentioned other family members and outsiders. (179 students did not answer this question.)

† Several investigations made in the United States of parent-children relationships show that a larger proportion of children of both sexes expressed preference for their mother. M. F. Nimkoff, quoting the results of these studies, concludes that parents who offer more in the way of companionship and exact less in the way of discipline will always be preferred. "In our own society," he says, "the relative disfavor in which fathers are held would then be accounted for by the fact that they are the ones who chiefly administer the more serious punishment, while offering less in the way of fellowship. In the competition for the favor of the children, the mother in our culture has a great advantage . . . the mother is relatively more a symbol of pleasure to the children, less a symbol of pain." 9

ent social classes. When a child said that he or she was more afraid of his mother than of his father, one could be sure that it was the mother who administered the severe punishment.

Sixty-four per cent of the boys and 56% of the girls who studied in high school were afraid of their fathers. This fear diminished as the children grew older, but still it was acknowledged by 43% of the male college students and 39% of the female college students we asked.* Fear was of course not the only feeling inspired by the father; it was often combined with love and respect. Among our respondents only 11% of the male college students, 8% of the female college students, 10% of the male and 5% of the female high-school students had purely negative attitudes toward their father (fear and desire to avoid him). Nevertheless, it seems that fear is a feeling much too often associated with the father to make Chinese family life harmonious.†

"The power of the father is too great; therefore, the children are only afraid of him and have no love for him," said a student informant.

The mother preserves her old position of the "kind one of the house" and does her best to mitigate the severe atmosphere of the Chinese home. She punishes her children less often and less severely than does her husband, and often does it unwillingly. "I would slap the child and feel sorry afterward," said a worker's wife in Peiping. "My poor children have not enough to eat and are suffering from cold. Why should I aggravate their hard lot by beating them?" explained a peddler's wife. The mother often tries to interfere when the father beats the children. In modern Chinese literature there are scenes similar to the famous one in *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, in which the mother, aided by the grandmother, saves her son from his severe father who wants to beat him to death.‡ "Women often spoil the children with their indulgence,"

* The average age of the boys in college was 22, in the high schools 17½; of the girls in college 21, in the high schools 17. For the summary of attitudes toward parents see Appendix, Tables VII and VIII.

† The young people answering the questionnaire were asked to put a check opposite the words: love, respect, admiration, companionship, fear, and desire to avoid. The checks showed so many variations, and the attitudes revealed by them so often coincided with the generally observed features of Chinese family relations (e.g., a warmer attitude toward the mother than toward the father) that one is justified in interpreting them as important indications of the tendencies in the feelings of Chinese adolescents and youth toward their parents.

‡ See, for instance, the novel of Hsieh Ch'ing Ch'ao, *Hai Shang Shuo-mang jen* (*The Shanghai Sleepwalkers*), where an old-fashioned father submits a young representative of Shanghai café society to a cruel beating and the mother rushes in to save her offspring.¹⁰

a peasant from Fukien remarked scornfully, expressing the criticism of many a Chinese husband. As woman's authority in the family increases, the children are punished less severely—the families of gainfully occupied women, such as factory workers or intellectuals, give many examples of this trend.

Only 40% of the boys and 47% of the girls in high schools admitted that they were afraid of their mothers. (The corresponding figures for colleges were 18% and 24%.) Love was much more frequent toward her than toward the father—especially with the boys—whereas the father enjoyed more respect.*

As of old, the mother-son relations are tender. To the numerous examples of harmonious and happy mother-son relations offered by Chinese literature we might add a number of new ones given by such men of contemporary China as the leader of the Renaissance Movement, the scholar and diplomat Dr. Hu Shih; the famous writer Pa Chin; the student (now an official) Tan Shih-hua, who told his story to the Russian writer S. Tretiakov.¹² All of them have warm words for their mothers in their autobiographies.

The times have brought new elements into the father-son relations, of which some intensify and some mitigate the old antagonism.

The gradual disappearance of concubinage is removing one of the possibilities of sexual rivalry between father and son.†

An opposite tendency may develop with the increase in love matches. A man in love with his wife is more apt to see his son as a rival for his wife's affection than a man married off by his parents and nurtured in the belief that children are the aim of marriage. This is exactly the situation described by Pa Chin in a short story entitled "Father and Son."

The hero of this story, a young clerk, married the girl he loved and was happy until his son was born. The father resented the fact that his wife concentrated her attention on her son, and he developed a hatred for the boy which was reciprocated. The father beat the son in spite of the mother's opposition. The son retaliated by saying: "Father is not good; I shall take a rifle and kill father." One night the child was crying. The father began to beat him and

* Some modern Chinese educators reproach the mother for putting all the burden of punishment on the father and thus hampering the development of the child's affection for him.¹¹

† But conflicts of this kind still exist in contemporary China. As late as 1935-37 newspapers reported cases of sons running away with their fathers' concubines; similar stories can be found in the records of the Social Service Department of the PUMC.

when the mother tried to interfere he grabbed the child and ran out into the rainy street with a mad idea of killing him. In the street the boy suddenly stopped crying and in the most appealing fashion asked his father to forgive him. Then fatherly feelings triumphed over the resentment of a hurt lover. He brought the child home and fell into the arms of his wife.¹³

One might think that in this story Pa Chin, who like many other Chinese contemporary writers was very much influenced by Western literature, tried to adapt Freudian ideas to the Chinese environment. But the very fact that such a story could appear in China without arousing protests shows that the situation described does not appear improbable to the reader.

As of old, relations between fathers and daughters are more harmonious. In the families of our upper-class informants there were many daughters who were their fathers' favorites. The fathers were proud of the girls' accomplishments and encouraged them to study, sometimes in spite of the mothers' opposition.

Relations of this kind are also not uncommon among the poor. A Tientsin shoemaker, for instance, was angry when his two sons, riksha coolies, occasionally spent their earnings to buy some additional food. But when his daughter brought home a dollar earned by sewing, the father immediately ordered her to spend half of it for a new dress.

"Fathers generally prefer their daughters, and mothers prefer their sons," said a 19-year-old farm laborer from North China, who certainly never heard of "complexes." It seems that his impression is not unfounded.

The children reciprocate their parents' attitudes. The girls are, as a rule, somewhat more affectionate toward their fathers than are the boys; they have more love and less fear of them. They are also less often afraid of their fathers than of their mothers, although the reticence of the fathers does not allow their daughters' love to be expressed as freely as their love for their mothers. Both boys and girls express more love and purely positive feelings toward their mothers than toward their fathers.

The most dreaded father is the one who beats his son himself. As soon as the punishment administered by the father does not include beating, the relations improve—the sons express less fear and more love and respect toward their fathers. When the mother takes over the task of inflicting punishment, the resentment against the father and the fear of him subside. Yet they do not disappear altogether—the son still knows that the father is responsible for

TABLE XI
CORRELATION BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
FATHER AND PUNISHMENT

Answers of 1,074 Male High-school and College Students
(percentages)

Attitude *	PUNISHED				NOT PUNISHED
	<i>Punishment with Beating</i> Punished by Father †	<i>Punishment without Beating</i> Punished by Others ‡	<i>Punishment without Beating</i> Punished by Father †	<i>Punishment without Beating</i> Punished by Others ‡	
<i>Purely negative</i>	14	8	11	4	2
<i>Negative & positive</i>	53	39	50	34	31
<i>Purely positive</i>	29	42	37	45	65
<i>No answer</i>	4	11 §	2	17 §	2

* Purely negative: only fear or desire to avoid are checked.

Purely positive: only respect, love, companionship, and admiration are checked.

Negative and positive: the most frequent combination in this attitude is fear, respect, and love, though there are cases when love and fear are checked, as well as respect and desire to avoid, etc.

† By father only and by both parents, but with father playing the main role.

‡ By mother only or by both parents, mother playing the main role.

§ Includes students who have no fathers.

his suffering.* The best relations prevail when the son is not punished at all. (However there are, of course, families where the sons' fear of their fathers is so great that the fathers do not need to use punishment in order to secure obedience. In such families purely negative feelings are rather frequent.) Mencius obviously knew of this correlation two thousand years ago when he insisted that the father should not teach his son. Teaching at that time was indissolubly bound up with punishment and it was difficult to cultivate filial piety under such circumstances.

The same response can be seen in the daughter's reaction to punishment by her mother, but the picture here is not so clear as in father-son relations; evidently the punishment by the mother, which is always milder than the father's, does not create much resentment.†

* Sometimes this was enough to switch the negative feelings to the mother. "I love my father more than my mother because my mother punishes me," declared several of our informants—peasants and workers of North China.

† See Appendix, Table IX.

It should not be forgotten that the feelings we have analyzed in Table XI were expressed by high-school and college students to whom beating was to a great extent a thing of the past.* Nevertheless the correlation is so obvious that the deep impression left on Chinese youth by corporal punishment and punishment in general is indisputable.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS

Sometimes the grandparents live in the house with the children, sometimes they stay with an uncle and the children visit them. The relations with the paternal grandparents are closer than with the mother's parents, but the latter, too, are considered very near relatives.

No matter where they live the grandparents seldom play a decisive part in the children's lives if the children's parents are alive. They seldom interfere with the children's education and their parents' plans for their futures. (For instance, only 6 students from whom information was secured said that their grandparents punished them.) The widowed paternal grandmother sometimes attempts to interfere if she is a person of strong character who has something to say in the family.†

The attitudes toward the grandfather and grandmother are shaped on the same pattern as those toward the parents: the children of both sexes are more afraid of their grandfather than of their grandmother and love the grandmother more; but the feeling of fear toward the grandfather is more often mentioned by the boys, whereas the girls are relatively more often afraid of their grandmothers.

Both boys and girls approach their grandfather with somewhat warmer feelings than they do their father and are less afraid of him; ‡ the grandmother, however, cannot compete with the mother.

What our young informants told us about their relations with their grandparents seems to indicate the same reciprocity we noticed in parent-child relations. The majority of the grandparents,

* Only one boy was beaten when he was a college student.

† The impression about the grandchildren's relations to their grandparents, gained mainly from accounts of upper- and middle-class informants, is confirmed by H. T. Fei, speaking for the peasant families in a village in Kiangsu. According to him, "the grandfather does not exercise authority over the child very often, but very often indulges him and serves as mediator between father and son. The grandson has no specific economic obligations towards his grandfather as long as his father is living." 14

‡ See Appendix, Table X.

according to their grandchildren's impressions, have no favorites, but those who do almost invariably prefer the boys. Also, the girls expressed a somewhat less positive attitude toward their grandparents than did the boys.

The Chinese child in the middle and upper classes usually grows up surrounded by brothers and sisters. Only the poorest families have to content themselves with one child.* The problem of the "only child" which weighs so heavily on Western families is much less of a problem in China.

The relations of brothers and sisters to a great extent reflect the old pattern. The children are attached to each other. An elder sister taking care of her little sisters and brothers is a common sight in the streets of Chinese villages and cities and the impression is that she does it more willingly than does a big sister in the West. The big brother is a natural protector and is called upon for help first, when a younger child is in peril—of being photographed by a foreign woman, for instance.

Respect for the elders is preserved in the brother-sister relations; when speaking of their feelings toward elder sisters and brothers the high-school and college boys and girls often mentioned respect and sometimes even fear, though these feelings play a much smaller part in brother-sister relations than in relations with family members of the older generation; 72% of the boys and 73% of the girls (college students) expressed only positive feelings when speaking of their elder brothers; 85% of the boys and 80% of the girls did so when speaking of their relations to their elder sisters.†

Yet man's superiority expresses itself even in these relationships; the elder brother is less loved and more feared than the elder sister, both by his brothers and sisters.

Purely positive feelings toward a family member seem to be in inverse proportion to the authority he enjoys. Father, grandfather, elder brother are less often objects of purely positive feelings of the children than the mother, grandmother, or elder sister.

Uncles, aunts, and other collateral relatives do not play an important part, even in the lives of children living in joint families.

Although there are parents and grandparents who choose one or several children as their favorites, the partiality seldom is so explicit that the children feel it acutely. "There are no favorites in our family," declared more than two thirds of the thousand college

* See pp. 150 ff. Only 24 of 1,164 college students' families from whom information was secured had only one child (2.1%).

† See Appendix, Table XI.

TABLE XII

PERCENTAGE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS WHO EXPRESSED
ONLY POSITIVE FEELINGS TOWARD ELDER
FAMILY MEMBERS

	<i>Male Students</i>	<i>Female Students</i>
Toward father	47	49
“ grandfather	62	57
“ elder brother	72	73
“ grandmother	75	70
“ mother	77	73
“ elder sister	85	80

students with sisters and brothers who answered the question about favorite children. The parents interviewed admitted favoritism even less often. In many families where one parent has a favorite another gives the same affection to all and thus alleviates the other children's jealousy, or each child has one parent who loves him best.

BOYS AND GIRLS

Boys and girls in their early childhood are brought up together. All the children of one father—boys and girls alike—have a common name, the name of their generation, to which is added their proper name. Thus, for example, in the Tsang family, described in Lin Yu-tang's *Moment in Peking*, the three brothers are called Po-ya, Sun-ya, Hsiang-ya, “ya” being the name of their generation.

Boys and girls are not treated alike. In many families girls are still considered inferior to boys. In the families of peasants and workers the higher mortality among the little girls than among the boys indicates that even in the absence of actual infanticide of girls, they are worse fed and cared for than the boys.* In the upper class (families of students) the parents who have favorites prefer the sons more often than they prefer the daughters (of 228 fathers who had favorites, 126 or 55% preferred sons; of 274 mothers who had favorites, 167 or 61% preferred sons). The girls usually do not resent this preference but take it for granted—the old tradition of women's inferiority evidently still influences them.

There are many indications, however, that the trend in the changing strata—among the industrial workers and in the upper class—is toward better treatment of girls. Several of our informants—industrial workers—mentioned that girls are more valued

* See pp. 150 ff.

since they work in the factories and it seems that a larger percentage of them survive than did before. In the upper-class (students') families the parents, who are representatives of the younger generation, have no favorites or prefer daughters more often than do the grandparents, who remain faithful to the old Chinese preference for males (83% of the grandfathers and 85% of the grandmothers who had favorites preferred grandsons to granddaughters).

To be sure, modern intellectuals still want to have sons, but I know families which were perfectly happy although they had only daughters. One of these families, that of the writer Lin Yu-tang, is very well known in the United States. Certainly nobody who reads the Lin sisters' charming account of their family life would suspect that there ever was such a thing as unwanted daughters in China.*¹⁵

The old rule about the separation of sexes is no longer observed. According to the *Li Chi*, at the age of 7 the boys had to be moved out of the women's apartments to live among males exclusively.¹⁶ Now boys and girls go to elementary schools together and often to colleges as well; there is less coeducation in the high schools.

THE CONCUBINE'S CHILDREN

Unequal treatment is more of a problem in families with concubines. It seems that grandparents and other relatives have a tendency to treat the children of concubines worse than they do the first wife's children. The first wife, who usually has more power in the house than the concubine and who naturally prefers her own children, can make the lives of her rival's children bitter. The father, however, more often than not prefers the concubine's children—because he loves their mother more, because they are younger, and because there may be among them the son he has longed for.

To avoid trouble, many men who have concubines in contemporary China have tried to separate the two families more completely than was the custom in old China, when wife and concubine stayed in separate houses but on the same compound. I know of a case where one wife and her children were in Peiping and another was in Shanghai and the father commuted between them—fortu-

* The better possibilities for the employment of women in modern times also influenced the treatment of girls in old-fashioned families. Thus, the author's servant did not mind having only a daughter and no sons. He was sure that she was almost as good a future provider as the son. "Now I take care of her; later she will maintain me," he once said.

nately he had business in both cities. It is possible that this separation is one of the reasons why only a few of the children of families with concubines admit that the offspring of the two wives are not treated equally (49 of 135 families of college students) and that they are not on friendly terms (26 cases). Moreover, there is often such a difference in age between the children of the two mothers that the possibility of friction is excluded.

The stepmother brings another element of discord, especially if she bears children to the father. One of the Red Army leaders, Peng Teh-huai, was actually driven out of his home by his stepmother.¹⁷ It seems, however, that harsh stepmothers have been much rarer in China than in the West. The wicked stepmother does not play any prominent role either in Chinese folklore or fiction, nor do the hospital records examined for this study contain any pertinent cases. Chinese fathers do not take any chances with their new wives—usually they are not allowed to punish their stepchildren. As widows seldom remarry, families including the stepmother's children by a former marriage are extremely rare.

THE REVOLT OF THE CHILDREN

There was a pronounced difference between the overt behavior of small and of older children. Chinese babies were noisy, bold, and natural, just like our Western babies, but their elder sisters and brothers, children of school age, seemed strikingly quiet and submissive. Sometimes when one saw them solemnly walking in their long gowns and skull caps or Western felt hats, they seemed less like children than like miniature editions of old scholars and officials. Their shyness in the presence of grownups seemed exaggerated. It was as if between the ages of 3 and 7 their spontaneity and naturalness suffered a blow from which they recovered only in college, if at all.

Yet one should not be deceived by these suave manners. These future bureaucrats and peasants have a will of their own and the years between the freedom of babyhood and the revolt of early manhood and womanhood are not spent in complete submission.

"Were there times when you, your sisters and brothers did not obey your parents when you were children?" was one of the questions asked in the students' questionnaire.

Twenty-seven per cent of the male and 18% of the female college students, 40% of high-school boys and 21% of high-school girls checked "Never." All the others were disobedient sometimes,

even frequently or constantly (there were few of the last).^{*} Similarly, the majority of parents interviewed complained that the children were disobedient and some added: "In the old days the children were not so."

This is of course a familiar theme of parents of all ages, but it seems that now the Chinese parents are right—about three quarters of boys and girls try to oppose their parents—certainly a sign of new times in China. No Chinese educator of forty years ago would have allowed his pupils to act out or attend a play like the one I saw in Canton in November, 1936. It was an American sketch representing naughty colored children in school. The young actors had a lot of fun painting their faces black, donning American blue overalls, and indulging in pranks and saucy remarks to their old teacher. Their audience enjoyed it equally.

What are the most frequent cases of disobedience? The poor people—peasants and workers—all reported the same sort of thing: children refuse to work, play hooky from school, quarrel with neighboring children or with their sisters and brothers. One Peiping boy disobeyed his father by eating too much meat—a crime in a poor family!

In well-to-do families the children are frequently quarrelsome or try to assert their right to laziness and play instead of work and study. A rich peasant's son who was sent to catch locusts gathered wild dates instead; a boy who had to learn a passage from Confucius found more pleasure in throwing stones into the water and watching the rings. Some of them were ashamed of work: "I did not want to be seen on the street with a bottle of sauce in my hands," said a businessman's son who was sent on an errand.

Like children everywhere, the little Chinese break their toys, refuse to go to bed early, eat improper food at improper times, irritate their parents by making too much noise. (Several boys and girls complained that their parents would not allow them to sing loud Chinese opera songs at home.) They try to avoid visits to relatives where they have to sit quietly and listen respectfully to the conversation of the grownups. Several children were punished for answering back—behavior very much against traditional Chinese home discipline. Perhaps modern children commit these

^{*} There were more disobedient girls among our informants in all the economic and educational groups and thus this difference cannot be explained by the fact that they came from richer and better-educated families. Evidently they could afford more insubordination because they were less afraid of their fathers—the main authority in the family. It is also evident that the young girls who go to college in China are endowed with more than average will power.

offenses more often than their fathers and grandfathers, but the offenses themselves are not new.

More modern troubles have been created by the fad for sports developed in China under the influence of the West, especially of America and England. The older children acquire this interest at school and their little sisters and brothers at home eagerly imitate them. The parents, who were taught that a gentleman has to cultivate his spiritual life and shun vulgar physical exercise, see their children enjoying baseball and tennis, wrestling like street mountebanks, coming home with swollen jaws and black eyes from boxing, climbing mountains, swimming in lakes and rivers, and endangering their precious bodies which do not belong to them but to their parents.¹⁸

Very few parents, even among those who have had a modern education, can sympathize with such performances! The first generation turned out of the westernized schools was not athletically minded. On the children's playground in a missionary university near Peiping where English and American children boldly climbed the high ladders and swung on the bars one could often see their Chinese playmates wistfully watching: their fathers (professors in the university) would not allow them to do anything similar unless their mothers or nurses stood near by to catch them if they should fall.

Yet, as soon as the children grew a little older they began to disobey their overprotective parents. A new generation is growing up in China.

Foreign example has brought other unwelcome habits. Imitating foreign customs, children have begun to develop a love for ice cream and cold drinking water. The latter habit has been opposed by parents with good reason: the unsanitary conditions in China make the drinking of unboiled water dangerous, and it is always safer to quench one's thirst with tea—or hot water, if one cannot afford tea.

Some of the children disobey openly and are punished for it. Many of them try to gratify their desires secretly. About two thirds of the students declared that they deceived their parents in their childhood—and did it not infrequently. The answers to our questionnaire show that the children who were punished mildly or not at all deceived their parents less often than the others.

Education in the modern Chinese family still preserves many features characteristic of education in imperial China. The results of our investigation seem to justify to a certain extent the bitter

accusations of a modern writer who complains that "the children have to obey their parents' order without consideration of whether the order is just or not; children do not dare to protest when they are unjustly treated; the children have no love but only fear and formal respect toward their parents."¹⁹ There are certainly many families of this kind.

Nevertheless, the changes in educational methods and the improvement of parent-child relations are clearly visible in the modernized strata of the population—among the industrial workers and in the upper and middle class. Even in the strata where modern trends are less perceptible, discipline is becoming less severe.

XX

Chinese Youth

YOUNG WORKERS AND PEASANTS

CHILD LABOR

THE childhood of the poor does not last long. At the age of 7, sometimes even earlier, the children of farm laborers and peasants begin to help on the farm; older children are often sent to the cities to work as apprentices in old-fashioned shops and factories along with the little sons and daughters of city workers and coolies. The lessons in obedience and subordination the children received at home are soon tested in the cruel world in which they had to live.

There are no exact statistics concerning child labor in China but its extent must be considerable. In Peiping or other old Chinese cities thousands of little apprentices (*hsiao tuti*) may be seen hammering copper, lead, and pewter, making artificial flowers, sewing garments, shoes, and hats, weaving and spinning in dingy rooms or in ancient temples, running errands, helping their fathers at peddler stands or their masters' wives in household chores.

Even more of them can be found in industrial cities. In China as everywhere in the world the beginning of industrialization has been marked by the extensive use of child labor. Large factories employ children only to a limited extent. In 1927 child labor represented 7% of the total employed in Shanghai textile factories,¹ but many small workshops using motor power and producing foreign-style objects such as electric bulbs, enamel, and aluminum ware, employ children almost exclusively. "Many of those local industries were confining adult labor to the management and clerical staff," says the Report of the Industrial Section of the Shanghai Municipal Council.²

Little girls who are not sent to the factories are often sold as slaves into rich men's households—girl slavery, though it was illegal, was still common in prewar China, especially in the South. Organizations like the Women's Department of the Kuomintang, welfare agencies, the YWCA have tried to help enforce the law against slavery. They have not been very successful and the number of female slaves before the second Sino-Japanese War was estimated

as two million.³ Female slavery, it is reported, has been completely wiped out in the Soviet districts; there the fundamental change in the whole setup of the country helped to put into practice the laws prohibiting slavery.⁴

In their place of work the children are subjected to harsh treatment. Most of them are hired as contract laborers; the contracts concluded with their parents make them virtual slaves for at least three years. The little workers and apprentices work as long hours as do the grownups. Many receive no pay at all—only food and lodging and a few cents on New Year's Day. Only a few of the Peiping apprentices receive as much as 50¢ or a dollar a month; the little factory workers receive 10–20¢ a day. The food provided by the masters is insufficient. Beriberi, scurvy, and other diseases caused by malnutrition and filth are common among the apprentices of Shanghai. In the workshops of Peiping and Shanghai they often sleep on wooden planks attached to the ceilings, or under the tables which other shifts continue to use for their work; others sleep on the streets.

Worst off of all were the little boys in the mining industry. The galleries of the old Chinese mines, which supply a large part of the coal and ore of China, are narrow and the use of small boys is convenient. The author had an opportunity to see the children who worked in the coal mines of Men-t'e-k'ou near Peiping. They emerged from the dark shafts almost completely naked, their thin ribs showing through their skin, covered with coal dust, and breathing heavily. They were carrying on the average 35-pound loads. The boys looked not older than 9 or 10, although there were some 14- and 15-year-olds among them. Their usual pay was 10–20¢ a day. They lived at home and came to work only every second day. "Otherwise they would die too soon," explained one of the mine owners.*

The little workers living in the shops and in the houses of the contractors are virtual prisoners and not allowed to go out. They can learn about new trends only indirectly, through grownup workers.

THE SONS

What are the relations of young peasants and workers to their families and the outside world? They differ from those of their fathers and older brothers.

* The impression of the author coincides with the description of Chinese coal mines in Shensi given by the German geographer F. von Richthofen seventy years earlier.⁵ These conditions have existed for centuries.

In contemporary China there are young men who have run away from home or, if they were sent as apprentices to towns, from their cruel employers. To be sure, there have always been such desertions. The ideology of the bureaucratic empire that crippled the energy of the young men of the upper classes has had less influence on the young workers and peasants. More of them belonged to another tradition which can be traced to feudal times and to the periods of wars and upheavals, so frequent in Chinese history. This tradition is expressed, for instance, in the picaresque novels: *The Three Kingdoms*, *All Men Are Brothers*, and others which are widely known among young workers and peasants, whether they have read them or, more frequently, heard episodes recounted by storytellers.

For all their filial piety and obedience the young workers and peasants have retained enough energy to break away from the home or workshop if they can no longer endure their oppression. They have tried to find a better employer or have joined the army of a warlord, or—since the end of the nineteenth century—have emigrated to Manchuria, the South Seas, Hawaii, America. Since 1924 there has been a new place to go—the Nationalist Army and later the Red Army and the Soviet districts that have attracted hundreds and thousands of workers, peasants, and educated youths.

The possibility that they might run away has strengthened the position of the youths who have stayed at home and has given them courage to defend their rights against their parents.

"Don't be so cruel to us, father," two riksha coolies in Tientsin used to say to their father who wanted to beat them when he suspected that they had not given him all their earnings. "What would you and mother do if we ran away?" This threat made the father, a shoemaker who told us the story, uneasy and he began to think that his wife was right when she implored him to treat the boys better. "Times are changing," he said.

But on the whole the young peasants and coolies who have stayed at home (especially the peasants) still submit to their parents' authority. They deliver their earnings to their parents.* They consult them when they have important problems to decide. Very few venture to accept new ideas about marriage and family relations. Among our informants, for instance, the proportion of those who were in favor of modern marriage, remarriage of widows, equality of sexes, etc., was even smaller among the young men under 25 than among the more experienced and independent men of 25–35 years of age. Only 2 in about 30 young men of this social group expected

* See p. 158.

their marriages to be arranged differently from those of their forefathers.

The young industrial workers are different. They continue the progressive development begun by their fathers and elder brothers. Several of them, as we have mentioned before, have won the right to spend their own earnings. Their attitude toward paternal authority is changing. Thus 14 out of the 16 young male industrial workers (under 25) interviewed in Shanghai had modern views on human and family relations and wanted to marry girls they loved.

Many young workers have studied in schools for adults run by the YMCA and other organizations. Many of them have taken part in strikes. Among the young men who have walked thousands of miles to reach the Soviet districts there are not only apprentices from old-fashioned shops but also factory workers.

The working-class and peasant youth of China have carried the greatest burden of the war against Japan. From their ranks came the millions of Chinese soldiers who fought with such undaunted courage, making continued Chinese resistance possible against an enemy superior in technical skill and equipment.

THE DAUGHTERS

The young daughter in a Chinese peasant or coolie house looks and acts very much like the girl in olden times; the new trends usually enter her life only when she becomes a factory worker.

The old-fashioned girl who goes to work in a factory changes her appearance. Her pigtail disappears—almost all the factories insist that their operatives bob their hair; coat and trousers are still worn at work because they are more serviceable, but after working hours the factory girl puts on a fashionable long gown. Leather shoes replace homemade cloth shoes. The Shanghai factory girls, like women in metropolitan areas everywhere, take particular pains with their appearance and spend a large part of their wages on dress; many girls in Wusih, Canton, Tsingtao, and Tientsin are well dressed too. It was only in Hankow (in the interior of China) that the author saw girl workers with pigtails, in country attire, and even with bound feet.

The role of the girl in the family has changed. Instead of being only another mouth to feed, she now makes use of her hands and earns more than is spent on her.

The role girls play in contributing to the family budget is shown

by information secured from girls working in the Ch'ing Feng Mill in Wusih. In a farm laborer's family in the suburbs of Wusih the father earned \$1 and his food for 3 days' work. The young daughter sent home \$2-\$3 a month or an equivalent of 6-9 days of her father's work.

In another poor peasant family of six, the two daughters—16- and 20-year-old girls, sent home \$5 a month. It is probably only owing to the sisters' contributions that their brother could be sent to school and \$12 tuition paid for him. The girls had never been to school.

In a worker's family in Wusih the father earned \$7 a month and his keep, his daughter provided \$5-\$5.50 additional.

After the death of a small restaurant owner in Kiangsu his eldest daughter, an unusually energetic and serious young girl, first tried to carry on her father's business. She failed. Her bad luck did not discourage her in her efforts to take care of the family. She went to a factory. The \$4 or \$5 she sent and her sister's earnings from sewing at home were the only income of the family, which consisted, besides the girls, of their aunt, their old grandmother, their 13-year-old brother and his child fiancée.

The contributions of several girl workers in Shanghai were equally important: all six members of the family of an unemployed boatman, including his wife, son, and little daughter, depended on the earnings of two girls of 17 and 18 who together earned about \$30 a month. In another family in which the father, a foreman in a textile factory, earned \$32 a month, the \$11 his 16-year-old daughter brought home was a welcome contribution and allowed him to support his wife's mother and his little son.

We have seen that their new economic role has changed the position of the married women workers—the mothers and elder sisters of the young girls we are discussing now. But what about the girls themselves? For the young girl it seems to have been more difficult to create new attitudes toward herself and to understand these changes when they actually took place.

Nevertheless the changes have been there.

The family has begun to be friendlier to the girls. They now stay longer with the family. Parents are reluctant to part with daughters who not only do not cost them anything but actually support them. Unmarried girls of 23, 24, and even 26 are not rare among factory workers.

More than that, the silent girl of former times whose opinion was never asked and who never dared open her mouth in the pres-

ence of her elders, especially men, has now begun to be taken seriously.

This has been especially noticeable with girls who, in addition to supporting their families and gaining valuable experience in the large cities, have become acquainted with the new ideas through studies and reading.*

The girls do not always understand the reasons for the change in their parents' attitude toward them. They are not as realistic as the married women who see at once the direct connection between their contribution to the family income and their status in the family. Some of the girls even indignantly decline to see this connection. "How can parents be influenced by money considerations in their relations to their child?" But many girls feel differently and do not hesitate to say: "My people are nicer to me since I have been working in the factory," or even more drastically, "since I have been bringing money home."

The growing prestige of the girls has been combined with the beginning of a change in their own attitude toward the authority of their parents. Even if they do not feel any changes in their position, even if there are not many changes in their ideas of what is "proper for the child to do," their behavior has begun to change.

Generally speaking it seems that the girls who grow up in the city, especially if they go to school, emancipate themselves more quickly than do the country girls, but at one point the country girls have had an advantage; more of them can freely dispose of their earnings. Most of the city girls live with their families and it is natural that they should hand over their wages to their parents and then ask for spending money. But the girls who live away from their families pay for their room and board (it was about \$4.50-\$5.50 in the dormitory of the Ch'ing Feng Mill in Wusih where the girls interviewed for this study worked, and about \$5-\$8 in a private boarding house in Shanghai), keep some pocket money, and send the rest home. Pocket money buys a new dress, an attractive comb, leather shoes, gilded teeth—the fashion with Wusih girls in 1936; a girl without an independent income could not afford all these things. It is this pocket money that the girls have in mind when praising factory life, and regard as a personal reward for their hard work. Their willingness to spend less on themselves

* There were only 4 girls participating in family decisions among 30 unmarried factory workers interviewed in Wusih who did not go to night schools; but there were 8 of them among 22 girls, workers and students of the YWCA schools, in Tientsin.

in order to send more to their families shows the degree of their devotion to their parents and of their subordination to parental authority.*

Of the 18 girl workers interviewed in the Ch'ing Feng Mill in Wusih (living away from their families and sending money home), 8 sent home more than half of what was left after they paid their room and board, 2 sent even $\frac{7}{10}$ and $\frac{1}{5}$ of it. But 10 others spent most of their money for themselves and would rather allow themselves the luxury of having their teeth gilded than send more money home.

The girls are not obliged to send money—they have to be asked for it; and some of them behave almost as an American factory girl would behave in similar circumstances.

There was, for instance, a teacher's daughter whose contributions were irregular, although her wages were relatively high—she earned about \$20 as a forewoman. Whenever the father needed money he had to go to his daughter and state his needs; then she would give him what he asked for. One can imagine that this teacher, a man who knew his Confucius, did not feel at ease in this crazy new world where a father had to humble himself before his daughter. He tried to preach frugality and thrift to her and asked her to give an account of her expenses. She did not comply with his demands, gave the family only about \$3 a month, and used the rest for herself or lent it to her fellow workers.

Two girls sent money home expecting that their father would save it for them. Their family was not harmonious. The girls often quarreled with each other and with their father who scolded them for being too wasteful (the gilded teeth were particularly resented). The fact that there was a stepmother did not improve this situation. When the girls discovered that their father spent their money instead of saving it, they refused to give him another cent. All his admonitions and scoldings were of no avail. He could not legally compel them to give him their earnings and his authority was shaken to such an extent that they did not obey him voluntarily.

Most of the girls, whether they send money to their families or not, win the right to dress according to modern fashions. The fathers grumbled: "These new dresses are immodest." The mothers express disapproval: "In my day girls did not spend so much money

* This does not apply to the country girls who are hired by a contractor. They never receive money in their own hands. The contractor collects their wages, pays a certain sum to their parents, provides them with food and lodging and gives them hardly any pocket money.

on dresses." But the girl who earns money cannot be stopped. She wants to look "like all the other girls," and she does!

Thus the first battle against parental authority which the girls have waged unwittingly, without understanding its implications, has been almost won: the family has had to recognize, in fact, if not in theory, their daughters' right to dispose of their own money.

But it is evidently easier for the young girl of China to dispose of her money than to dispose of her person. It has been quite an experience for our young Chinese assistants—all very modern college girls—to ask their working-class sisters what they think of modern marriage and how they expect their marriages to be arranged.

The idea that marriage is a family affair and that a decent girl must accept the mate chosen by her parents is still deeply rooted. At the same time the working girls know of the modern way, of the possibility of being united with a man one loves in a happy marriage. The idea appeals to them. Among the 150 girl factory workers who were asked what they thought of modern marriage and how their own marriages would be arranged, there were all sorts of attitudes.

The youngest girls interviewed in Wusih, especially those who had recently come from the country, felt that the very question was improper. They blushed, tittered, and did not answer.

Older girls in Wusih expressed their conservative views in a more matter-of-fact way. Yes, their parents would choose their mates for them. This was the proper way, and all their relatives did so. As for modern marriages, public opinion frowned on them, for it was shameful to choose one's own mate.

Yet our interviewer, a keen observer, noticed that not all the girls were sincere. There was something in the twinkle of their eyes and in their suppressed smiles that hinted at different plans and hopes than they were willing to admit. But evidently they considered these wishes and plans somewhat improper. They dared not discuss them with an outsider.

There was perhaps another reason that prompted the girls to use restraint when interviewed on this subject. The factory girls of Wusih, like other factory girls in China, were considered somewhat loose, and they wanted to defend themselves against all possible suspicion.

But this attitude was also the most frequent one among the YWCA students of Shanghai and Tientsin where modern marriage was already well-known. Sixty-three of 97 students of the YWCA

school in Shanghai and 13 of 25 YWCA students in Tientsin said that their marriages would be arranged by their parents. The proportion was smaller than in Wusih where 22 of 29 girls expected to submit to their parents' decision, but still quite considerable. Only 1 girl in Wusih, 7 in Shanghai, and 3 in Tientsin resented this and some of them even said "Modern marriage is better," but did not dare to do anything about it—"We can't help it."

Others expressed their protest against the old marriage system in the same way some girls in old China had; they declared that they would rather remain single.

"I am afraid of marriage. It is like falling into a trap. Parents-in-law might be severe, and the husband rude," said a 23-year-old Tientsin worker.

"I have seen too many married women suffering from their strict parents-in-law and husbands and have decided that I will be happier with my own parents. I talked things over with my father who approved of my decision. Now my parents are dead, the family depends on me and I will be happy to devote my life to them," said a Wusih worker, daughter of a ruined businessman. She was already 24—a sign that she was serious about her decision. This could not be said about the 8 girls in Wusih and Tientsin who expressed the same intentions—some of them admitted that they would not be able to carry out their plans against their parents' will.

Like the "Girls Who Do Not Go to the Family" * and the Buddhist nuns of old China, these factory girls were not real fighters against the old marriage system. Their decision was an act of despair, a sterile form of rebellion.

Yet at the time of our investigation many young factory workers who resented woman's fate under the old marriage system actively participated in the fight for the reform of marriage.

Several girls expected that their marriages would be arranged in a "semi-modern fashion": the parents would choose their mates but they themselves would decide whether they would marry them (3 of 29 girls in Wusih, 11 of 97 in Shanghai, and 1 of 25 in Tientsin expected such an arrangement). But only 23 of 97 girls belonging to the most advanced workers' group in the most westernized city of China—YWCA students in Shanghai—declared that they would choose their own mates and 9 of these 23 wanted to make their final decision dependent on their parents' approval.

Ten of 25 girls of the Tientsin YWCA group approved of mod-

* See p. 108.

ern marriage, but 3 of them were fully aware of the fact that they would not be able to achieve it. One was engaged, another who saw that "it is good to have a husband whom one loves" felt that it was "too much against the old customs," a third was afraid of public disapproval: "There were no such marriages among her relatives and friends."

As for the workers of Wusih, all of them expected to be married as their mothers and grandmothers had been, although 3 blushing admitted—at the end of the interview, after they grew familiar with the interviewer, who was an amiable young girl—that "if people choose their own mates there will be no complaints."

"But it is hard to find an ideal husband," said a 25-year-old Tientsin worker, with a sigh, "one has so little opportunity to meet men." "And what is an ideal husband?" she was asked. "The man must be independent, not unattractive, of good disposition, and faithful to me," she answered. Faithful! This girl had evidently adopted as her own the idea of monogamous marriage so passionately advocated by the progressive women of China.

It seems that a larger percentage of factory girls prefer their existence to that of an old-fashioned girl at home than was the case with married women. It is not that they do not feel the hardships of a twelve-hour working day and the tempo of modern machines, but they like to earn money. Why? "It is good to help the family," answered some of the girls. "I can do what I like. I spend my money freely. I can have a new dress," said others. "To stay at home and depend on one's parents is not good. I am an independent woman now. The family has more respect for me. Life in the factory is more interesting than life at home. I see more of life. I have more friends," said some YWCA students of Shanghai and Tientsin who in general seemed to appreciate their independence leading to equality with men more than the less developed dormitory girls of Wusih. It seems also that the daughters of city workers complain less and appreciate their independence more than the daughters of peasants, shopkeepers, and clerks.

In spite of the reaction that deprived them of free trade-unions, which, together with the Kuomintang and the Communist party in the 'twenties, carried on considerable educational activity among women; in spite of long hours and exhausting labor, the young women workers have continued to strive for education and knowledge. The YWCA and similar schools in Shanghai, Tientsin, and other industrial cities did not complain that they lacked students, although the girls often had to overcome their parents' opposition.

("In my time girls did not go to school," the mother would say. "Girls do not need to study," the father would add.) The girls wanted to go to those schools because they could acquire there a knowledge that would help them to understand the world they lived in. In the YWCA schools in Shanghai, which the author visited in 1937, the girls learned how to read and understand the newspapers; they were thoroughly acquainted with the facts of Japanese aggression in China and maintained that not the Japanese people but the militarists and fascists were responsible for it; they learned about the workers of other countries and how they struggled to improve their lot.

The young workers took part in the work of the illegal trade-unions that continued their existence through the years of reaction. They took part in the prewar strike movement. Mao Tun describes these energetic girls—strike leaders—in his novel of conditions in Shanghai in 1930–31, *The Twilight*. The present writer had an opportunity to speak with some of them during the historic strike in the Japanese mills in Shanghai in 1936 and was highly impressed by their vigor and cleverness.

When the war began the girl workers of Shanghai became active at once. The students of YWCA schools, for instance, did very good work. They organized refugee camps in the International Settlement, took care of orphaned children, worked at the front as nurses and interpreters.

They were worthy little sisters of the "Amazons of Shanghai"—the women factory workers who fought so valiantly in 1927 during the Nationalist Revolution.

STUDENTS

Chinese college students play an important role in the modernization of society and the family in their country. They have been exposed to the influence of Western culture in a more direct way than has any other group in China, and their response to modern trends has been most vivid. Many of these young people try to apply their new ideas immediately in their homes and in their school and political activities. Unlike the young peasants and workers who very often act in a new way without realizing it, the students are fully aware of the fact that they represent a new era of Chinese life and that they are in conflict with the old generation. They try to formulate for themselves the reasons and the meaning of this conflict as well as the positive new ideas about the

Chinese family that they expect to create. Moreover the fact that the college students belong to the upper and middle classes of China which still provide the majority of the country's leadership gives them a great influence in Chinese society now and in the immediate future.

All these facts prompted the author to pay special attention to the students' attitudes toward the family and to treat them as a special group.

The data concerning them were collected mainly by means of questionnaires * distributed in 22 colleges and 8 high schools in Peiping, Tientsin, Taiyüan, Tsinan, Shanghai, Hankow, Changsha, Foochow, and Canton and filled out by 1,164 college students (about 21½% of the students enrolled in 1936 in the Chinese colleges) and 536 high-school students. (See Appendix, Table XII.)

The questions (about 90) were designed to secure information about the socio-economic background of the students' families, the methods of education used by the parents, the students' attitudes toward family problems, especially toward parental authority and authority in society.†

Both missionary and purely Chinese schools were represented. The proportion of students of Christian schools questioned was larger than their proportion in the Chinese student body as a whole. But each group seemed to be fairly typical. The differences in attitude of the students of the two groups are mentioned in the text; their answers were tabulated separately. They have not been considerable except for a few cases. About 90% of the questionnaires were distributed among the students by their teachers; the great majority were filled in in classes (in one- or two-hour periods). The students knew that their answers would remain anonymous. About 95% of the questionnaires were printed and answered in Chinese.

The questionnaires aroused great interest among the students. More than half of those distributed were returned. They were

* A combination of questionnaire and schedule.

† Thus, for instance, the students were asked to state the occupation, education, religion, and income of their parents; the amount of their monthly allowance; how they were punished, and what other methods besides punishment their parents used to secure obedience. Other questions were: Did you ever disobey your parents when you were a child? Have you had disagreements with your parents since entering college (or high school)? What were the results of these disagreements? Did you ever criticize your parents? Could you express your criticism freely? Whom do you consult when you have a serious problem (concerning your schoolwork, politics, love affairs, etc.)? The married students were asked about the circumstances of their marriage, the unmarried about the way their marriage would be arranged. A number of questions were designed to gain insight into the political attitudes of the students.

answered very carefully. Many of the students answered all the questions and gave very detailed explanations of their behavior and domestic situations. The checking was done with great discrimination. Many students were not satisfied with the answers they had to check, but formulated them in their own way. The answers of high-school students were less complete and careful, but on many questions they gave interesting information.

The answers were compared with the personal observations of the author and material about Chinese youth provided by Chinese fiction and periodicals.

THE NEW EDUCATION

In old China the purpose of the schools was to prepare the students for civil service examinations, and all educated Chinese were trained as officials. The subject matter of these schools consisted mainly of classics written in the old literary language unintelligible to children. The teachers did not attempt to explain the texts read and memorized by their students. It was only when they were much older that the students were able to understand the ethical precepts they had learned at school.

The modern schools created in the nineteenth century have followed the Western—chiefly Anglo-Saxon and American—pattern. The curriculum has introduced the students to the problems of contemporary life. Although in the early years the Chinese schools imitated the foreigners too mechanically and neglected purely Chinese subjects, this mistake was corrected later and Chinese literature, history, philosophy, geography, etc., found their rightful places in the curriculum. Chinese schools have often been criticized for favoring theory at the expense of practical exercises even in such departments as natural sciences and engineering, but recently serious efforts have been made to correct these defects.

The new schools are more numerous than the old. In old China the majority of Chinese intellectuals acquired their education in family and clan schools or studied with private tutors. At the time of our investigation, about 40 or 50 years after the appearance of the first modern schools, there were in China 108 colleges, universities, normal, and technical high schools with 40,362 students and 3,140 high schools with 541,479 students.⁶ These schools are still inadequate to meet China's needs * and their number is relatively smaller than in advanced Western countries.

* In the United States, with a population less than one third that of China, there were, in 1938, 27,389 high schools with 6,529,500 students and 1,586 institutions of higher education (colleges, universities, etc.) with 1,220,002 students.⁷

Another new feature of modern colleges is the presence of girls in many of them. The high schools are still reluctant to endorse coeducation, but many colleges admit girls who have graduated from special girls' high schools.

Parents and young people can choose among the government schools, the private Chinese institutions, and missionary schools. The first high schools in China were organized by the missionaries (mainly of Protestant denominations) as early as the 1880's. After 1895, when industrialization and the developing reform movement put a premium on Western knowledge, they began to multiply rapidly. By then the government and private individuals had begun to organize schools on the foreign model; in 1898 the first Chinese university was established by the government in Peiping. Soon the purely Chinese schools greatly outnumbered the missionary schools. In 1935-36 only about 20% of the college students and about 12% of the high-school students studied in the missionary schools.⁸

Before, during, and after the Revolution of 1925-27 the missionary schools were often violently attacked by nationalists and radicals as factors in the imperialist encroachment upon China's sovereignty. The Christian educators were reproached for "educating Chinese youth in subservience to foreigners and killing their fighting spirit." Later the Christian schools were subjected to government control; religious subjects were made optional. At the same time the missionary schools made an effort to be more Chinese by appointing Chinese Christians as teachers and administrators.

In the late 'thirties the curricula of the missionary schools did not differ much from those of purely Chinese institutions. But their students were doubtless more exposed to foreign influences and Christian propaganda than the students of other schools.

As the cost of education in the missionary schools is much higher than in government schools and most of the private schools, the former have a much larger proportion of upper-class students than the latter.

HOW THE STUDENTS LIVE

To the majority of the students high school and college have meant a great change in their environment. Most students have chosen to study far from their native cities, in spite of the opposition of their parents. Those who have studied in their native towns more often than not lived in dormitories. The dormitories of the high schools were big halls with 15-20 beds. The majority of the

colleges had separate rooms for each student or double rooms. In the coeducational colleges the dormitories for male and female students were situated at a distance from each other.

The rooms in the dormitories were furnished modestly: a desk, two upright chairs, a bookshelf, and a hard bed with a hard pillow—that was all. But there was scarcely a room without plants, flowers, or pictures on the walls: the descendants of the old Chinese intelligentsia have a highly developed esthetic sense. The photographs adorning these rooms were usually not those of parents, friends, or sweethearts but of the owners themselves—perhaps an expression of the students' interest in their own recently discovered personalities.

Those college students who could not get accommodations in the dormitories lived in small hotels or, less often, in private apartments. Married students usually had their own apartments.

Those who stayed in the dormitories paid about \$150 for room and board in the Christian and \$50 in the government universities. Tuition amounted to \$20 a year in the government and \$100 a year in the Christian universities. The majority of the students had allowances from home. In the group of male students from whom information was secured for this study, the yearly allowances varied from under \$100 to over \$1,000. The majority of the students in the Christian universities received \$300–\$500, in the Chinese universities \$200–\$300. Some boys had scholarships covering part of their expenses and sometimes all their expenses. (These were granted by the Central Government, provincial governments, or missionary societies.) Some students had to earn part of their expenses, some were entirely self-supporting. The proportion of these students was higher in the government universities than in the missionary universities.

The most common methods of earning money were teaching, tutoring, doing odd jobs around the college (library, registration office, etc.), office work, and social work. Not a single student in our group did manual work and this seems to be typical: Chinese tradition would not allow an educated man to do the work of a coolie.

The girls in our group received a higher average allowance—the majority of them came from richer families.

The typical budget of a Shanghai student with an income of \$12 a month was as follows: room, \$3; food, \$5; carfare, \$.50; books, \$2; amusements, \$.50; miscellaneous (haircuts, etc.), \$1. With an income of \$20 a month the budget was: room, \$5; food, \$7; carfare,

\$2; books and magazines, \$3; amusements, \$1; miscellaneous (haircuts, soap, etc.), \$2.⁹

The typical budget of a student in a public senior high school in Peiping was: tuition, \$20; board (in the dormitory), \$40; books, stationery, etc., \$40; miscellaneous expenses, \$16; or a total of \$116 a year.¹⁰

The Chinese students devote much time to their studies. The school makes great demands on them and one should not forget that the difficult Chinese script requires special effort. Sports are quite popular on the campus but are hampered by the heavy curriculum and the traditional negative attitude of scholars toward physical exercise.

NEW INFLUENCES

"It was in the high school in N. that I heard for the first time about service to the community and not to the family only, although the teachers also stressed the importance of filial piety. We were told about the duties of a citizen, about patriotism, and the sacrifices we must make to make China strong. We were taught how to behave at public meetings, how to get along with people, how to keep public parks and premises clean. We learned Western history and got acquainted with the different constitutions. We read the biographies of great Western figures: Lincoln, Washington, Napoleon, Watt, Edison. English fiction acquainted us with Western love, so different from the Chinese. At school I got my first notion of natural science and Western philosophy. At school I heard Western music for the first time." This is how a young friend of the author who spent his childhood in a village in North China and studied in a government high school in Honan spoke of his high-school days.

At college the student became aware of new ethical, cultural, and political problems. He had to choose his position in the great political, national, and social struggles which have been shaking China in the twentieth century. There occurred innumerable discussions in classrooms where courses in economics, political science, sociology, education, history, and literature offered many opportunities to attack contemporary problems. The discussions continued in groups and circles which mushroomed all over the campuses of that time and in private conversations with friends and teachers.

WHAT THEY READ

The list of favorite books secured from a representative group of about 1,600 students * throws light on the influences the students were exposed to and their preferences.†

The modern student who eagerly devours the shabby volumes of a Shanghai publishing house seeks in them something different from what his grandfather hoped to find when his long nails turned over the thin, beautifully printed pages of the old classics.¹¹ The modern youth is not searching for esthetic experiences or intellectual gymnastics. Books are expected to teach him how to think, how to live, what to do, how to reform his private behavior and the society in which he lives.

Both old and modern Chinese books have been read on the campus. The students have not rejected the great ancient literature of their country, but they have made their own choices among the old books and revaluated them.

The modern Chinese students have been as fond of novels of adventure as the young workers and peasants. Love stories have appealed to them too. Of 641 references to favorite old books, 276 were to love stories. *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, so often quoted in the first part of this book, received 186 votes; 230 students mentioned novels of adventure (*The Three Kingdoms* and *All Men Are Brothers*).‡ The old literary treasures so highly valued by the students' forefathers, history, critical essays, and poetry, were mentioned only 135 times (among them *The Book of History* 26 times and *The Four Books*—the Bible of China—only 25 times). As was to be expected, the girls liked sentimental novels more, whereas the boys preferred novels of adventure.

Modern Chinese fiction held first place in the literary preferences of the youth, particularly books dealing with social problems or treating personal relations against a social and historical background. Such, for instance, were *The Family* by Pa Chin and *The*

* About 100 of the students who filled out the questionnaire did not answer the question about their favorite books.

† The answers of high-school and college students questioned for the purpose of this study roughly coincide with other investigations as, for instance, that made by the Peiping Public Library, as well as with the impressions of several professors who were asked about their students' preferences.

‡ Novels of adventure are especially popular with the radical youth. It is interesting that the leader of the Communist party, Mao Tse-tung, interviewed by Edgar Snow, mentioned *All Men Are Brothers* and Yüeh Fei's biography as the favorite books of his youth.¹²

Twilight by Mao Tun. These two writers were next in popularity only to Lu Hsün, "the Chinese Gorky" (who was mentioned 406 times); the woman writer Ting Ling and the historian Kuo Mo-jo were fourth and fifth in order of preference. All these authors were critical of the existing society and had an outspoken Left-wing tendency; they were, however, widely read by students of all political creeds.

Of the nonpolitical writers the most popular, especially with the girls, has been the woman writer and poet Ping Hsin. The satirist Lao She was widely read by Peiping students who loved his powerful vernacular description of familiar Peiping figures: teachers, riksha coolies, peddlers, petty officials.

Books of outspoken Right-wing tendency have been less popular: only 10 of these were mentioned as favorites.

Foreign literature, particularly Russian, English, and American, has an important place in the intellectual life of contemporary educated youth of China. When speaking of their favorite books the students mentioned English and American novels 217 times, Russian novels 162 times; novels written by authors of other nationalities 186 times. Speaking of their favorite authors the students mentioned Gorky more often than any other foreign author.

This popularity of Russian literature is remarkable, especially if one remembers that at the time of our investigation the other great powers had many more means of influencing the cultural life of China than Russia. English has been *the* foreign language in China. Many of the books mentioned by the students as their favorites were required reading. French and German have been taught in many schools. Not so with Russian. In the years following China's break with the Soviets in 1927 there were no Russian schools in China and almost no Russian was taught.

The success of Russian literature can be explained by the fact that the students found in it many problems which were similar to those that confronted them: the conflict of generations, new sexual ethics, the struggle for women's equality, the struggle between Tolstoy's "nonresistance" and the revolutionary attitude toward life. Sympathy with the Russian Revolution has also played a part. Gorky was often named as a favorite even by those who did not mention his books: the young people approved of his ideas although they had not read him.

Not unlike their older brothers, the students still sympathized with *Young Werther's* romantic love and individualism. Dumas' *La Dame aux Camélias* reminded them of their own Chinese

heroes in love with courtesans. Many novels of Dickens were required reading, but *The Tale of Two Cities* was more popular than all the others. Gorky's *Mother* was at the top of the list of favorite foreign books. Was not the heroine of the novel an old Russian woman who helped her son in his revolutionary activities, the ideal mother of a revolutionist? Next came *Les Misérables*, *War and Peace*, *Crime and Punishment*. The outstanding modern Russian writers were almost all represented. Upton Sinclair's *King Coal*, *The Jungle*, and *Boston* were mentioned several times—as well as Pearl Buck's *The Good Earth*, although the Chinese critics rejected this. The girls were fond of *Little Women*, *Pride and Prejudice*, and *Jane Eyre*. Shakespeare was known mainly through Lamb's tales.

The few nonfiction books named as favorites were almost exclusively on political and social science. Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, F. Engels' *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, H. Barbusse's *Stalin*, H. G. Wells's *Outline of History* were quoted most often. Some students even chose *Das Kapital* as their favorite. The Bible was mentioned as a favorite book only 32 times, although there were about 350 Christians among our informants.*

Magazines have been an important source of information on the campus; most popular were the two leading liberal publications: *The Far Eastern Miscellany* and *The Weekly of National Civilization*; *The Analects* published by Lin Yu-tang, Dr. Hu Shih's *Independent Critic*, the radical *World's Knowledge* and *Women's Life* were mentioned frequently. Conservative magazines were mentioned less often.

The questionnaire revealed many students as ardent movie fans. They seemed to appreciate particularly Chinese pictures dealing with social problems, patriotism, and love.

THEIR HEROES

Youth needs models and symbols. Who were the great men admired by the college youth of China in prewar days? Here again the questionnaire provided interesting information.†

There was hardly a student who did not include in his list of six great men, Chinese and foreign, one who was a symbol of the fight for national independence.

* See Appendix, Table XIV.

† Only the answers of college students are dealt with here.

Two names overshadowed all the others: Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek. In the Christian universities Chiang held the first place and Sun the second; this order was reversed in the government universities.

Confucius, the teacher and hero of past generations, still held his own; about one third of the students listed him. The fourth most popular Chinese hero proved to be the great patriot of the Sung dynasty, General Yüeh Fei. Next came the builder of the Chinese Empire, Ch'in Shih Huang-ti, and patriotic contemporary generals like Feng Yü-hsiang, Tsai Ting-kai, the hero of the Shanghai battle of 1932, and General Fu Tso-i, leader of anti-Japanese resistance in North China in 1935-36. Some of the students were still fond of Kuan Kung, the hero of *The Three Kingdoms*, later elevated to the position of a god of war. Representatives of civilian virtues like the Sung dynasty statesman Wang An-shih, noted for his social reforms, or philosophers like Mencius and Mo Ti, found fewer followers.

The choice of foreign heroes revealed that both American democracy and Russian Communism had found adherents among the youth. Lincoln was the most popular foreign hero in the Christian universities, but in the non-Christian group he yielded to Stalin. Lincoln was closely followed by Washington and Roosevelt; the two most popular radical heroes after Stalin were Lenin and Marx. (There is reason to believe that Stalin, Marx, and Lenin were often quoted as substitutes for Chinese Communist leaders whose names in 1937 were officially taboo in China.)

Hitler and Mussolini gathered relatively many votes, but this does not mean that all the students who checked their names had fascist sympathies. The political events of Europe were often represented in China in a somewhat distorted way. The name of Hitler, or Shih-te-lo as he was called in Chinese, had a different meaning in China than in Europe and America. Many students saw in him primarily a man who made his country strong and restored its independence. (The extent of "Versailles slavery" was greatly exaggerated in China.) Mussolini was more a symbol of fascism, but many students saw a nationalist hero in him, too.

And certainly nobody cared in the slightest for the social contents of the Kemal Pasha dictatorship. For the students who mentioned his name he was only a hero who changed the sick man of Europe into the vigorous young man of Anatolia. The frequent appearance of the name of Emperor Haile Selassie reflected the popularity of Ethiopia's fight against Italy for national independ-

ence. In 1935 Lin Yu-tang, for instance, admonished his countrymen to follow Ethiopia's example and resist Japan.

This nationalistic attitude is evidently responsible to some extent for the popularity of Lenin and Stalin. The context in which their names sometimes appeared shows that many Chinese youths appreciated them more for their policies with regard to national minorities and for their attitude toward China than for their Communist ideology.

Only 69 boys and 188 girls checked the name of Jesus, although the majority of the students in our group studied in Christian universities and 128 boys and 168 girls stated their religion as Christian. Several other great men figured among the "runners-up," with Gandhi, Napoleon, and Genghis Khan in prominent places. The democratic "heroes" of Western Europe in the period of appeasement did not appeal to the Chinese youth—Baldwin and Leon Blum were almost never mentioned. Some of the students selected great musicians (Beethoven) and inventors (Edison). An unhappily married young man expressed his admiration for Britain's romantic Duke of Windsor.

PURPOSE IN LIFE

Some of the students were asked what their purpose in life was. The answers are so characteristic of the prevalent mood of the colleges of that time that they are worth quoting.*

The largest group of answers revealed the students' preoccupation with social problems:

"I only think of freedom and the liberation of the Chinese people."

"The aim of my life? To live and struggle for the masses."

"I hope eagerly to live in a rational society. I want to smash this world where men hate men."

"A world of universal happiness without class distinctions, with equal distribution of products and wealth. Customs barriers must be abolished and international good will achieved."

"Bread for all, work for all, high standard of culture for all."

There were young men, however, who were satisfied with:

"Having work to do all the time."

"To achieve a perfect existence."

"To enjoy peace and happiness."

* There are only about 200 answers as this question was included only in part of the questionnaires.

Those who were inspired by the ideals of their scholarly ancestors were not very numerous. Their mentality is best characterized by the following statement: "My ideal is to accomplish a valuable piece of work, to achieve spiritual satisfaction, to lead a quiet life, and have congenial friends."

Those who were concerned with their personal happiness often tried to combine it with service to the community. They wanted: "Comfort in my own clothing, food, and housing and great contributions to society and the nation."

"A comfortable and tender home life. Devotion to study," said a 20-year-old businessman's son and then, evidently realizing that he had Sun Yat-sen, Lenin, and Gandhi among his favorite heroes, added "and service to society."

One student summed up the views of those who wanted to achieve harmony between individual happiness and service to ideals. He said: "Personal life should be active and happy and at the same time one should seek social happiness and progress."

THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

Reading, discussion, and intense preoccupation with political problems have been a vital necessity for the educated youth of contemporary China. Unlike their forefathers, the young Chinese of today are an important factor in the life of their country.

The modern Chinese colleges and high schools at an early date became cradles of political and cultural progress in China. It was a new phenomenon. To be sure, Chinese students in olden times also tried to influence the government and bring about reforms they considered necessary;¹⁸ but these movements, launched by the students of the Imperial College and elderly scholars and officials in the early period of imperial history and later in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, never achieved the dimensions and importance of the student movement in the twentieth century.

By their famous demonstration of May 4, 1919, the Peiping students aroused China against the cession of Chinese territories to Japan planned by the Versailles Peace Conference. Since then the youth has been organized and has repeatedly raised its voice at critical moments. It has helped to mobilize the Chinese people for the fight against the reactionary northern militarists and has taken part in political controversies.

In the period of reaction from 1927-31, cultural and literary problems as well as problems of family and human relations came

more to the fore than in the previous years, but the youth did not forget their political responsibilities and fully realized the interdependence of politics and their personal and family relationships. Politics were eagerly discussed in the youth organizations: in the government-sponsored Kuomintang groups, in the student YMCA, and especially in the illegal Communist party and other radical groups. The military training initiated in Chinese schools after 1925 (and partly before then) continued.¹⁴

The occupation of Manchuria aroused the campus. The students' demonstrations and protests were so violent that in 1933 they caused a crisis in the government: General Chiang Kai-shek resigned for a short period. At the end of 1935, during the negotiations over the establishment of an autonomous government in the North, which was tantamount to the complete subjugation of this part of China by Japan, the student rebellion flared up again. It started in Peiping and spread over all China. Demonstrations were followed by strikes. Spontaneous at the beginning, the movement was soon organized and directed by the Student Union and by the Students' National Salvation Association.

The students expressed their demands in numerous resolutions, petitions, and letters to the local authorities and to the Central Government. The crux of these demands was the organization of national resistance to Japan. In order to create the conditions for a successful fight and to mobilize the broad masses of the people, the students urged the granting of freedom of speech, press, and assembly and the discontinuance of the civil war (against the Soviet districts).

The youth took up the struggle with enthusiasm and courage. Those who were in Peiping in those grim December days of 1935 will never forget the sight of the slim fragile girls and boys, many of them not more than 15 or 16 years old, clad in their thin padded gowns, marching through streets swept by an ice-cold wind and standing for hours before the government buildings waiting for an opportunity to present their demands to the authorities.

The reactionary local government set the police against the youth. The students offered no resistance to the police who attacked them with leather belts, fire hose, and finally with swords. The students kept repeating: "We are all Chinese. Don't fight us, fight the Japanese." All Peiping knew the pathetic story of the 17-year-old high-school student Kuo, who died in the prison hospital of pneumonia contracted in the cold weather and aggravated by a severe beating. It was said that even the policeman guarding

him wept when the dying boy whispered his last appeal for resistance and national unity.¹⁵

During the next year and a half the movement gained in strength and scope, although strikes and demonstrations became less frequent. The students met a good response on the campus. Many teachers, both Chinese and foreign, as well as servants and workers at the schools, sympathized with the students' aims. Later the students went to the countryside and the working-class districts to win over peasants and workers and continued to appeal to the Chinese people at large and to the government. Soon it was clear that these appeals had not been in vain. By 1937 the movement for resistance had spread all over China, to all strata of the population.

There is no doubt that this popular movement was an important factor in the decision of the government to start resistance. In this critical hour the Chinese students played a role their country will never forget.

Why were the students so enthusiastic for national independence and political reform?

In the fight against Japan the Chinese students have had much at stake. They have known that in a Japanese-dominated China they would be excluded from all intellectual occupations. (In Manchuria, four years after the occupation, all Chinese intellectuals were replaced by Japanese.)¹⁶ They have also seen that the economic crisis in China, aggravated by the Japanese aggression, has created severe unemployment among Chinese intellectuals. When, for instance, a Shanghai school advertised in 1935 for a teacher, offering \$15 a month (less than \$5 U.S.) it received 150 applications within two days; a quarter of the applicants were college graduates, 70% high-school graduates.¹⁷

Of even greater importance was the students' knowledge that a Japanese victory would mean the destruction of the young, modern Chinese culture which they hold so dear. They have known that foreign domination would mean unspeakable suffering for their people. The perennial idealism and ardor of youth inspired them to fight. It was the same feeling which sent the French students to the barricades of Paris during the Revolution of 1830, which made the German students fight against Napoleon in 1812 and against the German reactionaries in 1848, and which in Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made the term "student" almost synonymous with "revolutionary." In our own times we see the students of India, Annam, and Siam on the same front of liberation and progress.

THE PARENTS

Thus the high-school and college environment has confronted the growing boys and girls with new ideas and standards different from those of their parents. With some of the youths the traditional ideas cultivated in their parents' homes have been so strong that modern trends have not affected them. Others have accepted the new ideals and have wanted to carry them out in practice. More often than not they have found the first obstacle in their parents.

Who are the parents of the students?

The age of fathers of the college students range from 38 to 70, with the largest number between 45 and 50. The mothers are somewhat younger. The fathers are mainly officials, businessmen, educators, landlords, and professional men.*

About one third of the fathers of the 639 college † boys who gave information about their fathers' education were college men, and an additional sixth of them were educated in modern high schools, in military academies, vocational schools, etc.; the rest were educated in old-fashioned schools (including the 12% of the total who received degrees under the old examination system). As to the fathers of the girl students (449 of them answered this question), more than half were college men and those who had been educated in old-fashioned schools stayed there longer and had scientific degrees. This shows that the fathers who sent their girls to college were themselves usually well educated.‡

In the high-school group the difference between the education of fathers of the boys and of the girls was not so marked. The same proportion of them (about 30%) had college education, yet only about one tenth of the boys' fathers were modern high-school graduates, whereas more than one fifth of the girls' fathers had studied in high schools. The proportion of the fathers with longer and better traditional school records was also higher among the girls' fathers.

The mothers of the girls were better educated too: 4% of the college girls' mothers had college education and 36% had high-school education; the corresponding figures for the boys' mothers were 2% and 19%.

The amount of students' allowances, the list of their fathers' occupations, as well as the number of people with college and high-school education among the students' parents, leaves no doubt

* See Appendix, Table XV.

† The others did not answer this question.

‡ See Appendix, Table XVI.

about the economic and social status of the students' families: they belong to the middle and upper class, with a heavy upper-class majority.* The proportion of upper-class families is higher among the girls than among the boys. Many of the students who have small allowances and have to rely on self-support are children of pauperized middle and upper-class people.

Some of the students' fathers were of the same cultural background as those with whom the New Youth movement had begun the fight twenty years before. Some were the older brothers of the participants, some belonged to the generation of fighters themselves.

ATMOSPHERE AT HOME

When they have returned home for vacations or weekly visits, the students have found that they are no longer treated as little children. "Our parents' attitude of rigid control changed into one of friendly guidance." This remark of a sociology student from Canton is typical of scores of similar ones scribbled by the students on the pages of the questionnaire. "Since we have been in college our parents have confidence in us. They let us take responsibilities. We feel that we are treated as scholars, teachers, and friends," said a girl student who not only felt the advantage of being older but knew that her status as a college student enhanced her position over that of girls who stayed at home.

These experiences are typical—83% of the 645 male college students and 82% of the 430 female college students from whom information was secured were consulted at home either by their father or by their mother or by both.

The children have responded by developing warmer attitudes toward their parents. "I was afraid of my father until I was about 15. Since then father has no longer used his power over me," wrote one of the students.

A girl told of her changed relations with her mother, a woman highly educated in the old style.

"My mother did not love me when I was a child; I did not love her either. Now she is kind to me and I love her very much."

Thus resentment against parents has subsided.

Sometimes the students have developed negative feelings toward their parents as a result of ideological contradictions in the family.

* The students were asked about the income of the family, but this question was often not answered and the majority of those answering gave information which was evidently wrong.

"My attitude toward my family changed after December 9, 1935 (day of the students' demonstration). I felt that they did not understand me," said a radical girl. But as a rule the radical students have displayed the same emotional attitudes toward their parents as the other students.

When comparing the college students' attitudes, as expressed in their descriptions of their feelings,* with the attitudes of the high-school students we see that fewer of them expressed the feeling of fear toward their parents and more had purely positive attitudes toward them.

Criticism of Parents

This warmer attitude on the part of the students does not prevent them from displaying a critical appreciation of their parents' behavior and ideas. For the college student, and often for the high-school student as well, the father is no longer the wise and powerful man of his childhood. The student perhaps unconsciously has become aware of the weakening of the old man's position in the new China and this has influenced his attitude toward his father.

In the questionnaire the students were asked whether they had ever disapproved of their parents' behavior. This was an embarrassing question. According to the teachings of the ancients, a son who finds fault with his father may remonstrate with him in a respectful way, mainly in order to save him from an embarrassing situation.¹⁸ But to admit to strangers that one's father is wrong is unfilial to the highest degree.

This rule still means a great deal to the modern youth. A large majority of high-school students did not answer our question; only 20% of the boys and 16% of the girls of the high-school group dared to admit that they criticized their parents. The college students were less reticent, but even among them 42% of the boys and 38% of the girls did not answer the question. This was by far the highest percentage of "no answers" in the whole questionnaire.† Some of those who did not answer had no criticism to express, but undoubtedly not a few just found it unseemly to express it.

As for the others, only 2 answered in the orthodox old-fashioned way: "Children should not criticize their parents"; 18% of the boys

* In checking the words "fear," "respect," "love," "admiration," etc. in the schedule. See Appendix, Tables VII and VIII, and above p. 245.

† Other questions were not answered by 5-10% of the college students. Another question which the students were reluctant to answer dealt with their disagreements with their parents. The sudden display of inhibitions here shows how seriously the students took the questionnaire.

and 15% of the girls simply said that they found no fault with their parents. The rest—40% of the boys and 47% of the girls—vigorously attacked their old folks and especially “the old man”!

The brunt of this attack was directed against his political views. He was reproached for being “reactionary,” “conservative,” “feudal,” acting “against the trend of the time.” His private life was also weighed and found wanting. He abused his paternal authority. He was “immoral,” “corrupt,” “lazy,” “egotistic,” “too cautious.” He often gambled, smoked opium, frequented brothels. He was seldom accused of drinking: it is not a vice of contemporary Chinese—they have opium smoking instead. If he took a concubine—as about one sixth of the students’ fathers did—his children greatly resented the fact.

Equally frequent and directed against both parents were reproaches for unhygienic habits.

Severe criticism was sometimes uttered by students who did not fail to check the word “respect” when expressing their feelings toward their fathers: they found it too difficult and brutal to part with this conventional formula.

The feelings toward mothers were warmer than towards fathers, and the children’s tendency to assume a more positive attitude as they grew older was more pronounced in their relations with their mothers than with their fathers.* Respect was expressed less often, love and companionship oftener. The mother was no longer associated with punishment, and the grown-up children who had conflicts with their families opposed their fathers more often than their mothers.

The mother was criticized less often and less severely than the father. Her faults—besides political backwardness and unhygienic habits—were mainly gossiping, playing mah-jong, quarreling, ill treatment of young daughters-in-law. The girls reported relatively more conflicts with their mothers and criticized them somewhat more frequently than did the boys. Armed with the superior wisdom provided by home economics classes, they sometimes reproached their mothers for being poor housekeepers. (Knowing how enthusiastic these girls were about the rules drawn up by American textbooks for housewives in San Francisco and Omaha, I doubt whether these reproaches were always justified.)

It is, of course, easier to utter one’s criticisms on an anonymous sheet of paper than to express them at home. Only about two thirds of the students who were critical of their parents told us that

* See Appendix, Tables VII and VIII.

they dared to say what they thought. Others kept their criticism to themselves. But whether expressed or not, the critical attitude remained.

Disagreements

Both high-school and college students reported disagreements with their parents: 68% of the 687 college boys and 61% of the 477 college girls reported disagreements of varying intensities; 15% of the boys and 17% of the girls said that they had none; 17% of the boys and 22% of the girls did not answer the question.*

The main sources of disagreement were marriage problems, politics, education, participation in the students' movement, and recreation; next came questions of modern hygiene and modern fashions, friends of the children, and their future professions; religious problems were apt to cause relatively little disagreement.†

Some of the students had conflicts on many issues; some disagreed with their parents on only one or two points.

The number of disagreements in the families of high-school students was much lower. Only 38% of the 387 boys and 31% of the 149 girls reported having them. The percentage of "no answers" was very high. With the younger boys and girls paternal authority was stronger—as we said above, more of them were afraid of their fathers than was the case with the college students. Moreover, there were fewer reasons for conflict. The high-school students and their parents were younger. The custom of early marriage and betrothal had begun to vanish in the upper and middle classes and there were fewer parents trying to choose mates for their children while they were still in high school. The political consciousness of the children was lower. Their conflicts centered mainly around questions of recreation, schoolwork, and sports.

Whatever the overt reason for disagreement, its deeper cause lies in the different ideology and attitudes of the two generations.

The parents still represent the "family first" idea of imperial Confucianism, the children consider themselves primarily citizens and individuals and not family members.

The best of them want to give their lives to their country and to their ideas. The typical conflict arising in such a case is disclosed in the following explanation of a radical student of the Teachers'

* The rather high percentage of "no answers" indicates that many of our young informants had inhibitions against revealing their domestic situation to strangers. But some of those who did not answer, as far as one can judge from the other answers, had no disagreements.

† See Appendix Table XVII.

College in Peiping, a landlord's son: "The encroachment upon my country's sovereignty and territory stirs my heart to go and save her. I do not want to be a slave who has lost his country. I do not want my countrymen to endure this fate. I want to sacrifice myself to awaken my brethren. This task is difficult and must take a long time. But all my parents want is that I shall graduate and support them with my salary. They always preach: 'Mind your own business.' I think that to guard and protect one's mother country is to be a filial son. I do not care about the opposition of my parents who have no vision."

The conflict arises sometimes even if the youth wants to devote himself to the cause in a more moderate way. The following statement of a son of a country merchant-landlord is typical of many young people: "My parents thought it would be better for me to give up my studies and be a merchant after my graduation from high school. I wanted to go to college in order to serve society."

The less idealistic boys and girls refuse to subordinate their lives to the interests of the family simply because they regard themselves primarily as individuals who have the right to personal happiness. "I do not consider the support of the family the aim of my education," said many of them. "The family members must be educated to rely on themselves and not on the family," declared several students who wanted to put an end to the obligations imposed by the joint family system.

When the young people marry, they want to marry a person they love or at least whom they consider suitable; the young men want to bring home a wife, and not a daughter-in-law for their parents. They want to arrange their marriage themselves, although the majority of them agree to do it in a way which will not hurt their parents.*

But sometimes the youth have represented a point of view which responds less to the needs of their country than the practical attitude represented by the parents. Frequently conflicts have arisen because the young people have wanted to study humanities while their parents have urged them to take up medical or technical studies, i.e., exactly what all the thinkers who have seen the necessity of technical progress in China have advocated.

* The question for the unmarried students: How do you want your marriage to be arranged? was answered as follows: Let the parents choose a mate for you: 2 men and 3 women; let the parents choose and ask for your consent: 18 men (3.5%) and 33 women (6.3%); choose your mate yourself and ask for your parents' consent: 276 men (54.5%) and 320 women (67.7%); decide entirely by yourself: 186 men (36.6%) and 72 women (15%). See also pp. 122 ff.

The interest of young people in sports has found as little understanding in their parents as did their first attempts as children to swim or climb trees. The conflict here has had a deep meaning. The youth are fighting for a new style of life, for a new attitude toward one's body; they want to become strong physically in order to be able to fight. This means more than mechanical imitation of foreign ways, as many parents have thought.

The new Western habits and forms of amusement have often been reasons for friction. Moving pictures have been a cause of numerous conflicts.

One can hardly blame the parents if one realizes what kind of third- and fourth-class American rubbish has been dumped sometimes into the moving-picture houses of Shanghai and other Chinese cities.

"It is disgusting," said an old scholar, a man of learning and taste, after having seen his first—and last—foreign film, which happened to be a G-man movie.

"My father is old fashioned," sighed his young daughter. "He does not appreciate Western culture."

"Why are you going to see these hideous performances? Would it not give you more pleasure to see old Chinese dramas?" Many students have reported domestic controversies along these lines.

The students of medicine and home economics have been especially active in the crusade for modern hygiene—trying to prevent their parents from spitting on the floor, urging them to ventilate their houses and use modern instead of old-fashioned doctors.

These young crusaders for hygiene are sometimes too eager in their imitation of Western habits and rejection of everything Chinese. "I dislike my parents' unhygienic habit of rinsing their mouths after meals," seriously declared a medical student from Changsha. No wonder that many old Chinese scholars shake their heads about this odd foreign culture!

The fad for modern fashions has also caused trouble for the young people, especially in the country and the small cities. The expensive and ridiculous foreign jackets and vests worn by young men are disliked; modern tight dresses outlining the girls' breasts (formerly fashionable women put bandages around them to make them appear flat), and showing their legs through a long split are considered immoral. Many a girl has waged bitter fights with her mother and has secretly implored her tailor to make the sleeves shorter and the gowns tighter than the mother would have had them. A few have ventured to appear before their fathers with

bare legs. The reaction was evidently violent. "I never did it again," confessed one of these young fashion reformers.*

It was to be expected that Chinese parents would not feel happy about their daughters going out dancing. The young girls who only a generation ago were kept in seclusion were now going places and being seen with strangers who held them in a tight embrace.

The girls have had other troubles of their own. Many of them won their right to study in college after a hard fight at home. But they reported fewer conflicts over marriage problems than the boys—the girl who won her right to go to college at the same time won the right to postpone her marriage or even to choose her own husband. But as we have seen above, the girls, both in high schools and colleges in general had less of a struggle with their parents than have the boys. This can probably be explained by the fact that many of the girls who were allowed to go to college were their fathers' darlings. Moreover, the majority of the girls belonged to higher economic and social strata than the boys; they were less radical, and thus had less friction with their fathers.

Religion

Many students have different religious beliefs from their parents. Very few young people whose families were Buddhists, Taoists, or Confucianists have kept the faith of their parents. In the Christian schools some of them have been converted to Christianity. The majority join the great mass of agnostics who were already numerous in the previous generation. It seems that the government schools have encouraged this attitude. Not all the Christians have been able to maintain their children's faith.† A similar situation in the West would have led to violent family discord. Not so much in China. Only 12% of the boys and 14% of the girls in colleges had disagreements with their parents over religious questions (the corresponding figures for the high schools were 8% and 2%); and only in six cases did the students characterize these disagreements as "real conflicts."

The great Chinese tradition of religious tolerance has extended its blessings to the young men and women of the modern genera-

* Feet and legs were the parts of a woman's body most cautiously guarded from men's eyes in old China. It is characteristic that a Chinese student who was not shocked to see a nursing mother with bare breasts should blush when a middle-aged foreign woman removed her shoe in his presence. This attitude probably originated in the custom of binding the feet, which distorted women's feet and made their legs too thin.

† See Appendix, Table XIII.

tion. Long before our students were born, it was quite common to have three religions represented in one educated family: the father, an official and scholar, would be Confucianist; the mother and grandmother would prefer Buddhism as more human and warm; and an uncle or elder brother, a poet and dreamer, would find an answer to his spiritual cravings in the wisdom of Lao Tzu, prophet of Taoism.

The fathers have possessed the virtue of tolerance to the highest degree. Confucianists or atheists, they have not opposed their sons and daughters being converted to Christianity, although they could not understand them; they have not even minded their failure to attend religious ceremonies, provided they abstained from too conspicuous demonstrations, and the children have usually complied with these demands. "They do not know anything about Christianity, but they respect my freedom of worship" was a statement often heard.

If there has been intolerance in the family it has come mainly from the mother or grandmother. Devout Buddhists, they have been at times deeply hurt when the children have refused to worship Buddha or Kuan-yin, the Goddess of Mercy. They also have been more insistent on their children's attendance at ancestor-worship rites. Nonreligious girls have suffered more than their brothers, perhaps because they were more under their mothers' domination than the boys.

There have been more religious conflicts in Christian families when the children have not followed the faith of their parents. Such cases have been frequent. Many young people declared that the naïve fundamentalist faith of their parents—early Christian converts—did not satisfy them. Their university studies and readings in Chinese and Western philosophy drove them to agnosticism or religious attitudes of a more sophisticated kind. More than one student declared that he did not approve of his parents' "Christian superstitions." "My parents believe in Christianity so ardently that they are almost superstitious," said a 24-year-old medical student from Changsha. "They say that God and Hell really exist, that everything in the Bible is true. I think that to believe in a religion means to cultivate personal virtues, and thus one's belief is closely related to one's everyday life. I do not believe in Heaven and Hell and in the letter of the Bible."

It is interesting, however, that only a few students spoke of Christianity as the religion of imperialism—a feeling so common among the youth in the 'twenties and early 'thirties: in 1937 Japan

was the enemy and Christian England and America possible allies.

But it seems that in Christian families parents have been less tolerant when they have seen their boys and girls drifting away from their faith—perhaps they have felt that they were losing face with their religious communities. Also, the children have been less willing to comply with the forms of the Christian ritual in which they did not believe than to participate in ancestor worship in families belonging to a traditional Chinese faith.

Compromise

Thus modern Chinese sons and daughters are far removed from the ideal of olden times when, according to the *Li Chi*, a son, even after the death of his parents, had to love what his parents loved, to revere what they revered.¹⁹ The younger generation now have their own views and try to live their lives in accordance with these views, despite their parents' opposition.

In some families, however, there has been perfect harmony between parents and children: either the old and the young have had the same ideas or the parents have been especially kind and the children submissive.

"I had no conflicts with my parents. During my boyhood they told me what I was to do. Now they know that I am a prudent boy. They give me much freedom and let me do anything that is good for me," said a 22-year-old student of history, a moderate nationalist, son of a retired official.

"My selection of a profession and other actions in life are dominated by the idea of national salvation and the expulsion of the invaders. My mother is as virtuous as Yüeh Fei's mother. She taught me the same things. There is no conflict whatsoever between us," said a Cantonese boy, son of a widowed high-school teacher.

Some fathers have succeeded in keeping their children in such a state of subordination based largely on fear that the children have not dared express their own opinions. There have been no conflicts in such families either.

"Our parents can beat and scold us. How can we dare contradict them?" sullenly commented a student from Changsha.

"In a family influenced by Confucianism there is no possibility of the children having different ideas from their parents," said a student from Canton.

The old education in the spirit of obedience weighed heavily upon the attitude of the youth. Many of the students of the late

'thirties could have repeated the words of their elder brother Tan Shih-hua who was a college student in the early 'twenties. Explaining why he was unable to reject the marriage imposed on him by his parents, he said: "It was not in vain that since my babyhood I had been taught good manners by my uncle, my grandmother, my teachers, and my mother, whose last words were: 'Never fight, Shih-hua.' " 20

Overt conflicts have also been absent in families in which the children have decided that they could not expect any understanding from their parents. They have kept their ideas and activities to themselves and have tried to postpone the inevitable showdown.

The same picture of outward harmony has been presented when the parents have capitulated to modern trends and let the children do what they liked.*

It would be wrong, however, to imagine that all the families of our informants in which disagreements were reported were torn by constant struggles and violent scenes with sons running away from home to escape an unwanted marriage or being subjected to house arrest, etc. There were cases of this kind in prewar China, as can be seen from numerous newspaper advertisements admonishing runaway sons to return to their heartbroken fathers and mothers. But such cases were relatively rare among the students of our group. Only a few designated their disagreements with their parents as "real conflicts."

In all other cases there were only "differences of opinion" and domestic peace was at least outwardly preserved, most often by means of a compromise.

Twenty-five to thirty years ago, at the beginning of the protest movement, the youth of that day wanted to break with this tradition of compromise and displayed much intransigence in their fight for personal freedom. The parents of that time were unyielding too. They were still sure of themselves and their rights. Filial insubordination was unheard of; not to fight against it meant to lose face before their friends and relatives. But times have changed. Parents are more used to the new ways. There are modern marriages, headstrong sons and daughters in many families, and parents know that they will not be condemned by public opinion if they let the children have their own way.

* Harmonious relations were reported (in the college group) by 31 boys and 35 girls; pure compulsion, by 7 boys and 2 girls; 37 boys and 70 girls reported that their parents did not interfere with their activities, although sometimes this was achieved only after a conflict.

As to the sons, at the time of our investigation in 1937 the radicals who had been the most ardent fighters for personal freedom were primarily interested in resisting Japan; all other issues were subordinated to this fight which, among other things, required a united national front. "And would it not be logical to start by achieving unity in your own family?" wrote the author of a radical pamphlet popular among students in 1936-37.²¹ "We don't want to sacrifice our ideas and shall fight for them, but we should not treat the members of our families as traitors, as enemies. They are patriotic too. Better try to win them over to our cause. Don't forget that yours is not an individual conflict but a conflict of generations. Promise them not to expose yourself to danger. Ask for advice and listen to their arguments patiently. . . ." A young friend of the author of the pamphlet tried this method and achieved excellent results. The ideas of his people gradually changed and instead of hampering him they helped him. From personal observation I know that many students heeded this advice.

Compromises have often been effected with the help of the mother.* After long conversations each party in the conflict would yield on some point; the face of the father and of the son would be saved and peace would be restored. Thus, a son who refused to marry the girl his parents had chosen for him promised to obtain his parents' approval of his own choice. When the disagreement had been caused by political differences, discussions were discontinued; the son pretended not to participate in demonstrations and the parents pretended to believe him. Modern clothes were not worn in the parents' presence, and sportsmen visiting with their parents abstained from swimming and playing "undignified foreign games" disliked by the local people; but when the parents came to visit their children in Peiping or Shanghai they did not object to the dresses worn by their daughters or the athletic exploits of their sons on the campus. Sometimes the compromise assumed the form of a deal: you marry the girl we choose for you, and you may study in Peiping; or: you may study political science instead of engineering, but you must promise not to take part in students' demonstrations.

The relations of the two brothers Liu, whom the author knew personally, are typical. They were strongly attached to each other, although they belonged to diametrically opposed political camps:

* The Communist leader Mao Tse-tung tells in his autobiography of his mother playing just such a role. Together with her sons she opposed the father. But she criticized any open display of emotions or open rebellion. It was not the Chinese way, she said.²²

the younger of the two was an active radical and the other, who was more than thirty years older and the head of the family, was a corrupt official, a staunch conservative, and an advocate of collaboration with Japan (although he always stressed that this collaboration was possible only under conditions which would preserve China's dignity). He was exactly the kind of man his brother considered an enemy of modern China.

The relation had undergone a severe test in 1930 when the younger brother was arrested soon after his return from Russia. Severely beaten in prison, he was about to be executed when a prison warden suddenly felt sympathy for the young revolutionist and agreed to send a message to his powerful elder brother. The younger Liu had little hope left, he knew that in these cruel times of civil strife kinship ties were sometimes forgotten, and that too much was at stake for the upper class of China in this fight with the Communists for them to respect Confucian virtues.

But Mr. Liu senior thought differently. Communist or not, the boy lying on putrid straw in a Honan prison was his younger brother. Through contacts, old friends, and money the young radical was released. In 1935-37 he was again active—against the Japanese and to a certain extent against the government in which his brother participated. Mr. Liu senior understood perfectly well what his younger brother was doing, yet he did not interfere with his activities. The younger brother in return scrupulously complied with the house regulations, attending all the family feasts, paying formal respect to his mother, elder brother, and sister-in-law. He even consented to make the traditional *k'o t'au* (touching the earth with one's forehead in a deep bow) on New Year's Day. He always spoke of his brother respectfully, stressed his kindness and abilities, and did not criticize him even when speaking with friends with whom he was very candid. It was not he but his wife who told the author the unsavory origin of the Lius' fortune which had been accumulated mainly during the three years that the elder brother was a local magistrate.

The students were asked to state the results of disagreements with their parents. The evaluation of their answers was extremely difficult. The same situation was often interpreted by different students in different ways. Many students who yielded to their parents admitted that they only pretended to yield and in reality continued to do what they liked (more than half who yielded or compromised gave this answer). Of the 3 students who said they had pretended to give in—for instance, by falsely promising their families not to take part in student demonstrations—one qualified

the settlement as a compromise (we saved each other's face), another called it his victory (I do what I like, after all), and the third said that he had had to yield (I have to conceal my actions).

The answers must be interpreted as approximate expressions of the students' feelings about their home situation and not as objective statements.

It seems that the youth did not feel they had come out too badly in this domestic struggle. To be sure, the majority of the disagreements and conflict situations admittedly ended in compromise. But in their deals with their parents the students usually got the better end. The girls, who had fewer conflicts, turned out to be somewhat more conciliatory than the boys (according to their own statements).*

Moreover, only a few declared that they yielded because their parents were right and they were wrong. Others did it because they did not want to hurt their parents—an explanation that reveals emotional attachment but not complete subordination to the parents. More than half of those who made concessions gave in also because they were afraid that if they went against their parents, all their relatives and neighbors would condemn them—community and kinship control was still strong. Some were afraid that too stubborn resistance would bring about a break with the family, and some found an escape in the old formula "Parents are always right."

About two fifths of the boys and almost one third of the girls admitted that they were induced to make concessions by their fear of losing economic support. Some quoted this economic reason as the only one, and some accompanied it with other considerations. This brings into the situation a note of cynicism incompatible with the ancient interpretation of filial piety.

Nevertheless, the number of admitted defeats and half defeats was considerable, even according to the students' own statements. Parents are evidently still something to be reckoned with in China.

Whom Do the Children Trust?

Whatever the emotional and conventional ties binding the students to their parents, few parents have kept enough of their children's respect and affection to be their only confidants in important problems, and many of them are excluded completely from

* The fact that only 18% of the young men were married and a part of them were married to girls of their own choice shows that many students really succeeded in avoiding or at least postponing the conventional marriage.

their children's confidence. The children's principal confidants are often their friends or teachers. Thus 45% of the male college students, when they wanted advice about their schoolwork, political activity, future profession, and personal problems (love, honor, etc.), consulted only friends or teachers; 8% consulted sisters or brothers only; 15% spoke with their parents only; and 32% consulted family members and outsiders. The advice of friends is more eagerly sought by boys; the girls are more family minded. Thus the college girls turned to outsiders exclusively in only 26% of the cases; in 11% of the cases their confidants were their sisters and brothers, in 29% one of the parents or both of them, and in 34% they consulted family members and outsiders. The older the children, the longer they stay at school, the more consistently they turn to their friends and teachers for advice. High-school students are less dependent on outsiders than college students.

The division of roles between the father and mother generally remains traditional. The father is consulted more by the sons, the mother by the daughters. The father is considered more competent in matters concerning schoolwork, the choice of profession, or even politics, although not many fathers enjoyed their sons' confidence and respect sufficiently to be consulted on political problems. The mother's advice is sought when emotional matters are involved. And of course the mother's help is asked for whenever one falls sick. Discussion of politics is decidedly outside the mother's sphere.

The position of the father as adviser is much more shaken when the children grow up than that of the mother.

It is possible that the students lost confidence in their parents to an even greater extent than they said. Many "consultations" with parents were purely conventional. Their sons consulted them because they did not want them to lose face. (Not to consult one's parents is unfilial!)

Thus a student in Peiping kept writing to his father, a small-town businessman, about his research work, although he realized very well that his father could not understand it. "If I were at home I would have to consult my father," said another young man, active in the student movement, although he had a poor opinion of the political wisdom of his conservative parent.

What Does His Home Mean to a Modern Youth?

"He was suddenly overwhelmed by a strange feeling of solitude. It was as if all the other members of his family were far away, as if

they lived in a different world. He felt cold as though he were oppressed by unspeakable sorrow and anguish. Nobody cared for him, nobody sympathized with him. He was utterly alone in this strange environment.”²³ This description of a young man’s feelings at home is repeated many times in the seven hundred pages of Pa Chin’s *The Family*. The hero feels differently when he is among his friends or in the editorial office of the magazine he is editing. “Here he feels that he is not an outsider, not a lonely man. He loves the other young men around him; they love him. He understands them; they understand him. He can trust them; they can trust him . . . But when he returns home and enters the big drawing room he feels himself again alone, as in a desert. . . .”²⁴

The popularity of Pa Chin’s novel among the students of prewar China suggests that many of them saw in the picture he draws, a description of their own relations with their families. There are other indications confirming this view.

We have seen that many of the students turn for advice not to their family but to outsiders. One of the reasons the Chinese adopted the Anglo-American boarding-school system rather than the type of school organization prevalent in Germany, France, Switzerland, or Russia is that the students are eager to study as far away from home as possible. “This system seems to work splendidly in China,” said the principal of the Methodist high school in Fokshan (near Canton) in a conversation with the author. “The parents are glad to send their children away and the children are happier at school than at home.” In Yenching University in Peiping so many students wanted to spend their vacations on the campus and not return home that the practice had to be forbidden lest the students lose contact with the realities of Chinese life.

When asked whether they preferred to spend their leisure time at home or outside, about three fifths of the boys and more than two fifths of the girls said that they preferred to be away; only one fifth of the youth of both sexes declared their preference for home; others were undecided. These answers can be explained partly by the students’ interest in outdoor activities, although only a minority of those who preferred to be away spoke of their desire to engage in sports, etc. Other factors seem more important. Chinese middle- and upper-class homes are uncomfortable, noisy, and lack privacy. But what contributes most to drive the students away from home is doubtless the psychological atmosphere, the feeling of a gap between the generations.

THE MODERN FATHER

At first it seemed strange that modern fathers, who had studied in modern universities, should be criticized for the same reasons as their old-fashioned contemporaries whose education was limited to the study of the "Sacred Books." They too are often blamed by their children for being "too domineering," "feudal," "unable to understand new trends," for arranging unwelcome matches for their children, for spitting on the floor, and unhygienically dipping their chopsticks into the common bowl.

On the other hand, some old fathers who have had little contact with modern trends live in harmony with their modern and even radical sons.

These two facts are less paradoxical than they appear. As we know, it was not easy to be modern in prewar China. The graduate of a modern college when living in the old Chinese environment was often absorbed by it completely and twenty years after graduation had only a faint recollection of modern ideas. On the other hand, some of the fathers with traditional training either accepted some modern ideas in one way or another or decided not to go against the trends of the time, although they could not understand them.

As always in periods of transition, there is between the extremes of the completely new and the completely old a no man's land where the old is exposed to the fresh wind of the new trends and the new withers away in an old environment. Nevertheless a statistical analysis of data secured from our informants permits us to establish a line of demarcation between modern and old-fashioned families. The parent-child relations differ in the two types of families and the atmosphere in modern families is better.

But this is true only of those families in which the father has had a college education. Our material does not reveal such a difference between families with fathers who were high-school graduates (there were some 250 of them), and purely old-fashioned families. This confirms the impression given by Chinese middle-aged high-school graduates—they are not modern. The half-modern education they received in the high school of thirty or thirty-five years ago has left no mark on them.*

* E. R. Hughes, an English missionary and educator who observed China for many years, comes to a similar conclusion about the high-school graduates: "The bulk of the graduates of secondary schools were not fitted to take professional or business posts, not even to make reasonably good teachers." ²⁵

The most striking fact is that children have much more confidence in their fathers when they are college educated. It is interesting to note that, unlike the degree of his education, the father's profession and religion do not seem to influence the attitude of his children toward him.

TABLE XIII
EDUCATION OF FATHER AND CONSULTATIONS WITH HIM

Topic of Consultations	Percentage of Boys Who Checked		Percentage of Girls Who Checked	
	<i>Modern Father</i>	<i>Old-fashioned Father</i>	<i>Modern Father</i>	<i>Old-fashioned Father</i>
<i>Schoolwork</i>				
Father only	17	4	6	6
Father participating	56	22	36	28
<i>Politics</i>				
Father only	13	3	13	6
Father participating	34	11	51	25
<i>Love</i>				
Father only	5	—	3	—
Father participating	21	9	25	14

Some modern fathers consider beating a sound method of education, but college men's sons are beaten less often than the sons of old-fashioned fathers (by 8%). This better treatment is rewarded by better behavior and warmer attitudes of the children. The sons of modern fathers deceive them less often.

Many college men, even young ones, assume at home the traditional mien of the stern father, but fear plays a much smaller part in their relations with their children.

The children of college men are practically the only ones to use the term "companionship" to describe their relationship with their fathers. Fifty-seven per cent of college men's sons checked only positive feelings when speaking about their attitudes toward their fathers as compared to 47% of old-fashioned men's sons.

College men are more respected by their children. Not only was the word "respect" more often checked in the questionnaire by children of college-educated fathers, but also more of them said that their fathers were good and that they did not deserve criticism.

This improvement of relations accompanying the transition from the severe treatment of children by the patriarch of olden times to the milder attitude of modern fathers is not limited to China. Many experts on Western families believe that there is

more affection between parents and children today than there was a generation ago,²⁶ and this is doubtless due to the milder treatment of children in the twentieth century.

Yet the college men's children, and especially their daughters, do not relate substantially fewer disagreements with their parents than other children.* The number of disagreements connected with marriage and religious problems decreases (college men's daughters especially suffer less from parental interference), but those caused by the young people's political views and activities even increase, whereas the number of disagreements on other issues remains almost unchanged.

This, however, does not contradict our impression that parent-child relations have improved as a result of the new trends.

If the children of modern fathers who talk with them more about politics have more disagreements with them on this issue than the sons of old-fashioned people it does not mean that their relations are worse. The atmosphere in such a family in spite of some heated discussions may be better than in families in which the son simply does not speak with his father about politics. In the landlords' and peasants' families where the proportion of college fathers is the lowest, there are more radical sons and daughters but fewer political conflicts than in any other group. Only 2 among 90 sons and daughters (college students) in this group ever discussed politics with their parents. In order to have a political discussion the young people must have some common language, some prospect of mutual understanding with their fathers, and this is more often the case when the father is modern. It is also interesting that the college fathers, according to their children, score more victories on political issues and succeed more often in keeping their sons from radicalism than old-fashioned fathers (comparison made in groups of the same economic level).

The analysis of individual cases reveals that 36% of college men's sons and daughters accepted paternal authority as compared with 19% of old-fashioned men's sons and 29% of their daughters.†

It seems that modern education and modern trends bring the father-son relations closer to the Confucian ideal of genuine love and respect, free of fear and compulsion. A filial modern son of a modern father will not only support him but do it with a happy countenance, just as the old sages wished!

Yet disagreements in modern families exist and are bound to

* See Appendix, Table XVIII.

† See Table XIV, p. 309.

continue. It is the sign of the times. China is no longer a static civilization where the sons, generation by generation, simply learn from their fathers the same old methods of work and appreciation of the same values. Now each decade brings new problems and new solutions. The father who does not keep up with the times inevitably becomes backward, even if he was trained in a modern school and belonged to the progressives of his day. China is no longer a country where the old man enjoys absolute authority and the young man has nothing to say. The youth now feel their new rights and responsibility. The active modern son takes up the fight where the father left off, he has to tread that part of the road abandoned by the father in his retreat and then go farther.

Since China started on the path of dynamic development, she has experienced the same conflict between the generations that other countries and epochs have known before her. Even if the father is not a "feudal reactionary" he and his son often cannot understand each other. Again and again the students' stories of their disagreements with their fathers recalled Leopold von Wiese's description of the father-son conflicts in the West: "The father thinks in terms of career, family maintenance and a respected name. . . . The son, however, if he is a noble soul, wants the father to hand him the torch of Eternal Light that emanates from the stars." ²⁷

It is not without significance, of course, that the Chinese students are so fond of Russian literature. The situation in Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons* that we found so different from the relations between the young eighteenth-century hero of *The Dream of the Red Chamber* and his father has been reproduced very often in China since 1911 in an atmosphere that reminds us of prerevolutionary Russia. Echoes of other countries and epochs come to one's mind when one listens to complaints of Chinese boys and girls. We think immediately of the German youth of the beginning of the twentieth century and of the first decade after the defeat of 1918, fighting for social revolution and sexual freedom in the stifling atmosphere of the German petty bourgeois home. We think of the young first generation of Americans brought up in free American schools in conflict with their immigrant fathers who cling to the patriarchal customs of their Polish villages, Balkan mountains, and the villages of South China.

It is still difficult for the Chinese son and especially for the daughter to express demands that bring them into disagreement with their father. Of the high-school students who answered the

Lynds' questionnaire in 1924 only 2% said that they had no disagreements with their parents, and the proportion of those who did not answer this question (and possibly had no disagreements also) was not high.²⁸ In China 20% of the college students and 15% of the high-school students who answered the question about disagreements said that they had none and the proportion of those who did not answer this question was very high, especially in the case of the high-school students.*

But even for high-school students disagreements in China center around much more important topics than in America. In America the main reasons for conflict are such questions as the use of the family automobile, grades at school, the suitability of various recreations, and the household chores, whereas in China even the high-school youth are involved in politics and have to fight against unwelcome marriages.†

In a way the generation conflict is much more acute in contemporary China than in America. Except for the immigrants and their children there is no conflict between the generations in America. As Folsom puts it, "American youth is slavishly imitative of its parents in general attitudes and in tastes and standards of consumption."²⁹

A PERSPECTIVE FOR THE FUTURE

The new generation of educated Chinese middle- and upper-class parents is determined to continue the improvement in family relations brought about by modernization.

The overwhelming majority of the students whom we questioned felt that reforms were necessary in Chinese family life.‡ Their ideal was a small family consisting of husband, wife, and children, although only a few of them felt that they had no obligations toward their aged parents. They believed that paternal authority should decrease and that the status of the young should be raised. The girls insisted also that the position of women should

* See Appendix, Table XIX.

† The conflicts about household chores do not exist in the upper-class families in China where there are enough servants. In the middle-class families the mothers will not let their educated sons do housework, and are even lenient with their daughters. Moreover, the majority of Chinese high-school students live in the dormitories whereas Middletown children live at home.

‡ Only 4% of the male and 3% of the female students denied the necessity of change. "The old family system provided a sound foundation for the Chinese state for many generations and it would be unnecessary, nay dangerous, to change it," said some of them.

be improved. They were partisans of new educational methods stressing the duties of citizenship.

Some of the students wanted these changes to come gradually; the radicals and even a few students with democratic and fascist tendencies advocated revolutionary changes. Many expected that changes in family life would automatically follow changes in society as a whole.

Which of these theories would they put into practice? How would they educate their own children? How much freedom would they allow them?

When the students were asked to answer these questions, they revealed themselves as more moderate than has been suggested by their criticism of their parents. Tradition weighs heavily not only on the fathers but also on the sons. Only 6 college students, however (of the 828 who answered these questions), insisted on preserving the old paternal power and wanted to decide everything for their future children, including their education, recreation, selection of friends, political affiliations, marriage, etc. About three fifths of the boys and a little over half the girls advocated a liberal program of education; they were in favor of complete freedom for their children or a combination of freedom with parental guidance and advice (but no orders), or wanted to reserve for the parents only the right to decide about their children's education and to let the children decide the rest.

But a little over one fifth of the future parents wanted to extend their control also to the selection of the future profession of their children, their recreation, and their friends. More than one tenth thought it necessary to interfere even in such problems as their children's religion, marriage, and political affiliations. "I shall not allow them to associate with Communists," said a conservative young man. "I would not allow my son to marry a dancer or a social butterfly," said his radical fellow student.

When asked specifically about the arrangement of their future children's marriage, the overwhelming majority came out either for full freedom for their children or for freedom of choice within the limits of their parents' approval. The partisans of full freedom had more adherents, but the followers of the "middle way" were also numerous, including not a few radical students.

The students will certainly do less than they promise unless the near future brings about basic social and economic changes. But the fact that their fathers carried out some of the ideas of their own

youth encourages the belief that in the future family life and relations will continue to improve.

ATTITUDES TOWARD AUTHORITY

After the answers of the students were systematized, tabulated, and used as material for the collective picture of a generation, an attempt was made to reconstruct pictures of individual boys or girls. The author tried to evaluate students' attitudes toward parental (mainly paternal) authority and to classify them into types.*

This procedure not only allowed the author to go from the abstract "collective figure" to the living individual but also threw new light on the collective picture itself. In describing the group more space was necessarily devoted to new revolutionary elements than to old traditional elements. A study of typical individuals will help us better to understand the relative strength of the old and new attitudes in the life of the Chinese upper- and middle-class youth at the end of a great period of Chinese history.

I have defined authority (p. 24) as "a relationship of domination-subordination which is based not on pure coercion but on the acknowledged superiority of the bearer of authority."³¹

Attitudes toward authority can be classified as follows:

I. Authority accepted. II. Lack of authority. III. Authority rejected. IV. Authority shaken.

I. Authority Accepted

A. *Authority accepted as a tradition*—a situation most closely approaching that which existed in old China. The young people classified in this group when characterizing their relations with their parents spoke of love and admiration, often combined with fear and respect. They did not criticize their parents. (Criticism, as we have said, is incompatible with the traditional form of respect.) They had no conflicts with them. If there was a difference of opinion, they yielded—and really yielded, without mental reservations. When explaining why they yielded they checked the phrase they and their forefathers had been taught to accept as an unshakable truth: "Because parents are always right," or admitted that they were afraid of public opinion or simply felt that dis-

* This classification was influenced to a great degree by that used in the investigations of the Institute of Social Research especially: German salaried employees and wage earners in 1931-32 and Swiss youth in 1934.³⁰

obedience is a monstrous thing. They consulted their fathers when they needed money or a new dress or had problems about their future profession or schoolwork, but did not go to them when they had to decide whether Chiang Kai-shek or the Communists were right or when they were slighted at school or fell in love. (Many of them however turned to their mothers with their personal problems.) Some of those who were married admitted being unhappy but did not list a conflict in connection with their marriage.

B. *Authority accepted voluntarily*—and in many cases rationally. This is the most positive type of authority: the children consider paternal authority as fully legitimate. Their statements about their feelings toward their parents mentioned only love, respect, and admiration. Fear was never mentioned, but a new feeling—that of companionship—which had not existed in father-son relations in old China sometimes came to the fore. They did not criticize their parents and some even maintained passionately: "My parents have none of the bad features [mentioned in the questionnaire]." "My parents are good and modern." They had no conflicts with their parents. "Our parents understand modern trends." Or: "Our ideas are similar." "Our parents allow us freedom within certain limits. There are no conflicts. Any disharmony is dispelled by explanations." "Father is well educated and clever." If there was a difference of opinion and the children yielded or compromised (such compromises were evidently due to the parents' attempt to save their children's face), they did it because they were persuaded that their parents were right (they did not check the conventional formula, which is such a cliché in China that it is often devoid of real meaning, but used their own version stressing the rational acceptance of parents' views). Some yielded because they loved their parents very much and did not want to hurt them. They consulted their fathers (and mothers) eagerly and in many cases the parents were the only confidants in important problems although the children lived far away from home.

A few ventured to remark that the hygienic habits of their parents were not up to date. In these cases they were always able to "remonstrate gently" in the manner allowed and even prescribed by the old sages.

II. Lack of Authority

A. *Parents' will enforced*. The situation in this (small) group was close to pure coercion. Many students of this group showed no sign of a positive attitude toward their parents, some merely said

that they respected their fathers (this, as we know, was often only a conventional formula). Most of them showed signs of a broken will. They had had conflicts with their parents and afterward yielded completely, ceasing to participate in the student movement or to see their friends openly, etc. They admitted that they were compelled to yield and almost always adduced their economic dependence on their parents as the main cause of their surrender.

B. *Parents abstain from exercising their authority.* The youth of this group had full freedom. The parents did not exercise their authority even in the form of advice and guidance. They were not consulted and were often criticized, sometimes openly. In most cases their children said that they loved and respected them.

III. Authority Rejected

Those whose attitude we characterized as refusal to accept paternal authority were quite different. They wanted to assert their own wills against their parents. All of them had conflicts or serious differences of opinion. They neither yielded nor compromised. Often they were able to make their parents comply with their wishes. Sometimes the conflicts remained unsolved, each side insisting on its point of view. (For example, a student would refuse to marry the girl chosen by his parents and his parents would refuse to break the engagement; a student would continue to take part in the student movement and his parents would continue to reproach him for it.) Sometimes the student only pretended to yield in order not to be deprived of his allowance, and continued to follow his own bent. The greatest concession sons and daughters of this group made to their parents was to "save their face" by declaring that they yielded, while in reality their parents knew perfectly well that their children did as they pleased. They seldom spoke with their fathers about important problems (their relation with their mothers however often remained affectionate). When characterizing their attitude toward their fathers they often omitted to mention respect and love, or combined it with fear or desire to avoid their fathers.

Such an attitude, if the parents had insisted on their prerogatives, should logically lead to severe conflicts. Such cases are well known in modern China. One of the heroes of Pa Chin's novel broke with his parents when he refused to marry a girl selected for him by his grandfather. A young research worker interviewed in Peiping broke with his father for ideological reasons. Yet there

were only two cases of students who had broken with their families among our informants (both boys)—it is possible that students who had broken with their families would have been unable to continue their studies.

IV. Authority Shaken

Between those who accepted and those who rejected paternal authority there was a group of students belonging to families in which paternal authority was shaken—sometimes slightly, sometimes seriously. These students did not yet dare to defy their parents openly. If there were conflicts, they were willing to compromise—but not yield completely. Sometimes they postponed a showdown by avoiding the issue, by not informing their parents of their activities and plans for the future. In more serious cases they excluded their parents from their confidence, admitted that they felt no love and even no respect for their fathers, criticized them, lied to them, and stressed their economic dependence from their parents. In less serious cases they still professed respect and love for their parents, consulted them along with outsiders and sisters and brothers, but did not hesitate to admit that their own opinions were different, that they disliked their fathers' political views, their mothers' gossip, or their parents' habit of spitting on the floor.

Some young people in this group, when relating their differences of opinion or conflicts with their parents, did not criticize them: "My parents cannot help having such views—there is a conflict between the generations," they declared. They loved and respected their parents but did not fear them and did not consult them on important problems. The disagreements almost never achieved the dimensions of real conflicts.

Table XIV shows that in the group of college students we investigated only somewhat more than one quarter accepted paternal authority completely. In the families of almost two fifths paternal authority was shaken; the parents of 10% of the boys and 8% of the girls abstained from exercising their power and the parents of 4% of the boys and 2% of the girls compelled their children to obey their orders.

It is significant that among the students there was a group that accepted their parents' authority voluntarily. The largest group of this kind was encountered among the sons and daughters of fathers who had college education. The daughters of fathers with traditional education were somewhat more willing than sons to accept

the authority of their fathers. This was probably due to the fact that the girls who received their fathers' permission to go to college had warm emotional relations with them.*

When comparing the students of different political views it was clear that the radicals were less willing to accept their parents' authority than the moderates.

TABLE XIV
ATTITUDE TOWARD AUTHORITY
(687 Male and 477 Female College Students. In percentage.)

<i>Education of Father:</i>	Male Students			Female Students		
	<i>College</i>	<i>Traditional</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>College</i>	<i>Traditional</i>	<i>Total</i>
I. <i>Authority accepted</i>						
A. As a tradition	22	13	17	19	19	20
B. Voluntarily	14	6	8	17	10	13
II. <i>Lack of authority</i>						
A. Parents' will enforced	3	4	4	2	3	2
B. No interference	9	14	10	5	12	8
III. <i>Authority rejected</i>	3	5	4	4	2	3
IV. <i>Authority shaken</i>	34	38	37	40	34	39
No conclusion	15	20	20	13	20	15

TYPICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TOWARD AUTHORITY

I. Authority Accepted

A. *Authority accepted as tradition.* A 22-year-old student of Teacher's College in Peiping. His father, who died recently, had been an official with a college education. After his death the boy lived with his mother, younger brother, and a cousin. The mother was without schooling. There were no favorites in the family. The

* The high-school students were more submissive. About 38% of them accepted paternal authority, mainly in the traditional way. It is very likely that it was the case also with many of the other 37% whose answers did not give enough material to allow one to draw definite conclusions. Nevertheless, there was a group of 110 families (about 20%) where paternal authority was seriously shaken. Four boys' attitudes could be characterized as rejection of paternal authority. For the small group of boys and girls who accepted paternal authority voluntarily the majority had fathers with college education.

family spent evenings together sometimes but not often; likewise, the parents' interests in the children's schoolwork, reading, etc., had been sporadic. The boy could not say whether he preferred to spend his leisure time at home or away. He disobeyed his parents sometimes in his childhood. The methods of punishment used were beating and scolding (beatings were discontinued when he reached the age of 14), which were administered mainly by the father. Other methods of making the boy obedient were lectures on morals, books about filial piety, stories about parents' filial attitude toward their own parents. He stressed respect, admiration, and love when describing his feelings toward his parents, but did not discuss with his parents any of his important problems except his school work and plans for his profession. When he was in love or wanted to talk about politics he went to his friends.

He had no disagreements with his parents. The only problem which might possibly cause a conflict was marriage, but he expected this to be solved satisfactorily by a compromise: either he would choose the bride and let his mother approve of her or his mother would choose her and ask for his approval. He was satisfied with his mother's rule; she gave him "adequate freedom" and he could do "anything which is not forbidden by society and which does not constitute unfilial conduct." The family was Confucian but he did not adhere to any religion and this created no problem. His heroes were Confucius, Washington, Buddha, Chiang Kai-shek, Mussolini, and Stalin—a rather motley crowd, which in the Chinese environment of 1937 meant an outspoken nationalist tendency. He liked Chinese historical books like *Shih Chi* (*Historical Memoirs*) by Ssu-ma Ch'ien, *History of the Han Dynasty*, novels like *The Dream of the Red Chamber* and *The Three Kingdoms*, and the writings of the liberal leader of the early twentieth century, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.

B. *Authority accepted voluntarily.* 1. *Free development of personality.* This 23-year-old girl student of sociology in the Ch'i Lu Missionary University in Tsinan (Shantung province) was the daughter of a prosperous foreign-trained engineer. Her mother had been educated in the traditional manner. The girl had six younger brothers and sisters and an older sister who worked as a bank clerk. The family life was harmonious; the parents had no favorites among the children; parents and children sat together every evening in the living room talking, reading, playing games. The girl liked to spend her leisure time at home but also liked to go out and could do as she pleased.

She was sometimes disobedient in her childhood. Both father and mother punished her, but neither she nor her sisters and brothers were ever beaten. "All the children in the family are very kind. Our family education and school education have been modern and scientific. Our parents understand the psychology of youth and childhood," she said. The girl felt love, respect, and admiration for parents, grandparents, and her older sister. She discussed all her important problems with her parents, sisters, and brothers but also consulted her friends and teachers.

There was no conflict with the parents because, as she explained: "full freedom was granted to the children. . . . We behave according to our own ideas. Our parents give only their suggestions and advice." She expected to choose her own mate and ask for her parents' consent, but she herself when she had children would give them full freedom to marry whomever they liked. She would only decide what type of education they should have and give them advice only about their friends and amusements. The family was Buddhist, but the girl had no religion and the parents evidently did not object to this.

She refused to say what heroes she preferred. "Each of them has his good points," she said. Her favorite author was Charles Dickens.

2. *A restricted personality.* A 19-year-old boy student of the University of Nanking (a missionary school). His father (46) was an official with a modern (college) education, the mother was illiterate, the family was well to do. It consisted of the boy's parents, brother, sister-in-law, little nephew, and himself. They were not religious.

There were no favorites in the family; both sons were equally loved by their parents. The boy was never intentionally disobedient; if he misbehaved the parents did not punish him, but his father corrected his behavior by describing the great men of China's past. "My parents always knew how to persuade me. How could I disobey?" The atmosphere in the family was harmonious (the boy checked on the list "kindness to all the members of the family" as being its main characteristic). The family spent every evening together; the father was interested in the sons' play and schoolwork. The boy preferred to stay at home and not to go out with friends.

He felt love and admiration for his father, love and comradeship for his mother. His admiration for his father seems to have been genuine: "My father is very modern," he said, "his ideas are ahead of his time. . . . My mother is very kind and is always right." There was no important problem he would not discuss with his parents, but he also had friends with whom he discussed politics.

He was also consulted in family affairs by his parents and older brother.

The boy reported one attempt at independent action: he wanted to study natural sciences like his uncle whom he admired very much, but his father persuaded him to study English instead; he did this and was not sorry. He wanted to choose his future bride himself but ask for his parents' consent and expected that his future children would behave in the same way. The only criticism he made of his father's behavior was that he slept too late, but he explained that his father did not feel well. Yet he considered the "convenience and comfort of father" the main aim of the family.

His heroes were Sun Yat-sen, Napoleon, and Bismarck. His favorite books, Mencius and Chuang Tzu (Chinese philosophers), and the *Tso Chuan*. He also liked some foreign books: the *Life of Samuel Johnson*, Helen Keller's *The Story of My Life*, Washington Irving's *Sketch Book*, Booker T. Washington's *Up from Slavery*. His political attitude seemed nationalistic with a conservative tinge. He felt deep obligations toward his country. "If there were no China how could I enjoy the education my parents are giving me? Therefore I must love my country very dearly."

II. Lack of Authority

A. *Parents' will enforced.* A 25-year-old student of education in Canton—his father a well-to-do businessman of old-fashioned education, his mother having no education at all. They lived in a joint family of eighteen members. The family was rather old-fashioned—for example, the men and women ate separately.

The boy grew up in "absolute obedience," as he said, was punished by his mother, but never beaten. The old rules of propriety were stressed in the family and the children were often told that they should practice the old Confucian virtues of righteousness, filial piety, etc.

There were several occasions when the young man's opinions were different from his parents': on marriage, politics, the student movement, modern fashions, modern hygiene, and recreation. He yielded on all points. He had to marry a girl he had never seen before and who neither shared his interests nor understood his problems. He was dissatisfied with his marriage and though he thought sometimes of educating his wife, he seemed to be skeptical of the result of his efforts. He loved his mother, but his only feeling

toward his father was the desire to avoid him (he checked these words twice). He spoke with his father only about his schoolwork—evidently because he had to; but he preferred to go to his brother when he needed money. He did not consult other people; neither brothers, sisters, friends, nor teachers were mentioned as his confidants.

He evidently found his compensation in reading and revolutionary dreams. His favorite books were "love stories which helped to solve life's problems." His unsatisfied desire for romantic love was expressed in his selection of the Duke of Windsor as one of his heroes. His other heroes were Confucius, Lenin, Marx, Stalin, and Kemal Pasha. (He was classified among those whose political sympathies were not clear.) He promised to give his children full freedom in the selection of their mates.

III. Authority Rejected

A 26-year-old girl, student of philosophy in Ching Hua University near Peiping. Her father was a railway engineer, a graduate of the Imperial University in Tokio; the mother had studied six years in an old-fashioned school. Both the girl and her people were irreligious. Theirs was a joint family of nineteen members including several of the father's brothers, their wives, and children.

The family was not badly integrated—all the members ate together at one table and spent some evenings together. The girl did not mind spending her evenings at home, but she was not a homebody who definitely preferred staying at home to any other way of spending her leisure time. In her childhood she was disobedient sometimes and was punished (mainly by her father); the last time she was beaten was at the age of 12.

Her political activities brought her into severe conflict with her parents, although she had been her father's favorite as a child. Her parents investigated her correspondence, discovered her radical tendencies, and did not allow her to go back to school during the student strike. After that, as she put it, "They did not control me any longer." In order not to lose economic support she told her parents that she had given up her dangerous ideas, but in reality continued her activities and, as she said, "My parents know that I am cheating them." She checked the word "respect" when referring to her parents, but she reproached her father with being a reactionary and smoking opium and did not discuss any problems

but money, her future profession, her health, and her dress with her parents. She expected to marry whom she liked without asking her parents' approval.

Her heroes were Sun Yat-sen, Marx, Stalin, and Clara Zetkin. Her favorite authors were Turgenev and Pa Chin, her favorite books Gorky's *Mother*, Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle*, and Mao Tun's *The Twilight*.

IV. Authority Shaken

A merchant's 26-year-old son, medical student in Changsha. His father had studied six years in an old-fashioned school; the mother had not studied at all. The family and the boy were irreligious. The family was not very well to do—the son had to do some journalistic work in order to supplement his allowance of \$260.

As a child he was sometimes disobedient and was beaten (slaps on the hands), mainly by his father; once he was beaten severely when he tried to smoke (at the age of 13). The family stressed filial piety as the main virtue expected of its members and the parents often told how obedient they had been in their childhood. The boy had a conflict with his father, who did not want him to study medicine because he thought that doctors were not respectable; the son went ahead. But he had to marry against his will a girl whom he had never seen before and with whom he was unhappy. So, evidently, was his brother who had left his wife.

He checked respect as the only feeling toward both his father and mother, but it seems that this check was a conventional gesture. He said that four or five years ago he had realized that "the family's and parents' ideas were bad." He criticized his father for having a concubine and frequenting brothels (his remark that his father loved his younger brother's deserted wife more than anyone else in the family may have had a derogatory meaning, too), for gambling, spitting on the floor, and unhygienic habits. But he could express his dissatisfaction openly only with his parents' spitting on the floor and their superstitions, the other things he could not discuss. He went to his father only when he needed money. In personal things his mother, not his wife, was his confidant. His heroes were Confucius, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, General Fu Tso-i, and Lincoln. His favorite books were Chinese classics. Other reading matter mentioned was medical magazines. He was classified as of democratic nationalist tendency.

THE POLITICAL TRENDS ON THE CAMPUS

Different political philosophies and trends—Communism, fascism, conservatism in the old Chinese style, liberal democratic trends, nationalism—have vied for the students' sympathies and have been eagerly discussed on the campus.

From the magazines and books read by the students, their ideas about their "aim in life," their heroes, their explanations of the political conflicts in their families, etc., it was possible to gain some insight into the political attitudes of the college students who answered our questionnaire.* These attitudes show many variations and the classification into conservatives, fascists, democrats, Christians, radicals, and nationalists does not do justice to the originality of Chinese political thinking.* Nevertheless the following table

* The answers of the high-school students did not yield enough material to justify an attempt at classification.

† It was extremely difficult to form a conclusion about the students' political attitudes. Sometimes one aspect of their hero's personality completely overshadowed all the others for the students. Thus, as was mentioned before, Kemal Pasha, Haile Selassie, General Feng Yü-hsiang were appreciated only for their role in the struggle for national liberation and for the strengthening of their country's prestige. On the other hand, such leaders as Marx on the radical side and Wilhelm II on the reactionary side were appreciated mainly for their social ideas. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek were judged as leaders in the struggle for China's independence and unification, but their social and economic programs were also taken into consideration. Sun Yat-sen, for instance was often chosen by those students who also chose Lenin and Stalin or Lincoln and Washington, whereas Chiang appeared sometimes in company with Mussolini and Hitler. The name of Hitler appeared in different contexts. If he was mentioned by those who also admired Mussolini, Genghis Khan, Ch'in Shih Huang-ti and Bismarck, there were reasons to believe that it was his authoritarian ideology which attracted the student. If, however, his name was associated with the names of Sun Yat-sen, Yueh Fei, and Haile Selassie—even Stalin joined the company now and then—it was evident that he was considered primarily as the man who had made Germany strong.

Favorite books and authors were not taken as reliable criteria of political views. The name of Lu Hsün, for instance, did not help much to discern the political views of the students who chose him. His political views were clearly radical, but his books or name were often mentioned by students who otherwise did not reveal any radical tendencies. The same, though to a lesser extent, is true of Gorky. But if a student mentioned *Das Kapital* or Lenin's *Imperialism* among his favorite books and chose Sun Yat-sen, Marx, and Lenin as the great men he admired most, one could presume that his tendencies were radical (although the question remains open as to whether he had really read the books). *The Four Books* mentioned as the favorite book in combination with such heroes as Confucius and Mencius or Ch'in Shih Huang-ti and Chiang Kai-shek seemed to justify the classification of a student as a conservative.

The Christian students who mentioned Jesus Christ as the figure whom they admired most (or one of them), read Christian literature, and gave no clear indication as to their political attitude (except for some nationalist tendencies) were classified as "Christians."

gives a certain idea of the relative strength of political trends among the college youth of prewar times.

TABLE XV
POLITICAL SYMPATHIES OF COLLEGE STUDENTS IN 1937
(percentages)

<i>Political Tendencies</i>	Male		Female
	<i>382 Students of Christian Colleges</i>	<i>305 Students of Non-Christian Colleges</i>	<i>477 Students</i>
Conservative	14	7	9
Fascist	19	14	11
Democratic	10	7	16
Christian	10	2	16
Radical	12	34	16
Nationalist	21	14	13
Not clear	14	22	19

The classification into conservative, fascist, democratic, radical, and nationalist gives a more adequate idea of the students' attitudes than would a classification according to existing political parties. The Communist party was practically the only representative of socialist-radical thought; the moderate socialist parties had virtually no followers in China. But the Kuomintang contains a wide gamut of political trends—from fascist to socialist.

One must bear in mind that whatever their political opinions may be, almost all students are nationalists.

There are two kinds of nationalism—aggressive and defensive. Aggressive nationalism stresses the superiority of its own nation and considers this superiority a justification for the subjugation of other nations. Defensive nationalism, while deeply appreciative of the values of its own people and culture, does not insist on their superiority; its partisans fight for their national independence and cultural values but do not try to subjugate other nations.

Most of our students belonged to this second type. Only a small fraction failed to reveal interest in the Chinese national struggle.

What are the motives and circumstances determining the political attitudes of contemporary Chinese youth? What makes them embrace conservative, democratic, fascist, or radical doctrines? In China, where rebellions against the established order were unsuc-

cessful for so many centuries, the problem of what makes a radical is especially interesting.

Three main theories have been advanced to explain what H. D. Lasswell calls "the scheme of political motivation."³² One, based on psychoanalysis, regards the individual's revolt against social authority as a continuation, "displacement," and rationalization of his revolt against his parents, ultimately rooted in the Oedipus complex. Another gives the greatest importance to ideological motives, the individual's insight into social injustice, and his desire to create a more rational order. A third subordinates the individual's attitude to his social and economic status; according to it, members of underprivileged groups are more apt to revolt against the existing authority than members of privileged strata.

The material the author collected in the course of her investigation seems to throw some light on this problem.

The students were divided into three groups, according to income. In the higher income group were those receiving more than \$500 a year (including a few who had more than \$1,000); the middle group received \$200-\$500; the lower income group less than \$200 a year.

The distribution of political sympathies in these groups can be seen from the following table:

TABLE XVI
INCOME AND POLITICAL SYMPATHIES
(percentages)

I. 687 MALE STUDENTS

Income	Political Sympathies						
	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Fascist</i>	<i>Democratic</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Nationalist</i>	<i>Radical</i>	<i>Unclassified</i>
<i>Low</i>	10	10	10	7	14	32	17
<i>Middle</i>	12	14	9	8	19	20	18
<i>High</i>	11	27	7	4	17	18	16

II. 477 FEMALE STUDENTS

	Political Sympathies						
	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Fascist</i>	<i>Democratic</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Nationalist</i>	<i>Radical</i>	<i>Unclassified</i>
<i>Low</i>	6	4	22	14	10	24	20
<i>Middle</i>	9	12	13	15	14	18	19
<i>High</i>	10	12	19	17	13	12	17

The table shows that the students belonging to the lower income group show more radical and less fascist and conservative tendencies than the students of the high income group.

Who were these members of the poorest group? The majority were sons of small landlords and peasants who were wealthy according to the village standards but infinitely poorer than industrialists, bank directors, professionals, or high officials. These students had to count every copper, to look for odd jobs in order to support themselves in school; to buy a book often meant for them to do without a meal; they froze in winter in their shabby padded gowns and homemade shoes, and only a few among them had more than one decent silk gown to wear on special occasions. The menace of unemployment after graduation was a terrible reality for them.*

At school these poor girls and boys often sat side by side with more fortunate companions. The rich people's children were dressed in fashionable silk gowns or expensive foreign suits; most of them had learned English and sometimes other foreign languages at home and in high school and that gave them a better start at college. They looked forward to studying abroad. Later their family backgrounds and foreign training would make the menace of unemployment less threatening for them. No wonder fewer of them were eager for drastic social changes.

But the economic explanation is far from telling the whole story. There were conservatives and fascists in the poor group and quite a few radicals in the richer one. Other influences were at work.

The most important seems to have been the atmosphere in the college. Influenced by specific local conditions, the schools of North China contained many more radicals and ardent nationalists than the schools of Central China or even of Canton, the revolutionary city of the past. The Japanese menace of that time was more real in North China than elsewhere. Almost all the students combined their political sympathies with nationalism, but in the North more of them believed that the Communists, who had declared war on Japan as far back as 1932 and who stressed the necessity of mobilizing the broad masses for the fight, were more reliable than the other political parties.

The school influence worked also in another way. It seems that the students of missionary universities were less radical not only

* There were 36% of radicals among the sons of peasants and landlords; the children whose families stayed in villages and small market towns had a higher percentage of radicals than the children of city people.

because they were on the average wealthier than students of government universities but also because they were subjected to ideological influences which deflected them from radical ideas.

The influence of the family background also played a part; the sons and daughters of college men were less radical than those of parents educated in the old style. The same is true of Christian families: their children, and especially the children of Christian ministers, show the smallest proportion of radicals and the largest percentage with democratic and Christian ideology. (In both cases families of the same economic level were compared.)

These two influences—father's and partly mother's modern education and the Christian faith of the family—were the only family influences that seemed to show some negative correlation with radical ideas. Almost all the other circumstances of the students' childhood seemed to be unrelated to political attitudes.

The proportion of sons with purely negative attitudes toward their fathers was not larger among the radical students than among those with conservative and moderately democratic political views.

Similarly unrelated to the students' political views were the presence of favorite children in the family, unequal treatment at home, disobedience in childhood, the degree of the parents' interest in students' schoolwork, reading, methods of education and punishment, etc. Corporal punishment had no great bearing on the development of rebellious attitudes. The only exception was the girls—the radical girls had been beaten more often than the others and were more often disobedient, but the difference is not particularly striking (42% of the radical girls reported having been beaten in their childhood as compared to 37% of the group as a whole).

Thus the results of our investigation do not bear out the theory that an unfriendly home atmosphere with a severe father and inharmonious family relations is particularly favorable to the development of radicalism in the young.

It would be interesting to know why there were fewer radicals among girls than among boys. The difference was in reality smaller than the tables on pages 316 and 317 might lead one to suppose. First of all, when dividing the students into only three groups we did not create two completely comparable units of boys and girls in each. The girls in each group were better off than the boys. Then the proportion of girls with college-bred fathers or girls from Christian families, as well as of those who attended Christian universities, was higher than that of the boys. But taking all these circum-

stances into consideration it still seems that the proportion of radical girls remained somewhat lower than that of the boys—as well as the proportion of conservatives and fascists. The girls responded more readily to Christian propaganda. As Appendix Table XIII shows, 90% of the daughters of Christian families still considered themselves Christian when at college, whereas one quarter of the sons declared that they had broken with Christianity; a much larger number of girls than of boys of non-Christian families were converted to Christianity during their school days. Democratic tendencies among the girls were stronger because upper- and middle-class girls can expect a great improvement in their lot through the introduction of liberal reforms which will give them the right to vote, to have equal opportunities in employment, etc.

Yet once the young people adopted radical ideas, which usually happened during their college years or in the higher grades of high school, their relations to their families changed. Their views encountered strong opposition from their parents because the young people advocated a new political and economic system which threatened the privileged position of the father. Furthermore, the whole ideology of Communism was a flagrant contradiction of the old Chinese tradition. The radical youths were more critical of the old Chinese family system than other youths; they also exceeded the others in their demands for full freedom in the choice of mates.*

The radicals did not dislike their parents more than the other students, but they criticized them more often and more openly. The overwhelming majority of complaints about parents' political views came from the radical students. They took their parents into their confidence less frequently than the others. Thus, for example, only 10% of the radical boy students and 20% of the girls discussed politics with their fathers, whereas more than double this proportion of fascist, conservative, democratic and Christian boys and girls were anxious to hear what their father had to say about Chiang Kai-shek, the Japanese, and the Communists. Consultations with the father upon other problems diminished also. The relations with the mother remained warm, however, and an admirer of

* The proportion of radical students who did not think changes in the Chinese family system necessary was smaller than in any other political group: out of 225 radical students only 2 denied the necessity of change. Sixty per cent wanted to marry a girl of their choice without asking for parents' approval, as compared to 18% of the conservatives, 23% of the fascists, and 16% of the Christian and democratic boys. Comparison of the girls' answers shows the same difference between the radicals and the others.

Lenin and Stalin came to his mother just as the others did when he was in trouble.

Distaste for staying at home was more pronounced in the radical than the nonradical students. The difference was especially pronounced among the girls, since girls are generally more likely to be homebodies than boys. Only one fifth of the radical girls, for instance, preferred to spend their leisure time at home, whereas about half the conservative and democratic girls wanted to be there.

As was to be expected, they had more conflicts with their parents than the average: 76% of the radical boys and 75% of the girls reported having had difficulties with their families as compared with 68% for the whole boys' group and 61% for the whole girls' group. The main reason for this difference was their more eager participation in the student movement,* but it seems that they were also more eager to fight for their rights in other respects; for example, they not only declared that they would marry whom they liked but put up more resistance when their parents wanted to marry them off in the old-fashioned way. They also often contradicted their parents' wishes in choosing their friends, etc.

They appeared to have more stamina than the others and more often succeeded in achieving their aims. Although the students' interpretation of their conflicts with their parents must be accepted with caution,† it is interesting to note that the radical students reported more victories than the other students.

To sum up, the radical students have shown more signs of rebellion against paternal authority than the other students.‡ But it seems that this rebellion was caused not by early childhood experiences but by the influence of their environment outside the family. There is constant interaction between family and society—but in this particular instance the influence of society at large is predominant.§

* Of the radical boys 24% had conflicts on this account as compared to 15% of democrats, 16% of nationalists, 12% of conservatives, and 6% of fascists. The corresponding figures for girls were 29%, 7%, 13%, 9%, and 4%.

† See p. 295.

‡ See Appendix, Table XIX.

§ It is interesting to compare the results of this investigation with that conducted by the Adjustment Bureau in New York City in 1940. Its results contradict the theory that "radicals are those who have had personal maladjustments and who are driven by their inner conflicts into revolutionary action." As personal maladjustments are often closely connected with unfortunate childhood experiences, our conclusions seem to go in the same direction. The New York investigation, however, failed to find a correlation between the economic status of the informants and their ideas.³³

THE MODERN YOUNG MAN

About a quarter of a century ago, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the leader of the Renaissance Movement, expressed his desire to see the regeneration of Chinese youth. "Instead of the youth of old—weak, effeminate, devoid of militancy, seeking only wealth and high position—a new youth should arise—strong, valiant, free from paternal authority, idealistic."

To what extent has modern intellectual youth achieved this ideal?

Russia has accomplished a complete transformation of its intelligentsia since the revolution. Russian literature bears witness to this. Instead of the "well-intentioned man who cannot achieve anything," the favorite hero of nineteenth-century Russian fiction, modern Soviet literature displays a gallery of teachers, doctors, engineers, professors, explorers, party secretaries—men of will power who know what they want and get it done.

The Russian Revolution has broadened the social strata from which intellectuals are recruited: a large part of them come now not from families of intellectuals but from families of workers and peasants. In the Soviet Union the intelligentsia is no longer a separate caste.

No such change has taken place in China. Most young Chinese intellectuals still come from the same upper- and middle-class strata as the intellectuals of olden times. They also preserve many characteristics of their forefathers; many still represent old rather than new China.

Nevertheless, many new features have appeared in the young intellectuals. The Chinese young man of today who is typical of the new trends is socially minded. He puts his duty toward society above his duty toward his family. He no longer follows the rule of absolute obedience to authority either in the family or in society. He has learned to appreciate and assert his own personality.

His attitude toward physical exertion is slowly changing. He tries to strengthen his body, he practices sports and does not think that a desk, books, and writing brush are the only tools worthy of a perfect gentleman. Although he is not militaristic, he has more appreciation of military valor than before, if it serves a good cause.

The old tradition was persistent enough to prevent even the most ardent intellectual youths from joining the army as rank-and-file fighters; when the second Sino-Japanese War began they still thought that there were enough coolies to do the fighting.

Nevertheless, the intellectual youth have shown great courage during this war.

The very fact that they have continued their studies is proof of their heroism and their willingness to serve their country. The Japanese in the occupied regions deliberately and systematically destroyed all the institutions of higher learning and most other schools. They wanted subjected China to be a country without culture; the Chinese were to be only coolies and manual laborers working under Japanese supermen. At the price of incredible hardships the youth of China succeeded in moving westward, in keeping the Chinese schools free, and thus helping to preserve the Chinese cultural heritage and the flame of new knowledge.

The students continued their studies during the war under incessant bombardments, in dugouts and caves, with piles of bricks serving as chairs and peasant huts as classrooms.³⁴

But the young intellectuals of both sexes also helped in the war effort—they served as doctors, organizers of war production in industrial coöperatives and government factories, as propagandists, teachers, and commanders of the new Chinese Army and of guerrilla units which fought for so many years with indomitable courage.

XXI

Friendship

EVEN under the Chinese Empire, where family relationships were so powerful, people felt the need for other relationships. They needed companions with whom they could discuss their problems on equal terms. One could not be absolutely frank with one's father: there was always a feeling of subordination involved in this relation; one could not talk freely with a grown-up son or even a younger brother without running the risk of loss of dignity. Few wives could understand their husband's problems.

Po Chü-i, a famous poet of the Tang dynasty, was deeply unhappy in the remote province of west Szechuan where he served as governor, as long as he was there alone with his wife and children.

He began to feel at ease only when he found a companion, an intellectual equal and friend, who shared the poet-governor's love for poetry as well as wine.¹

For thousands of years China cultivated the sentiment of friendship. Friendship was sacred even in feudal times; later it was highly valued by military men. The oath of friendship exchanged by the three warrior heroes of *The Three Kingdoms*, Liu Pei, Kuan Yü and Chang Fei,² still thrills Chinese youth. Sometimes friends gave each other a solemn oath of friendship in the temple of Kuan Yü—one of the heroes of *The Three Kingdoms* who later was sublimated to the rank of the God of War. "If we are not born on the same day, we shall die on the same day. If we have wealth we shall spend it together; if we have a horse, we shall ride together; if a misfortune comes, we shall suffer together; if happiness comes, we shall enjoy it together. The spirits should condemn us if we have two hearts and not a single one."³ Friendship was also extremely important in imperial China, and played a greater role in men's lives than anywhere else. Confucius included friendship in his list of the most important human relationships. It was a kind of extension of the family: the freely chosen friend supplemented the family members and kinsmen who were allotted by gods and parents. But in passing from relatives to friends, neighbors, and countrymen the Chinese were not approaching the universal love preached by one of Confucius' rivals, Mo Ti. There always remained a limitation, a certain exclusiveness.

Confucius himself cultivated friendship; his disciples were his friends. It is not by accident that his *Analects* contain warm words about friends: "Is it not a joy to have friends coming from distant quarters?"⁴

"It is a joy!" echoed scores of Chinese officials, writers, poets, and scholars.

"Nothing brings more joy than friendship," says the talented author of *All Men Are Brothers* in the charming preface to his novel, written about 1,500 years after Confucius.⁵

It was not only a joy but a necessity. Friends were as reliable as brothers and relatives and had more understanding. "At home rely on parents, going away rely on friends," says an old adage. Friends assisted the young scholar with his examinations, helped the poor man earn his daily bread, loaned money, and could be depended on to help gain promotion. (How could one expect a promotion if not through a relative's or a friend's help?) Friendship was for life, perfect loyalty was expected from a friend and disloyal friends were punished by the gods.

Serene comradeship is perhaps the most valuable human experience for a Chinese scholar. Friendship, not love, inspired the most beautiful lines in Chinese poetry.⁶ Friendship is also the favorite human topic of Chinese painting. When a Chinese artist needs a human motif to animate a landscape he generally chooses not a beautiful girl, not lovers, but a group, or more often two old men—old friends sunk in silent contemplation.

Sometimes friendship between men had erotic overtones. Homosexuality was a common vice in old China. Several friendships in the *Liao-chai* stories are openly described as homosexual.*⁷ Pao-yü of *The Dream of the Red Chamber* in addition to his more or less innocent love for Tai-yü and his liaisons with several servant girls, also has homosexual relations with a young actor and probably with his cousin. Homosexual relations were in vogue in the school of the Chia clan (described in the same novel) and the adult libertine Hsieh Pan comes there to find a boy friend.⁸ The male impersonators of feminine roles were often partners in homosexual relations.⁹ But homosexuality was not the most essential feature of Chinese friendship.

Feasts with friends were pleasurable to the highest degree. Li

* The reader of H. A. Giles's translations, however, will not be aware of it. In "The Magnanimous Girl" ("Hsieh Nü") all descriptions of homosexual relations are eliminated by the translator. The "Huang Chiu Lan" ("Mr. Huang Number Nine") was not translated at all. This is again an example of how Victorian censorship distorted the picture of China.

Tai-po, drunkard and genius of the Tang dynasty, describes such feasts with much gusto.

Eating and drinking, however, were not the main purpose of these gatherings, though the Chinese always had the best cuisine in the world and were great gourmets. "When my friends come, they do not necessarily drink wine," says Shih Nai-an. "If they like to, they may, but they don't have to. Conversation is our delight."¹⁰ Similarly, when the poet Ch'eng-kung Sui summoned his friends there was "loud talk and simple feasting."¹¹

Talk was what they liked, these old men of China. Quiet conversation with a friend was the best tonic for Po Chü-i when he was sick, and the greatest pleasure in life which remained for an old man in his last years.¹²

What did they talk about, these old men, when they feasted, walked around the lake, contemplated mountain streams, or enjoyed the moonlight? They recited poems, discussed philosophical topics, spoke of moral perfection, and helped each other to develop what was best in their souls.

"What we talk is not politics," eagerly asserts Shih Nai-an. There were many reasons. For one thing, Shih Nai-an and his friend were humble. They were far from the capital, and political news changed into hearsay before it reached them, and so on.¹³ But Shih Nai-an is so eager to explain that the reader becomes suspicious and soon discovers that after these "unpolitical gatherings" Shih shut himself up in his study and wrote the most political work in Chinese literature, a novel about generous, noble robbers and greedy corrupt officials—a book which is still a favorite with Chinese revolutionists.

Certainly they talked of politics, of political intrigues and conspiracies, criticizing the government and government officials. Men always talk about such things and in a society where one instinctively looks over one's shoulder before speaking and where an incautious word may cost one his position or life, one can only speak freely to somebody one can trust. Relatives are reliable but inadequate. One has to have confidants of one's own choice. And when the Chinese formed a revolutionary party or a secret society it was inevitable that a group of personal friends would be the nucleus of it.

Friendship is still an essential feature of Chinese life. As of old, a good friend, "one who knows me," plays a great part in the life of a Chinese, and the man who has no close friends is as unhappy as the one who has no family—perhaps even more so.

It seems that the role of the friend has actually increased in importance as compared with olden times. Among the modernized strata of the population as, for example, the industrial workers and college students, friends dispute, and often successfully, the position of relatives. Our informants among the industrial workers often told us that they would rather go to their friends than to their relatives when they needed help and that they would rather aid their friends than their relatives, thus defying the rule expressed in the old adage: "Kinsmen first, friends next." "It is hard to ask a relative for help, but a real friend is always willing to give assistance," said a worker in Shanghai. An intellectual, a librarian in Peiping, was of the same opinion. "It is better to go to a friend for a loan, he won't sneer at you," was the way he put it.

In the life of the student the friend loomed very large. On the campuses of high schools and universities feelings are born that bind young people together for life and give the deepest emotional satisfaction.

"A friend is the most helpful, faithful, and encouraging human being in the world," said a Peiping student. "Friendship is paramount in society," said another. "Friendship above all," echoed a third. "My friend understands me." Such phrases could be cited ad infinitum. The friend was the one to whom the young people were most likely to turn when they had emotional trouble, when they had important political and intellectual problems to discuss. Many of them stressed that they would choose as their confidant a friend rather than father or brother. It seems that friendship played an especially great role in the life of the young people with outspoken political interests.

As we have shown in Chapter XVI when analyzing students' attitudes toward nepotism, the majority of students who were willing to be led by personal considerations rather than by the demands of efficiency in choosing candidates for a position preferred friends to relatives, even brothers. "My friend understands me better than my brother"—the student who used this phrase expressed the opinion of many of his companions.

For some of the students this relation had a utilitarian character: they expected help from their friends in the future and tried to make useful connections. The parents encouraged these contacts, for as of old one needed friends to gain position and prosper in life. But with the majority of young people friendship was a pure sentiment devoid of all ulterior motives.

XXII

Summary and Conclusions

CULTURAL CHANGES IN CHINESE HISTORY

CONTEMPORARY China is the scene of momentous cultural changes affecting the whole economic, political, social, and ideological structure of the country. The process of change has been painful and long drawn out—the old agricultural bureaucratic society which remained basically stationary for about two thousand years developed a great power of inertia and still offers tenacious resistance to innovations. Yet there is no reason to doubt that the process of transformation will be successfully completed. China is not, as has sometimes been suggested, organically incapable of reconstructing her civilization. Chinese society has known basic changes in the past. Before the establishment of bureaucratic absolutism (in the third century B.C.) the country experienced several transformations as fundamental as the one which we are witnessing now, and each time the pattern of family life changed with the economic and social structure.

Before the dawn of Chinese history the ancestors of the modern Chinese who lived on the middle courses of the Yellow River changed their mode of making a living: from food gathering, hunting, and fishing which was their occupation during the Old Stone Age, they advanced to agriculture and cattle breeding in the New Stone Age. Their stone implements improved. In the New Stone Age great changes were made in the methods of agriculture and pottery making: the hoe was supplanted by a primitive plough; the potter's wheel made its appearance.

There were also changes in social organization. Original equality gave way to social stratification at the end of the New Stone Age. The basic social unit at the end of the New Stone Age was evidently the matrilineal clan; the clans were united into tribes. The position of women, relatively high when food gathering, performed almost exclusively by the women, offered the main means of existence, became lower when hunting came to the fore. It was relatively higher in the early period of agriculture and pottery making when these pursuits were in the hands of the women than after men took to the plough as well as to the potter's wheel.¹

THE BEGINNING OF CHINESE HISTORY

China emerged from prehistory toward the beginning of the second millennium B.C. During this period the principal settlements were situated in the northwest corner of what is now the provinces of Shantung, North Honan, and South Hopeh. Agriculture and cattle breeding were the main occupations of the population. A rudimentary form of feudalism superseded the tribal organization of the prehistoric period. Town life began to develop. The population consisted of feudal lords or chieftains and peasants and a small group of artisans and merchants. The country was unified under the rule of the kings of the Hsia and Shang dynasties (1994–1523 and 1523–1027 B.C. respectively—traditional dates).

Our information about the social organization of this period is confined to the upper class. The basic social unit was the patrilineal clan with fraternal succession. Clan endogamy was common although not obligatory. Polygyny was an accepted form of marriage. The pattern of behavior established in the previous period when women played a relatively large part in the economic life of the group had not yet been broken and the position of women was still relatively high. Ancestor worship assumed an important part in the religious and cultural life.²

THE LATE FEUDAL PERIOD

The next thousand years of Chinese history, known as the Chou dynasty period (1027–256 B.C.), saw changes in the geographic environment in which the Chinese people lived, as their cultural and political sphere expanded from the northwest corner of what is now China to the south and east—further into the valley of the Yellow River and later into the valley of the Yangtze. Agriculture began to make wide use of artificial irrigation, first on a small and later on a large scale. The feudal form of social organization became more elaborate. Chinese peasants were bound to the soil; the upper class (the nobility) was organized on the principle of feudal hierarchy. Social differentiation was marked and was deliberately maintained by rules prescribing different patterns of dress, modes of life and behavior for different social groups.

The family organization at this time was patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal, these characteristics being particularly conspicuous among the nobles. The basic social unit was changing from the patrilineal clan to the joint family. Smaller family units, con-

jugal and stem families, also existed. The clan as an economic unit was preserved longer among the peasants than in the upper class. Ancestor worship was further elaborated and regulated. The number of ancestors to be worshiped and rites performed were in accordance with the family's position in the feudal hierarchy. The peasants had no right to have ancestor temples and perhaps were not even allowed to worship their ancestors at all. Strict clan exogamy became a rule. Paternal authority stood high in all classes of the population. Father-son relations among the feudal lords were formed on the pattern of vassal-suzerain relations; the son's attitude toward his father was dominated by awe and fear. Parent-child relations among the peasants (as reflected in the popular songs of the period) were less formal than in the upper class and were permeated with genuine love. Polygyny, common in the upper class, was practiced in the form of the "sororate." * But some remnants of previous family patterns were still apparent. The position of women, although constantly deteriorating, was still relatively high, especially among the peasants. The sexual mores, already formalized among the nobles, were relatively free among the peasants.³

IMPERIAL CHINA

The end of the Chou period saw the expansion of the Chinese political and cultural sphere to the great plain of Central China, the Yangtze Valley and farther south (into what are now the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yünnan, etc.). The new natural environment of the country imperatively demanded the centralization of public works in order to secure artificial irrigation for the cultivation of rice which now became the main crop, and at the same time to protect the country from the periodic floods caused by the Yellow and Yangtze rivers and their tributaries. The intensive character of Chinese agriculture became more pronounced.

Changes in political and social organization took place. After many fights and relapses into feudal chaos, the feudal organization was superseded by a centralized bureaucratic monarchy. The upper class changed its character—the learned civil official became the ruler of the country instead of the feudal knight. The peasants remained the main producers, although the number and importance of artisans and merchants increased with the growth of market economy. Society remained strongly differentiated econom-

* When marrying the man took his wife's sisters and sometimes nieces as secondary wives.

ically, but the rigid class distinctions of the feudal period gave place to the formal possibility of transition from one occupation or social class to another. The lower classes now could imitate the dress, customs, patterns of behavior, and attitudes of the upper class.

Family organization on the whole followed the pattern established in the upper class in the feudal period, but was modified in several essential features. The Chinese family, as it was formed in the imperial period, became one of the outstanding examples of the patriarchal family in the world. This pattern still persists in contemporary China, especially among the tradition-bound strata of the population.

As in the late feudal period, the basic social unit was the economic family whose prevalent type was different in different social classes: more joint families in the upper classes, more conjugal and stem families in the lower classes. The Confucian philosophy—which dominated the ideology and customs of imperial China—stressed the importance of the family as the basic social unit. For the bulk of the population (peasants and artisans) the economic family was the unit of production and consumption. Family ties were powerful. But contrary to the common assumption, genuine “family communism” (each member contributing according to his abilities and being supplied according to his needs) existed evidently only in conjugal families. In larger family units the consumption of the individual member and his wife and children largely depended on his contribution to the family income.

The relations of the family to its extended kin and clan were very close. Mutual help of kinsmen and clansmen was imperatively demanded by moral philosophy and public opinion; it was especially effective when it could be given at the expense of the world at large. In relations to strangers family, kin, and clan functioned as strong protective units.

The high respect enjoyed by the old people and especially by the old man was an outstanding feature of Chinese civilization under the empire. This respect increased the power of the male head of the family—father or grandfather. The belief in the posthumous life of the ancestors and ancestor worship helped to intensify popular respect for the old. Confucianism proclaimed filial piety to be the main human virtue and made a strong effort to put parental authority on the basis of genuine respect and love and to eliminate fear and compulsion from the relations of children to their parents. Parents’ love for their children was also stressed, but parents’ obli-

gations toward their children were considered less important than children's obligations toward their parents. The role of youth in society was negligible.

The deterioration of the status of women, already noticeable in feudal times, continued. Confucianism, Buddhism, and the legal code stressed woman's inferiority. Obedience to the man—father, husband, and son—was proclaimed to be her duty. Property rights were denied her. The killing of baby girls was not uncommon among poor people. Selling of women of all ages, although forbidden by law, was widely practiced. Divorce was practically impossible except on the initiative of the man. Remarriage of widows and divorced women was almost impossible. The custom of binding the feet further accentuated women's bondage.

Marriages were arranged by parents, the feelings and desires of the bride and groom were not taken into consideration. Love matches and courtship were considered improper. Polygyny was an accepted form of marriage and was common in the upper class.

This rigid pattern was not enforced with complete efficiency—that could not be done in an agricultural society functioning in a “more or less” way. The closest approach to the pattern was achieved in the upper classes. Yet the lower and middle classes made strong efforts to follow it. Thus, for example, the binding of feet originated in the upper class where they did not make use of women's labor power, but it was imitated by the poor people, although to them the handicap it caused brought some economic disadvantages. Yet the pattern was not rigidly followed although it was accepted in theory: economic conditions usually proved more powerful than ideological considerations. In spite of the fact that the large joint family was generally considered the ideal type of the family it was mainly an upper-class phenomenon; the poor could not have many families of this type because they had fewer children than the rich, and their old men and women died at an earlier age. Lazy family members, supported by their more industrious relatives, could be found among the well to do (although probably less often than is generally believed) but were almost unknown among the poor, who could not afford to take care of drones.

The scarcity of women among the poor, due to female infanticide and selling of women, was responsible for the existence of marriage by purchase among them. For economic reasons polygyny was practically unknown among the lower classes. The poor man could not afford the expense involved in divorcing his wife or

taking another wife while the first was alive or even after her death. This induced the husband to be more considerate toward his wife and improved her position to a certain extent.

The rigid rules of behavior of family members were often broken, and feelings and situations observed in families all over the world manifested themselves in China. Chinese parents gave preference to the children of the sex different from their own. The warmest relations in the family were those not mentioned by Confucius as being the most important: the relations of mother and son and of father and daughter. Women of unusual attractiveness and will power enjoyed good treatment and often achieved a dominating position in the family.

Chinese society in imperial times harbored basic contradictions. One of them was implicit in the attitude toward the family and society. Confucius and his disciples subordinated the interests of the family to those of the state, and the strengthening of family ties was meant primarily as a means of strengthening the state. Later the family became an end in itself and the duties of the good son and family man brought him into conflict with the duties of a good citizen.

In the 2100 years of imperial history China experienced many dramatic events: uprisings, violent changes of dynasty, and foreign conquests. The country was not lacking in creative ideas in philosophy and literature as well as arts and crafts. Gunpowder, the printing press, and porcelain were Chinese inventions. China's spiritual life was rich and her level of material culture probably higher than that of Europe before the industrial revolution. But all these events and creative endeavors did not transform the economic, political, and ideological structure of the country. For two thousand years China was a static and stagnant society.

MODERN TIMES

In the nineteenth century Chinese society, organized on the pattern of oriental despotism, had begun to change into a modern capitalist society. The usual sequence observed during periods of cultural change the world over could be seen: changes (1) in technology; (2) in the economic structure; (3) in the social and political structure; (4) in behavior, attitudes, and ideas.⁴

The new technology had been introduced: in the sphere of production—modern factories, power plants, new methods in mining, attempts at new methods in agriculture; in the sphere of commu-

nications—railways, steamships, autobuses, telegraph, telephone, radio. A wave of new objects of consumption had poured into the country—factory-made cloth being the most important and ubiquitous. New styles in housing, dress, and food followed.

The economic structure of the country had begun to change. Agriculture has continued to be the mainstay of Chinese economy, but the industrial sector has been growing. Modern methods of production, division of labor, and mechanization have been slowly driving out the old handicrafts.

Momentous changes have taken place in the social structure of the country. The upper class, in addition to officials and landlords, now includes industrialists and merchants. New influential groups of intellectuals have arisen among the middle and upper classes. Relatively small but powerful groups of industrial workers have appeared among the wage earners. The relations between these workers and their modern employers are essentially the same as those of employer and employees in present-day Europe or America. Industrial and commercial profits and land rent now constitute the main source of income for the upper classes, instead of the officials' salary, as in olden times. In brief, the Chinese economic structure has begun to follow the pattern of capitalist industrial society.

The change in the political organization of China was initiated by the abolition of the absolutist monarchy and the setting-up of a short-lived parliamentary regime. A period of civil wars followed. Since 1927 most of China has been ruled by a military and party dictatorship which, theoretically,⁵ considers itself a transitional regime to be supplanted later by a parliamentary democracy. In the northwestern part of the country, in the so-called "special area," the Soviet system has been in operation; democratic local self-government has achieved considerable progress during the war in the regions where the guerrillas have been active.

New ideas began to manifest themselves powerfully after the process of industrialization started. Democracy, socialism, Communism and fascism have found advocates among the modern Chinese whose fathers did not know any political philosophy other than Confucianism. New ideas of freedom, new critical attitudes toward political and moral authorities began to penetrate Chinese minds. The rights of the individual and the rights of the community were stressed, and the central position of the family in Chinese social and emotional life was challenged. The new ideas were reflected in the creation of new organizations. Modern political

parties developed and overshadowed in importance the ancient secret societies. Trade-unions appeared alongside the guilds left over from imperial times. Christianity and Western ethical teachings found Chinese adepts, and Chinese Christian churches of different denominations were established.

New social and esthetic ideas began to influence Chinese literature and arts.

Important changes have taken place in human relations—in the family, among friends, and in the relations between the individual and society.

But whatever changes there have been in China have been slow and incomplete. In the late 1930's, almost a hundred years after the violent impact of the West had begun and more than sixty years after the first new techniques were introduced into China, the country had not completed the process of transformation but was a mixture of old and new elements. New trends were felt almost everywhere, but in many regions and strata of the population the old pattern was predominant. Despite the progress of industrialization. China has been unable to master modern technology to the extent of achieving full independence, as was the case with other countries backward in their industrial development: Japan and Russia, for example. Before the war China was in the position of a half colony.

At first sight the slowness of the present changes seems difficult to explain. China, a country of high civilization, was infinitely better prepared to take over Western methods and ideas than primitive societies—in fact, Western techniques and Western ideas had an immediate functional value for China.

In the nineteenth century, before the interference of the West, China possessed several manufacturing enterprises (mining, textile) and labor power was abundant and relatively skillful.

Her highly developed centralization, uniformity of culture, and multiple ways of communication provided a sound basis for the acceptance of Western ideas of patriotism and nationalism. Moreover, patriotism was not as alien to old China as is often assumed. In periods of stress, for instance during the struggles against the Mongols in the twelfth century and against the Manchus in the seventeenth, Chinese patriots played a great part in saving their country, and the names of Generals Yüeh Fei and Wen Tien-hsiang, who were active under the Sung dynasty, fighting against the foreign invaders, are among the most honored in China. Despite all the differences existing between Chinese and Western

ideologies, Chinese political, philosophic, esthetic, and moral teachings often resemble those produced by Western Hebrew-Greek-Roman-Christian tradition. In the sphere of family relations Confucius' emphasis on the emotional aspect of parent-child relations is in line with the most progressive Western ideas. Frequently Chinese and Western ideas complement each other and there is the possibility of a harmonious and fruitful exchange. In fact, the discovery of Chinese philosophy and arts has made a deep impression on Western thought and arts.⁶ The Chinese intelligentsia accepted many Western ideas without difficulty.

Yet in spite of all this China was less prepared to be transformed into an industrial capitalistic society than were other agrarian civilized countries whose civilizations were less developed than the Chinese when they came in contact with Western industrialism. The reason for this is that China was organized on the pattern of Oriental bureaucratic despotism, which is utterly alien to the West and which proved incapable of serving as a transition toward capitalism. It was different with Russia and Japan, for example. They were feudal countries and their social organization bore a striking resemblance to the European feudal pattern. They began organically to develop toward industrial capitalism, the elements of which are clearly apparent in seventeenth-century Russia and in nineteenth-century Japan in the late Tokugawa period. In contrast to Russia and Japan, the transformation of China had no organic roots in the country itself.*

CHANGES IN THE FAMILY

It has been often observed by sociologists that "the family mores tend to lag in social changes,"⁷ changing more slowly than the economic organization, social classes, political organization. The

* Modern research discovered a pronounced development toward capitalism within the feudal Japanese society before its contact with the West. "The rapid adoption of Western capitalism was possible because of the fact that currency economy was developed during the Tokugawa period and the Japanese economy was in a position where it could be turned into capitalism." *The Social and Economic History of Japan* (Kyoto, 1935); quoted by Hugh Borton in a review in *Pacific Affairs*, 1936, p. 285. See also *Studies in the Historical Development of Capitalism in Japan*, reviewed by Saburo Matsukata in *Pacific Affairs*, 1934, pp. 71 ff.

As for Russia, in the 17th century, some decades before Peter the Great, "there existed the roots out of which the new [capitalist] industry could develop." (*History of the USSR* [Moscow, 1939], I, 479.) Moreover, even before Peter, Russia's contact with the West was much more intense and intimate than China's—except for 250 years (1223–1480) when Russia was dominated by Mongols and some hundred years afterward.

picture of family life in contemporary China fully corroborates this view.

Nevertheless, the Chinese family has changed. The changes have come in two ways: as a result of the new social and economic environment and the ideological influence of the West, the latter coming either through direct contact with the West or through the medium of modern Chinese schools, literature, etc., college education being the most potent medium of westernization. The environment is mainly—if not exclusively—responsible for the changes among the peasants and workers. They have heard very little, if anything, of modern ideas; but those who live in industrial cities or in rural districts where innovations have taken place and especially those who work in modern factories have seen their family life and relations changed by industrialization. As for the upper classes, those who live and work in the new environment have been mainly the owners of modern industrial, commercial, and banking enterprises and their higher employees, officials in the big cities, teachers, and professionals. They also have been exposed to modern ideological influences. These influences have also been an important factor in the modernization of those upper-class strata whose mode of life and work has not essentially changed as, for example, landlords or owners of traditional workshops and commercial enterprises.

The greatest changes have taken place among those strata and individuals who live in the new environment and have been exposed to new ideas.

Among the workers and peasants living in new conditions the changes in behavior preceded the changes in attitudes. With the members of the educated classes the changes in ideas and attitudes preceded changes in behavior. The workers and peasants often behave in new ways toward their parents, husbands, or children without realizing that they are repudiating the old Confucian rules; the young intellectuals often have new ideas about paternal authority, marriage, etc., without being able to put them into practice.

THE CHANGING POSITION OF YOUTH

China is no longer the country where the old man reigns supreme. His important function in society is passing. The young man achieves more prominence in political life, in business, everywhere. The relations in the family have begun to reflect this development. The children feel that they have not only duties but

also rights. The small children are less obedient than they used to be in olden times.

In the educated classes many adolescents and youths, imbued with modern ideas, have conflicts with their parents over their right to marry whom they like, to choose their friends, their profession, amusements, and—above all—to participate in decisions concerning the fate of their country. The youth now not only have ethical and political ideas and values different from their parents' but often carry their ideas into practice in spite of their parents' opposition. Most important is that they do it with full conviction that they have the right to take their fate into their own hands and no longer recognize paternal authority as absolute. If they accept paternal advice, they do it because (as often happens in modernized families) they accept paternal authority voluntarily.

Many working boys and girls are beginning to regard their earnings as their own and not as the property of their families; some of them protest against harsh treatment by their parents; some strive to choose their own mates. But only a few of them realize that they are acting against moral rules that dominated the lives and behavior of their forefathers.

Work in modern factories, studies in modern schools, and life in big cities enlarge the young people's knowledge and experience and enhance their prestige in the family—they are consulted much more frequently than their parents were at their age.

But despite all these changes children are still more obedient in China than in the West. Chinese high-school and college students have fewer overt disagreements with their parents than American youths of their age; the rule of obedience is even less frequently broken among peasants and workers.

A peculiar characteristic of Chinese parent-child conflicts is that most of them—in accordance with the old Chinese tradition—do not end in a clear-cut victory for one side but in a compromise.

THE CHANGING POSITION OF WOMEN

The modern women—factory workers, career women, and educated housewives—have won a position in family and society far superior to that of their grandmothers or of those of their own contemporaries who have continued to live under the old conditions. The modern wife is often her husband's equal and not infrequently has acquired a dominant position in the family. She has more influence on her children—she is less subjected to her

mother-in-law. Women have successfully begun to combat polygyny.

All the women of China have profited from the modern trend that has banned the binding of feet and restored woman's freedom of movement. The seclusion of women and the rules concerning the separation of the sexes have begun to disappear. In the cities women are seen in all the public places: streets, markets, theaters. In the modernized strata—among the factory workers and modern intellectuals—the example set by the modernized women and the new attitudes of their husbands have helped to improve the position of those women who themselves were not modern—that is, those who have neither worked nor enjoyed a modern education.

Factory workers have often been “powerful in the family in spite of themselves”—their ideas and attitudes are the same as those of the women in olden times; they do not believe in woman's equality and long for a dominating husband. Many women with modern education have been, in theory, ardent supporters of woman's complete emancipation and equality but have been unable to put any of their dreams into practice and in their families enjoy fewer rights than women factory workers. The greatest advances in family status have been made by those women who combined modern ideology with economic independence, that is, by career women and factory workers who have studied in progressive schools or taken part in modern organizations.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN FAMILY LIFE

With the progress of industrialization and the destruction of the economy of self-sufficiency, the family was gradually losing its role as an economic unit.

As of old, the prevalent family type depends on the social and economic status, but modernization has brought an increased proportion of conjugal families in all social classes. This increase has been achieved mainly at the expense of the joint families; the proportion of stem families has decreased slowly. Both economic and ideological factors are responsible for the dissolution of joint families. On the one hand, the high cost of living in the cities prevents industrial workers from bringing their unproductive old people with them; on the other hand, the possibilities for the employment of women and children in factories lead them to bring their wives and children to the cities and thus to establish new conjugal families. These economic considerations, to which we must add

the fact that there is greater mobility in modern China, partly explain the tendency toward the conjugal family in the upper and middle classes. Other not unimportant reasons are the ideological differences which arise between modernized men and their tradition-bound parents and brothers, and the spread of love matches, which induce the modern official or industrialist to take his wife and children with him to the city rather than leave them with his parents in his native town.

There are no indications that modernization has tended to disturb the normal birth rate in China. On the contrary, modernized families seem to have on the average more children than nonmodernized families of the same social strata (this is evidently due to the better economic and hygienic conditions prevalent in these strata and to the better treatment of the little girls).

The clan has been rapidly losing its economic role. This process has been almost completed in the North, but it has advanced in the South, too, despite the stronger clan tradition of this region.

Mutual help of clansmen and kinsmen is still widely practiced. The war has probably intensified the obligation to help one's kin. Frequently people who have thrown their lot in with the Japanese and their puppets have helped their patriotic and anti-Japanese relatives.⁸

But two significant new developments have taken place in the attitudes of modernized people toward their kinsmen. The friend has gained in importance and has begun to dispute the role of the relative. And even more portentous is the modern tendency to avoid helping one's relatives and friends at the expense of the community at large. The modern Chinese has declared war on nepotism and, despite many difficulties and setbacks, he can boast of important victories in this respect.

The fight against nepotism has been prompted by economic factors—the imperative demand for increased efficiency of labor as a result of industrialization. It has also expressed the new Chinese mentality—the growth of patriotism, and the greater importance of society as opposed to the family.

Even before the war the idea that a moral man should live for his parents rather than die for his country or his ideals was no longer generally accepted. So many people did die for their ideals in the struggle for unification and liberation of China between 1911 and 1937! During World War II the belief that their supreme duty is toward their country has won the hearts of the Chinese

people. At the beginning of the war General Chao asked his mother to forgive him because he was dying for his country instead of saving his life in order to take care of her. The newspapers gave wide publicity to this letter of a filial son.⁹ Later he would not have felt the need to apologize for his patriotism.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

Can the evolution of China during the last hundred years be called progress, that is, a change for the better? This question is as much a moot point among the students of China as it is among the social scientists who ponder the development of Western civilization. Yet it is a question which unavoidably confronts every thinking person.

Before trying to answer we must first agree on what is progress. No universally accepted definition has been found and any answer must necessarily be of a tentative character. The author is inclined to accept the definition suggested by the views of the utilitarians: "Progress is a change of social conditions which creates greatest happiness for the greatest number of people."¹⁰ As to the notion of happiness, Lucretius described it very adequately: "What does nature demand? That our body be free from pain, that our spirit be joyous and free from fear and anxiety!"¹¹ Yet the happiness of a human being of course implies the possibility of freely developing his personality and abilities. A person who has not had this possibility cannot be called happy even if he himself feels satisfied. A man who is really happy must be able to say with the great Russian poet Alexander Block:

I hallow everything that was.
I never sought a better fate.
How much you swelled with love, O heart!
O intellect, how much you blazed!¹²

To quote J. S. Mill, "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."¹³ A development which would change our thinking, suffering, striving humanity into a horde of satisfied pigs would not deserve the name of progress.

The full development of the personality can be achieved and can contribute to individual and general happiness only when it is in harmony with the happiness of the community. The com-

munity must be organized so that individuals can have free play within the limits created by the rights and welfare of all.¹⁴ Individualism in a society striving for the happiness of all its members is not identical with individual egotism, which means a narrowing of the human being cut off from the joys of coöperation.

This complete individual and collective happiness can be achieved—or at least approached—only in a society of fully realized freedom: freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom from all kinds of inequality and injustice, freedom to express one's thoughts, freedom to decide one's own fate and to share in the administration of the community.

Only in such a society can personality and culture really be developed and human beings enabled to achieve real happiness and satisfaction. Only in a society in which human labor is free and is not a commodity can it be a source not of boredom, fatigue, and pain but of enjoyment and satisfaction.

Only in such a society is a family life possible which contributes its full share to the happiness of the individual and the well-being of society. In a society free from want where everybody's right to education, satisfactory food, shelter, and work is secure, the family will lose its compulsive features. Woman, who will achieve full spiritual and economic equality with man, will not need a husband as a provider but solely as a companion in a spiritual and bodily union which contributes to her happiness. True individual love will achieve unknown intensity in such a society and bring a happiness hitherto unknown.

The parent-child relations, free from compulsion and mechanical authority, will be built on true companionship and mutual respect. The guidance of the parents will be a voluntarily accepted guidance which does not hamper the development of the child's personality.

The moral code of this new family will not be forbearance implying constraint, but mutual love and respect, making life together not a tiresome obligation but a joy.

Certainly this ideal is still far from realization. But it may be asked whether there are reasons to assume that the development of family relations is moving toward this ideal?

At first sight, contemporary Chinese life presents such a dismal picture that one is inclined to answer emphatically: "No! There is no progress!" Divorce, desertions, intense sufferings of old-fashioned women and modern men united in marriage, violent

conflicts between parents and children, suicides resulting from family tragedies, family divisions after violent quarrels, sufferings of the old people who cannot understand and appreciate new rules and standards, intense sufferings of individuals torn between the old and the new morality—does not all this make life infinitely more tragic and hard than it was in old China?

But this conclusion would not be correct.

To begin with, conditions in contemporary China should not be compared with the relatively stabilized periods of old China but with the periods of war, disruption, famine, and foreign invasion. In the past, too, political and economic strain resulted in an increase of family tragedies.

It should also be remembered that China is experiencing a period of cultural maladjustment after the initial change of technology and material environment.*

The process of change has everywhere been accompanied by initial maladjustment and suffering. The transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe was not accompanied by an immediate and conspicuous increase of individual happiness. The emancipation of youth and women after the industrial revolution caused many tragedies. And how much more difficult is this process in China where the changes came at once and without the benefit of the relative prosperity brought to the Western world by industrial capitalism. Nevertheless, compared to the old patriarchal family, the modern Western family has certainly secured more well-being for its members and opened new horizons to them. "For all the limitations, this form of new family which few families as yet share, has undeniably superior values as compared to earlier forms,"¹⁶ says a student of Western family life. After her investigation of Chinese family life, past and present, the author of this book is inclined to make a similar judgment. Through the difficulties of the period of maladjustment and crisis a new pattern of family life has begun to emerge, which is certainly brighter than the old pattern.†

* As MacIver puts it: "Maladjustment occurs generally when technological change is suddenly or abruptly introduced, so that it disturbs the established culture."¹⁵

† As far as we can learn, family life in the Soviet districts seems to present the new features mentioned above even more prominently than the rest of China. The women have achieved greater equality than elsewhere in China. Modern marriage has become a rule among the leading strata of Soviet society and is spreading rapidly, and monogamy has made great progress. The stress put by Soviet laws on the rights of children, and the numerous children's and youth organizations participating in the life of the community, have improved the status of youth and children in the family.¹⁷

THE CHINESE FAMILY DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

The news from beleaguered China during the war has been scarce and it is not easy to appraise the social and economic processes taking place there. Some factors seem to have retarded modernization and progress, some seem to be speeding them up.

Wartime China has been a country almost without modern industry—the Japanese have conquered all the industrial centers. Contacts with the West have been limited—only a few foreigners have come to China and not many Chinese have been able to go abroad.

The loss of prestige experienced by the white man owing to his initial defeats in the Far Eastern campaign is apt to strengthen the position of those who have been critical of Western culture and modernization. The new wave of nationalism and feeling of national dignity accompanying China's evolution from the status of a half-colony to that of a free country might, at least temporarily, have the same effect.

There have been, however, strong factors making for more rapid modernization.

The shift of Chinese cultural and political life to the West and Southwest has helped materially to improve education in this part of the country and education is, as we know, one of the most important ideological factors in modernization. Many high schools and colleges have been founded in places where there were none before; students and intellectuals have been conducting propaganda in the remote villages and small towns of Szechwan province.

The same function of modernization has been fulfilled by the Chinese industrial coöperatives. The coöperatives, which started in 1938, have grown considerably and now supply the Chinese Army and civilian population with consumers' goods, formerly supplied by the industrial enterprises and handicrafts temporarily lost to the enemy; some of the coöperatives even went over to the production of small arms. Although compelled to work with native raw material exclusively, on a small scale, and sometimes to use outmoded methods of production, the coöperatives, led by progressive intellectuals, industrial workers, and a few foreigners, have tried to make available to China all the achievements of modern technology which can profitably be applied under the circumstances, and to carry a broad program of technical and general education to the members.¹⁸

The new Chinese Army has also been a medium of modernization. The soldiers are taught to read and write and they receive a certain amount of political education (the amount varies in different parts of the army—the former Red Army units and those from Kwangsi province are the most progressive); those who learn to handle complicated modern arms receive a certain degree of technical education.

The same has been true even more of the guerrillas, who gather in their ranks the best elements of the Chinese people and with whom political education is an essential method of recruiting their fighters and keeping them together.

Moreover, the coöperatives and the guerrillas also have served as schools of democracy in China.

The process of women's emancipation has been accelerated during the war. More and more women have been participating in the Chinese war effort: as nurses, social workers, propagandists, members of industrial coöperatives, members of guerrilla detachments, and even as soldiers. One of the most efficient guerrilla leaders was a woman, old Mother Chao. It has not been uncommon in the villages of the guerrilla areas to see a young girl going from house to house collecting money and food for the defenders of China.*

Children too have been widely used as helpers by the guerrillas.

These women and children have been demanding more and more rights in their families and the men who themselves are participating in democratic organizations will be less reluctant to grant them these rights than the old-fashioned men.

The end of the war did not bring an end to the sufferings of the people of China. As soon as the Japanese were defeated many of China's unsettled economic and political problems came to the fore again with great urgency.

Yet, whatever the present difficulties, there are good reasons for optimism about China's future. The vast natural resources of the country, her gifted and courageous people, who have created one of the greatest cultures of the world, the deeply rooted elements of democracy in Chinese political philosophy and everyday life, the extent and momentum of the progressive movement during the last forty years—all these give promise that China will be able

* "Does not your mother object to it?" the author asked a Chinese friend who told her that his sister took part in these activities. "No," he said, "mother says that nowadays it is not *li* [rules of proper behavior] that matters, but only '*k'ang Jih*' [resist Japan]."

to overcome her present difficulties, carry out urgently needed democratic reforms, and consolidate herself as a great democratic power.

The world at large certainly needs this solution of the Chinese problem not less than China herself. The war could not have been won without the stubborn Chinese resistance. China could not have preserved her sovereignty if she had been left to fight the enemy alone. Now, when West and East are attempting to build a durable peace, to heal the wounds inflicted by war, and once more advance human culture, China needs the world and the world needs China.

Contrary to the wishes of K'ang Yu-wei who, disgusted with old Chinese family life, wanted to abolish the family altogether, the new China and the future world certainly will not discard the family. It satisfies deep biological and emotional needs. Soviet Russia where, after one of the most radical revolutions the world has ever known, the family has been strengthened rather than abandoned, offers the best proof of this.

Friendly coöperation with other nations should help China to achieve happiness and prosperity. By preserving and developing the best features of their family and other human relations the Chinese can teach the rest of the world how to be faithful and devoted friends, how to respect and take care of the aged, how to enjoy the birth and growth of children, how to be tolerant and human. China needs world culture to become happy and prosperous. The world needs China to develop its civilization to the highest possible level.

APPENDIX

THE CHINESE DYNASTIES

CHRONOLOGICAL SCHEME OF CHINESE HISTORY *

THE EARLY FEUDAL PERIOD

Hsia Dynasty	B.C. ca. 1994-1523
Shang (or Yin) Dynasty	“ “ 1523-1027

THE LATE FEUDAL PERIOD

The Chou Dynasty	“ “ 1027-256
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THE CHINESE EMPIRE

The Ch'in Dynasty	“ “ 221-207
The Earlier Han Dynasty	“ “ 202-A.D. 9
The Later Han Dynasty	A.D. 25-220
Epoch of Three Kingdoms	220-265
The Western Tsin Dynasty	265-317
The Eastern Tsin Dynasty	317-420
Epoch of Division between North and South	420-589
The Sui Dynasty	590-618
The T'ang Dynasty	618-906
The Five Dynasties	907-960
The Liao Dynasty	907-1123
The Chin Dynasty	960-1279
The Sung Dynasty	1114-1234
The Yüan (Mongol) Dynasty	1260-1368
The Ming Dynasty	1368-1644
The Ch'ing (Manchu) Dynasty	1644-1911

The Republic of China established in 1912.

* Adapted from L. C. Goodrich, *A Short History of the Chinese People* (New York and London, 1943).

TABLE I
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE HEADS OF FAMILIES FROM WHOM INFORMATION WAS SECURED FOR THIS STUDY *

- I. Villages (North China,† Kiangsu,‡ Fukien ‡):
Farm laborers; small, middle, well-to-do peasants; village artisans; teachers; shopkeepers; landlords.
- II. Nonindustrialized cities † (Peiping and small cities in North China):
 1. Wage earners:
 - A. Workers in traditional occupations: masons, carpenters, shoemakers, tailors, awning makers, painters, lacquer carvers, paper-flower makers, ironsmiths, tinsmiths, brass-smiths, porcelain menders, rug makers, weavers, spinners, barbers, unskilled workers (coolies), servants (cooks, riksha coolies, nurses), sewing women.
 - B. Workers in modern shops and institutions: printers, iron foundry workers, weavers, electricians, railway workers, streetcar workers, chauffeurs, bus drivers.
 2. Lower middle class: clerks and shop assistants, artisans (independent producers), riksha coolies (owners and those hiring their vehicles and paying rent to the owners), peddlers (of vegetables, cooked food, haberdashery, candies, peanuts, melon seeds, etc.), street barbers, tongue scrapers, fortune-tellers.
 3. Middle class: businessmen: owners of traditional workshops employing laborers, owners of stores, of small old-fashioned banks; shop managers, employees (clerks) in traditional and modern business enterprises, petty officials and military officers, elementary school teachers, newspapermen, traditionally trained physicians.

* The information was secured from the hospital records and by means of special interviews. The person interviewed was not always the family head, but the families were classified according to the occupation of the family head.

The hospital records provided answers to only a small part of the problems treated in this book. The interviews were based on a printed schedule containing about 50 different questions, but for various reasons it was not always possible to ask all the informants to answer all the questions. The author excluded from the statistical evaluation contradictory, indefinite, and evidently unreliable data (e.g., records where the informant in enumerating the members of the family would say that there are "four or five" children, etc., were not analyzed as to the size of the family). For more about the methods and history of the investigation see K. A. Wittfogel's *New Light on the Chinese Society* (New York, 1938), pp. 5-11.

† Interviews and hospital records.

‡ Interviews only.

4. Upper class: landlords, owners of old-fashioned and modern commercial enterprises, modern bankers and industrialists, high officials, high-ranking employees (mainly of banks and institutions); professionals: engineers, modern-trained physicians, lawyers, high military officers, high-school teachers and principals, college professors.

III. Industrialized cities: ‡

SHANGHAI:

1. Wage earners:
 - A. Industrial workers: textile workers (spinners, weavers, dyers, packers); workers in public utilities (waterworks and power stations); machine-builders; workers in iron foundries, brass, electrical appliance, wood, tobacco and food factories; long-shoremen, sailors, streetcar repairers.
 - B. Workers in traditional industry: shoemakers, glovemakers, makers of bamboo furniture, coppersmiths, waiters, cooks, domestic servants, and nurses.
2. Lower middle class: Artisans (tailors, shoemakers, barbers), petty officials (including custom officials), petty clerks, shop assistants, rent collectors, geomancers, magicians.
3. Middle class: store and workshop owners, small compradores, clerks in banks, factories, big stores, contractors, owners of boarding houses, private teachers.
4. Upper class: engineers, doctors.

WUSIH

1. Wage earners: industrial workers (mainly textile), cooks.
2. Lower middle class: clerks, teachers, priests, bankrupt small shopowners.

TIENTSIN

1. Wage earners: industrial workers (mainly textile), tobacco, glove makers.
2. Lower middle class: ricksha coolies, peddlers, bankrupt small shopowners.

TABLE II
FAMILY TYPE AND SOCIAL CLASSES

<i>Family Type</i>	Conjugal	Stem	Joint	<i>Total Families</i>
Farm Laborers	1	1	—	30 Peasant Families in Kiangsu
Poor Peasants	9	11	2	
Middle Peasants	2	4	—	
Poor Peasants	10	8	3	40 Peasant Families in Fukien
Middle Peasants	3	5	1	
Well-to-do Peasants	1	—	3	
Merchants & Landowners	1	1	4	64 Families in Tientsin and Wusih
Wage earners	16	6	2	
Lower Middle Class	19	18	3	

TABLE III
AVERAGE SIZE OF FAMILIES OF DIFFERENT TYPES
(458 Rural Families and 1,365 Urban Families in North China)

<i>Family Type</i>	<i>Conjugal</i>	<i>Stem</i>	<i>Joint</i>
Rural: Farm Laborers	3.7	4.7	6.2
Poor Peasants	3.5	5.3	8.5
Middle Peasants	4.4	6.1	9.9
Rich Peasants	4.5	7.0	8.9
Landlords	3.7	7.3	11.4
Urban: Wage Earners	3.2	4.9	7.4
Lower Middle Class	4.0	5.2	8.9
Middle Class	4.3	6.7	9.3
Upper Class	4.8	6.5	9.8

TABLE IV

ATTITUDE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS TOWARD NEPOTISM *

Occupation of Students' Fathers: †	Question: To Whom Would You Give the Position?						Total	
	Agriculture	Business- men	Officials	Professional Men & Educators	Christian Ministers	Old-time Scholars		Others
Number of Male Students Reporting:	64	201	98	104	14	15	76	572
Answer				Per Cent				
To a relative	20	19	18	15	14	60	8	18
To a friend	48	30	42	44	29	7	42	37
To the most deserving person ‡	32	51	40	41	57	33	50	45
Number of Female Students Reporting:	11	112	112	90	18	10	51	404
Answer				Per Cent				
To a relative	—	18	11	17	22	10	16	15
To a friend	27	20	36	15	11	30	29	24
To the most deserving person ‡	73	62	53	68	67	60	55	61

* The attitudes of high-school students were as follows: relatives were chosen by 24% of the boys and 23% of the girls; friends by 29% of the boys, 29% of the girls; the most deserving person by 47% of the boys and 48% of the girls.

† Only those who answered the question are listed here.
‡ Mainly to those with the best qualifications.

TABLE V
ATTITUDE OF CHINESE HIGH-SCHOOL AND COLLEGE
STUDENTS IN HAWAII TOWARD NEPOTISM

Question: To whom would you give a position?

<i>Answer</i>	<i>Boys</i>		<i>Girls</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
To a relative	121	65	111	62
To a friend	15	8	14	8
To the most deserving person	50	27	54	30
	<u>186</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>179</u>	<u>100</u>

TABLE VI

METHODS OF PUNISHMENT

1. Male College Students

<i>Religion of the Family:</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Confucian</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Other Religions *</i>	<i>No Religion</i>	<i>Not Given</i>
<i>687 Students Reporting</i>	114	61	100	36	338	38
<i>Method</i>				<i>Per Cent</i>		
Punishment, including beating	57	65	39	46	40	52
Punished, but not beaten	33	27	38	37	42	30
Not punished †	5	3	8	—	8	5
No answer	5	5	15	17	10	13

2. Female College Students

<i>Religion of the Family:</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Confucian</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Other Religions</i>	<i>No Religion</i>	<i>Not Given</i>
<i>477 Students Reporting</i>	112	35	93	8	201	28
<i>Method</i>				<i>Per Cent</i>		
Punishment, including beating	49	41	40	39	37	19
Punished, but not beaten	40	38	46	46	44	10
Not punished	7	14	9	15	10	—
No answer	4	7	5	—	9	71

* Taoists, Mohammedans, etc.

† One family: Christian and Taoist.

3. Male High-School Students

<i>Religion of the Family:</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Confucian</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Other Religions</i>	<i>No Religion</i>	<i>Not Given</i>
<i>387 Students Reporting</i>	45	26	108	20	146	42
<i>Method</i>				<i>Per Cent</i>		
Punishment, including beating	60	38	61 *	55	54	40
Punished, but not beaten	24	38	26	40	25	24
Not punished	9	8	4	—	7	5
No answer	7	16	9	5	14	31

4. Female High-School Students

<i>Religion of the Family:</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Confucian</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Other Religions</i>	<i>No Religion</i>	<i>Not Given</i>
<i>148 Students Reporting</i>	10	10	54	7	60	7
<i>Method</i>				<i>Per Cent</i>		
Punishment, including beating	50	30	29	28	22	28
Punished, but not beaten	30	30	43	28	53	44
Not punished	—	30	—	14	5	—
No answer	20	10	28	30	20	28

* This group includes a very large proportion of boys from peasant families, where beating was more common than among the urban middle and upper classes.

TABLE VII

ATTITUDE TOWARD PARENTS.

(687 Male and 477 Female College Students; 387 High-school Boys and 149 High-school Girls. Answers in per cent.)

<i>Attitude</i>	<i>Toward Father</i>				<i>Toward Mother</i>			
	<i>Sons</i>		<i>Daughters</i>		<i>Sons</i>		<i>Daughters</i>	
	<i>High School</i>	<i>College</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>College</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>College</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>College</i>
Fear	64	43	56	39	40	18	47	24
Desire to avoid	17	19	7	13	2	8	2	4
Respect	80	62	73	68	66	60	70	58
Love	57	52	70	62	70	80	74	85
Companionship	6	11	7	15	—	10	—	18
Admiration	31	23	28	35	—	24	—	31

TABLE VIII

ATTITUDE TOWARD PARENTS

(606 Male and 427 Female College Students; 355 High-school Boys and 126 High-school Girls.* Answers in per cent.)

<i>Attitude</i>	<i>Toward Father</i>				<i>Toward Mother</i>			
	<i>Sons</i>		<i>Daughters</i>		<i>Sons</i>		<i>Daughters</i>	
	<i>High School</i>	<i>College</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>College</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>College</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>College</i>
Purely negative †	10	11	5	8	5	4	2	3
Negative and positive ‡	57	42	59	43	40	19	54	24
Purely positive §	33	47	36	49	55	77	44	73

* One hundred and forty-five students did not answer the questions and 39 gave unclear and contradictory answers. These are not included.

† Purely negative attitude: only fear or desire to avoid were checked.

‡ Negative and positive: the most frequent combination of feeling in this attitude was fear, respect, and love, though there were cases when love and fear were checked, as well as respect and desire to avoid, etc.

§ Purely positive: only respect, love, companionship, and admiration were checked.

TABLE X

ATTITUDE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS TOWARD GRAND-
PARENTS

<i>Attitude:</i>	<i>Toward Grandfather</i>		<i>Toward Grandmother</i>	
	<i>Grandsons</i>	<i>Granddaughters</i>	<i>Grandsons</i>	<i>Granddaughters</i>
<i>Students Reporting:</i>	208	106	289	168
<i>Answers, Per Cent</i>				
Purely negative	6	9	7	12
Negative and positive	30	26	17	18
Purely positive	62	57	75	70
Not clear and no answer	2	8	1	—

TABLE XI

ATTITUDE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS TOWARD ELDER
BROTHERS AND SISTERS

<i>Attitude:</i>	<i>Male Students</i>		<i>Female Students</i>	
	<i>Elder Brother</i>	<i>Elder Sister</i>	<i>Elder Brother</i>	<i>Elder Sister</i>
<i>Students Reporting:</i>	367	328	248	191
<i>Answers, Per Cent</i>				
Purely negative	7	3	8	4
Negative and positive	19	11	18	15
Purely positive	72	85	73	80
Not clear	2	1	1	1

TABLE XII

The students who answered the questionnaires belonged to the following 22 colleges and 8 high schools, situated in 10 large cities of North, Central, and South China.

Colleges: Yenching,* Ching-Hua, Shihta, Pingta, Chung Kuo, Min Kuo, Tung Pei (in Peiping); Futan and Shansi University (Taiyüan); Nankai (Tientsin); Ch'i Lu * (Tsinan); University of Nanking,* Ching Ling Women's College * (Nanking); Ta Hsia, University of Shanghai * (Shanghai); Central China College * (Wuchang), Yali Medical School,* University of Hunan (Changsha); Hua Nan College * (Foochow); Sun Yat-sen University, Hsiang Ch'i College, Lingnam * (Canton).

High Schools: School of Finance and Commerce; * Third Middle School,* Second Municipal Girls' School; National Midwifery School (Peiping); Chi Kuan High School (Tsinan); Middle School at the University of Shanghai * (Shanghai); Yali Middle School * (Changsha); Girls' Vocational School (Foochow).

* Missionary institutions.

TABLE XIII
RELIGION OF THE STUDENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES .

1. CHRISTIAN COLLEGES

Religion of Male Students

<i>Religion of the Family</i>	<i>Confucian</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Taoist & Other</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>No Religion</i>	<i>No Answer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Confucian	7	1	—	4	17	—	29
Buddhist	—	—	3	10	36	—	49
Taoist and other	2	—	4	4	7	1	18
Christian	1	—	1	75	17	7	101
No religion	—	—	2	17	145	4	168
No answer	—	—	—	6	1	12	19
	<u>10</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>116</u>	<u>223</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>384</u>

Religion of Female Students

	<i>Confucian</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Taoist & Other</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>No Religion</i>	<i>No Answer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Confucian	2	—	—	8	11	2	23
Buddhist	1	1	1	26	33	3	65
Taoist and other	—	—	1	—	4	—	5
Christian	—	—	—	91	3	8	102
No religion	—	—	—	21	97	4	122
No answer	—	—	—	7	2	8	17
	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>153</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>334</u>

TABLE XIII (Continued)

2. CHRISTIAN HIGH SCHOOLS

<i>Religion of the Family</i>	<i>Religion of Male Students</i>					<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Confucian</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Taoist & Other</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>No Religion</i>	<i>No Answer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Confucian	8	—	—	2	2	3	15
Buddhist	3	19	—	15	41	19	97
Taoist and other	1	—	2	4	6	2	15
Christian	—	—	—	30	4	6	40
No religion	2	—	—	12	50	6	70
No answer	—	—	—	6	—	11	17
	14	19	2	69	103	47	254

	<i>Religion of Female Students</i>					<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Confucian</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Taoist & Other</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>No Religion</i>	<i>No Answer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Confucian	1	—	—	—	—	1	2
Buddhist	—	1	—	1	1	—	3
Taoist and other	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
Christian	—	—	—	4	—	1	5
No religion	—	—	—	—	8	1	9
No answer	—	—	—	—	—	2	2
	1	1	—	5	10	5	22

TABLE XIII (Continued)

3. NON-CHRISTIAN COLLEGES

Religion of the Family	Religion of Male Students					Total
	Confucian	Buddhist	Taoist & Other	Christian	No Religion	
Confucian	8	1	—	—	20	32
Buddhist	1	—	—	1	45	51
Taoist and other	1	—	1	—	16	18
Christian	—	1	—	7	5	13
No religion	2	—	—	1	161	170
No answer	—	—	—	3	5	19
	12	2	1	12	252	303
Religion of Female Students						
	Confucian	Buddhist	Taoist & Other	Christian	No Religion	Total
Confucian	3	—	—	1	6	12
Buddhist	—	1	—	2	20	28
Taoist and other	—	—	1	1	1	3
Christian	—	—	—	7	3	10
No religion	—	—	—	3	70	79
No answer	—	—	—	1	1	11
	3	1	1	15	101	143

TABLE XIII (Continued)

4. NON-CHRISTIAN HIGH SCHOOLS

<i>Religion of the Family</i>	<i>Religion of Male Students</i>				
	<i>Confucian</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Taoist & Other</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>No Religion</i>
Confucian	8	—	—	—	2
Buddhist	—	1	—	—	8
Taoist and other	—	—	1	—	2
Christian	1	—	—	2	2
No religion	1	—	—	—	72
No answer	—	—	—	—	1
	<hr/> 10	<hr/> 1	<hr/> 1	<hr/> 2	<hr/> 87
					<hr/> 32
					<hr/> 133
					<hr/> 11
					<hr/> 11
					<hr/> 5
					<hr/> 5
					<hr/> 76
					<hr/> 25
					<hr/> 133
					<hr/> 8
					<hr/> 51
					<hr/> 6
					<hr/> 5
					<hr/> 51
					<hr/> 6
					<hr/> 127
	<i>Religion of Female Students</i>				
	<i>Confucian</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Taoist & Other</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>No Religion</i>
Confucian	4	—	—	—	4
Buddhist	—	5	—	1	41
Taoist and other	—	1	2	—	3
Christian	—	—	—	4	—
No religion	1	—	—	—	48
No answer	1	—	—	—	—
	<hr/> 6	<hr/> 6	<hr/> 2	<hr/> 5	<hr/> 96
					<hr/> 12
					<hr/> 127

TABLE XIV

FAVORITE BOOKS OF CHINESE STUDENTS

Answers of 1,600 Students of 22 Chinese Universities and 8 High Schools in 1937

<i>Books</i>	<i>Number of Boys Naming Book</i>	<i>Number of Girls Naming Book</i>	<i>Total</i>
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I. CHINESE

A. Old books

1. Heroic trend

<i>All Men Are Brothers</i>	90	19	109
<i>The Three Kingdoms</i>	87	20	107
Others	12	2	14
	<hr/> 189	<hr/> 41	<hr/> 230

2. Sentimental and descriptive

<i>The Dream of the Red Chamber</i>	124	62	186
<i>The Westchamber</i>	25	2	27
Others	45	18	63
	<hr/> 194	<hr/> 82	<hr/> 276

3. Classics, history, poetry

<i>The Four Books</i>	21	4	25
<i>The Book of History</i>	19	7	26
Others	66	18	84
	<hr/> 106	<hr/> 29	<hr/> 135

Total old books	489	152	641
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B. Modern books (fiction)

1. Left-wing authors

Lu Hsün *	105	35	140
Pa Chin	41	37	78
Mao Tun	36	11	47
Others	59	18	77
	<hr/> 241	<hr/> 101	<hr/> 342

2. Nonpolitical and liberal trend

Ping Hsin	6	16	22
Lao She	7	4	11
Others	9	11	20
	<hr/> 22	<hr/> 31	<hr/> 53

3. Right-wing authors

Total modern books (fiction)	269	136	405
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* Lu Hsün was mentioned as favorite author 406 times.

<i>Books</i>	<i>Number of Boys Naming Book</i>	<i>Number of Girls Naming Book</i>	<i>Total</i>
C. Nonfiction †			
Hu Shih	3	—	3
Lin Yu-tang	2	—	2
Liang Ch'i Chao	4	3	7
Others	12	1	13
	<hr/> 21	<hr/> 4	<hr/> 25

II. FOREIGN BOOKS

A. Fiction

1. Anglo-Saxon

Dickens	37	32	69
Hardy	4	18	22
Alcott	9	14	23
Others	68	35	103
	<hr/> 118	<hr/> 99	<hr/> 217

2. Russian

Gorky ‡	32	26	58
Tolstoy	15	6	21
Turgenev	12	7	19
Others	45	19	63
	<hr/> 104	<hr/> 58	<hr/> 162

3. Other nationalities

Goethe, <i>Werther</i>	24	7	31
A. Dumas, <i>La Dame aux camélias</i>	27	17	44
Hugo, <i>Les Misérables</i>	13	18	31
De Amicis, <i>Cuore</i>	15	3	18
Others	39	23	62
	<hr/> 118	<hr/> 68	<hr/> 186

B. Nonfiction

The Bible	23	9	32
Marx, <i>Das Kapital</i>	10	—	10
H. Barbusse, <i>Stalin</i>	6	4	10
H. G. Wells, <i>Outline of History</i>	3	1	4
Others	29	4	33
	<hr/> 71	<hr/> 18	<hr/> 89

† Hu Shih was mentioned as favorite author 62 times, Lin Yu-tang 45 times, Liang Ch'i Chao 21 times, Cho T'ao-fen 22 times.

‡ Gorky was mentioned as favorite author 185 times.

TABLE XV
OCCUPATION OF FATHERS
(of 1,164 College and 536 High-school Students)

<i>Occupation of Father</i>	<i>College</i>		<i>High School</i>	
	<i>Male Students</i>	<i>Female Students</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>
Agriculture	78	12	68	4
Business	233	149	134	39
Officials	128	126	69	52
Military and police officers	29	14	17	6
Professional workers	49	39	17	13
Educational pursuits	74	54	18	14
Priests & evangelists	15	24	2	—
Old Chinese scholars & medi- cal doctors	18	10	9	2
Manual workers	2	—	1	—
Other occupations, and no occupation	19	16	1	3
No answer	42	33	51	16
	<u>687</u>	<u>477</u>	<u>387</u>	<u>149</u>

TABLE XVI
EDUCATION OF FATHERS
(of 1,164 College and 536 High-school Students)

<i>Education of Father</i>	<i>College</i>		<i>High School</i>	
	<i>Male Students</i>	<i>Female Students</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>
College	203	228	109	43
High school *	111	54	48	29
Military school	9	12	2	7
Elementary school	13	6	8	2
Traditional Chinese school	227	84	130	40
Degree under the old exami- nation school	76	65	16	9
No answer	48	28	74	19
	<u>687</u>	<u>477</u>	<u>387</u>	<u>149</u>

* Including normal schools, professional schools, YMCA schools, etc.

TABLE XVII
DISAGREEMENTS WITH PARENTS
(of 1,164 College and 536 High-school Students)

	<i>College</i>		<i>High-School</i>	
	<i>Male Students</i>	<i>Female Students</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>
<i>Students Reporting:</i>	687	477	387	149
<i>Subjects of Conflict</i>	<i>Answers, Per Cent</i>			
Marriage	27	15	13	6
Education	21	19	10	17
Future profession	13	9	9	3
Religion	12	14	8	2
Appreciation of Western culture	14	7	8	2
Political situation in China	17	13	7	5
Participation in the Stu- dent Movement	19	15	7	6
Friends chosen	17	15	10	6
Modern hygiene	15	11	10	10
Modern fashion	16	14	6	6
Recreations	22	18	13	20
No conflict	15	17	9	3
No answer	17	22	53	66

TABLE XVIII
COLLEGE STUDENTS' DISAGREEMENTS WITH PARENTS
Percentage of Students Who Checked

	<i>Male Students</i>		<i>Female Students</i>	
	<i>Father College Man</i>	<i>Father Had Traditional Education</i>	<i>Father College Man</i>	<i>Father Had Traditional Education</i>
<i>Students Reporting:</i>	203	303	228	149
<i>Subjects of Conflict</i>	<i>Answers, Per Cent</i>			
Marriage	23	28	12	22
Education	20	22	18	20
Future profession	14	13	3	12
Religion	6	15	11	22
Appreciation of Western culture	13	16	8	11
Political situation in China	20	17	16	12
Participation in the Stu- dent Movement	22	19	17	14
Friends chosen	20	17	17	14
Modern hygiene	15	16	11	13
Modern fashion	18	16	15	15
Recreations	21	21	18	24
No conflict	21	12	18	17
No answer	14	20	20	20

TABLE XIX

POLITICAL ATTITUDE AND ATTITUDE TOWARD PATERNAL AUTHORITY

(of 687 Male and 477 Female College Students)

Political Attitude of Male Students, Per Cent

<i>Attitude toward Paternal Authority</i>	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Fascist</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Radical</i>	<i>Nationalist</i>	<i>No Conclusion</i>
I. Authority accepted							
A. As a tradition	28	27	15	17	7	19	12
B. Voluntarily	5	8	9	21	4	9	6
II. Lack of authority							
A. Parents' will enforced	1	2	7	4	7	5	2
B. No interference by parents	11	8	7	9	18	8	7
III. Authority shaken	29	33	44	26	37	35	37
IV. Authority rejected	4	3	—	4	11	3	1
No conclusion	22	19	18	19	16	21	35

Political Attitude of Female Students, Per Cent

<i>Attitude toward Paternal Authority</i>	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Fascist</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Radical</i>	<i>Nationalist</i>	<i>No Conclusion</i>
I. Authority accepted							
A. As a tradition	20	24		25 *	12	16	15
B. Voluntarily	18	4		15	7	16	16
II. Lack of authority							
A. Parents' will enforced	2	—		2	4	6	2
B. No interference by parents	6	7		6	12	8	8
III. Authority shaken	34	48		28	42	27	37
IV. Authority rejected	—	2		4	5	3	—
No conclusion	20	15		20	18	24	22

* Christian and Democratic.

NOTES

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I. State and Society

1. F. Weidenreich, "The Sinanthropus Population of Choukoutien" (locality 1), *Bulletin of the Geographical Society of China*, I, No. 4 (1935), 437-439.
2. K. A. Wittfogel, "Die Theorie der Orientalischen Gesellschaft," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, Jahrgang VII, Doppelheft, 1-2 (Paris, 1938); M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen, 1920-21).
3. *The Great Learning*, "Chinese Classics," trans. by James Legge (London, Oxford, 1893-95), I, Part 2, p. 229; see also *Confucian Analects*, "Chinese Classics," p. 2. The quotations from the "Chinese Classics" either follow the translations of James Legge or modify them on the basis of the Chinese text and its interpretations by Legge, F. S. Couvreur, and R. Wilhelm.
4. *The Works of Mencius*, "Chinese Classics," II, Part 2, p. 171.
5. *The Hsiao Ching (Classic of Filial Piety)*, "Sacred Books of the East," trans. by James Legge (Oxford, 1879), III, 466.
6. *The Doctrine of the Mean*, "Chinese Classics," I, Part 2, pp. 270-271.
7. See K. A. Wittfogel, "Wirtschaftliche Grundlagen der Entwicklung der Familienautorität," in the symposium *Autorität und Familie*, Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung (Paris, 1936), p. 506.
8. *Li Chi (The Book of Ritual)*, trans. by James Legge. "Sacred Books of the East" (Oxford, 1879-85), Vols. XXVII and XXVIII. Vol. XXVII is quoted as *Li Chi*, I; Vol. XXVIII as *Li Chi*, II. See *Li Chi*, I, 66, 68, 70, 449 ff.; II, 230 ff.
9. *Confucian Analects*, "Chinese Classics," I, Part 2, p. 72. See also *The Doctrine of the Mean*, p. 259; *Li Chi*, I, 131.

II. Functions and Structure of the Family

1. D. H. Kulp, *Country Life in South China* (New York, 1925), p. 148.
2. Frédéric Le Play, *L'Organisation de la famille* (Paris, 1874), pp. 10-11, 28 ff.
3. See C. C. Wu, "The Chinese Family: Organization, Names and Kinship Terms," *American Anthropologist*, XXIX (July-Sept., 1927), 316.
4. See J. J. Duyvendak, *The Book of Lord Shang* (London, 1928), pp. 8, 15; also M. Kokin and G. Papayan, *Agrarnyi Stroi Drevnego Kitaja (Agrarian Organization of Ancient China)* (Leningrad, 1930), p. 148.
5. T'ao Hsi-sheng, *Hun-yin yü Chia-tsu (Marriage and the Family)* (Shanghai, 1934), pp. 64 ff.
6. See K. A. Wittfogel, *New Light on the Chinese Society* (New York, 1938), p. 8.
7. See e.g., *Shang Yü* (The Sacred Edict of the Emperor K'ang Hsi with the amplifications of the Emperor Yung Ch'eng and a paraphrase by an 18th-century official, Wang Yu-po) (Shanghai, 1871 ed. is quoted here), running pp. 6, 7. See also G. Boulais, *Manuel du code chinois* (Shanghai, 1923), p. 308, and Jakiuf Bichurin, *Kitai v grazhdanskoi i nraustvennom sostojanii (China: Civil and Moral)* (St. Petersburg, 1848), IV, 175, 176.

8. Boulais, *op. cit.*, p. 198.
9. T'ao Hsi-sheng, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
10. See Mabel Ping Hua-li, *The Economic History of China* (New York, 1921), pp. 173, 174, 176, and tables pp. 436-437; S. Balazs, "Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte der T'ang Zeit," in the *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen* (Berlin, 1931), p. 19.
11. *Chin Ping Mei*. A 15th-century novel. The German trans. by F. Kuhn (Leipzig, n.d.) is quoted. Wu Ching-tzu, *Ju Lin Wai-shih (Scholars' History)*, an 18th-century novel. Shanghai, 1920, ed. has been quoted here.
12. P'u Sung-ling, *Liao-chai Chih-i*, a 17th-century collection of short stories. Shanghai, 1936 ed. is quoted. *Liao-chai* has been translated into English by H. A. Giles as *Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio* (New York, 1925 ed. is quoted here).
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14. Ts'ao Hsüeh-ch'in, *Hung Lou Meng (The Dream of the Red Chamber)*, an 18th-century novel. Shanghai, 1936 ed. is quoted here. See the genealogy of the Chia family in the appendix.
15. *Li Chi*, I, 458.
16. *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, pp. 85, 88, 689, 690, 694.
17. Boulais, *op. cit.*, p. 160; *Ta Tsing Leu Lee*, Being the Fundamental Law, and a Selection from the Supplementary Statute of the Penal Code of China . . . , translated by G. T. Staunton (London, 1810), pp. 79-80.
18. *Confucian Analects*, "Chinese Classics," I, Part 2, p. 2.
19. *The Sacred Edict*, running p. 8.
20. See H. Maspero, *La Chine antique* (Paris, 1927), p. 114; M. Granet, *La Civilisation chinoise* (Paris, 1929), pp. 372, 396; also H. G. Creel, *The Birth of China* (London, 1936), p. 281.
21. *The Works of Mencius*, "Chinese Classics," II, Part 2, p. 189.
22. See, e.g., *Li Chi*, II, 67.
23. See tables of kinship based on the old sources in Legge's ed. of *Li Chi*, I, between pp. 208 and 209.
24. See E. Erkes, "Das Primat des Weibes im alten China," *Sinica*, Jahrgang X, pp. 166 ff.; Granet, *op. cit.*, p. 315; A. Conrady, *China*, in Pflug Hartung's "Weltgeschichte" (Berlin, 1910), III, 483-485; Ch'en Tung-yüan, *Chung-kuo Fu-nü Sheng-ho Shih (History of the Life of Chinese Women)* (Shanghai, 1937), p. 22.
25. See K. A. Wittfogel, "Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic History," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, IV, No. 1 (Paris, 1935), 44.
26. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, I, 378-380, quoting *Peking Gazette*.
27. *Ta Tsing Leu Lee*, pp. 343, 344.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 287 ff.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 372-373.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 35.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 372.
32. James Legge, "Imperial Confucianism." Four lectures delivered in the Taylor Institution, Oxford. *The China Review*, VI (July, 1877-June, 1878), 156.
33. See, e.g., *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, pp. 71, 138-141, 369-372; *Scholars' History*, chap. 16; *The Sacred Edict*, Sheet 2, p. 4.
34. "Miscellanea of [Li] I-shan," trans. by E. D. Edwards, *Chinese Prose Literature of the T'ang Period* (London, 1937), I, 131.
35. *Liao-chai*, pp. 378 ff. (Giles, p. 340).

III. Relationships within the Family

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2. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
3. Granet, *La Civilisation chinoise*, pp. 387 ff., 403, 518.

4. *Confucian Analects*, "Chinese Classics," I, Part 2, p. 12. See also *Li Chi*, II, 227.
5. *Li Chi*, I, 451; and *Li Chi*, II, 215; see also *Li Chi*, I, p. 362.
6. *The Works of Mencius*, "Chinese Classics," II, Part 2, p. 88.
7. Luther's *Werke*, II, Part 1, p. 150, quoted by H. Marcuse in the symposium *Autorität und Familie*, p. 158.
8. See summary of these stories in J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese* (London, 1865), I, 452-459.
9. Shih Nai-an, *Shui-Hu Chuan*, a 13th-century novel (Pearl Buck translated it into English under the title *All Men Are Brothers*). German trans. by F. Kuhn (*Die Räuber von Liang Shan Moor*, Leipzig, n.d.) is being quoted. See pp. 348, 362, 504.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 515.
12. Doolittle, *op. cit.*, I, 456.
13. Legge, *Imperial Confucianism*, p. 152.
14. *Hsiao Ching*, p. 476.
15. G. Jamieson, *Chinese Family and Commercial Law* (Shanghai, 1921), p. 3; Hsü Chao-yang, *Chung-kuo Ch'in-shu Fa Su-yüan (The Origin of Chinese Kinship Law)* (Shanghai, 1933), p. 72.
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20. *Tso Chuan* (commentary to the annals of the feudal state of Lu, 778-721 B.C.), "Chinese Classics," V, Parts 1 and 2. See e.g. Part 1, pp. 66, 114; Part 2, pp. 540, 556.
21. Granet, *op. cit.*, pp. 384, 398 ff. See also Granet, "Les Catégories matrimoniales et relations de proximité dans la Chine ancienne," *Annales sociologiques*, série B, fasc. 1-3 (Paris, 1939), pp. 5, 15.
22. Jamieson, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
23. See, e.g., a story told by Han Fei Tzu. *The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu* trans. by W. K. Liao (London, 1939), I, 126; see also stories of similar conflicts in Pearl Buck's *The Good Earth*, and *Sons*.
24. Trans. by C. H. Brewitt Taylor (Shanghai, Hongkong, Singapore, 1929), chaps. viii and ix.
25. *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, pp. 54, 96, 98, 134, 201 ff., 635.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
27. *Li Chi*, II, 341.
28. See Sié Kang, *L'Amour maternel dans la littérature féminine en Chine* (Paris, 1937).
29. *Hsiao Ching*, p. 470.
30. Trans. by H. Rüdelsberger under the title "Die Geschichte von Fräulein Regenbogen," *Chinesische Novellen* (Leipzig, n.d.).
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32. See, e.g., the story Ts'eng Weng in the *Liao-chai collection*, p. 96 (Giles, p. 193).
33. See, e.g., the example of solidarity displayed by the Chia family described in *The Dream of the Red Chamber* when one of its members falls into disgrace, pp. 692 ff.

IV. Love, Marriage, Divorce

1. See *Shih Ching (The Book of Poetry)*, "Chinese Classics," IV, Part 1, 2. Commentaries of Confucian scholars on the songs quoted by Legge are very characteristic.
2. *The Works of Mencius*, "Chinese Classics," II, Part 2, p. 144; see also *Li Chi*, I, 78.

3. See, e.g., "Li Wa-chuan," a story by Po Hsing-chien (T'ang dynasty) trans. by Edwards, *Chinese Prose Literature*, II, 154.
4. *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, p. 196.
5. See "A Hsiu" in the *Liao-chai* collection, p. 288.
6. See "Ying Ning" in the *Liao-chai* collection, p. 33.
7. Giles, *Strange Stories*, p. 71.
8. See the description of the Chinese attitude toward love by R. Wilhelm in "The Chinese Conception of Marriage," in H. Keyserling, *The Book of Marriage* (New York, 1926), pp. 126-127.
9. A. Waley, *One Hundred Seventy Chinese Poems* (London, 1918), p. 18.
10. See Edwards, *op. cit.*, II, 190 ff. See also the attitude toward marriage imposed by parents as displayed by the heroine of Lin Yu-tang's *Moment in Peking* (New York, 1939).
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15. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
16. M. Kovalevski, *Modern Customs and Ancient Laws of Russia* (London, 1892), pp. 36-37.
17. Quoted by L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution* (New York, 1906), I, 205.
18. F. Halle, *Women in the Soviet East* (New York, 1935), p. 68.
19. C. Colliver Rice, *Persian Women and Their Ways* (London, 1923), p. 27.
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22. *Ta Tsing Leu Lee*, p. 114.
23. Ch'en Ku-yüan, *op. cit.*, pp. 94 ff.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
26. *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, pp. 527, 536.
27. See, e.g., stories in the *Liao-chai* collection: "Ma Tien-jung," p. 196 (Giles, *op. cit.*, p. 265); "Hung Yü," p. 67 (Giles, *op. cit.*, p. 139); see also *Pei She Chi-kuan*, a novel trans. by St. Julien under the title *Blanche et bleue, ou les deux couleuvres fées*, roman chinois (Paris, 1834), pp. 37, 39.
28. See, e.g., "Benediction," a story of a widow sold by her late husband's family, told by the modern writer Lu Hsün, trans. by E. Snow in *Living China* (London, 1936), pp. 51 ff.
29. Chao Feng-chieh, *Chung-kuo Fu-mü tsai Fa-lu-shang-chih Ti-wei (Legal Position of Chinese Women)* (Shanghai, 1934), pp. 28, 29. See also the importance attached to the betrothal in *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, pp. 436, 438 ff.
30. *Ta Tsing Leu Lee*, p. 111.
31. R. H. Lowie, article "Marriage," *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1933), X, 149.
32. Article "Marriage," *The Jewish Encyclopaedia* (New York, 1903), VIII, 335; article "Polygamy," *ibid.*, X, 121.
33. Quoted by Ch'en Tung-yüan, *History of the Life of Chinese Women*, p. 74.
34. English trans. by Chi-chen Wang (New York, 1941).
35. Quoted by Ch'en Ku-yüan, *op. cit.*, p. 239.
36. Quoted by practically all the books on the history of Chinese family. See T'ao Hsi-sheng, *Marriage and the Family*, p. 49. Professor T'ao adds interesting commentaries.

37. Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, I, 179, 180, 183, 205, 206.
38. See Ch'en Ku-yuan, *op. cit.*, p. 241; *Ta Tsing Leu Lee*, p. 120.
39. Goodsell, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71; A. K. Faust, *The New Japanese Womanhood* (New York, 1926), pp. 58, 59, 110.
40. Ch'en Ku-yuan, *op. cit.*, p. 237. See also T'an Yen-chiu, *Chung-kuo Li-hun-ti Yen-chiu* (*Researches in Divorce in China*) (Shanghai, 1932), p. 6.

V. Women in the Family and Society of Old China

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4. See Ayscough, *Chinese Women*, pp. 14, 15.
5. For detailed summaries of these books see Ch'en Tung-yüan, *op. cit.*, pp. 46, 113, 183, etc.; also Ayscough, *op. cit.*, pp. 76 ff.
6. Chao Feng-chieh, *Legal Position of Chinese Women*, p. 1; see also commentaries to *I Li* (*Book of Ritual and Ceremonies*), trans. by John Steele (London, 1921), II, 20.
7. *Li Chi*, I, p. 77.
8. Sung Jo Hua, quoted by Ch'en Tung-yuan, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
9. *Ta Tsing Leu Lee*, pp. 307, 315, 342; Chao Feng-chieh, *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 62.
10. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, pp. 179-80, pp. 183 ff.
11. Article "Indian Law," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (14th ed.), XII, 231 ff.
12. *Jewish Encyclopaedia* (New York, 1903), V, 338.
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14. Goodsell, *op. cit.*, pp. 205, 207, 208, 225 ff.
15. Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
16. *Ta Tsing Leu Lee*, p. 110.
17. See *Chin Ping Mei*, pp. 390, 734, 784, 840.
18. Ch'en Tung-yüan, *op. cit.*, pp. 125 ff.
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32. *Ta Tsing Leu Lee*, p. 315; Chao Feng-chieh, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
33. Trans. into English by Ayscough, *op. cit.*, p. 250 ff.
34. See stories in the *Liao-chai* collection: "Ma Chieh-fu," p. 330. "Yun-lo Kung-chü," p. 280; Shao Lin-tzu," p. 510. See also a story from the 17th-century collection of short stories, *Chin Ku Chi Kuan*, trans. by H. Howell in the collection, *The Inconsistencies of Mme. Chuang* (London, 1922), p. 103.

35. *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, p. 737.
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VI. Family and Society

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3. *Li Chi*, I, 69.
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VII. The Birth of Modern China

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VIII. The New Economic and Social Environment: Rural China

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14. Hsiao-tung Fei, *Peasant Life in China* (London, 1938), p. 276.
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3. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
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6. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 117, 144.
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21. Yang and Tao, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 50; Tao, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.
23. *Standard of Living of Shanghai Laborers*, pp. 159, 160.
24. Yang and Tao, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
25. *Standard of Living of Shanghai Laborers*, pp. 140-141.
26. Yang and Tao, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
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31. Gamble, *op. cit.*, pp. 303, 336.
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X. The Old Family under Attack

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XI. Love and Marriage in Contemporary China

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XII. The Type and Size of the Family

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60. See Fei, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 34.
61. For a summary of opinions about the population problems in China see Lamson, *op. cit.*, p. 222 ff.

XIII. Family Coöperation

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XIV. Extended Kinship

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2. Fong, *China's Industrialization*, pp. 10-11.
3. See Gamble, *How Chinese Families Live in Peiping*, p. 183.

XV. The Clan

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2. Chen Han-seng, *Agrarian Conditions in Southernmost China* (Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore, 1936), p. 37.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
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XVI. Nepotism

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XVII. Husband and Wife

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5. P'an Yu-mei, "Village Women," p. 272.
6. Buck, *Chinese Farm Economy*, p. 384.
7. See Ta Chen, *Emigrant Communities in South China*, pp. 118 ff.
8. Ch'en Tung-yuan, *History of the Life of Chinese Women*, p. 407.
9. P'an Yu-mei, *op. cit.*, p. 279.
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24. T'an Yen-chiu, *Researches in Divorce in China*, pp. 28 ff., 58, 62; Lamson, *Social Pathology in China*, pp. 330 ff.
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26. Wales, *op. cit.*, pp. 167 ff.

27. Pa Chin, *Chia*, pp. 314, 348 ff.
28. Trans. by Snow in *Living China*, p. 100 ff.
29. Mai, *op. cit.*, p. 257; Lo Tun-wei, *The Chinese Marriage Problem*, pp. 113 ff.
30. See a report in P'an Kuan-tan, *The Chinese Family Problem*, p. 80.
31. Milam, *Students' Homes in China*, p. 14.
32. See Chang Hsi-ch'en, editor, *Hsin Hsing Tao-te (New Sexual Morals)*, Symposium (Shanghai, 1934).
33. P'an Kuan-tan, p. 223.
34. *Hsin Hsing Tao-te*, pp. 68 ff.
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36. Milam, *op. cit.*, pp. 12 ff.
37. One of these stories was told by Ida Pruitt in her sketch, "Husbands and Wives," *Democracy*, No. 7 (Peiping, 1937).
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40. Nora Waln, *The House of Exile* (Boston, 1933), p. 139.
41. The story was told by the son of the couple in answering the questionnaire on family problems.
42. See *Peiping Shen Pao*, Sept. 29, 1936.

XVIII. Old Men and Women

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3. P'an Yu-mei, "Village Women," 279 ff.
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XIX. Children

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16. *Li Chi*, I, p. 476.
17. Snow, *Red Star over China*, p. 267.
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XX. Chinese Youth

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2. *North China Herald*, March 10, 1937.
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4. See Snow, *Red Star over China*, p. 172; Nym Wales, *Inside Red China*, pp. 167 ff. The actual abolition of slavery in Soviet districts in Kiangsu in 1927-37 was confirmed to the author in November, 1936, by the officials of the Women's Department of the Kuomintang in Nanchang; the same thing was asserted in conversations with the author by several journalists and writers who visited the Soviet districts in the North-west in 1937-44.
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7. *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1940 (Washington, 1941), pp. 113, 114, 115.
8. Adapted from *The Chinese Yearbook*, 1937, pp. 85, 95, 96.
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28. See R. and H. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York, 1928), p. 522.
29. Folsom, *op. cit.*, p. 208.
30. *Autorität und Familie*, Zweite Abteilung, "Erhebungen," pp. 231 ff.; "Arbeiter

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31. See also Erich Fromm, "Soziolpsychologischer Teil," in *Autorität und Familie*, pp. 79, 80.

32. See e.g., H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1930).

33. *Common Sense*, January, 1941.

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XXI. Friendship

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2. *The Three Kingdoms*, chap. i.

3. *Vestnik Asii (The Courier of Asia)* (Harbin, 1910), No. 4, pp. 186-187.

4. *Confucian Analects*, "Chinese Classics," I, Part 1, p. 1.

5. *All Men Are Brothers*, p. 5.

6. See, e.g., Po Chü-i's poem "To Li Chien," Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 145; see also Waley's Preface.

7. See, e.g., stories like "Hsieh Nü"; "Huang Chiu Lan," *op. cit.*, pp. 46 ff., 161 ff.

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10. *All Men Are Brothers*, Preface, p. 6.

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XXII. Summary and Conclusions

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10. Formulated by the author after J. S. Mill's *Utilitarianism* (London, 1864), chap. ii.

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12. Trans. by Ephim Fogel.

13. J. S. Mill, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

14. F. Müller-Lyer, *The Family* (New York, 1931), p. 371.

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16. B. Stern, "The Family and Cultural Change," *American Sociological Review* (1939), p. 207.
17. See Gunther Stein, *The Challenge of Red China* (New York, 1945), pp. 248-250.
18. See Snow, *The Battle for Asia* (New York, 1941), Parts 6, 9; George Hogg, *I See a New China* (Boston, 1944).

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